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Abstract 
Information security failures affecting the personal data held by Australian 
organisations are an issue of increasing concern.   In Australia, one of the few legal 
obligations to secure personal data was contained in National Privacy Principle 4 
(NPP 4) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (now replaced by APP 11). NPP 4 required 
private sector organisations covered by the Act to ‘take reasonable steps’ to protect 
personal information. The Australian Privacy Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’) is 
given a broad range of powers by the Privacy Act to support compliance with NPP 4. 
The appropriate exercise of these powers in relation to NPP 4 should improve the 
security of personal information held by Australian organisations. 
This thesis considers the extent to which the Commissioner’s exercise of its 
powers in relation to NPP 4 could be regarded as an appropriate regulatory response 
to information security failures.  The examination of the Commissioner’s exercise of 
its powers is through a new conceptual framework which is in two parts.  First, the 
exercise of powers is analysed by reference to an industry standard approach to 
information security.  The second framework considers the exercise of regulatory 
power by reference to principles of transparency, balance and vigour.  Transparency 
includes transparency of decision-making, which in turn introduces principles of 
procedural fairness, and transparency of compliance activities.  Balance involves 
notions of proportionality and consistency and the targeted use of powers, while 
vigour refers to the frequency and timeliness of the Commissioner’s use of powers.   
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides an analysis of information 
security practice to support the identification of an accepted industry practice 
approach to securing personal information. Consideration is also given to the 
implications for the Commissioner of the two regulatory models on which the 
Privacy Act is based: principle-based regulation and a responsive regulatory 
approach.  This supports the identification of the second part of the conceptual 
framework, that regulatory powers should be exercised in a transparent, balanced and 
vigorous way.  The Commissioner’s broad range of powers is also considered, and 
divided into two groups: oversight powers and investigation powers. Part 2 examines 
the Commissioner’s use of its oversight powers, including the provision of guidance, 
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education and advice. Part 3 examines the Commissioner’s use of its investigation 
powers based on a detailed review of six NPP 4 own motion investigations 
conducted by the Commissioner, all of which related to high profile data breach 
cases.  
Findings of the research include that, although there has been some 
improvement in general transparency and community engagement, it is difficult to 
characterise the exercise by the Commissioner of any of its  oversight powers 
regarding NPP 4 as transparent, balanced or vigorous: there is no evidence of 
monitoring of non-compliance; where audits are conducted, the reports do not 
provide detailed guidance as to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Security 
Principle; there are few instances of the provision of advice or education relating 
directly to NPP 4 and only two guidance documents specifically covering NPP 4 
have been released in 13 years.  Similar findings are made in relation to the 
Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers.  All of the 6 investigations were 
conducted in response to media interest. In all of the cases, an “on the papers” 
investigation process was used, based on written responses to largely generic 
requests for information sent by the Commissioner to the six respondents, with little 
independent evidence gathering or confirmation of the facts as asserted by the 
respondents, whether directly or via  third party investigation reports commissioned 
by the respondents.  In each of the Commissioner’s reports (other than Vodafone), 
the links between the Commissioner’s understanding of NPP 4 (reflected in 
statements of general principle), the findings of fact, the stated reasons for decisions 
and the decisions themselves are unclear. The reports seem intended to provide 
community reassurance in response to media reports rather than real transparency of 
decision-making or guidance as to the Commissioner’s interpretation and application 
of NPP 4 in different cases. 
The Commissioner’s use of powers also does not support an industry practice 
approach to information security. The OAIC’s issued guidance does not explicitly 
use the risk based framework for the selection and management of security controls 
supported by most other sources of guidance on information security practice. The 
published investigation reports provide few connections between an industry practice 
approach to information security and the Commissioner’s assessment of whether 
iv  
reasonable steps had been taken.  The investigation files suggest that the OAIC may 
not have a complete understanding of the intended operation of ISO 27001 and ISO 
27002, the main international standards for information security.  There is also 
evidence that the OAIC may not have the appropriate skilled resources to conduct 
investigations into data breach cases involving complex technical issues. 
In conclusion, this thesis contends that the Commissioner’s use of its powers in 
regard to NPP 4 has not been transparent, balanced or vigorous, nor has it been 
supportive of industry best practice.  Accordingly, the Commissioner has not 
exercised its powers in the complex ways contemplated by the regulatory 
foundations of the Privacy Act. Until such time as it is able to do so, it is unlikely 
that the Commissioner’s use of its powers in regard to the Security Principle will 
result in any significant improvement to the security of the personal information held 
by Australian organisations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Protecting personal information from unauthorised access, loss, misuse, or 
disclosure is an issue of increasing concern.1    
A survey of data breaches in the first six months of 2014 reveals multiple 
incidents in which data, including names and addresses, credit card details and 
medical records, was accidently or inadvertently exposed to or compromised by 
attackers.2   Many of these incidents, such as the Target attack that affected over 40 
                                                 
1  In Nicole Brangwin, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, ‘Cyber Security’ (Research 
Publication, Parliamentary Library) < 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/p
ubs/BriefingBook44p/Cyber>, cyber security is referred to as a ‘strategic priority for Australia’s 
national security with the threat of cyber-attacks dramatically increasing.’  Results from a survey 
by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner show that a quarter (23%) were 
concerned about the risk of ID fraud and theft while 16% were concerned more generally by 
data security (16%) and the risks to financial data (11%).Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, ‘Community Attitudes to Privacy Survey’ 2013 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-reports/2013-
community-attitudes-to-privacy-survey-report.pdf>).A survey completed in November 2012 
involving over 1000 Australians aged between 18 and 65 found that 64% of respondents were 
concerned about the security of their online personal data while only 26% consider companies 
trustworthy of holding their data responsibly. Australian Consumer Data Survey 2012 referred 
to in  'The 10 Worst Data Breaches of 2013'  ITBusinessEdge (online)  
<http://www.itbusinessedge.com/slideshows/the-10-worst-data-breaches-of-2013.html>. 
Another survey of 4050 adults in 7 different countries found that 90% were concerned about 
data security.  See, eg, Tom Pullar-Strecker, ‘Leaked, Stolen Data Leaps’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 14 December 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/leaked-stolen-
data-leaps-by-40-20121213-2bdhm.html>.  Data security was the most common cause of 
complaint to the Australian Privacy Commissioner in 2008 – 2009 (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner, The Operation of the Privacy Act Annual Report: 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 
(2009) 65 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/migrated/2009-10-
29012634/OPC_Annual_Report2008-09.pdf> (‘OPC 2009 Annual Report’)) and represented the 
cause of complaint in over 15% of cases in 2011 and 2012; see Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2010 - 2011 (2011) 37 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/annual-reports/oaic-annual-report-
201011/> (‘OAIC 2011 Annual Report’); and Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Annual Report 2011 - 2012 (2012) 54 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-
us/corporate-information/annual-reports/oaic-annual-report-201112/> (‘OAIC 2012 Annual 
Report’). 
2  Martyn Williams, ‘The 5 biggest data breaches of 2014 (so far)’, PC World (online), 11 July 
2014 <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2453400/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-2014-so-far.html> 
2  
million customers3 and the eBay compromise that involved over 145 million 
members,4 have received extensive international media coverage. In December 2012, 
the personal details of thousands of Australian military staff and students were stolen 
by a hacker who breached a university database at the Australian Defence Force 
Academy.5  The stolen data, which included names, identification numbers, 
passwords, email addresses and dates of birth of about 10,000 students and 1,900 
staff at the academy, was subsequently posted on several different websites.6  
Another successful attack affected a number of Australian online retailers, including 
the popular site ‘Catch of the Day,’ resulting in the loss of names, delivery addresses, 
email addresses, encrypted passwords and credit card data.7 
The Australian Signal Directorate (ASD), which is responsible for advising the 
Australian Government on cyber security, believes that ‘[m]alicious cyber activity 
will continue to challenge Australia’s national security, economic prosperity and 
                                                 
3  Brian Krebs, 'Target: Names, Emails, Phone Numbers on Up To 70 Million Customers Stolen', 
KrebsonSecurity, 10 January 2014 <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/01/target-names-emails-
phone-numbers-on-up-to-70-million-customers-stolen/>; Grant Gross, ‘Breach exposes data on 
70 million customers, Target now says’, ComputerWorld (Online), 10 January 2014 
<http://cwonline.computerworld.com/t/8834412/980558529/651232/17/>; Michael Riley, Ben 
Elgin, Dune Lawrence, and Carol Matlack ‘Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card 
Numbers: How Target Blew It’, Businessweek (Online), 13 March 2014 
<http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-
credit-card-data>. 
4  Denver Nicks, ‘Investigators Target eBay Over Massive Data Breach’, Time (Online), 23 May 
2014 <http://time.com/110210/ebay-data-breach/>; Fran Foo, ‘Warning after eBay passwords 
“stolen”’, The Australian (online), 23 May 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/warning-after-ebay-passwords-stolen/story-
e6frgakx-1226927542280>; Brid-Aine Parnell, ‘eBay faces Multiple Probes into mega-breach’, 
The Register (online), 23 May 2014 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/23/ebay_security_breach_investigations/>. 
5  Markus Mannheim, ‘“It took three minutes”: Defence data stolen in ADFA hack’, The Canberra 
Times (online), 11 December 2012 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/it-pro/security-it/it-took-
three-minutes-defence-data-stolen-in-adfa-hack-20121211-2b6yp.htm>. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Josh Taylor, ‘Catch of the Day waits 3 years to reveal data breach’, ZDNet (online), 18 July 
2014 < http://www.zdnet.com/au/catch-of-the-day-waits-3-years-to-reveal-data-breach-
7000031759/>. 
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social wellbeing.’8  The ASD points to four trends that are influencing this increase 
in malicious activity: 
 Greater motivation to undertake cybercrime as more high-value 
information is stored and communicated on both government and 
commercial networks; 
 Greater ability to acquire the skills to carry out cyber-attacks; 
 Expansion of the spectrum of malicious actors; and 
 Development of new technologies, particularly the growth in cloud 
computing, and the expanding use of mobile computing devices such as 
smartphones, laptops and tablet computers, which will increase the number 
of potential vulnerabilities.9 
Despite growing concern about data breaches, whether caused by accident or 
malicious attack, and the impact that they may have on Australia’s national security, 
economic prosperity and social wellbeing, it seems that a significant number of 
breaches could be prevented. 
Many data breaches are the result of poor data security practices or of simple 
errors.  Examples include sending letters containing medical information to the 
wrong people10, or mistakenly publishing personal information online as a result of 
poor internal procedures. In February 2014, it was reported that the Australian 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection accidentally published the name, 
date of birth, country of origin, arrival date, and location of every asylum seeker in a 
mainland detention facility on the Department’s website.11 In March 2014, the 
                                                 
8  Australian Signals Directorate, Information Security Manual Principles (September 2012 
Release) (Department of Defence, 2012) 6. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Adam Greenberg, ‘St. Vincent Breast Center mails 63K letters to wrong people’, SCMagazine 
(Online), 8 July 2014 < http://www.scmagazine.com/st-vincent-breast-center-mails-63k-letters-
to-wrong-people/article/359791/>. 
11  Allie Coyne and Paris Cowan, 'Immigration dept confirms asylum seeker data breach', ITNews 
(online), 19 February 2014 <http://www.itnews.com.au/News/372741,immigration-dept-admits-
asylum-seeker-data-breach.aspx#ixzz366DGFeTf>, Jared Owens, ‘Immigration admits asylum 
 
4  
National Tertiary Education Union contacted the Australia Privacy Commissioner 
after the details of over 2000 of its members at five universities were made public.12 
The same poor security practices and simple errors that led to unintended 
disclosures of personal information also contribute to the success of malicious 
attacks. In its 2012 survey, Verizon reported that 96% of breaches resulted from 
attacks that were ‘not highly difficult’ and which could have been avoided through 
simple and inexpensive changes.13  The most recent Verizon report notes that over 
90% of all of the attacks considered by the reports over the last 10 years fall into one 
of only nine different ‘attack patterns.’14  This in turn suggests that information 
security incidents could be prevented if organisations implemented controls to 
mitigate only a small number of attacks.15  This statistic is supported by the ASD, 
which reported that 85% of the attacks it responded to in 2011 ‘involved adversaries 
using unsophisticated techniques’ that could have been prevented if the victims had 
                                                 
seeker privacy bungle: probe launched’, The Australian (online), 19 February 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/immigration-admits-
asylumseeker-privacy-bungle-probes-launched/story-fn9hm1gu-1226831518565>; Allie Coyne, 
‘Australia faces lawsuits over asylum seeker data breach’, ITNews (online), 10 March 2014 
<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/374603,australia-faces-lawsuits-over-asylum-seeker-data-
breach.aspx>. Other reported incidents include Fran Foo, 'ACCC admits to data breach, but 
denies being hacked', The Australian (online), 11 April 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/accc-admits-to-data-breach-but-denies-being-
hacked/story-e6frgakx-1226881178192?nk=5a744d7d8b05049d7efbce9a1cf90d69>; Hedley 
Thomas and Emma Hart, ‘CMC blunder exposes secret dossiers’, The Australian (online), 6 
March 2013 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/cmc-blunder-
exposes-secret-dossiers/story-e6frgczx-1226591128641#>. 
12  Julie Hare, ‘Call to cops over privacy breach’, The Australian (online), 5 March 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/call-to-cops-over-privacy-breach/story-e6frg6n6-
1226845153676#>. 
13  Verizon Ltd, Data Breach Investigation Report (2012).  There are a number of other surveys 
that evidence the continuing problem of data being accessed by unauthorised third parties (both 
maliciously and accidently).  See, eg, a survey by KPMG that reported that the amount of leaked 
or stolen data rose by 40%, including the loss of 6.5 million user passwords in July 2012 by 
social networking site LinkedIn, the loss of 1.5 million people's credit card details by financial 
services firm Global Payments and the loss by clothing retailer Zappos in January 2013 of the 
personal details  including physical and email addresses  of its 24 million customers.  The report 
also said there had been no improvement in the security of information held by governmental 
and healthcare organisations.  Reported in Tom Pullar-Strecker, above n 1. 
14  Verizon Ltd, Data Breach Investigation Report (2014) 15. 
15  Ibid. 
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implemented a package of four simple security safeguards.16  More recently, a 2013 
survey showed that attackers were still successfully exploiting well-known 
vulnerabilities that could be addressed by taking basic security measures.17 
This failure to implement basic security protection is particularly concerning 
given the increase in targeted attacks, particularly those known as ‘advanced 
persistent threats.’18  If organisations are currently falling prey to attacks that could 
be thwarted by readily available and easy-to-implement security measures, they are 
even more likely to be unable to withstand a sophisticated, targeted, and continuous 
malicious attack. 
National Privacy Principle 4 and its successor, Australian Privacy Principle 11 
(APP 11), in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), is one of the few legislative provisions 
regulating corporate information security practices in Australia.19  NPP 4 (also 
known as the ‘Security Principle’)20 required each private sector organisation 
                                                 
16  ‘At least 85% of the intrusions that ASD responded to in 2011 involved adversaries using 
unsophisticated techniques that would have been mitigated by implementing the Top 4 
mitigation strategies as a package’; Australian Signals Directorate, Top 4 Mitigation Strategies 
to Protect Your ICT System (2012) 
<http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/Top_4_Mitigations.pdf?&verNov12>. 
17  Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches. Security Breaches 2005 - Present 
(31 December 2013) <http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach>. 
18  For reports on targeted threats see, for example Pullar-Strecker, above n 1.  For information on 
the nature of the cyber threats in 2013, and the more sophisticated attacks largely from organised 
criminal gangs see 'Global Payments Breach Tab: $94 Million', DataBreach Today (online) 10 
January 2013 <http://www.databreachtoday.com/global-payments-breach-tab-94-million-a-
5415?rf=2013-01-10-edbt&elq=b448ef0d32454de0ae87cd614dc3becc&elqCampaignId=5522>. 
19  Other legislated security obligations include Rule 11.1(a) of Privacy (Tax File Number) Rule 
2015 (Cth), issued under the Privacy Act s 17, which requires Tax File Number (‘TFN’) 
recipients to take reasonable steps to safeguard TFN information. The Personally Controllable 
Electron Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) (‘PCEHR Act’) requires that organisations participating 
in the Electronic Health Record System must take steps to secure data processed by that system. 
There are also a number of industry specific codes which include some security obligations. 
These include the Code of Banking Practice (Australian Bankers Association Inc, 2013) which 
is a voluntary industry scheme overseen by the Australian Bankers Association Inc. Another 
important code is the Telecommunications Consumer Protections Code (Communications 
Alliance Ltd, 2012) (in particular Clause 6.9). 
 
20  In this research, where relevant ‘Security Principle’ means both NPP 4 and its successor 
Australian Privacy Principle 11 (APP 11). 
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covered by the Act21 to ‘take reasonable steps to protect the personal information it 
holds from misuse and loss and from unauthorised access, modification or 
disclosure.’22  
Ensuring that personal information is protected against unauthorised access, 
disclosure, modification, misuse, and loss is one of the basic principles recognised by 
most privacy regimes. The Fair Information Practice Principles,23 the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines,24 the EU Directive on Privacy,25 and the APEC Privacy Framework26 all 
contain a provision similar to NPP 4.   Data security has been referred to as a 
‘constant theme’ in all of the international instruments on data protection.27  It was  
identified as one of the twelve fair information principles on which there was 
consensus by Bennett and Raab,28 it is one of the basic principles applied by data 
                                                 
21  There are a number of exemptions and ‘carve-ins’ in terms of the private organisations covered 
by the Privacy Act There are a number of exemptions and ‘carve-ins’ in terms of the private 
organisations covered by the Privacy Act, for example, s6D(4) which provides that an 
organisation is not a ‘small business’ (and so will not come within the small business exemption 
from the Act) if it ‘provides a health services to anther individual and holds any health 
information.’  See also s7B(3) which exempts ‘employee records’ from the Act.  These 
exemptions will not be discussed further in this research. 
22  The National Privacy Principles were contained in Privacy Act Schedule 3.  As of 12 March, 
2014 the NPPs have been replaced by a new set of principles called the Australian Privacy 
Principles.   
23  The Fair Information Practice Principles were originally proposed in the United States 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's seminal 1973 report: Records, Computers and 
the Rights of Citizens, Report of the U.S. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare’s 
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, July, 1973 (‘The HEW Report’). 
These principles are at the core of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 
552a. 
24  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines Covering the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data adopted  by the OECD Council on 23 
Sept. 1980 (OECD Doc. C(80)58/Final) (‘OECD Privacy Guidelines’). Security Safeguards 
Principle 11, Part 2 of the OECD Privacy Guidelines. 
25  European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personla data and on the free movement of such 
data [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 17.1. 
26  Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation Secretariat, 'APEC Privacy Framework' (2005) 
<http://www.ema.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%2803995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2
645824B%29~APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf> Principle 
22 (‘APEC Privacy Framework’). 
27  Rosemary Jay, Data Protection Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2012) 305. 
28  Colin J Bennett and Charles D I Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global 
Perspective (MIT Press, 2nd revised ed, 2006). 
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processing laws referred to by Bygrave,29 and it is one of the ten principles used by 
Greenleaf as a baseline for determining whether a data privacy law exists.30 
Although the wording of the Security Principle differs between the different 
privacy regimes, the common, general requirement is that organisations must take 
‘reasonable care’ to protect personal information. This general requirement is neither 
prescriptive nor precise. It articulates a substantive objective without providing any 
detail as to how that objective is to be achieved. This type of legal requirement is 
known as a principle.31  The Privacy Act is an example of principle-based regulation: 
all of the main obligations pursuant to the Act (including NPP 4) were and are 
couched as general principles rather than prescriptive laws.  
In any principle-based regulatory system, the regulator plays a pivotal role in 
ensuring that the regulated community understands what is required to achieve 
compliance with the principles.  The Australian Privacy Commissioner (‘the 
Commissioner’) is the regulator responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
Security Principle, and as part of that role, establishing a common understanding 
regarding compliance.  To assist the Commissioner as regulator in a principle-based 
system, it is given a range of powers. These powers fall into two main groups: 
oversight powers (including the ability to provide guidance, advice, and education, 
and to monitor and audit compliance) and enforcement powers (including the power 
to investigate potential interferences with privacy and make determinations).32   
These powers are intended to be used in a responsive manner.33  This means that the 
                                                 
29  Lee Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer, 
2002) 57. 
30  Graham Greenleaf, 'Sheherezade and the 101 data privacy laws: Origins, significance and global 
trajectories' (2013) 23(1) Journal of Law, Information & Science 4, 11-12. 
31  The difference between principles, bright line rules and complex or detailed rules is considered 
further in Chapter 2 below. 
32  See, eg. the reference to the Commissioner’s oversight and enforcement powers in Australian 
Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 
No 108 (2008), [45.10] (‘For your information’). 
33  The responsive regulatory approach and its relationship with the Privacy Act is considered in 
detail in Chapter 2.5.2. 
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oversight powers should be used in the first instance to ensure that the regulator’s 
expectation of compliance is properly communicated. More punitive powers, which 
are associated with the use of the enforcement powers, should only be used in the 
case of serious or repeated infringements.  The use of the oversight and enforcement 
powers in this hierarchical manner is consistent with a responsive regulatory 
approach (discussed further in Chapter 2). In view of the broad range of powers 
available to the Commissioner, it is important that those powers be used in the most 
appropriate way to ensure that the principles stated in the Privacy Act are met.  When 
considering the exercise by the Privacy Commissioner of its powers, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was of the view that the Commissioner should 
take a transparent, balanced, and vigorous approach to the use of the available 
powers to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act.34   
Over the last 20 years, information security professionals have developed a 
broadly accepted approach to effective information security. Although there are 
variations, sufficient commonality exists among the main variants to support the 
proposition that, as a matter of industry practice, the accepted method to manage the 
security of information (and to reduce the risk of information security incidents) is by 
the use of a risk-based information security management system.35   It would be 
expected that, in using its oversight and investigation powers to develop consensus 
on the compliance obligations imposed by NPP 4, the Commissioner would refer to 
this industry practice approach to information security. It would also be expected that 
the Commissioner would use the range of powers available in a transparent, 
balanced, and vigorous manner in order to build consensus, or, at the least, a 
common understanding, between the regulator and the regulated community 
regarding the Commissioner’s interpretation of NPP 4 (consistent with an industry 
practice approach) and the Commissioner’s application of that interpretation in 
different circumstances.36    
                                                 
34  For your information, above n 32, [4.74]. 
35   The industry best practice approach to information security is discussed further in Chapter 3.4 
below. 
36  For your information, above n 32, [4.35].  The relationship between these principles and 
accepted principles for the exercise of regulatory powers is discussed further in Chapter 2.6. 
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The relationship between the appropriate use of regulatory powers (based on 
the principles of transparency, balance, and vigour) and industry practice to support 
the desired outcome of ‘reasonable’ protection of personal data held by Australian 
organisations is represented by Figure 1.  The transparent, balanced, and vigorous 
use of the Commissioner’s available power should support the adoption of industry-
accepted information security practices to produce the outcome of a reasonable level 
of protection of the personal information held by Australian organisations. 
 
Figure 1: Framework to assess what is an appropriate regulatory response to NPP 
4. 
This thesis will examine the Commissioner’s exercise of its oversight and 
investigation powers in relation to NPP 4.  In doing this, the thesis will address a 
question of increasing importance to Australian corporations and the general 
community. 
If the Commissioner’s exercise of regulatory powers in relation to NPP 4 
involves the transparent, balanced and vigorous consideration and application of 
‘reasonable’ security measures assessed by reference to accepted industry 
information security practices, there will be greater certainty as to what security 
measures Australian corporations need to take in order to meet their NPP 4 
10  
compliance obligations.  As a consequence, the personal information of Australians 
should be more appropriately protected. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The key research question of the thesis is: 
To what extent is the exercise of the Commissioner’s investigation and 
oversight powers in relation to NPP 4 an appropriate regulatory response? 
This research question gives rise to three sub-questions. They are: 
1. What oversight and investigation powers are available to the Privacy 
Commissioner? 
2. What is the relationship, if any, between the exercise of those powers 
and recognised industry practice in Australia? 
3. To what extent is the exercise of those powers consistent with 
principles for the exercise of regulatory powers? 
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The research question posed by this research is answered in the following 
parts. 
 Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4) includes a literature review, a consideration of the two 
regulatory systems that are the foundations of the Act (principle-based regulation and 
a compliance approach), and an outline of the conceptual framework to be used as 
the basis of the analysis of powers included in Parts 2 and 3. The conceptual 
framework includes two elements: the extent to which the exercise of the 
investigation and oversight powers by the Commissioner could be regarded as 
transparent, balanced, and vigorous; and the extent to which the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of reasonable steps for the purposes of NPP 4 is consistent with an 
industry approach to information security.  
Part 2 (Chapters 5 and 6) contains an analysis of the Commissioner’s use of its 
oversight powers in regard to NPP 4. Chapter 5 reviews the Commissioner’s 
monitoring, audit, advice, and education powers, and analyses the use of those 
powers with reference to the two components of the conceptual framework.  The 
Commissioner’s use of its guidance powers is considered separately in Chapter 6.  
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This includes the guidance documents that have been issued, together with case notes 
and pre-February 2011 own motion investigation reports (OMI reports) that involved 
any consideration of NPP 4.  Again, the use of the guidance power is considered 
through the lens of the conceptual framework used in this research. 
Part 3 (Chapters 7 to 10) analyses the Commissioner’s investigation powers.  
To date, enforcement of compliance with the Privacy Act by the Commissioner has 
principally involved the investigation of complaints and the conduct of 
Commissioner-initiated investigations, called own motion investigations (OMI). The 
Commissioner has the power to make determinations, which power is considered in 
Chapter 7.  However, the power has been used infrequently and rarely in regard to 
NPP 4.  Accordingly, this research will focus on the use of the investigation power. 
The Commissioner’s published guidance on its approach to the use of its 
investigation powers is considered in Chapter 7. To support the analysis of how the 
Commissioner has conducted its investigations, a group of 6 OMI reports published 
between February 2011 and July 2012 has been selected for detailed consideration.  
These cases are introduced in Chapter 8, which describes the factual details and the 
findings made in each of the published reports.  Chapter 9 analyses each of the 6 
investigations, using the framework of the transparent, balanced, and vigorous use of 
powers, to determine the extent to which these investigations could be regarded as 
consistent with principles for the exercise of regulatory powers.  Chapter 10 
examines each investigation by using the framework of industry practice to 
determine whether the investigations and resulting reports could be regarded as 
supporting an industry practice approach to ‘reasonable steps’ to secure personal 
information. 
Chapter 11 summarises the findings from this research, applies the findings to 
answer the research questions, and concludes with a short consideration of the 
implication of the findings from this research for the future. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This research is limited to the consideration of NPP 4 of the Privacy Act.  
12  
A separate privacy principle, Information Privacy Principle 4 (IPP 4), formerly 
applied to government agencies.  This principle was different from NPP 4.37 It 
obliged government agencies to take steps to prevent the unauthorised use or 
disclosure of personal information that had been disclosed to a third party in 
connection with the provision of a service to the agency. IPP 4 had no provision 
equivalent to the obligation to destroy information pursuant to NPP 4.2    In view of 
these differences; this research is confined to the consideration of information 
security incidents affecting the private sector only. 
This research is further confined to consideration of: 
 Those private sector organisations that fall within the operation of the Privacy 
Act. There are significant exemptions from the operation of the Privacy Act, 
including the exemption for ‘small business;’38 and 
 ‘Personal Information’ as defined in the Act.39  Although defined broadly 
enough to cover, for example, the collection of information by health service 
providers, there are significant areas where the Act has no application, for 
example, in the protection of corporate confidential information or trade 
secrets.   ‘Employee records’ held by private organisations are also exempt 
from the operation of the Act.40  The consideration of information other than 
‘personal information’ as defined in the Privacy Act is outside the scope of 
this research. 
This research commenced in 2010 and is concerned with the exercise of powers by 
the Commissioner.  Accordingly, this research will consider the Privacy Act as it was 
                                                 
37  Privacy Act Schedule 2 Information Privacy Principle 4. 
38  Privacy Act s 6. Small businesses are those with an annual turnover of $3 million or less. For 
guidance on the meaning of ‘small business’ for the purposes of the Privacy Act, see 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/business/small/guidance   
39  Privacy Act s 6(1) defined personal information as “... information or an opinion (including 
information or an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded 
in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be 
ascertained, from the information or opinion.”  This has been amended effective 12 March 2014.  
This amendment is not material for the purposes of this research. 
40  Ibid s 7B(3). 
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before the amendments introduced by the Privacy Amendment Act41 became 
effective, although reference is made to amendments wherever relevant.   However, 
it is noted that there are few substantive differences between NPP 4 and APP 11,42 
and accordingly the findings of this research should continue to have some relevance 
post March 2014.  Consideration of the implications of this research in the context of 
the amended Act is included in the concluding chapter of this research.   
The Commissioner’s use of its powers is ongoing.  However, this research needed to 
limit its scope in point of time.  Accordingly, it includes detailed consideration of 
instances of the exercise by the Commissioner of its powers in relation to NPP 4 up 
to March 2014 only.  Audits completed and determinations and guidance issued after 
March 2014 are outside the scope of this research.  The consideration of the 
Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers in Part 3 relied on data collected 
regarding the investigations.  To enable the collection and analysis of relevant data, 
consideration of OMI Reports is limited to those issued up to March 2013 only. This 
limitation is discussed further in Chapter 4 below. 
1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF RESEARCH TO PUBLISHED RESEARCH 
The review of the literature relevant to the question raised by this research 
can be considered by reference to the following: 
 Literature relating generally to the legal obligations of Australian 
corporations to secure information; 
 Literature relating to NPP 4 as part of the Privacy Act; and 
 Literature relating to the exercise of powers by the Commissioner to support 
compliance with the Act. 
                                                 
41  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) (‘Privacy Amendment 
Act’). 
42  See Chapter 2.3 for more detailed consideration of the differences between NPP 4 and APP 11. 
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1.5.1 Information Security and Australian Law 
The increased media interest and public concern in response to the growing 
number of information security incidents involving personal information might be 
expected to be reflected in the literature.  
Unfortunately in Australia there has is little recent legal literature regarding the 
regulation of information security practices.43  
Only one recent Australian legal text considers legal issues associated with 
securing information and the consequences of failing to adequately secure 
information.44  Although this text does not undertake a detailed analysis of NPP 4, it 
does consider the meaning of ‘reasonable security’ noting that, although it might be 
assumed by non-experts that there is a universal ‘benchmark’ against which the 
adequacy of a security regime may be assessed, it is not, in reality, straightforward 
because of the ‘relative’ nature of the security and its relationship with the 
management of risk.45  It recommends that organisations adopt a standards-based 
information security management system to meet various obligations to provide 
reasonable security.46  The legal obligation to keep information secure is considered 
by another, more recent Australian text, which notes the Privacy Act principles and 
the problem for the Commissioner in providing guidance that may rapidly become 
outdated through swift technological change.47  The text also refers to industry 
standards such as ISO 2700148 and ISO 27002,49 and PCI DSS,50 suggesting that 
                                                 
43  An Australian based academic has authored a number of articles relating to information security 
liability – including one of the standard of care.  However, these are set in the context of the 
laws of the United States, not Australia.  See for example De Villiers, M., Information Security 
Standards and Liability. 2010  Journal of Internet Law   13. 
44  Nick Gifford, Information security: managing the legal risks (CCH Australia Limited, 2009). 
45  Ibid Chapter 12. 
46  Ibid 193 – 194. 
47  Margaret Jackson and Marita Shelly, Electronic Information and the Law (Lawbook Co, 2012) 
127 – 132. 
48  International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC:27001:2013 Information technology – Security 
techniques – Information security management systems- Requirements (2013) (‘ISO 27001’). 
49  International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology – Security 
Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management (2013) (‘ISO 27002’). 
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‘[a]dherence to an approved standard can be used as a defence against claims of 
negligence.’51  These references to industry standards as the basis for considering 
what is reasonable security are pertinent to the discussion in Chapter 3 of the 
industry practice approach to information security, and the use of that approach as 
part of the conceptual framework for considering the Commissioner’s exercise of 
powers. 
The regulation of information security in Australia has been considered from 
the perspective of a proposed data breach notification law, which concludes that 
these notification laws are unlikely to lead to better information security.52  The 
article does not refer to the obligation to take reasonable steps in NPP 4 or to the use 
by the Privacy Commissioner of its powers to support organisational compliance 
with NPP 4. 
1.5.2 NPP 4 
To date, there have been no cases in Australia where a court has considered 
what might constitute ‘reasonable steps’ to protect personal information for the 
purposes of NPP 4.     
In the absence of binding legal decisions, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (OPC) and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
(OAIC)53 have published case notes and own motion investigation reports (OMI 
reports) that provide some guidance about how the Commissioner has interpreted and 
applied NPP 4 in different cases.   These case notes and OMI reports and the 
principles which can be derived from them, together with the guidance issued by the 
                                                 
50  Payment Card Council, ‘Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard v3.0’ 
<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/> (‘PCI DSS’). 
51  Jackson and Shelly, above n 47, 127 – 132. 
52  Sara M Smyth, 'Does Australia Really Need Data Breach Notification Laws - And If So, What 
Kind' (2012-2103) 22(2) Journal of Law, Information and Science 159. 
53  The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (‘OPC’) became part of the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (‘OAIC’) in 2010, after which time case notes and own motion 
investigation reports were published by the OAIC rather than the OPC. 
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OAIC that explains the OAIC’s interpretation of NPP 4 and the way the 
Commissioner conducts investigations, are discussed in later chapters.  
There are a large number of texts which cover Australian privacy laws.  These 
texts refer to the inclusion of NPP 4 in the legislation but devote little discussion to 
the meaning or intended or actual operation of that principle.54  For example, in the 
consideration of NPP 4 in Annotated National Privacy Principles, reference is made 
to the Commissioner’s published guidelines and the factors indicated as relevant to 
determining what is reasonable in those guidelines.55  In terms of meeting the 
requirements of NPP 4, the text recommends a compliance strategy based on the 
implementation of policies designed to address issues identified by an information 
security risk assessment, together with compliance with an industry standard (a 
similar approach to that recommended by the information security legal texts 
discussed).56     
IPP 4 (the equivalent of NPP 4 which applied to public entities) and NPP 4 
were examined as part of a University of New South Wales Interpreting Privacy 
Principles Project in 2006.57  The research made the point that information security is 
a separate and mature area of expertise.  It referred to the deference shown by 
privacy regulators to the established expertise of the information security industry 
and the consequent tendency of those regulators (including the then OPC) to refer to 
general standards and guidelines on security, rather than to be overly prescriptive 
regarding what was required by the Security Principle.58  The research did however 
caution that care should be taken when using generic information security standards 
                                                 
54  See, eg, Carolyn Doyle and Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2005), 
Margaret Jackson, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2nd ed, 2001), and 
Jeremy Douglas-Stewart, Annotated National Privacy Principles (Presidian, 2009). 
55  Douglas-Stewart, above n 54, [2-2950] - [ 2-3252]. 
56  Ibid [2-30307]. 
57  Nigel Waters, Graham Greenleaf and Paul Roth, 'Interpreting the Security Principle' (2006) 
<http://www.cyberlawcentre.org/ipp/publications.html; Waters, Nigel, 'Interpreting the Security 
Principle' (Paper presented at Symposium: Interpreting Privacy Principles: Chaos or 
Consistency?, Sydney, 17 May 2006), Nigel Waters and Graham Greenleaf, 'IPPs examined: 
The Security Principle' (2004) 11(3) Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 67. 
58  See, eg, Interpreting the Security Principle, above n 57, 8 – 10. 
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in the context of protecting personal information. In particular, it suggested that those 
standards may not necessarily address unauthorised access by authorised personnel 
or limitations on the collection of personal information.59  The research also noted 
the importance of risk in determining what is ‘reasonable.’60 It suggested that a 
number of general principles relevant to NPP 4 can be derived from the 
Commissioner’s guidance and case notes.  These included, for example, that given 
the number of disclosures that relate to ‘human error’, the importance of appropriate 
training and enforcement (which is part of ‘personnel security’) is clear.61  Similarly, 
the project supported the proposition that the existence of access controls and an 
audit facility is an important part of taking reasonable security measures.62  The work 
did not seek to compare the Commissioner’s interpretation of NPP 4 to industry 
practice, nor did it consider the extent to which the exercise of powers in relation to 
NPP 4 can be considered as in accordance with principles of good regulation.  
The Commissioner’s application of NPP 4 in the context of the Sony data 
breach and the Guide to Information Security: ‘Reasonable Steps’ to Protect 
Personal Information63 (Guide to Information Security) has been considered in a 
more recent article which is covered in more detail later in this research.64 
Otherwise, there has been little detailed consideration of NPP 4 in the 
literature. 
                                                 
59  Ibid. 
60   Ibid 6. 
61  Ibid 13-14.  
62   Ibid 11-13, 21 – 22..  Subsequent case notes have supported this proposition, for example, N v 
Utility Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 13; M v Commonwealth Agency [2008] PrivCmrA 13; but 
compare FH v NSW Department of Corrective Services [2003] NSWADT 72. 
63  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guide to Information Security: reasonable 
steps to protect personal information (2013) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-guides/guide-to-information-security> (‘Guide to Information Security’).  
64  Geoff Bloom and Kristina Frketic, 'The OAIC’s new Guide to Information Security, the hacking 
of 77 million Sony users, and the privacy breach that cost $171 million' (2013) 9(9) Privacy Law 
Bulletin 150.  The Commissioner’s data breach investigations were also reviewed in Andrew 
Miers and Elise Martin, ‘Lessons from recent data breaches’ (2012) (9) 2 Privacy Law Bulletin 
24. 
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1.5.3 Commissioner’s Exercise of Powers  
More literature relates to the functions and powers of the Privacy 
Commissioner and the way that those functions and powers have been used.  This 
was a topic of particular interest at the time of the two most recent ALRC reviews on 
the introduction of the new amendments.65 More recently, there has been some 
consideration of the Commissioner’s investigation into the Google Street view 
incident which, among other things, notes the absence of transparency in decision-
making in the statements made by the Commissioner about that investigation.66  
There has also been some consideration of the new powers that came into effect in 
                                                 
65  See, eg, Lee A Bygrave, 'Where have all the judges gone? Reflections on judicial involvement in 
developing data protection law - Part 1' (2000) 7(1) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 11; Lee A 
Bygrave, 'Where have all the judges gone? Reflections on judicial involvement in developing 
data protection law - Part 2' (2000) 7(2) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 3; Graham Greenleaf, 
'The "Tabula Rasa": Ten Reasons Why Australian Privacy Law Does Not Exist' (2001) 24(1) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 262; Graham Greenleaf, Nigel Waters and Lee A. 
Bygrave, 'Promoting and enforcing privacy principles:an analysis of ALRC proposals for the 
role of the Privacy Commissioner' (Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre, 2007) 
<http://www.cyberlawcentre.org/ipp/publications/papers/ALRC_DP72_Enforce_final.pdf>, 
Nigel Waters, Abi Paramaguru and Anna Johnston, 'Enforcement of privacy laws – issues 
arising from Australian experience v.2' (Working Paper No 3, Cyberspace Law & Policy Centre, 
UNSW, November 2007).  Graham Greenleaf, 'Reforming reporting of privacy cases: A 
proposal for improving accountability of Asia-Pacific Privacy Commissioners' in Paul Roth (ed), 
Privacy Law And Policy In New Zealand (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) ('Reforming 
reporting of privacy cases'); Graham Greenleaf and Nigel Waters, 'Australia’s Privacy Bill 2012: 
Weaker Principles, Stronger Enforcement' (2012) 118 Privacy Laws & Business International 
Report, Issue 115, Special Supplement, February 2012 16 (‘Weaker Principles’); Anthony 
Bendall, 'The governance of privacy : speak softly and carry a big stick' (2009) 60 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law National Forum 39; Graham Greenleaf and Nigel Waters, 
'"Making privacy law safe for business": Australia's 2012 privacy Bill' (2012) 8(10) Privacy Law 
Bulletin 266 (‘Making Privacy Law Safe’); Mark Hummerston, 'Sword or Shield: The Role of a 
Regulator' (Paper presented at Interpreting Privacy Principles Symposium, University of New 
South Wales, 3 June 2007) 
<http://www.cyberlawcentre.org/ipp/events/symposium07/Sword%20or%20shield.pdf>; Kevin  
O'Connor, 'The Federal Privacy Commissioner : pursuing a systemic approach' (2001 ) 7(1) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal Forum 13. 
66  Mark Burdon and Alissa  McKillop, 'The Google Stree View Wi-Fi Scandal and its 
Repercussios for Privacy Regulation' (2014) 39(3) Monash University Law Review 702. 
  
19 
 
March 2012,67 including the potential issues for the Commissioner in the 
enforcement of new APP 8.68 
There has been little consideration of the way the Commissioner has elected to 
use its powers specifically in relation to NPP 4, apart from the work undertaken as 
part of the University of New South Wales project69 and the 2008 ALRC review.70  
Specifically, there is no research into the use by the Commissioner of its oversight or 
investigation powers in relation to either NPP 4 or information security incidents 
more generally. 
There also appears to be only limited research into the operation and 
enforcement of the equivalent of the Security Principle in other jurisdictions with 
similar regimes for the protection of personal information to that in Australia.71   
There has been more consideration by legal scholars in the United States regarding 
how the Federal Trade Commissioners have responded to information security 
                                                 
67  Ashley Tsacalos and Vanessa Verzi, 'Civil penalties for breach of privacy — coming soon!' 
(2013) 10(2) Privacy Law Bulletin 28; Charles Alexander, Elisabeth  Koster and Helen Paterson, 
'Punitive powers guided by ambiguity: the Australian Federal Privacy Commissioner's new 
powers in the context of a principles-based privacy regime' (2013) 9(5) Privacy Law Bulletin 66.   
68  John Dieckmann, 'The new APP 8: crack down on cross-board data flows' (2012) 8(10) Privacy 
Law Bulletin 270. 
69  See Waters, Greenleaf and Roth, above n 57; and Waters and Greenleaf, above n 57. 
70  See Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Review of Privacy Issues Paper 31' (2006) 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/ip-31>, which asked generally whether the Privacy Commissioner’s 
powers to oversee the Privacy Act are appropriate and exercised effectively.  
71  See, eg, Martin Meints, 'The Relationship between Data Protection Legislation and Information 
Security Related Standards' in Vashek Matyáš et al (eds), The Future of Identity in the 
Information Society: IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology (Springer 
Boston, 2009) 254; Andrew Charlesworth, 'The future of UK data protection regulation' (2006) 
11(1) Information Security Technical Report 46, Jeff Langenderfer and Don Lloyd Cook, 'Oh, 
what a tangled web we weave: The state of privacy protection in the information economy and 
recommendations for governance' (2004) 57(7) Journal of Business Research 734; John  
Woulds, 'Information privacy and security - A regulator's priorities' (1997) 2(1) Information 
Security Technical Report 38.  There has been some review of the operation of the equivalent of 
the Privacy Act in other jurisdictions.  In the UK, the Rand Report reviewed the effectiveness of 
the Data Protection Act  - See Neil Robinson et al, 'Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive' (RAND Coporation, 2009).  In Canada there is a five year review regime in place, 
supporting the release of the 2008 Privacy Commissioner Report ‘Leading by Example: Key 
Developments in the First Seven Years of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA)’ (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2008). 
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incidents, although that study was from the perspective of protecting consumers from 
unfair and deceptive practices, and in the context of a regime that does not have 
comprehensive data protection laws similar to the Privacy Act.72  There has also been 
significant attention paid to the data breach notification laws passed by various states 
of the US, which laws could be regarded as a regulatory response to information 
security incidents.73  However, given the different regulatory approaches to securing 
personal information taken in Australia and the United States, the US literature 
regarding the operation of data breach notification laws has limited relevance.   
1.6 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Given the focus of this research on the operation of the Security Principle 
within the Australian privacy regime, it is worth considering how information 
security has been viewed in the privacy literature.   
Figure 2 below represents the relationship between the objectives of 
information security (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3) and the main objectives 
of most current data protection laws.  
                                                 
72  See, eg, T D Breaux, and D L Baumer, ‘Legally ‘reasonable’ security requirements: A 10-year 
FTC retrospective’ (2011) 30(4) Computers & Security 178; A Serwin, ‘The Federal Trade 
Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best 
Practices’ (2011) 48 San Diego L. Rev 809, J L Henry et al, ‘FTC Proposes Broad New Privacy 
Framework, and Asks “How It Might Apply in the Real World”’ (21 December 2010) K & L 
Gates < http://www.klgates.com/ftc-proposes-broad-new-privacy-framework-and-asks-how-it-
might-apply-in-the-real-world-12-21-2010/> , J S H Hiller, and D L Baumer, ‘Due Diligence on 
the Run: Business Lessons Derived from FTC Actions to Enforce Core Security Principles’ 
(2009) 45 Idaho Law Review 35; and M D Scott, ‘The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data 
Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?’ (2008) 60 Admin. L. Rev. 129. 
73  Some of the literature relating to data breach notification laws in the United States includes 
S A Needles, ‘The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach 
Notification Law’ (2009) 88 N.C.L. Rev 267; K Picanso, ‘Protecting Information Security Under 
a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law’(2006) 75(1) Fordham Law Review 355; 
S Romanosky, D A Hoffman, and A Acquisti, ‘Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation’  
(2014) 11(1) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 74; S Romanosky, R Telang, and A Acquisti, 
‘Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?’ (2011) 30(2) Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 256; J W Schneider, ‘Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative 
Approaches to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data’ (2009) 15 Boston University 
Journal of Science & Technology Law 25; P M Schwartz and E Janger, ‘Notification of Data 
Security Breaches’ (2007) 105(5) Michigan Law Review 913. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between information security and privacy 
Although considerable overlap exists between the two, the objectives of 
information security are different to those of privacy.74  While information security is 
an important part of privacy, information security does not exist solely to protect 
personal information.  Equally, privacy concerns more than the protection of 
personal information from specified harms.  
The distinction between privacy and security has perhaps been most explicitly 
recognised in the context of computer design, with information security design 
focusing on useability, while privacy design considers issues such as consent and 
control.75  By contrast, within the privacy literature, information security has been 
viewed as an enabler of privacy, rather than an objective in its own right.76  One 
                                                 
74  Ann Cavoukian and Mark Chanliaj, 'Privacy and Security by Design: A convergence of 
paradigms' (Information and Privacy Commissioner, Canada, 2013) 
<http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2013/01/pbd-convergenceofparadigms.pdf>. 
75  See, eg, P Dourish and K Anderson, 'Collective information practice: exploring privacy and 
security as social and cultural phenomena.' (2006) 21(3) Human-computer Interaction 319; 
Kenneth Radke, '"Who decides?": security and privacy in the wild'(Paper presented at the 25th 
Australian Computer-Human Interaction Conference: Augmentation, Appluication, Innovation, 
Collaboration, 2013). 
76  Sam DeKay and Ken Belva, ‘Privacy Roles and Responsibilities’ in Warren Axelrod, Jennifer 
Bayuk, and Daniel Schulzer (eds), Enterprise Information and Security (Artech House 2009) 9; 
‘The role of information security is to implement the mechanisms that establish and enforce 
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American commentator has stated that concern for individual privacy is ‘[p]erhaps 
the biggest driver of laws requiring security.’77   Of course, some commentators have 
recognised information security and privacy as overlapping, but not totally 
congruent, notions.78  The explanatory material attached to the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines notes that ‘security and privacy issues are not identical.’79 
However, the distinctions between privacy and security and the implications of 
those distinctions for the regulation of privacy and information security do not seem 
to have been explored rigorously or systematically. The tendency of the privacy 
literature to conflate security and privacy could be regarded as obscuring these 
distinctions.80  A recent article has pointed to at least one important consequence of 
this conflation.81  According to the author, privacy establishes a normative 
framework for deciding who should legitimately have the capability to access and 
alter information, whereas security implements those choices via a set of 
mechanisms.82  The author suggested that a security failure is different to the 
                                                 
privacy rights’; and 13 ‘History reveals privacy is the ‘why’ and information security is the 
‘how’.’ Similarly, Jane Strachan in ‘Cybersecurity Obligations’ (2005) 20 Me. B. J. 90, seems to 
assume that information security is the protection of personal information.  She concludes that 
‘Information security is a key component of information privacy’. 
77  Thomas J Smedinghoff, Information Security Law : The Emerging Standard for Corporate 
Compliance (IT Governance Publishing, 2008) 49. 
78  Dean William Harvey and Amy White, 'The Impact of Computer Security Regulation on 
American Companies' (2002) 8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 505, 508 points out that it is 
important to distinguish ‘privacy’ as involving ‘the right of individuals to control the use and 
disclosure of information about them’ and ‘security’ as meaning the ‘safeguards ... to protect 
information from unauthorised access, attacks from outside the organisation, and from misuse 
and negligence with the organisation.’ See also Calvin C Gotlieb, 'Privacy: A Concept Whose 
Time Has Come and Gone' in D Lyon and E Zureik (eds), Surveillance, Computers and Privacy 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Paul Thompson, 'Privacy, Secrecy and Security' (2001) 
3(3) Ethics and Information Technology 13.  See also Lukas Feiler, Information Security Law in 
the EU and the U.S.: A Risk-Based Assessment of Implicit and Explicit Regulatory Policies (A 
Joint Initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School of Law, 2011) 71 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/ttlf/papers/feiler_wp9.pdf>. 
79  Explanatory Memorandum, OECD Privacy Guidelines 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtran
sborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#memorandum > 56.   
80  See references at n Error! Bookmark not defined. 
81  Derek E Bambauer, 'Privacy Versus Security' (2013) 103(3) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 667. 
82  Ibid. 
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balancing of opposing interests and rights implicit in consideration of the right to 
privacy, and that we should be less forgiving of security failures than of privacy 
failures.83  His argument was that there are no competing moral claims to resolve in 
information security failures and that they make all parties worse off.  As a 
consequence, the author supported a clear distinction in enforcement approaches 
between privacy and security breaches. The analysis of information security as 
largely mechanistic is consistent with the industry standard approach to information 
security put forward in this research.  The proposition that the regulatory model that 
is best for privacy may not be as appropriate for the regulation of information 
security is relevant to this research. If it is the case that the Commissioner’s exercise 
of powers is not “appropriate” based on the conceptual framework used in this 
research, it may be that the regulatory models that underpin the Privacy Act and 
which inform the way that the Commissioner’s powers should be exercised are not 
the best models for ensuring the information is properly secured. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
The number and severity of data breach incidents continues to highlight the 
problem of ensuring that information is appropriately protected.  
The Security Principle is one of the few statutory provisions in Australia that 
requires organisations covered by the Privacy Act to take reasonable steps to protect 
personal information from misuse, loss, or unauthorised access or disclosure.  This 
requirement makes the Security Principle an important regulation in regard to 
organisational information security practices. 
 NPP 4 was framed as a principle.  Accordingly, its meaning and application 
should be established by the regulator responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
principle. It might be expected that, in establishing its understanding of NPP 4, the 
Privacy Commissioner as the relevant regulator would exercise the wide range of 
powers it has available, including both oversight and investigation powers, to support 
the adoption of steps that are commensurate with an accepted industry practice 
                                                 
83  Ibid 669. 
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approach to information security in order to protect personal information.  If that 
were the case, then NPP 4 would be applied in an appropriate way to support the 
protection of the personal information of Australians. 
To date, information security has received limited consideration in the 
Australian legal literature. When it has been considered, the concept of ‘reasonable 
security’ has been couched in the context of industry standard approaches, such as 
those of ISO 27001 and ISO 27002. Similarly, there has been little recent 
consideration of NPP 4, either in its own right or by reference to the Commissioner’s 
use of its powers to support an interpretation or application of NPP 4.   
By examining in detail the Australian Privacy Commissioner’s exercise of 
powers in relation to NPP 4, through the lens of industry best practice and of the 
transparent, balanced, and vigorous use of powers, the research results from this 
thesis will fill an important gap in the privacy law literature.   They may also 
influence the future use by the Commissioner of its powers to ensure that the 
personal information of Australians is properly protected. 
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Chapter 2: The Commissioner’s Powers 
This chapter will briefly trace the development of privacy laws before examining 
in more detail NPP 4 as part of the Australian privacy regime.  It will then consider 
the functions and powers given to the Australian Privacy Commissioner, pursuant to 
the Privacy Act in the context of the regulatory foundations for the Privacy Act, 
which are: 
 Principle-based regulation or PBR; and 
 A responsive approach to enforcement. 
The current literature will be reviewed to identify the implications of these two 
regulatory foundations for both the regulator and for the regulated community.   
The analysis in this chapter will answer the first sub-question in this research: 
What powers are available to the Privacy Commissioner pursuant to the Privacy Act 
in relation to information security failures? The principles for the exercise of 
regulatory powers will provide that part of the conceptual framework used to answer 
the third sub-question in this research: To what extent is the exercise of the 
Commissioner’s powers consistent with principles for the exercise of regulatory 
powers? 
2.1 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the 1960s, the increasing use of computers around the world by both public 
and private entities raised considerable public concern about information privacy.84 
                                                 
84  Gehan Gunasekara, 'Paddling in unison or just paddling? International trends in reforming 
information privacy law' (2014) 22(2) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
141, 143. See also Priscilla M Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and 
Public Policy (University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
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Commentators devoted significant attention to the issue85 with privacy becoming an 
important public policy item in the US and other jurisdictions.86   
For example, in the UK, the Younger Committee was commissioned to 
consider computing in the private sector in 1972, concluding that ‘the computer 
problem as it affects privacy in Great Britain is one of apprehensions and fears and 
not so far one of facts and figures.’87  Only four years later in 1976, a second 
committee recognised that the increasing general use of computers was a concern 
and recommended the passage of legislation that later became the first UK Data 
Protection Act.88   In the United States, public concern about the US Social Science 
Research Centre proposal to establish a Federal Data Centre to provide access to and 
coordinate the use of government statistical information resulted in a report 
commissioned by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and released in 
1973 (the HEW Report).89  The HEW Report recommended that Congress enact 
legislation adopting a Code of Fair Information Practices for automated personal 
data systems (operated by both the public and private sectors).  The Code set out a 
list of rights that individual ‘data subjects’ (people whose personal information was 
stored) should have, and made specific recommendations for laws that would 
implement and enforce this Code. One of those recommendations required 
organisations that were keeping automated databases on individuals to enact 
                                                 
85  Daniel Solove, 'A Brief History of Information Privacy Law' (Public Law Research Paper No 
215, George Washington University Law School, 2006) [1-24].  Solove refers to the following 
in support of this statement: Alan Westin ‘Privacy and Freedom’ (1967), Arthur Miller ‘The 
Attack on Privacy’ (1971); ‘Nomos X11: Privacy’  (J Ronald Pennock & J W  Chapman eds. 
1971); Alan Westin & Michael A. Baker ‘Databanks in a Free Society’ Computers 
Recordkeeping and Privacy’ (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, ‘The Files’: Legal Controls Over the 
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966); 
Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211–45 
(1968); Symposium, Privacy, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251–435 (1966). 
86  Priscilla Regan, 'Privacy and Commercial Use of Personal Data: Policy Developments in the 
United States' (2003) 11(1) Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 1; Regan, above n 
83. 
87  Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012, HMSO,1972. 
88  Report on the Committee of Data Protection (1978) Cmnd 7341. 
89  The HEW Report, above n 23. 
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safeguards to protect this data.  This requirement was a precursor of NPP 4.90   Many 
scholars believe that the Code of Fair Information Practices has influenced the 
development of privacy law in the United States and around the world.91   
The Code of Fair Information Practices from the HEW Report was 
incorporated into the US Privacy Act of 1974,92 as were additional, more prescriptive 
provisions specific to ensuring data security.  The Act required agencies to ‘establish 
appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to ensure security and 
confidentiality of records to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards.’  This 
model of dual recognition of computer security and the protection of privacy 
included in the U.S. Privacy Act has continued in the range of sector-specific laws 
that have been passed in the United States.93  
These sector-specific laws in the US support a broadly similar approach to 
information security, that is, that there should be a documented security management 
process in place that involves the identification and analysis of risks and the 
implementation of a range of administrative, physical and technical safeguards that 
reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level.94  This 
legislative approach to information security in the US is consistent with the industry 
practice approach to information security discussed in Chapter 3.  
                                                 
90  Principle 5 of the Fair Information Principles, above n 23.  The five core principles of privacy 
protection recognised by the Code are: (1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; 
(3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress. 
91  Regan, above n 85, 14; Marc Rotenberg, 'Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get)' (2011) STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 
92  Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
93  The U.S. sector specific laws include for example Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 and 1320d-4 (HIPAA) and Final HIPAA Security 
Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Part 164 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public L. 106-102, Sections 501 
and 505(b), 15 U.S.C. Sections 6801, 6805 
94  This commonality of requirements in regard to information security has led some commentators 
to suggest that in the U.S. there is a general duty of care in regard to securing data.  See, eg, 
Smedinghoff, above n 77. 
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In Australia, concerns regarding privacy and increasing computerisation were 
first raised in 1973.95  The Law Reform Commission produced two reports 
considering the issue: the first in 1979, which focused on issues relating to the 1976 
Census,96 and the second in 1983, which involved a broader consideration of 
different privacy issues.97   
The first report referred to the way that computerisation had changed the way 
that information of the sort included in the census (such as religion, marital status 
and income) was collected.  It noted that computers had led to ‘a radical increase in 
the capacity of record systems to store and retrieve personal information’ with its 
associated cost savings.98  Although the Law Reform Commission found that public 
concerns around these issues were valid, it did not recommend any major changes at 
that stage, given the broader consideration of different privacy issues being 
undertaken at the time as part of ALRC Report 22.99 
The second Law Reform Commission report stated that privacy was in danger, 
identifying the chief sources of danger as growing official powers, new business 
practices and new information technology.100  It referred to the issues raised by the 
‘extensive and expanding use of computers to process personal information in public 
and private administration’ including the vulnerability of information-handling 
networks.101  The Commission recommended that a Privacy Act be passed to 
establish information privacy principles and to provide for the appointment of a 
Privacy Commissioner.  It also recommended that the Australian privacy regime 
should be consistent with privacy protections implemented in other jurisdictions on 
                                                 
95  See the Morison Report 1973 (Report on the Law of Privacy to the Standing Committee of 
Commonwealth and State Attorneys General No. 170/1973). 
96  Law Reform Commission, Report 12: Privacy and the Census (1979) vi – vii (‘Privacy and the 
Census’). 
97  Law Reform Commission, Privacy (1976 - 1983), Report No 22 (1983) (‘Privacy (1976 – 
1983)’). 
98  Privacy and the Census, above n 95, 96. 
99  Ibid 
100  Privacy (1976 – 1983) above n 96, 4. 
101  Ibid, 8. 
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the basis that, as part of an ‘interdependent international community’ it is important 
that solutions to common problems are compatible with ‘those developed in 
countries with which Australia is inextricably involved, and with which it shares 
common interests.’102  In particular, it recommended the adoption of privacy 
principles based on the OECD Privacy Guidelines.103  This recommendation was 
consistent with the views of the Honourable Michael Kirby,104 the Chairman of the 
Law Reform Commission in Australia at the time, who had also chaired the OECD 
expert group responsible for the development and publication of the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines.105  These highly influential guidelines were published in 1980, and have 
had a significant impact on the development of member privacy legislation 
throughout the world, including Australia.106  
2.2 THE AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY ACT 
The Australian Privacy Act, adopting the model put forward in the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines and otherwise implementing many of the ALRC 
recommendations, was passed in 1988. The Act was significantly amended in 2000 
when it was extended to apply to private entities.107  It was amended again in 
December 2012,108 which amendments became effective in March 2014. As 
                                                 
102  Ibid. 
103  Privacy (1976 - 1983), above n 96, 8.  
104  About Michael Kirby (October 2014) 
<http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemi
d=2> 
105  Justice Michael Kirby, 'The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on 
privacy' (2011) 1(1) International Data Privacy Law 6 
106  See Graham Greenleaf, 'The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe: 
Implications for globalization of Convention 108' (2012) 2(2) International Data Privacy Law 
68; and Graham Greenleaf, 'Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating' (2012) 
112 Privacy Laws & Business International Report, Issue 11-175; Justice  Michael Kirby, 'The 
history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy' (2011) 1(1) 
International Data Privacy Law Journal 6. 
107  Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth). 
108 Ibid. 
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discussed, this research will focus on those provisions of the Act that were in effect 
prior to March 2014.109  
The Act listed a set of Information Privacy Principles (IPPs)110 that were the 
base line privacy standards applying to all Australian and ACT government agencies.   
Following the amendments in the year 2000, the Act also included a separate set of 
National Privacy Principles (NPPs)111 that applied to those private sector 
organisations covered by the Act.   Ten NPPs covered the collection, use and 
disclosure and secure management of personal information.  
The Act specifically provides that organisations covered by the Act shall not 
breach a privacy principle.112  In addition to the Commonwealth Privacy Act, a 
number of State Acts cover the protection of personal and health information by 
State government agencies.113  These largely follow the same form as the 
Commonwealth Privacy Act. As discussed in Chapter 1.4, this thesis will examine 
the application of NPP 4 as part of the Commonwealth Privacy Act. 
2.3 NPP 4 
National Privacy Principle 4 was written in two parts.  National Privacy 
Principle 4.1 (NPP 4.1) reflected the wording of the security principle in the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines and required those organisations it applied to, to ‘take reasonable 
steps to protect the personal information it holds from misuse and loss and from 
unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.’114  The purpose of NPP 4.1 was not 
only to prevent unauthorised access, modification or disclosure of personal 
information (whether directly by an organisational employee or indirectly as the 
result of a malicious third party such as a hacker) but also to protect against other 
                                                 
109  See Chapter 1.4. 
110  Privacy Act Schedule 2. The IPPs have now been replaced. 
111  Ibid Schedule 3. The NPPs have now been replaced. 
112  Privacy Act s 16. 
113  See Appendix D for a list of Australian State Privacy legislation. 
114  Privacy Act Schedule 3 National Privacy Principle 4.1 
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categories of risk covered by the terms ‘misuse’ and ‘loss.’  These terms include, for 
example, unauthorised use by authorised personnel and the corruption of data.115 
The second limb, National Privacy Principle 4.2 (NPP 4.2), had a much 
narrower operation.  It required an organisation ‘to take reasonable steps to destroy 
or permanently de-identify personal information if it was no longer needed for any 
purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed under National Privacy 
Principle 2.’116   Information security theorists regard secure disposal as a sub-part of 
information security management, and a specific area for the implementation of 
controls.117  This research will focus on the more general requirement to take 
‘reasonable steps’ in NPP 4.1, recognising that a failure to take reasonable steps to 
securely dispose of data may be both a breach of the general requirement in NPP 4.1 
and the more specific requirement in NPP 4.2. 
NPP 4 was considered by the ALRC as part of its 2008 review of the Privacy 
Act.   The questions posed in relation to NPP 4 by the review included: 
 Is the scope of NPP 4 relating to the obligations of an organisation to secure 
data adequate and appropriate; and 
 Should the IPPs and the NPPs regulate the deletion of personal information 
by organisations and agencies?118 
The ALRC concluded that no significant change was required to NPP 4 other 
than the unification of NPP 4 and IPP 4 together into a single ‘Australian Privacy 
Principle.’119 A similar unification was also recommended for the other NPPs and 
                                                 
115  Waters, Greenleaf and Roth, above n 57. 6. 
116  Privacy Act Schedule 3 National Privacy Principle 4.2. 
117  See, eg, ISO 27002, above n 49, Section 11.2.7 which refers to the secure disposal and re-use of 
media as one of the 114 different controls that might be selected to mitigate information security 
risks. 
118  For your information, above n 32, [4-17] –[4-19]. 
119  For your information, above n 32, Chapter 28. 
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IPPs.120   Accordingly, the Privacy Amendment Act121 introduced a new APP11 titled 
‘Security of Personal Information,’ which replaced NPP 4 and IPP 4 but which is 
substantively the same as the previous two principles.  The word ‘interference’ has 
been added to ‘protection from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure’ to 
make it clear that the protection must extend to computer attacks and other attacks 
that might not be covered by the other terms.122  The reference to ‘reasonable steps’ 
has been changed to ‘take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances.’123  The 
Explanatory Memorandum notes that this change is to make it clear that the 
assessment is an objective one ‘but when considering what are objectively reasonable 
steps, the specific circumstances of each case must be considered.’124 It is not 
expected that the amendment will have any major substantive effect.125 
This research will focus on NPP 4, rather than APP 11, although some 
consideration of the operation of the new principle is included in the final chapter.  
As previously discussed, all of the main international instruments on data 
protection include a requirement that organisations must take ‘reasonable care’ to 
secure personal information.126    
The OECD Privacy Guidelines provide that ‘[p]ersonal data should be 
protected by reasonable security safeguards,’127  which is the most broadly expressed 
version of the principle.  NPP 4 adopts this broad wording from the OECD Privacy 
                                                 
120  For your information, above n 32, Executive Summary ‘The Privacy Act and Privacy 
Principles.’ 
121   Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
122  Explanatory Memorandum, ‘Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012’ 86 
(‘Explanatory Memorandum’). 
123  The wording of APP 11 is different to that proposed by the ALRC for the data security principle. 
See For your information, above n 32, [28.105]. 
124  Explanatory Memorandum, above n 122, 54. 
125  Alexander, Koster and Paterson, above n 67. 
126  See discussion in Chapter 1.5.2. 
127  The Security Safeguards Principle 11, Part 2 of the OECD Privacy Guidelines provides: 
‘Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.’  OECD Privacy 
Guidelines, above n 24. 
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Guidelines.   Article 17 of the EU Data Protection Directive requires organisations 
to protect personal data by implementing ‘appropriate technical and organisational 
measures.’128 In determining what measures may be appropriate, the provision refers 
to ensuring ‘a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing 
and the nature of the data to be protected,’ having regard to the state of the art and 
the cost of implementation of the measures. 129   
The security principle in the APEC Privacy Framework is also more 
comprehensive than the OECD provision. It refers to the implementation of 
safeguards which should be:  
proportional to the likelihood and severity of the harm threatened, the sensitivity of the 
information and the context in which it is held, and should be subject to periodic 
review and reassessment.130 
The APEC Framework also refers to risk, the relationship between the measure 
to be implemented and the ‘likelihood and severity’ of harm and the need for those 
safeguards to be subject to regular review.  Risk, the use of risk to select 
‘proportional’ security measures and the need for periodic review, are all part of the 
industry practice approach to security considered further in the next chapter.  
2.4 OVERVIEW OF THE OAIC’S FUNCTIONS AND POWERS 
The role of Privacy Commissioner was created by the Privacy Act in 1988.  
The Privacy Commissioner was originally supported by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (OPC).  In 2010, the OPC became part of the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC), which is headed by the Australian Information 
Commissioner (AIC), which office also includes the Office of the Freedom of 
Information Commissioner.131  The Privacy Commissioner currently reports to the 
                                                 
128  EU Data Protection Directive 95/46, above n 25, Article 17.1. 
129  Ibid. 
130  APEC Privacy Framework, above n 26, Principle 22 
131  Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth). 
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AIC, but maintains the same functions and powers, albeit with some new 
constraints.132  It has been proposed that the OAIC will be disbanded and the Privacy 
Commissioner’s functions will be undertaken by the Commissioner acting in an 
independent statutory position within the Human Rights Commission, however these 
changes seem to be on hold.133  The implications of this change are considered 
briefly at the end of this research. 
The Commissioner has a broad range of functions. Prior to March 2014 they 
included: 
 Monitoring and research;134  
 Advice;135  
 Education;136 and 
 Guidance, including publishing binding guidelines and non-binding fact 
sheets, information sheets and guidelines.137  
                                                 
132  Ibid s 12.  See also Carolyn Adams, 'One office, three champions? Structural integration in the 
office of the Australian Information Commissioner' (2014) 21 AJ Admin L 77. 
133  John McMillan, Australian Information Commissioner, James Popple (Freedom of Information 
Commissioner) and Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Australian Government’s Budget 
decision to disband OAIC’ (Statement, 13 May 2014) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/statements/australian-governments-budget-decision-to-disband-oaic/australian-
government-s-budget-decision-to-disband-oaic>.  The re-structuring is proposed in the  Freedom 
of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill (Cth) which was introduced into the 
Senate but not considered before the end of the 2014 sitting period. The current status of that 
Bill is available at Parliament of Australia,  Freedom of Information Amendment (New 
Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Cth) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result
?bId=r5350>.  The OAIC has advised that it will  ‘remain operational until further notice.’ 
Office of the Australian Information Commission, OAIC to remain operational until further 
notice (December 2014) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/australian-
governments-budget-decision-to-disband-oaic/oaic-to-remain-operational>. 
134  Privacy Act s 27(1)(b). 
135  Ibid s 27(1)(j). 
136  Ibid s 27(1)(m). 
137  Ibid s 27 (1)(e), ‘to prepare and publish in such manner as the Commissioner considers 
appropriate, guidelines for the avoidance of acts or practices ... that may ... be interferences with 
the privacy of individuals ...’. This is in addition to the power to issue guidelines relating to 
approved privacy codes, and under the Data Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 
(Cth) and s 135AA of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). 
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These functions, together with the power to audit public entities,138 were 
grouped together and referred to as ‘oversight’ functions by the ALRC.139   
The individual appointed as Commissioner is given the power to do all things 
necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of 
these functions.140    
 In addition to these oversight functions, the Commissioner also has an 
investigation and enforcement role.  The Commissioner can investigate complaints 
and can also conduct investigations on its own motion.141  The Commissioner can 
make a determination following complaint-based investigations, which may include 
the award of compensation and requiring the rectification of practices.142 In this 
research, given the low number of determinations made to date,143 these enforcement 
powers will be referred to as the ‘investigation’ powers of the Commissioner. 
The Commissioner’s oversight and investigation powers have been extended 
by the recent amendments to the Privacy Act. The Commissioner’s new powers 
include the ability to: 
 Conduct an assessment of the maintenance of personal information of a 
private organisation (referred to as the privacy assessment power). This is 
similar to the pre-existing power to audit public entities;144  
                                                 
138  For your information, above n 32, [47.87] - [47.116]. 
139  Ibid [47.2]-[47.22]. 
140  Pursuant to the Privacy Amendment Act, a new s 27(2) will be inserted which will confirm that 
the Commissioner has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done in 
connection with the performance of those functions Privacy Act. 
141  Privacy Act ss 36, 40. 
142  Ibid s 52. 
143  The Commissioner’s use of the power to make a Determination which was the major 
enforcement power available prior to March 2014, other than carrying out investigations, is 
discussed further in Chapter 7.3. 
144  Privacy Act s 33C. 
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 Accept written, enforceable undertakings by entities145 and, if an undertaking 
is breached, apply to the Federal Court for an order directing the entity to 
comply with the undertaking or any other order the court considers 
appropriate; 146 
 Make a determination after an own motion investigation;147 
 Include in a determination any order that it considers necessary or 
appropriate;148 and 
 Apply to court for the imposition of civil penalties for a serious or repeated 
interference with the privacy of an individual. 149  
As these new functions only became effective in March 2014, there has been 
little opportunity to determine how they will be used by the Commissioner, 
particularly in regard to NPP 4.  Therefore reference is included for the sake of 
completeness only, although reference to the effect that some of these powers may 
have in terms of the findings of this research is included in the final Chapter.  
Taken together, the Commissioner can provide policy advice to government 
and parliamentary inquiries, issue binding and non-binding guidelines, provide 
education and receive, investigate, and determine the outcome of complaints. The 
OAIC has acknowledged the breadth of its different function and powers, noting that: 
‘Taken together, these functions cast the OAIC in the roles of regulator, decision 
maker, adviser, researcher and educator.’150  The uniqueness of investing a 
government-created role with this broad mix of powers and functions, which fall 
                                                 
145   Ibid s 33E. 
146  Ibid s 33F. 
147  Ibid s 52(1A). 
148  Ibid s 52(3A). 
149  Ibid. Pt VIB deals specifically with civil penalty orders. 
150  Alan Hawke, 'Review of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Australian Information 
Commissioner Act 2010' (Australian Government, 2014) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/ReviewofFOIlaws.aspx>.  See also OAIC 2012 
Annual Report, above n 1, 4. 
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across all parts of the ‘legislative’, ‘executive’ and ‘judicial’ spectrum, has been 
remarked upon.151 
To understand why the Privacy Commissioner has been given such a broad 
range of powers, including both oversight and investigation powers, and how it is 
anticipated that these powers will be exercised, it is important to understand the 
regulatory foundations underpinning the Privacy Act. An appreciation of these 
foundations and the related assumptions about the regulatory interactions required to 
support their successful implementation will help inform this analysis of the 
Commissioner’s use of its powers to support compliance with NPP 4. 
2.5 REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS 
The Privacy Act is based on the twin foundations of principle-based regulation 
and a compliance approach to enforcement.152   
2.5.1 Principle-Based Regulation 
In introducing a privacy regime based on the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the 
Australian Government accepted a principle-based regulatory model for the 
protection of personal information in Australia.153 Principle-based regulation (PBR) 
was confirmed as the appropriate regulatory model for privacy on the introduction of 
the private sector provisions in 2000154 and as part of the OPC review in 2005.155 
PBR was confirmed again by the ALRC in 2008, after the ALRC gave specific 
consideration to the issue.156  
                                                 
151  Philip Schutz, 'Accountability and Independence of Data Protection Authorities - A Trade Off?' 
in Daniel Guagnin et al (eds), Managing Privacy through Accountability (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012); Kevin O'Connor, above n 65, 233. 
152  For your information, above n 32, Chapter 4. 
153  Ibid [2.4], [18.24]. 
154  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 November 2000, 22370 
(D Williams, Attorney-General). 
155  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 'Getting in on the Act: The Review of the Private Sector 
Provisions of the Privacy Act 1988' (2005) (‘Getting in on the Act’). 
156  For your information, above n 32, Chapter 4.  
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Principles can be distinguished from bright line rules (as defined below) and 
complex or detailed rules, examples of which are included in the table below.157 
Bright line rule Principle Complex/detailed rule 
An organisation must not 
collect personal 
information relating to an 
individual’s sexuality 
An organisation must not 
collect personal 
information unless it is 
necessary for one of its 
functions or activities 
 
An organisation [defined] 
must not collect [defined] 
personal information 
[defined] unless all of the 
following conditions are 
met: [list of conditions]. 
Table 1: Examples of different types of regulatory provisions158 
A ‘bright line’ rule contains a single criterion of applicability. Their simplicity 
means bright line rules are straightforward and so easier to understand and apply than 
principles; however, they are susceptible to gaming and ‘creative’ compliance.  The 
specificity of the rule means it may not be broad enough to capture all of the conduct 
that it is aimed at.  Alternatively, an organisation may ‘comply with the letter, but not 
the spirit, of the rule.’159  
A complex or detailed rule can provide a higher degree of certainty by 
providing greater detail about what is required for compliance.  However, the greater 
degree of specificity means that these rules are even more susceptible to 
manipulation and creative compliance than bright line rules.160 
In comparison, a ‘principle’ articulates substantive objectives rather than 
specific compliance requirements.161 The perceived benefits of principle-based 
regulation include being less susceptible to gaming and a ‘tick box’ compliance 
                                                 
157  J Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2007) 10. 
158   For your information, above n 32, Table 18.1. 
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160  Ibid [18.30]. 
161  Ibid [18.29]. 
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approach.  Principles give firms ‘increased flexibility to decide more often … what 
business processes and controls they should operate.’162 It is believed that the 
devolution to the regulated community of the interpretation of compliance 
obligations will result in an industry that deals with regulatory issues in a more 
effective and efficient way.  Principles are also seen as more flexible than 
prescriptive rules and therefore more durable in a rapidly changing environment.163 It 
is this durability aspect that was stressed by the ALRC in its review of the 
appropriateness of the principle-based regulatory scheme, particularly when 
considering the challenges posed by new technology.164 While concluding that the 
advantages of PBR outweighed the drawbacks, the ALRC identified that one of the 
issues with principles was certainty as to what was required for compliance: 
While principles may appear simple to apply — in that they are concise and 
avoid arcane language — problems can arise in practice where, for instance, 
there is a dispute as to the meaning of the key terms.165  
The ALRC considered the level of detail and guidance that should be provided 
by the privacy principles themselves, noting that the choice of how prescriptive the 
principles should be reflected a wider policy choice about the degree to which the 
regulation of personal information should be ‘light-touch.’166   
Notwithstanding this commitment to PBR as the preferable regulatory model, 
the ALRC accepted that there were areas — health and research, credit reporting and 
telecommunications — where principles were ‘not adequate to achieve the relevant 
policy objectives.’167  For those areas, the ALRC recommended a ‘hybrid’ regulatory 
                                                 
162  Financial Services Authority U.K., Principles Based Regulation: Focusing on the Outcomes that 
Matter (2007) 6 – 7. 
163  For your information, above n 32, [18.55]. 
164  Ibid, 235. 
165  Ibid [18.29]. 
166  Ibid [18.35]. 
167  Ibid [4.37].  
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model (involving principles and rules), which it regarded as the best way to meet the 
competing needs of clarity, flexibility, simplicity and certainty.168    
NPP 4 was not considered by the ALRC as a principle which should be 
supplemented by rules, unlike NPP 11, which covered use and disclosure.169  
However, the ALRC did consider that the Commissioner should issue separate non-
binding guidance to support a clearer understanding of NPP 4.170 
The ALRC drew particular attention generally to the importance of guidance 
from the regulator to support certainty as to the meaning of principles, stating that 
‘the principle-based regime cannot operate effectively unless there is such 
guidance.’171   It also warned that care needed to be taken to ensure that guidance did 
not become de facto rules172 or that confusion was caused by the proliferation of 
guidance.173  
There is some suggestion that PBR equates to ‘light-touch’ regulation in the 
sense of it being more difficult to establish breach.  The ALRC stated that the use of 
principles was an appropriate regulatory approach to business needs as a matter of 
policy because ‘[i]t is generally more difficult to establish a breach of high-level 
principles than provisions imposing detailed and specific obligations.’174  This was 
subsequently clarified when the ALRC confirmed the ‘long-standing policy position’ 
that the Privacy Act should be light touch ‘in the sense that it should provide only 
such regulation as is required to protect individuals’ privacy without unreasonably 
burdening the public or private sectors.’175 
                                                 
168  Ibid [4.37], [18.57] - [18.59]. 
169  Ibid [4-34]. 
170  Ibid Recommendation 28-3. 
171  Ibid [4-59].  The use by the Privacy Commissioner of its guidance powers is discussed further in 
Chapter 6. 
172  Ibid. 
173  Australian Law Reform Commission, Reviewing the Privacy Act, Issues Paper No 31 (2006). 
174  For your information, above n 32, [18.35]. 
175  Ibid [18.62]. 
  
41 
 
In its guide to regulation, the Australian Government referred to PBR generally 
as a type of ‘light touch regulation’, noting the benefits it provides through allowing 
maximum flexibility among the regulated community regarding how they achieve 
compliance.176 It also noted that PBR must be implemented properly to ensure that 
those affected understand their legal rights and obligations, otherwise the regulation 
may not be effective.177 However, little further elucidation on what that proper 
implementation might entail is provided in the guide. 
The role of the regulator and the methods they use to engage with the regulated 
community to ensure compliance are important to PBR.   One of the assumptions 
supporting principle-based regulatory theory is that the market is self-correcting and 
that responsible organisational management will ensure the adoption of appropriate 
systems and processes to meet the outcomes stated in the principles.178  However, to 
ensure that the market operates in the expected way, there must be: 
 Close engagement between the regulator and the regulated based on mutual 
trust;  
 Outcomes and goals clearly communicated by the regulator; and 
 A predictable enforcement regime.179 
In her more recent work, Black underlined the importance of close engagement 
between the regulator and the regulated community, referring to the need for a dense 
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network of ‘regulatory conversations’ between the regulator and the regulated 
regarding the purpose and application of the principle, where the outcome is 
structured around the goal that the principle is trying to achieve. 180  Black noted that 
principles give the regulated more discretion in what they do, so that responsibility 
for ensuring that the objectives of the principles are met is shifted in part from the 
regulator to the regulated.181  According to Black, this involves ‘a significant shift in 
responsibility to firms and requires a substantially different set of skills on the part of 
inspectors and compliance staff to engage in the negotiations and qualitative 
judgement that are entailed.’182  The shift in responsibility also involves a conscious 
and deliberate focus by the regulator on the firm’s internal systems of management 
and controls.183   
Finally, Black referred to the importance of regulators managing the greater 
interpretive risk for firms that arise from the use of principles, and minimising the 
effects of this risk through its enforcement approach.184  Black’s view was that if a 
regulator were to take a punitive approach to every minor infraction it would lead to 
a demand for rules.  Enforcement therefore ‘has to be responsive to the firm's own 
attitude and behaviour’ and focus on outcomes.185   
In other words, PBR requires a closely engaged regulator using a responsive 
enforcement approach to achieve clearly communicated outcomes and goals as part 
of a two-way conversation, while focusing on the operation of organisational 
management systems and controls. 
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2.5.2 Compliance Approach 
The Privacy Act is based on a particular type of approach to compliance 
referred to as responsive regulation.186  This is consistent with Black’s view of the 
importance of a responsive regulatory approach in a principle-based system.187   
Responsive regulation takes account of the relationship between regulation and 
those being regulated, and offers a graduated approach to enforcement.188  A 
responsive approach to regulation was first articulated by Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite.189  It provided an alternative to traditional ‘command and control’ 
enforcement approaches and a potential middle ground between the public interest in 
regulating businesses and the interest of businesses in reducing state intervention.190 
Responsive regulation is based on the contention that, in order to be effective, 
efficient and legitimate, regulatory policy should take neither a solely deterrent nor a 
solely cooperative approach.  It proposes a regulatory pyramid with different 
regulatory actions to be taken when responding to the non-compliance of different 
types of organisations. 191  
The pyramid arranges enforcement strategies in a hierarchy with more 
cooperative strategies deployed at the base of the pyramid and progressively more 
punitive approaches utilised only if, and when, cooperative strategies fail. The 
pyramid recognises the three types of regulatees. First, at the base of the pyramid, 
and forming the biggest group, is the organisation or individual who is presumed to 
be willing to comply but who may be misinformed or lacks knowledge about their 
compliance obligations. Second, in the centre of the pyramid, is the organisation or 
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individual who needs incentives to comply. Third, at the top of the pyramid is the 
irrational organisation or individual or the knowing offender whose actions require a 
much heavier sanction.  
The pyramid model emphasises that most effort should be directed towards 
initiatives at the base of the pyramid, which will address the most common reasons 
for non-compliance. Escalation to responses higher in the pyramid should occur only 
when efforts to secure compliance through guidance and education have failed.  
Regulatees who demonstrate a willingness and ability to correct any harm they 
have caused and to become compliant should be treated less harshly than those who 
fail to cooperate in response.192  The regulator should go on to ‘somewhat punitive’ 
action ‘only reluctantly and only when dialogue fails, and then escalate to even more 
punitive approaches only when the more modest forms of punishment fail.’193 When 
they become willing to cooperate, the regulator should, according to Ayres and 
Braithwaite, be able to forgive a history of wrongdoing and de-escalate down the 
pyramid to less harsh enforcement.194  
To ensure the effective administration of the responsive regulatory system in 
question, it is also important to have a specific regulator in place.195  One of the main 
roles of the regulator is to provide education and guidance regarding what is required 
to be compliant, particularly where the legislative framework is principle-based.  
When used with a PBR in particular, compliance is dependent on a shared 
understanding of what the principles mean and how they are to be applied.  This 
understanding is developed through iterative and reflexive communications between 
regulator, regulatee and others as to the purpose and application of the principle.196 
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In its review of the regulatory underpinnings of the Privacy Act, the ALRC 
supported responsive regulation.  It noted its focus on achieving outcomes, calling it 
a ‘useful framework to administer a principles-based regime such as the Privacy 
Act.’197 The Ayres and Braithwaite enforcement pyramid and their contention that 
compliance is ‘most likely’ when a regulator displays an explicit enforcement 
pyramid were referred to with approval.198   
Outside the work of the ALRC, the use of a responsive approach to ensure 
compliance with the Privacy Act has been generally supported, 199 although there has 
also been some criticism about the particular way that Commissioners have elected 
to use the range of available functions and powers in pursuance of a responsive 
approach.200  The Privacy Commissioner has expressly referred to the enforcement 
pyramid as central to the OAIC’s approach to enforcement activity,201 also describing 
its enforcement approach as ‘an escalation model that includes a range of regulatory 
responses.’202 
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2.6 EXERCISE OF REGULATORY POWERS  
The responsive use of a broad range of powers means in practical terms that the 
regulator has many different options for the use of powers to secure compliance.   
In 2001, the Commissioner provided guidance on the way it intends to use its 
powers to promote compliance with the Privacy Act.203  Issued following the 
extension of the Act to private entities, the guide’s underlying premise is that the 
Commissioner will seek to strike a balance between ensuring privacy protection and 
not unduly burdening relevant organisations.204 The guide explicitly reflects a 
responsive regulatory approach, stating that the OPC’s ‘first and preferred approach 
at all times’ will be to provide advice, assistance and information, rather than 
punishment.205 In summary, the guide: 
 Outlines the process for investigating and resolving complaints;206 
 Refers to own motion investigations, providing that the OPC will take the 
same approach to OMIs as it does to complaint-based investigations;207and 
 Outlines how the Commissioner will publicly report on its use of powers.208   
In terms of the underlying principles guiding the exercise of powers, the guide 
makes only two statements.  The first is that the OPC will act in a way which is open 
and predictable.  In particular, it will ‘not take action in relation to an organisation 
without first giving it fair warning.’209  The second is that the action taken by the 
OPC will be proportional to its seriousness. Factors relevant to the assessment of the 
seriousness of any matter include the number of people affected and the disadvantage 
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they may suffer together with the ‘willingness of the organisation to take action to 
resolve the matter and to prevent recurrence.’210 This last aspect is again consistent 
with a responsive regulatory approach. 
 The ALRC referred to the regulated community’s understanding of the basis 
on which the OAIC will use its powers as fundamental to the success of the 
responsive regulatory approach.211   To assist in the community’s understanding, the 
ALRC suggested that the Commissioner publish a clear policy on the use of its 
powers.  The ALRC believed that such a policy would act as an incentive for 
compliance and would also allow the regulator to discriminate between organisations 
that were genuinely trying to comply and those that were not.212  
In terms of the exercise of its powers, the ALRC was of the view that if the 
Commissioner was both using, and seen to be using, a wide range of strategies to 
ensure compliance with the Privacy Act, the ‘benefits of specific and general 
deterrence that can be generated by a transparent, balanced and vigorous 
enforcement approach can be achieved.’213  The ALRC did not take the opportunity 
to comment on the 2001 guide. 
The ALRC’s position that the Commissioner’s powers should be exercised in a 
way which is transparent, balanced and vigorous is broadly consistent with the 
commitment to the open, predictable and proportional exercise of powers expressed 
in the 2001 guide.   
The proposition that the Commissioner’s use of its powers should be 
transparent, balanced and vigorous is also consistent with the other models for 
regulatory action. For example, Malcolm Crompton, the Australian Privacy 
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Commissioner from 1999–2004,214 proposed a framework for assessing the 
performance of privacy regulators. According to this framework, a privacy regulator 
would be assessed based on transparency, among other things, in regard to its 
enforcement and complaint-handling roles.215 Other criteria suggested by Crompton 
included independence, fairness and accountability, which arguably are part of 
transparency when applied to investigations and reporting.  These elements are 
discussed in more detail in the next section, which considers procedural fairness as 
part of transparency.   
The United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has issued a 
Data Protection Regulatory Action Policy216 that outlines the ICO’s strategy for 
ensuring compliance.  According to this policy, the UK ICO’s powers will be used 
where personal information is at risk because obligations are deliberately or 
persistently ignored, examples need to be set, or the interpretation of the law is in 
doubt.217  This policy further provides that regulatory action taken by the ICO will be 
consistent with the five principles of good regulation that UK regulatory bodies must 
have regard to: transparency, accountability, proportionality, consistency and 
targeted responses.218 The UK ICO policy expands on the idea of transparency. It 
provides that the ICO will be open regarding the regulatory action taken, making 
information about the cases pursued, their nature and the outcomes available on its 
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and Pat Barrett, ‘Commentary on Malcolm Crompton’s Paper entitled “Light Touch or Soft 
Touch?: Reflections of a regulatory implementing a new privacy regime”’ (Speech delivered at 
National Institute of Governance, University of Canberra, 18 March 2004). 
215  Ibid 6. 
216  Information Commissioner's Office, Data Protection Regulatory Action Policy Version 2.0 (UK 
Government, 2013) 
<http://ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/data-
protection-regulatory-action-policy.pdf>. 
217  Ibid 1-2. 
218  Ibid.  These five principles for measuring and improving the quality of regulation and its 
enforcement were first set out by the UK Better Regulation Task Force. Better Regulation Task 
Force, Principles of Good Regulation (UK Cabinet Office, 2003). 
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website and in its annual reports. 219 The policy also provides that, where regulatory 
action reveals problems that are common to a particular business sector or activity 
and it is apparent that there is a need for general advice on the issue in question, the 
ICO will make such advice available.220 
Within the EU, the key statement on principles of good regulation is contained 
in the Mandelkern Report221 which lists 7 ‘common principles’ of regulatory quality 
which include proportionality, transparency and accountability.222   
These guiding principles of transparency, accountability, proportionality and of 
consistency that are used by various governments to assess regulatory actions are 
consistent with the ALRC’s principles of transparency, balance and vigour.  The 
concept of proportional use of powers is synonymous with the idea of a balanced yet 
vigorous response akin to the regulatory principles inherent in PBR and responsive 
regulation.  Similarly, the idea of consistency can also be included within an 
assessment of whether the response has been balanced.   
‘Accountability’ is a little more complex.  It falls within the idea of 
transparency, at least to the extent that the Commissioner should be able to be held 
accountable for the way in which its powers have been used.  Transparency as an 
accountability mechanism introduces considerations of procedural fairness and 
reasons for decisions, which is discussed in more detail in the following section.  The 
more general question as to whether the Commissioner has acted appropriately so as 
to be held accountable having regard to the review and appeal provisions provided 
within the Privacy Act is outside the scope of this research.223 
                                                 
219  Information Commissioner's Office, above n 215.  
220  Ibid. 
221  Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation Report on Better Regulation, Final Report (European 
Commission, 13 November 2001) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/better_regulation/documents/mandelkern_report.pdf>. 
222  R Baldwin, Better Regulation: Is it better for business? (Federation of Small Business, 2007). 
223  For consideration of the accountability of the Privacy Commissioner, see the references above n 
65. 
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It is proposed that the criteria put forward by the ALRC, that the exercise of 
regulatory powers should be transparent, balanced and vigorous will be used as part 
of the conceptual framework used to assist in answering the third research question 
of this research: To what extent is the exercise of the Commissioner’s powers 
consistent with principles for the exercise of regulatory powers? 
The framework will be applied to the consideration of the use of both the 
Commissioner’s oversight powers and to the use of the investigation powers.  It will 
include, for example, consideration of the following: 
Transparency  Openness about the use of powers, including the 
reasons for the use of powers;  
 Openness about the outcomes achieved; and  
 Assistance in understanding how the Commissioner 
interprets the law. 
 
Balance  Consistency of the use of powers;  
 Proportionality of use of powers; and  
 Whether powers have been used in a targeted manner 
to address areas of greatest risk. 
 
Vigour  Frequency of the use of powers;  
 Types of powers which have been used; and 
 Timeliness of the use of powers. 
 
As already referred to, there are additional facets to the idea of transparency 
which are raised in the context of the use of the Commissioner’s investigation 
powers. In 2003, Professor Greenleaf considered how to assess the Commissioner’s 
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reporting on the use of its investigation powers.224  Two criteria were proposed for 
that assessment: first, whether the reports help interested parties understand how the 
Commissioner interprets the privacy law(s) of the jurisdiction; and second, whether 
they help all relevant parties understand the range of outcomes reached in individual 
complaints and whether those outcomes provide reasonable redress for the 
complainants, while only imposing reasonable burdens on the respondents.225  These 
criteria are consistent with ideas of transparency, particularly in regard to decision-
making, and balance.  However, in the context of the use of the investigation powers, 
they also raise questions of procedural fairness, in particular whether the 
investigation provided the complainant with reasonable redress. When considering 
the use of the investigation powers (as opposed to the oversight powers) and 
particularly the decisions made based on those investigations and the reporting of 
those decisions, additional considerations could be regarded as part of the 
transparent, balanced and vigorous use of such powers. 226   These considerations are 
covered by the broad concept that, when carrying out investigations and making and 
reporting on decisions, a regulator should act in accordance with the principles of 
procedural fairness. 
2.6.1 Procedural Fairness and the Investigation Powers 
The OAIC has acknowledged that it will use its investigation powers in 
accordance with the principles of procedural fairness.227 Administrative law texts 
                                                 
224  Reforming reporting of privacy cases, above n 65. 
225  Ibid. 
226  See, eg, Michael Head, Administrative Law Context and Critique (The Federation Press, 3rd ed, 
2012) 186; and Sarah Withnall and Michelle Evans, Administrative Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2010) Chapter 11. 
227  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Privacy Complaints and Procedures 
Manual' <http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/privacy-operational/privacy-
complaints-practice-and-procedure-manual/file-management-and-security-standards> 
(‘Complaints Manual’), 14; which includes a section headed ‘Good Decision Making and 
Procedural Fairness’. This document is no longer published on the OAIC’s website. A copy is 
available from the researcher. The OAIC’s commitment to the principles of both procedural 
fairness and good decision making was confirmed in the draft policy issued in March 2014, 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Regulatory Action Policy 
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identify three common law rules implicit in procedural fairness.228   The three 
elements or rules on which procedural fairness are based are:  
 The right to a fair hearing; 
 The bias rule; and  
 The evidence rule. 
Compliance with these same three rules is recognised by the Commissioner as 
part of the framework for its use of its investigation powers in its Complaints 
Manual.229  
2.6.1.1 The right to a fair hearing rule 
The fair hearing rule requires that a person must be allowed an adequate 
opportunity to present their case where certain interests and rights may be adversely 
affected by a decision-maker. In the OAIC’s context this is interpreted as requiring 
that the respondent be advised of the allegations in as much detail as possible, be 
advised of possible outcomes, be given the opportunity to reply to the allegations 
and, where appropriate, allowed an opportunity to comment on any proposed finding 
before the final decision is made.230   
In assessing the use by the Commissioner of its investigation powers, this 
research will consider the extent to which each respondent was: 
 Advised of the allegations; 
 Advised of the possible outcomes; 
 Given an opportunity to reply to the allegations; and 
 Allowed to comment on proposed findings before the final decision. 
                                                 
(draft)’(March 2014) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news/consultations.html#info_security> 
(‘Regulatory Powers Policy’). 
228  See, eg, Head, above n 225, 186; and Withnall and Evans, above n 225, Chapter 11. 
229  Complaints Manual above n 227, 14. 
230  Ibid. 
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2.6.1.2 The bias rule 
The second rule, the bias rule, states that no one ought to be judge in his or her 
own case.231 This requires that the deciding authority be unbiased during the hearing 
or making the decision.  Consideration of this issue is outside the scope of this 
research.  
2.6.1.3 The evidence rule 
 The third rule is that any findings must be based upon logically probative 
material.232  This is reflected in the Complaints Manual, which provides that case 
officers and decision-makers should be able to clearly point to the evidence on which 
findings are based.233   The standard of proof is the civil standard: the balance of 
probabilities, that is, that based on the evidence it is more probable than not that the 
alleged breach occurred.234 
The Complaints Manual does not provide detailed guidance about the method 
for identifying or collecting relevant evidence or how a decision is to be made by 
reference to that evidence. It does confirm that, to ensure procedural fairness, the 
‘OAIC needs to take account of all relevant considerations and needs to support its 
position with evidence or other material.’235  The Manual refers to different types of 
evidence that might be available, including copies of audit trails from computer 
systems and ‘corroborative evidence from third parties, often by way of a statutory 
declaration.’236  The Manual suggests that further evidence-collecting steps might be 
considered, depending on the response to the initial request for information sent to 
the respondent entity.  These steps might include requesting further information or 
                                                 
231   Ibid. 
232  See Head, above n 226. 
233   Complaints Manual above n 227, 14. 
234   Ibid 
235  Ibid. 
236  Ibid 17. 
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documents from the respondent or complainant or seeking independent corroboration 
from another source, for example a website, government body or third party.237 
In 2007, the Administrative Review Council (ARC) released a series of best 
practice guides designed for agencies with decision-making authority (which would 
include the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner).  These include a 
guide on the role of decision-makers when receiving evidence, determining questions 
of fact and accounting for their findings, called the ARC Evidence Guide.238 The ARC 
Evidence Guide distinguishes between material facts (facts required to be established 
by the regulator, for example, that the entity has taken reasonable steps to secure 
personal information) and relevant facts, which go towards establishing the material 
facts.  According to the ARC Evidence Guide, ‘[t]he factual findings should form a 
chain of reasoning that leads logically from relevant facts through material facts to 
the decision.’239   
The ARC Evidence Guide provides that a decision-maker such as the Privacy 
Commissioner must: 
 Determine all material questions of fact; 
 Not base a decision on a fact without evidence for that fact; and 
 Ensure that every finding of fact is based on evidence that is relevant and 
logically supports the finding.240 
Each of these criteria will be considered as part of the consideration of 
procedural fairness in the detailed review of the Commissioner’s use of its 
investigation powers in Part 3 of this research. 
The Complaints Manual does not distinguish between the evidence 
requirements in complaint-based investigations (where two parties provide evidence) 
                                                 
237  Ibid. 
238  Administrative Review Council, Decision Making: Evidence, Facts and Findings (August 2007) 
<http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Publications/Reports/Pages/Downloads/ARCBestPracticeGuide3Evi
denceFactsandFindings.aspx> (‘ARC Evidence Guide’). 
239  Ibid 2. 
240  Ibid 1. 
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versus own motion investigations (which typically only involves a respondent).  This 
possibly reflects the Manual’s focus on complaint-based investigations.  It might be 
expected that those cases where only the applicant or respondent provides evidence 
might be treated differently to more adversarial situations where opposing sides both 
put forward their own view of the facts. In own motion investigations (OMIs), it is 
likely that much of the information will be provided by the entity being investigated.  
The ARC Evidence Guide states that information provided by applicants (or 
respondents in the case of OMIs) may be used as evidence but only for ‘establishing 
facts that are likely to be true or that are not material.’241  This limitation is significant 
in OMIs and will be considered further in the analysis of the use of the investigation 
powers included in Part 3. 
2.6.1.4 Decision-making 
The right to be given reasons for a decision is considered by some as another 
strand of procedural fairness and as part of good decision-making.242 The 
Administrative Review Council supports providing reasons for a decision and 
regards it as an obligation that is part of the principles of good decision-making and 
procedural fairness.243 
The provision by the Commissioner of reasons or adequate reasons for its 
decisions has been a contentious issue. 244  The Privacy Act does not require the 
Privacy Commissioner to provide any formal statement or reasons for a decision 
                                                 
241  Ibid 4. 
242  See, eg, Head, above n 225, 186. 
243  Administrative Review Council, Decision Making: Reasons (August 2007) < 
http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/Revised+Best+Practice+Guide+4+-+Reasons+-
+24+April+2008.pdf > (‘ARC Decision Guide’). 
244  See, eg, Greenleaf, Waters and Bygrave, above n 65; Graham Greenleaf, Nigel Waters and Lee 
Bygrave, Submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy Issues 
Paper No 31, January 2007, 524.  The ALRC considered the Privacy Commissioner’s reporting, 
particularly in regard to its OMI reports, and recommended that it could be more comprehensive, 
particularly in regard to the specific details of investigation outcomes. See For your information 
above n 32, [50.17]. 
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other than where a determination is made.245    In the absence of a specific legislative 
provision to that effect, the Australian common law does not require the 
Commissioner to provide reasons for its decisions.246    However, there are 
recognised issues where decision-makers provide either no reasons, or inadequate 
reasons.  These include that:   
 Business lacks certainty about how to comply with the law; 
 Potential complainants or respondents (or their professional advisers) 
have very little information about how the Act is interpreted by the 
Commissioner, and little idea what arguments they need to raise; 
 Scholars are hampered in the development of privacy jurisprudence, 
because without decisions they have no basis for a critical analysis of 
how the Commissioner is interpreting the Act; 
 The ability of the press, consumer organisations and privacy advocates 
to keep watch on the adequacy or fairness of Privacy Commissioners' 
decisions and remedies is impeded; and 
 Privacy Commissioners are able to ‘bury their mistakes’, so that any 
misinterpretations of the law, and any failures to insist that government 
agencies and business interests provide adequate remedies in individual 
cases, are less likely to come to light. 247 
Notwithstanding that there is no obligation do so, there is evidence that the 
OAIC intends that its published case notes and OMI reports provide adequate 
reasons for decisions, at least to the extent that that can be regarded as an integral 
part of the transparency of decision-making.   
                                                 
245  Privacy Act s 55(2). 
246  See the High Court in Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, which held 
that an administrative decision-maker had no obligation at common law to give reasons for a 
decision.  Other commentators have suggested more recently that it is time for the common law 
position in Australia to change, as it has in Canada and the United Kingdom.  See Justice Chris 
Maxwell, 'Is the giving of reasons for administrative decisions a question of natural justice?' 
(2013) 20 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 76; and Justice Mark Weinberg, Adequate, 
Sufficient and Excessive Reasons (Judicial College of Victoria, 2014). 
247  Greenleaf, above n 65. 
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The OAIC has said that case notes are produced ‘to demonstrate transparency 
of decision-making.’248 The OAIC’s Guide to Producing Case Notes states that it is 
intended that published reports will illustrate the application of the privacy principles 
in common circumstances, the OAIC’s interpretation of the Act or the OAIC’s 
complaint-handling process in relation to complex or difficult investigations.249 
Similar statements are included on the OAIC’s website.250  The Commissioner has 
said that the publishing of investigation reports will provide ‘a public record of the 
OAIC's views on how privacy laws should be interpreted,’ which can ‘assist 
complainants and respondents to better understand how privacy laws will apply’ and 
increase ‘transparency in our investigation process and … help organisations and 
agencies to better understand their privacy responsibilities.’251 
The role of OMI reports in providing transparency of decision-making was 
referred to by the OAIC in its response to one of the FOI applications made as part of 
this research.  In considering whether to provide access in the interests of enhanced 
scrutiny of public decision-making, the OAIC decision-maker (determining largely 
not to provide that access) noted that the access was not necessary as ‘(t)he purpose 
of the OMI report is to provide the public with the necessary information to 
scrutinise the decision-making process.’252    
                                                 
248  See, eg, OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 38. 
249  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Guide to Producing case notes' (January 
2013) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/privacy-operational/guide-to-
producing-case-notes > (‘Guide to Producing Case Notes’). 
250  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy case notes’ (12 April 2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/privacy-case-notes>.  Case notes are 
also published on AustLII, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AICmrCN/>. Case notes of 
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Office of theAustralian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy case notes – archive’ 
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251   Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner, 'Privacy law reform: challenges and 
opportunities' (Paper presented at the Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law Conference, 23 
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<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news/speeches/timothy_pilgrim/timothy_pilgrim_emerging_challenges
_feb12.html#_ftn1>. 
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outweighed by ‘the potential for commercial damage to the third party organisations and 
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To illustrate and promote a better understanding of the application of privacy 
principles, it would be expected that the Commissioner’s published case notes and 
OMI reports would provide a clear explanation of the way the principles have been 
interpreted and applied in the particular circumstances. Similarly, it would be 
expected that that explanation would be supported by clear and logical reasons for 
the decision, grounded in findings of fact that are supported by the evidence.  Clarity 
of reasoning, based on facts that support the decision made, are all part of 
transparency of decision-making. 
Recently, the OAIC has issued a draft Regulatory Action Policy253 for 
consultation.  This draft policy provides that, when making decisions, the OAIC will 
act consistently with general principles of good decision-making, as explained in the 
ARC’s Best Practice Guides, which include ARC Best Practice Guide 4 - Reasons254 
(the ‘ARC Decision Guide’).  The ARC Decision Guide states that providing reasons 
for a decision ‘aligns with other important principles of administrative law that 
require accountability and transparency in decision- making.’255  
In determining whether the reports to be analysed later in this research meet the 
requirements for good decision-making, as part of the overarching principle of 
transparency, this research will use the direction included in the ARC Decision 
Guide.256  This Guide provides that reports should detail all the steps in the reasoning 
process, linking the facts to the decision such that a reader should be able to 
understand exactly how the decision was reached without having to guess at any 
gaps.257 To achieve this, the ARC Decision Guide provides that decisions should 
clearly contain the following: 
                                                 
potential impediment to information exchange between the OAIC and third party organisations 
in the future.’ Letter from Caren Whip, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner to 
Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013. 
253  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227. 
254  ARC Decision Guide, above n 243. 
255  Ibid 2. 
256  ARC Decision Guide, above n 243.  
257  Ibid 8 – 9. 
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 The decision, referring to the legislation that authorised the decision, the 
relevant statutory provision and those aspects which need to be resolved or 
answered, and the decision reached on those matters; 
 The findings on material facts, which should include all material facts.  When 
a finding of fact is inferred, the statement should set out the primary facts and 
the process of inference; 
 The evidence or other material on which those findings are based. This 
should include all evidence that was considered relevant, credible and 
significant in relation to each material finding of fact. The statement should 
demonstrate that each finding of fact is rationally based on evidence; and 
 The reasons for the decision, detailing all the steps in the reasoning process 
that led to the decision, linking the facts to the decision.258 
The analysis of the published reports included in this research will consider the 
extent to which those reports meet the above criteria to determine whether they 
comply with the principles of good decision-making, in addition to the elements of 
procedural fairness.  This in turn will influence the extent to which the 
Commissioner’s reports can be regarded as transparent. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Australia’s Privacy Act is based on the OECD Privacy Guidelines and included 
a principle, known as NPP 4, which required that organisations take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to protect personal information from misuse and loss and unauthorised access, 
modification and disclosure.  Similar principles form part of other privacy regimes. 
The Privacy Act is based on two regulatory approaches: principles rather than 
rules as the basis for regulation and a responsive regulatory approach to compliance.  
For the purposes of this research, the main consequences of those regulatory 
foundations are: 
                                                 
258  Ibid 7 – 9. 
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 The need for active engagement between the Commissioner as regulator and 
the regulated community to develop a shared understanding of what 
outcomes are intended by those principles and how they should be met, given 
the uncertainty of the wording of the principles; and 
 In terms of compliance, the use by the regulator of a wide range of oversight 
and investigation powers to achieve compliance in a responsive rather than a 
punitive way, with a focus on guidance and education.   
Consistent with the regulatory foundations of the Act, the Commissioner holds 
a wide range of powers which fall into two categories: 
 Oversight powers, including powers to monitor developments and undertake 
research, advise, audit, educate and issue binding and non-binding guidance; 
and 
 Investigation powers, including the power to carry out complaint-based and 
own motion investigations and to make determinations. 
The ALRC noted that it was important, given the broad range of powers 
available and the legislative reliance on a responsive regulatory approach, that the 
Commissioner exercise those powers in a way that could be regarded as transparent, 
balanced and vigorous.  These principles are broadly consistent with those proposed 
by other regulators and commentators for the effective exercise of regulatory powers.  
Accordingly, it is proposed that for the purposes of this research the appropriateness 
of the Commissioner’s use of both its oversight and its investigation powers will be 
assessed by reference to principles of transparency, balance and vigour. It was also 
noted that the idea of transparency had further facets when considered in the context 
of the use of the investigation powers. In particular, it was noted that, as part of the 
need to provide transparency, investigations and decisions should be made in 
accordance with the principles of procedural fairness and the right to receive 
adequate reasons for a decision.  When considering the adequacy of the evidence (as 
part of the consideration of procedural fairness), this research will consider whether: 
 All material questions of fact have been determined; 
 Every decision on a fact is based on evidence for that fact; and 
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 Every finding of fact is based on evidence that is relevant and that 
logically supports the finding.259 
When considering whether adequate reasons for a decision have been given in 
a report, this research will consider the following: 
 Does the decision refer to the legislation that authorised the decision, the 
relevant statutory provision and those aspects which need to be resolved or 
answered, and the decision reached on those matters; 
 Are clear findings made on all material facts; 
 Does the report refer to the evidence or other material on which those 
findings are based and is that finding of fact rationally based on evidence; and 
 Do the reasons for the decision link the facts to the decision?260 
All of these considerations will form part of the conceptual framework to be 
used in the analysis of the Commissioner’s use of its oversight and investigation 
powers to answer the third sub-question: To what extent is the exercise of those 
powers consistent with principles for the exercise of regulatory powers?  
The next chapter will consider information security best practice in Australia, 
in order to assist in answering the second sub-question: What is the relationship, if 
any, between the exercise of those powers and recognised industry practice in 
Australia?  
 
                                                 
259  ARC Evdence Guide, above n 237, 1. 
260  ARC Decision Guide, above n 242. 
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Chapter 3: Information Security  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although there is ample evidence of information security failures with the 
almost daily publication of details of new data breaches, there is only limited 
understanding outside the world of information security specialists of what is meant 
by information security and why it is so challenging. This chapter will define 
‘information security’ and explore the complexities of securing data by reference to 
the development of computing and data network technology.261  It will then consider 
how the desired outcomes of information security can best be met, by reviewing 
current industry practices and standards.  From this, a framework for an industry 
practice approach to information security will be derived. This framework will be 
used to answer the second sub-research question: What is the relationship between 
the Commissioner’s exercise of his investigation and oversight powers and 
recognised industry practice in Australia? 
3.2 DEFINITION OF ‘INFORMATION SECURITY’ 
Generally, the term ‘security’ is understood to mean the protection from 
threats.262  The most commonly used definition of information security is ‘the 
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information’ 263  where:  
                                                 
261  ‘Definitions and characterisations are significant because our view of information security and 
its management is greatly influenced by the definitions and the frameworks through which we 
categorise and sort the different contexts that we seek to secure.’ Lizzie Coles-Kemp, 
'Information security management: An entangled research challenge' (2009) 14(4) Information 
Security Technical Report 181 
262  Smedinghoff, above n77. 
263  This is the definition used in ISO 27001, above n 48. See also T Peltier, ‘Establishing business 
control for electronic mail communications’ (1998) 12 Information Systems Security 34; M 
Krauss and H Tipton, Handbook of Information Security Management (CRC Press, Boca Raton, 
Florida, 2012); Meints, above n 71. 
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 ‘Confidentiality’ is the property that information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes;264  
 ’Integrity’ means ‘the property of protecting the accuracy and completeness 
of records,’265 and  
 ‘Availability’ is ‘the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by 
an authorised entity’.266 
This definition is based on identifying the objectives of information security, 
which also include accountability, non-repudiation and authentication.267 Another 
definition, from the perspective of how security is to be achieved (rather than by 
describing security by the desired outcomes) is: 
Security is a combination of physical, logical (ICT) and personnel security 
measures designed and implemented to provide ‘defence in depth’ 
appropriate to the perceived threats/risks to the assets being secured.268  
The need to combine a range of different measures to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information is a consequence of the way 
that computer technology and computer networking (via both private networks and 
public networks such as the internet) has developed and been adopted by 
government, private enterprises and individuals. 
3.3 BACKGROUND 
The first electronic computers were developed during and immediately 
following World War II.269  These were largely stand-alone systems housed on 
                                                 
264  International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC 27000:2014 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security management systems — Overview and vocabulary, (2014), 2 
(‘ISO 27000’). 
265  Ibid 5. 
266  Ibid 2. 
 267  Qingxiong Ma, Allen C Johnston and J Michael Pearson, 'Information Security Managegement 
Objectives and Practices: A Parsimonous Framework' (2008) 16(3) Information Management & 
Computer Security 251. 
268  Australian Government Information Management Office, Commercial Service Provider 
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government premises and were used to run a single program at a time.  The main 
security risk was unauthorised access, which could be prevented by both physically 
securing the machines and limiting physical access to a small group of known 
authorised operatives.270  Developments such as the sharing of processing on the 
same system (with different people performing different tasks) introduced new risks 
by, for example, making it possible for one user to read and modify another user’s 
data.271  As a result, logical access controls (such as user identification and 
authentication) were incorporated into computing technology.  
As computers became cheaper and the benefits from automating processes 
became more widely understood, computers moved out of the defence and research 
world and into mainstream government and business use.272 These computers were 
still largely stand-alone machines that could be physically protected from 
unauthorised access, although the business requirements for the integrity of 
processing and availability of both the data and the data processing systems 
introduced new ‘security’ issues.  
The increasing general use of computers also saw new threats, with the first 
computer viruses appearing in the early 1980s, spread by diskettes, which at that time 
were the principal method for transferring information between physically remote 
                                                 
269  See, for example, William T Moye, 'ENIAC: The Army-Sponsored Revolution' 
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272  Margaret van Biene-Hershey, 'IT Security and IT Audting Betwen 1960 and 2000' in Karl de 
Leeuw, Maria Michael and Jan Bergstra (eds), The History of Information Security: A 
Comprehensive Handbook (Elsevier, 2007), 665. 
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and unconnected computer systems.273  Concerns around the spread of viruses 
highlighted the risks posed by untrained employees as well as the vulnerability of 
most systems to malicious software.274  The need for anti-virus software as well as 
appropriate training for any personnel who had access to computing equipment was 
added to other existing security measures: logical access controls, physical security 
and secure technology. 
The inefficiencies of exchanging information via diskettes were increasingly 
overcome by linking computers by networks, usually established using phone 
lines.275 These original networks were largely based on proprietary hardware and 
software (such as IBMs SNA)276, which made it difficult to establish connections 
between different types of computer systems.277  In the 1990s, to overcome the 
restrictions of proprietary networking technology, organisations started moving to 
the ARPANET network, the use of which until then had largely been limited to the 
government and research institutions.278  ARPANET was based on a non-proprietary 
protocol for transmitting data: TCP/IP.279  TCP/IP, still used today, supports the 
transmission of data packets ‘in the clear.’ This means (in the simplest sense) that 
data packets travelling across the network can be intercepted and read by anyone 
who can access any part of the network on which the packets are being transmitted.  
                                                 
273  ‘Elk Cloner’ and ‘The Brain’ are reported to be among the first viruses ever created. D PJ 
Denning, Computers under attack: intruders, worms, and viruses (Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, United States of America, 1991). 
274  See, eg, Fred Cohen ‘On the implication of computer viruses and methods of defense’ (1988) 
7(2) Computers & Security Journal 167. 
275  Laura DeNardis, ‘A History of Internet Security’, in Karl de Leeuw, Maria Michael and Jan 
Bergstra (eds), above n 271. 
276  See H. Gilbert, Introduction to SNA (2 February 1995) 
<http://www.yale.edu/pclt/COMM/SNA.HTM>. 
277  Margaret van Biene-Hershey, above n 271, 664. 
278   The APRA NET network had been developed by the ARPA, as part of a U.S. Department of 
Defense funded project to produce a redundant, reliable network which remote mainframes 
could use to communicate data in the event of a nuclear attack.  It was a response to United 
States’ concerns that it was trailing the Soviet Union in scientific research following their 
launching of the Sputnik (which justified the significant investment in research at the time), and 
a desire to ensure the preservation of command and control communications capability in the 
event of a nuclear attack. See Laura DeNardis, above n 274, 682. 
279  Ibid. “TCP/IP” means transmission control protocol and internet protocol.   
  
67 
 
TCP/IP provides interoperability, flexibility and rout-ability but is an inherently 
insecure protocol.280  However, it remains the most commonly used protocol for the 
transmission of data, with the transformation of ARPANET into the internet 
following the development of another new protocol developed in the late 1980s, 
HTTP.281   The adoption of TCP/IP led to a range of security add-ons to help protect 
data in transmission, such as encryption, as well as new architectures incorporating 
elements such as firewalls and de-militarised zones, to protect organisations from 
malicious network traffic entering and compromising their systems. The new 
interconnectedness via the internet provided an easy vector for attack by a vast range 
of adversaries against any government, organisation or individual connected to the 
ubiquitous network. It led to a whole set of new security issues, such as website 
defacements, botnets and denial of service attacks, caused by malicious actors. The 
potential for the large-scale disclosure or compromising of information as a result of 
an accident or unintentional human error increased.   
Challenges for securing computers and the information that they processed had 
been recognised as early as the 1960s.282 A project to investigate security issues 
funded by the US government resulted in a report issued in the early 1970s by the US 
Department of Defense titled Security Controls for Computer Systems, also known as 
The RAND Report.283  It recognised that computers would be the product of private 
industry, not the government, and explicitly called for a shift away from thinking of 
security purely in terms of a technology problem and hardware protection (or 
computer security) to conceiving of it more in terms of data, users, and 
                                                 
280   Andrew G Blank, TCP/IP Foundations (Sybex, Alameda, USA, 2004) 2-3. 
281  HTTP (hyper-text-transfer-protocol) supports hyperlinked pages of information distributed over 
the internet and was invented in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee, an academic looking to support 
academic research sharing.  It is the foundation of data communication on the world wide web.   
282  See, eg, the quote from Willis Ware, one of the early computer security leaders and the man 
responsible for the Rand Report (referred to below) from Jeffrey Yost, above n 270, 601. 
283  The Rand Report was produced as a result of a Task Force organized by ARPA in 1967 to study 
and recommend appropriate computer security safeguards that would protect classified 
information in multi-access, resource-sharing computer systems. The Rand Corporation, Rand 
Report R-609, Security Controls for Computer Systems (Department of Defense, February 1970) 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R609-1/index2.html> (‘The RAND Report’). 
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infrastructure.  The approach recommended in the RAND Report, which was based 
on a combination of administrative, technical and procedural security measures to 
manage the technology and the people who interact with it, has influenced the 
subsequent development of information security practice and is reflected in most of 
the current approaches to information security. Accordingly, the RAND Report is 
regarded by many as the seminal document for computer security.284   
3.4 INFORMATION SECURITY BEST PRACTICE 
As a consequence of the development of computing and networking 
technology, there is no simple solution to information security.  What is required is a 
combination of administrative, technical and procedural security measures to manage 
the technology and the people who interact with it.  For the purposes of this research, 
it is important to understand whether there exists a broadly accepted approach to 
ensuring information security that may be used as the standard or benchmark for 
determining whether reasonable steps were taken to protect personal information for 
the purposes of NPP 4.   
Consideration of the different industry approaches to information security in 
the literature has been limited almost exclusively to technical issues.285  The major 
information security standards have been compared and the parallels between them 
noted; however, there has been little detailed assessment of their relative strengths 
and weaknesses or whether they all support a generally similar approach.286  There 
has certainly been only limited consideration of information security standards in the 
legal context.287 
                                                 
284  Ibid. 
285  The absence of any extensive non-technical research into information security standards has 
been noted.  In particular, the need for more interdisciplinary review of information security, 
especially by reference to psychology and sociology theories, has been identified. See, for 
example, Coles-Kemp, above n 260. 
286  See, eg, H Susanto, M Nabil Almunawar and Yong Chee  Tuan, 'Information Security 
Management System Standards: A Comparative Study of the Big Five' (2011) 11 International 
Journal of Electrical and Computer Sciences 23; and Constantine Gikas, 'A General Comparison 
of FISMA, HIPAA, ISO 27000 and PCI-DSS Standards' (2010) 19(3) Information Security 
Journal: A Global Perspective 9. 
287  See, eg, Gifford, above n 44. 
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The following describes the most widely used of the different approaches to 
information security in Australia and internationally. 
3.4.1 General Information Security Standards 
3.4.1.1 ISO 27001 Information Security Management System 
The International Standards Organisation (ISO)288 publishes standards which 
are said to represent a consensus on current practice.  They are developed following a 
period of public enquiry and consultation, including with consumers, academia, 
special interest groups, government, business and industry.  They are designed for 
voluntary use, although they may be adopted by industry or imposed by 
governments.  ISO 27001289 and ISO 27002,290 both issued by ISO have been 
referred to as ‘the closest thing to a universal information security standard.’291  
These standards were referred to as the benchmark for reasonable security in those 
Australian texts that have considered the issue.292   
As at March 2014, the range of ISO standards relating to information security 
includes ISO 27001, ISO 27002 and ISO 27005.293 These international standards 
have been reviewed and approved for release in Australia.294   
ISO 27001 provides the specification for an information security management 
system (ISMS) against which certification by an ISO Certification body, based on the 
recommendation of an authorised third party auditor, can be granted.  The objective 
                                                 
288  ISO is a nongovernmental body, made up of representative bodies from over 160 countries.   
289  ISO 27001, above n 48. 
290 ISO 27002, above n 49. 
291  Gifford, above n 44, 193 - 194 
292  See Chapter 1.5.1 for consideration of the relevant literature. 
293  International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC 27005: 2008 Information Technology – Security 
techniques - Information Security Risk Management (2005) (‘ISO 27005’).  For more 
information on the ISO 27000 series of standards refer to the following website: 
<http://www.27000.org/iso-27005.htm>. 
294  The Joint Technical Committee IT-012 whose members include Commonwealth Attorney 
General’s Department, ABA, IIA, DOD, AEEMA and the Certification Forum of Australia, 
approves internationals standards for adoption in Australia. 
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of the standard itself is to ‘provide a model for establishing, implementing, operating, 
monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving an Information Security 
Management System.’ 295  
 
 
Figure 3: Plan Do Check Act model 
The management model proposed by ISO 27001 adopts a continual 
improvement cycle, which means that an organisation needs to regularly monitor and 
review the effectiveness and performance of its ISMS and to make improvements as 
necessary to ensure it maintains the desired level of protection.296   An example of 
this continuous improvement cycle is the Plan Do Check Act Model shown in Figure 
4.   
ISO 27001 uses risk management as the basis for the selection of controls and 
for the review of the effectiveness and performance of the system.  After identifying 
the assets that are within the system, an assessment of the information security risks 
                                                 
295  ISO  27001 above n 48, v. 
296  This process design is often referred to as the Deming Cycle, which has been established in the 
context of quality of management for more than 50 years.  The same process model is used by 
other ISO management standards such as ISO 9001 (Quality Management System), ISO 14001 
(Environmental Management System) and ISO/IEC 20000-1 (IT Service Management). 
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to those assets is undertaken.   ‘Information security risk’ is defined in ISO 27005 as 
the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of 
assets and thereby cause harm.297 
Once the risks have been assessed and prioritised for action, a system of 
controls must be selected to ‘manage’ those risks. The controls, which must be 
customised to the needs of each individual organisation within the context of an 
organisation’s overall business risks, should be selected from all sources then 
compared to the list in ISO 27001 Annex A and ISO 27002 for the sake of 
completeness.298  
ISO 27001 Annex A and ISO 27002 contains 14 control areas and 114 separate 
controls.  The 14 control areas are: 
 Security policy;  
 Organisation of information security; 
 Asset management (which includes classification);  
 Human resources security; 
 Physical and environmental security; 
 Operations management; 
 Access controls; 
 Cryptographic controls; 
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance; 
 Communications security; 
 Supplier management; 
 Information security incident management; 
                                                 
297  ISO 27005, above n 293, 1. 
298  ISO 27001, above n 48, 4. See also Gikas, above n 285. 
72  
 Business continuity management; and 
 Compliance. 
ISO 27001 is the most commonly referred to information security standard, but 
it is not without its critics.299  Criticisms include that the standard is outdated (it is 
based on an approach to security management and a body of text created over twenty 
years ago),300 that the focus on outputs supports the perception that the standard can 
be applied ‘mechanistically’301 and that it fails to recognise the importance of 
specific organisational and societal factors.302  
Other international standards relevant to information security, in addition to the 
ISO 27000 series of standards, are detailed below. 
3.4.1.2 OECD guidelines for the security of information systems and networks 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) first 
published guidelines for the security of information systems and networks in 1992.303  
They were updated and reissued in 2002 as part of the five-yearly review cycles.304  
                                                 
299  Cath Everett, 'Is ISO 27001 worth it?' (2011) 2011(1) Computer Fraud & Security 5; and Alan 
Gillies, 'Improving the quality of information security management systems with ISO 27000' 
(2011) 23(4) The TQM Journal 367, which examines the barriers to adoption of ISO 27001 and 
refers to costs, particularly those of consultants as one of the issues.   
300  David Lacey, ‘Security: Best practice or ancient ritual?’ ComputerWorld UK (online), 12 
January 2011<http://www.computerworlduk.com/in-depth/security/3256436/security-best-
practice-or-ancient-ritual/#>. 
301  The validity of the guidelines by appeal to common practice has also been questioned.  See 
Mikko Siponen and Robert Willison, 'Information security management standards: Problems and 
solutions' (2009) 46(5) Information & Management 267. 
302  Coles-Kemp, above n 260.  But also see, eg, R Werlinger, K Hawkey and K Beznosov, 'An 
integrated view of human, organizational, and technological challenges of IT security 
management' (2009) 17(1) Information Management & Computer Security 4, which undertakes 
a study to determine the main challenges that IT security practitioners face in their 
organizations, including the interplay among human, organizational and technological factors. 
303  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks Recommendation of the OECD Council at its 22nd  Session 
on 14 – 15 October 1992 (OECD, 1992) 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesforthesecurityofinformationsystems199
2.htm.>. A review in 1997 determined that the Guidelines did not need to be updated at that 
time.   
304   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for the Security 
of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security  Recommendation of the 
OECD Council at its 1037th Session on 25 July 2002 
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Driven by both the growing ubiquity of networks and the events of 11 September 
2001,305 the updated Guidelines recognised the increased interconnectivity of 
systems and consequently the need to develop a ‘culture of security’ which 
represented a new way ‘of thinking and behaving when using and interacting within 
information systems and networks.’306   The adoption of the 2002 Guidelines marked 
a switch from a ‘risk avoidance’ model for the security of previously isolated and 
siloed information systems, to a ‘risk assessment and management’ approach.  There 
are clear parallels between the 2002 OECD Security Guidelines and the risk-based 
management system specified in ISO 27001.  Both provide a framework for 
organisations to manage security issues in accordance with their own risk appetites.  
However, there is little consideration of external factors in the OECD Security 
Guidelines, although they do refer to basic principles such as acting ethically.  
The OECD has also done important work around cryptography, recognising 
that the ‘use of effective cryptography in a network environment can help protect the 
privacy of personal information and the secrecy of confidential information.’307 The 
use of encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information and also 
non-repudiation and authentication makes encryption an important security 
control.308 
                                                 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/oecdguidelinesforthesecurityofinformationsystem
sandnetworkstowardsacultureofsecurity.htm  (‘OECD Security Guidelines’).  See also 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Review of the 2002 Guidelines 
(OCED, 2012) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/Security%20guidelines%20review.pdf>, 35-
36. 
305  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Role of the 2002 Guidelines: 
Towards Cybersecurity for an Open and Interconnected Economy (OECD Digital Economy 
Papers No 209, OECD Publishing, 2012 ) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8zq930xr5j-en at 36>. 
306  OECD Security Guidelines, above n 304  
307  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Recommendation of the Council 
concerning Guidelines for Cryptography Policy 27 March 1997 - C(97)62/FINAL. 
308  See, eg, Section 10 Cryptography of ISO 27001, above n 48, 14  which refers to the use of 
cryptographic controls ‘to protect the confidentiality, authenticity and/or integrity of 
information.’ 
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Unfortunately, though useful at a high level and supported by other 
publications, the OECD Security Guidelines do not offer the same level of detailed 
operational guidance as ISO 27001 or even CobiT, which is probably the second 
most widely used security management system.  The 2002 OECD Security 
Guidelines are currently under review.309 
3.4.1.3 CobiT 
A different approach to ISO 27001 is provided by CobiT (from ‘Control 
Objectives for Information Technology’), which is a widely used management 
framework for information security.  Developed by the Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (ISACA), it is a non-technical framework that divides a list 
of suggested controls into four phases or domains dealing with ‘Planning and 
Organisation (PO)’, ‘Acquisition and Implementation (AI)’, ‘Development and 
Support (DS)’ and ‘Monitoring and Evaluation (ME)’.  It has a broader scope than 
ISO 27001 in that it is concerned with the governance of all information technology 
but, like ISO 27001, is concerned with an overall approach rather than the 
specification of granular procedures.310    Similar to ISO 27002, CobiT contains a 
series of control recommendations that support the high level requirements (equating 
to the ISO 27001 system requirements).  Information security controls recommended 
include, for example: 
 Ensuring information security is managed at the highest level of the 
organisation and in line with business requirements;  
 Identifying security requirements based on a risk analysis and compliance 
requirement and reflecting this as a documented set of policies and 
procedures; and  
 Ensuring these are properly implemented and communicated to all users and 
shareholders. 
                                                 
309  Roger Clarke, Challenges Facing the OECD's Revised Security Guidelines (2013) 
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/SOS/OECDS-1311.html>. 
310  Gifford, above n 44, 197. 
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CobiT is probably best thought of as a complementary system to the ISO 
27001-based management system, providing additional support in the design of the 
management system through its governance and auditability focus. 
3.4.1.4 Payment Card Industry — Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) 
By contrast, the Payment Card Industry–Data Security Standard (PCI–DSS)311 
is a mixture of principles, guidance and prescriptive requirements backed up by a 
system of private incentives and penalties. The PCI-DSS was developed by the 
founding payment brands of the PCI Security Standards Council, including American 
Express, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa Inc. International, to help improve the 
security of credit card holder data (and to reduce losses and reputational damages 
through fraudulent credit card usage.)   
It is an example of an industry addressing its own data security needs.  
Compliance with the PCI-DSS is a matter of contract enforced between the credit 
card companies, the banks and the merchants.  There is the possibility of significant 
penalties being imposed for failure to comply with the PCI-DSS if a breach of 
security occurs, together with termination of the right to process credit card 
payments, which operate as significant incentives for compliance by merchants and 
other organisations that process credit card payments. 
The PCI-DSS provides a general set of security requirements that can be 
customised for each organisation, including requirements for security management, 
policies, procedures, network architecture, software design, and other critical 
protective measures.  It is based on the implementation of 6 security principles that 
include 12 high-level security requirements, which are themselves supported by over 
100 more detailed controls.  The 6 principles are: 
 Build and maintain a secure network; 
 Protect cardholder data; 
                                                 
311  Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard version 3.0’, 2013 
<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3.pdf>. 
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 Maintain a vulnerability management program; 
 Implement strong access control measures; 
 Regularly monitor and test networks; and 
 Maintain an information security policy. 
The standards specified in PCI-DSS are different to the 14 domains in ISO 
27001 and the supporting controls in ISO 27002.  The PCI-DSS principles are not 
sequential or linear and vary in nature, scope and granularity.  ‘Some ... are 
prescriptive while others ... are normative in the sense that they leave the particular 
means of implementing protection and security to the entity responsible for 
compliance.’312 
In addition to specifying security standards, the PCI-DSS program includes 
requirements for regular third party testing and independent audits of compliance, 
depending on the number of transactions processed by merchants.  The results of 
these audits must be submitted to the PCI-DSS Council on a regular basis.  As stated, 
failure to comply can lead to fines and, ultimately, loss of the right to process credit 
card transactions.  The mandatory monitoring of compliance with the standard by the 
PCI-DSS Council is one of the differentiators of this standard from ISO 27001, 
where certification of compliance by an independent auditor is a voluntary option. 
3.4.2 Australia Government Information Security Management 
Both the Federal and the State governments have developed approaches to 
secure the information held in government-controlled systems. 
Australian Federal government agencies are covered by a specially designed 
framework comprised of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) 313 and 
                                                 
312  Edward A. Morse and Vasant Raval, 'PCI DSS: Payment card industry data security standards in 
context' (2008) 24(6) Computer Law & Security Review 540, 550 – 551. 
313  The Commonwealth Attorney‐General sets Government’s protective security policy and has 
released the Protective Security Policy Framework, in pursuance of that responsibility. Attorney 
General, Protective Security Policy Framework Securing Government business (Attorney 
General’s Department 2010) (‘PSPF’).   
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the Information Security Manual (ISM).314   Although not binding on private 
organisations, these documents are of interest because they are stated to represent 
best practice in mitigating or minimising the threat to Australian government 
systems.315  
The ISM is based on a series of high-level principles which are supported by a 
detailed controls manual.  The first principle is information security risk 
management, which supports agencies making informed, risk-based decisions 
specific to their unique environments, circumstances and risk appetite (subject to the 
implementation of a number of controls which are stated to be mandatory).316 The 
ISM defines risk as the chance of something happening that will affect objectives. 
Risk is measured in terms of event likelihood and consequence. 317 The other 
principles refer to: 
 Roles and responsibilities; 
 Information security documentation (including security policy); 
 Information security monitoring;  
 Physical security;  
 Personnel security; and 
 Communications infrastructure.318  
                                                 
314  The ISM is published by the Australian Signals Directorate pursuant to the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 (Cth).  It is made up of a number of different publications including  ISM Principles, 
above n 8; Australian Signals Directorate, Australian Government Information Security Manual 
- Controls  (April 2013) 
<http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Information_Security_Manual_2014_Controls.pdf> (‘ISM 
Controls’).  
315  ISM Principles, above n 8, 12 
316  An example of how the selection of controls would typically be couched as responsive to risk 
assessment outcomes is the first control objective specified in the Australian Government 
Information Security Manual: ‘Agencies select and implement information security controls 
from the ISM as part of a formal risk management process.’ ISM Principles, above n 8, 1. 
317  ISM Principles, above n 8, 63. 
318  Ibid 12 – 34. 
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In addition, there is a range of more technology-specific principles dealing with 
topics including product security, media security, software security, email security, 
network security and cryptography.319 
The approach and content of the ISM is closely related to that of the two main 
international standards for information security, ISO 27001 and ISO 27002.  Given 
this closeness, the ISM can be taken to represent the implied approval by the 
Australian Government of those standards generally as the preferred approach to 
information security management.  As noted by the Victorian Government, which 
itself adopts the PSPF and the ISM for Victorian Government agencies, the PSPF 
and ISM are based on the ISO 27000-series standards and the ISM itself is a 
developed version of ISO 27002, offering a ‘more substantive set of controls ... with 
qualitative and evidence-based control recommendations.’320 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the regulator of 
Australia’s financial services industry, is one of Australian’s best known regulators, 
with a wide remit including banks, credit unions and superannuation funds.321  In 
2010 it published a Prudential Practice Guide on the management of security risk in 
information and information technology (IT) (PPG 234).322  Similar to the ISM and 
the ISO 27001 risk-based approach to information security management, PPG 234 
supports the development of an IT security risk framework, which is to be regularly 
reviewed to ensure compliance and effectiveness, using a principles-based approach 
to provide flexibility for compliance by regulated organisations.  However, unlike 
                                                 
319  Ibid 37 – 60. 
320  The Victorian Government standards include Victorian Government Chief Technology 
Advocate, SEC POL 01 Information Security Management Policy - 2012 version 201 (Victorian 
Government CIO Council, 1 October 2012) < http://www.digital.vic.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SEC-POL-01-Information-Security-Management-Policy1.pd>, 2. 
321   According to APRA’s website, APRA oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, general 
insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance, friendly societies, and most members of the 
superannuation industry. APRA is funded largely by the industries that it supervises. It was 
established on 1 July 1998. Australia Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘About APRA’ (7 
January 2014) <http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Default.aspx>. 
322  Australia Prudential Regulation Authority, PPG 234 -  Management of security risk in 
information and information technology (1 February 2010) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/PPG_PPG234_MSRIT_012010_v7.pdf>  
(‘PPG 234’). 
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ISO 27001 and ISO 27002, it identifies areas of risk specific to the institutions 
regulated by APRA where it expects that specific controls should be implemented, 
including: 
 User training and awareness;  
 Access control;  
 IT asset life-cycle management;  
 Monitoring and incident management process; and 
 IT security reporting and assurance mechanism. 
Although differing in the high level control areas which are identified, the 
broad approach of recommending a risk assessment framework for the selection and 
review of security controls is consistent with the information security management 
approach specified in ISO 27001.  
The State Governments in Australia have adopted different approaches to 
ensuring the security of the information that they hold, however, they all reference 
ISO 27001 and ISO 27002 to some degree.  The New South Wales Government has 
long supported compliance with ISO 27001 and IS0 27002. 323  The Queensland 
Government has re-issued a modified version of ISO 27001 as an ‘information 
standard’324 and the Victorian Government in 2012 adopted the Commonwealth 
                                                 
323  In 2001, NSW Premiers Circular No. 2001 – 46 required agencies ‘to have their IT systems 
certified to the national standard AS/NZS 4444 information security management when 
accredited certifiers become available’  (see Premier and Cabinet, M1999-19 Applicability of 
Memoranda and Circulars to State Owned Corporations. (NSW Government, 2001).  This 
advice was updated by NSW Government’s Digital Information Security Policy 2012 covering 
the NSW public sector (Premier and Cabinet, MD2012-15 Digitial Informatin Security Policy 
(NSW Government, November 2012) < 
http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/146688/Digital_Information_Security_P
olicy_2012.pdf> , 4 - 6  The Policy expressly refers to ISO 27001 and ISO 27002, including the 
requirement to have a risk based ISMS in place that incorporates a minimum set of controls.  
Organisations covered by the policy must be independently certified to be compliant with ISO 
27001 (as from June 30, 2014), they must also provide an annual attestation to compliance as 
part of the body’s annual report (from June 30, 2014).   . 
324  Queensland Chief Information Office, Queensland Government Information Standard 18: 
Information Security,  (Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the 
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Government’s PSPF and ISM, which both incorporate the fundamentals of ISO 
27001 and ISO 27002.325 
3.4.3 Best practices approach to information security 
The most prominent Australian government and regulator guidance and 
industry standards relating to information security have been briefly reviewed.  The 
next question is whether any general propositions that could be used as the basis for 
describing a methodology for determining objectively what is reasonable in terms of 
securing personal information for the purposes of NPP 4 can be derived from those 
different approaches. 
The comparison of the different approaches indicates that they all incorporate 
risk assessment to some extent together with some sort of iterative process-based 
management approach (including monitoring and review).326   Accordingly, these 
two elements should be included in any ‘standard’ approach to information security 
management. 
There is not as great a commonality in terms of the different types of security 
controls that are recommended to be implemented to address identified risks, 
although there is significant overlap.  Further review of the different standards 
suggests that the most commonly recommended categories of security controls are: 
 Personnel security (including training and user awareness); 
 Physical security; 
 Access controls; 
                                                 
Arts, December 2012)  < http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/549-
information-security/2704-information-security-is18policy>. 
325   Victorian Government standards include Victorian Government Chief Technology Advocate, 
SEC STD 01 Information Security Management Framework version 3.1 (Victorian Government 
CIO Council, 1 October 2012) < http://www.digital.vic.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SEC-STD-01-Information-Security-Management-Framework.pdf>. 
326  The need for a process in addition to risk is recognised outside the information security 
management standards, see e.g.,  K Bamberger, 'Technologies of Compliance: Risk and 
Regulation in the Digital Age' (March 2010) 88(4) Texas Law Review 815, 816; Kevin Cronin, 
'Best Practice and the State of Information Security ' (2010) 84 Chicago-Kent Law Review 8.  It 
has been suggested that a process based approach is part of the legal duty to take reasonable care 
to secure date in the United States: Smedinghoff, above n 77. 
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 Communications and network security; 
 Information systems acquisition, maintenance and development; and 
 Compliance. 
Within each of these controls areas, different standards recommend different 
controls, with different degrees of specificity. Most approaches do not require the 
implementation of any particular control although there are some that are more 
prescriptive, such as the ISM and PCI-DSS.  Given the earlier discussion about the 
complexities of information security and the need for multi-layered levels of defence, 
it is not surprising that most of the standard approaches to information security are 
not prescriptive regarding the specific controls that need to be in place, and refer 
instead to general domains where controls should be considered.  This is a 
consequence of the determination of the detailed types of controls to be implemented 
being an outcome of the risk assessment process, rather than a mandatory 
requirement.  As already mentioned, all the main standards (even those that include 
some mandatory controls such as the ISM and the PCI DSS) incorporate some 
reference to the need for a risk-based framework for the identification and 
implementation of security measures as part of an overarching information security 
management system.  Accordingly, it could be said that general industry practice 
does not require that any particular security controls necessarily are in place, but it 
does suggest a range of different domains from which controls should be selected as 
part of a defence in-depth approach. 
In summary, it is contended that there is a standard practice approach to 
information security, which is comprised of three interlinking components: 
 The use of risk assessment as the basis for the identification of risks to assets 
and for the selection of security safeguards to manage that risk.  The risk 
identification process should include the consideration of threats and 
vulnerabilities;  
 The selection of security safeguards, including administrative controls (such 
as policies and personnel-related controls), physical and technical security 
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controls to manage the risks identified as part of the risk assessment and of 
the recurring process of review and re-calibration of the security system; and 
 The adoption of an iterative monitoring, review and improvement process 
that incorporates the risk assessment outcomes and regular monitoring and 
testing to ensure that the security safeguards remain appropriate for the 
management of the identified risks. 
3.4.3.1 Information security and risk management 
Given the importance of risk assessment and of an iterative management 
process to this standard practice approach to information security, it is appropriate to 
consider information security risk management in more detail. 
Information security risk management is the overall process that integrates the 
identification and analysis of information security risks to which an organisation is 
exposed, the assessment of the potential impact on the organisation, and the decision 
regarding the action to be taken to accept, eliminate or reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level.  It requires a comprehensive identification and evaluation of the 
organisation’s information assets, the identification of risks to those assets (based on 
vulnerabilities and threats), the likelihood of occurrence and the consequences of 
those risks, and an assessment of the different risk treatments.327   
The typical risk management process is illustrated by the flowchart in  
Figure 4, and incorporates the following: 
 Risk assessment; 
 Risk treatment; and 
 Risk acceptance. 
                                                 
327    Kevin J. Soo  Hoo, How much is enough? A risk-management approach to computer security 
(Working Paper, Stanford University, CA, 2000) <http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/11900/soohoo.pdf.>  See also CISA, CISA Review Manual 2006, ISACA 
2006.  See also ISO 27001, above n 48, Section 4.2.1(d) which requires the identification of 
threats and vulnerabilities to organisational assets as part of establishing an ISMS 
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Figure 4: Standard risk management process 
Risk assessment is the first step in the risk management process and is itself 
made up of the following steps: 
 Risk identification; 
 Risk estimation; and 
 Risk evaluation. 
For the purposes of this research, it is the process of risk assessment and 
treatment that is the most important because these set the objective standard that 
should be applied in particular circumstances. 
3.4.3.2 Risk identification and evaluation 
Information security risk assessment is different to other risk assessment in that 
it incorporates the actual identification of risks.  ISO 27005 defines ‘information 
security risk’ as the potential for a threat to exploit a vulnerability, and notes that it is 
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measured in terms of a combination of the likelihood of an event and its 
consequences.328 A threat is only worth considering if there is a vulnerability that can 
be exploited by the threat.  Information security risks are identified through a 
consideration of threats and the weaknesses they may be able to exploit.  Reflecting 
this relationship between threat and vulnerability, information security risks are often 
described by the following formula:  
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability329  
Accordingly, the identification of threats and vulnerabilities is a key part of 
information security risk assessment. 
Threat source is an important consideration when identifying possible threats.  
Sources include: 
 Human acts — intentional and accidental; 
 Technical failure; and 
 Physical and environmental factors (including fire, storm and flood). 
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses which may be exploited by a threat.  Examples 
of vulnerabilities include unpatched software, weak passwords, databases with 
limited access controls in place and the ability to connect unprotected devices to a 
network. Having identified a risk in terms of a threat and an exploitable vulnerability, 
the likelihood of that risk occurring is then assessed, as is an evaluation of the harm 
that will be caused if the risk occurs.  
Risk assessment generally, and information security risk assessment in 
particular, is a complex area. For the purposes of this research, however, further 
consideration of information security risk assessment is not undertaken.  The key 
                                                 
328  ISO 27005, above n 293, 1. 
329  ISO 27005, above n 293, 10 - 13 refers to the identification of threats and vulnerabilities as part 
of the risk identification stage.  National Information Assurance Training and Education Center 
defines risk in the IT field as ‘the loss potential that exists as the result of threat-vulnerability 
pairs.  Reducing either the threat or the vulnerability reduces the risk.’  NIST SP 800-30 defines 
risk as ‘a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a particular potential 
vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organisation.’  A more 
comprehensive definition of ‘risk’ that also included an evaluation of risk would also include 
consideration of the likelihood of occurrence and the impact if the risk did occur. 
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understanding is that risks must be identified and quantified, which is typically 
achieved by consideration of threats and vulnerabilities together with likelihood of 
occurrence and consequence, having regard to the particular circumstances of the 
organisation undertaking the assessment. 
3.4.3.3 Risk treatment 
One of the main issues for effective risk treatment is the question of how to 
select the most ‘appropriate’ risk treatment once the risk has been identified.  This is 
the third element of the standard approach to information security adopted by this 
research. Risk treatment options include avoidance, transfer, mitigation and 
acceptance. Mitigation is the most commonly used technique and is usually achieved 
by the selection of different security measures or ‘controls.’ Traditionally, risk 
treatments are selected on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. However, this method 
of selection is being challenged by more sophisticated modelling, for example, the 
calculation of a perceived composite risk330 or use of a quantitative analysis of 
different security measures that counteract individual risks by identifying 
information processes within an organisation (and the target security levels for all the 
identified core business processes) and the potential threats.331  Whatever method is 
used, the outcome of the risk assessment phase will guide the risk treatment phase by 
informing: 
 The type of security measure that should be in place, by reference to the 
nature of the risk, and the underlying threat and vulnerability pair; and 
 The ‘depth’ of the controls that should be in place, which should be 
based on the level of risk. 
For example, if the identified risk is the accidental disclosure of customers’ 
personal financial records through the loss of back-up tapes, then the security 
                                                 
330  Lawrence D. Bodin, Lawrence A. Gordon and Martin P. Loeb, 'Information security and risk 
management' (2008) 51(4) Communications of the ACM 64. 
331  Bojanc Rok Bojanc, Borka Jerman-Blažič and Metka Tekavčič, 'Managing the investment in 
information security technology by use of a quantitative modeling' (48) 6 Information 
Processing & Management , 1031. 
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measures that might be considered to reduce that risk could include back-up tape 
encryption, a defined process for the secure transfer of tapes to secure off-site storage 
locations, capability review of any third party involved in the transfer and off-site 
storage process and additional contractor and employee awareness training. The 
presence or absence of these controls, assessed in the context of the organisation’s 
risk profile, should guide the determination of whether ‘reasonable security’ 
measures were in place.  The type, number and extent of the controls that should be 
in place will be linked to the level of the evaluated risk in the specific circumstances, 
and the cost and ease of implementation of the relevant safeguards.  Accordingly, it 
is difficult to assess the appropriateness of any security measure or system without an 
understanding of the specific risk environment. 
It is worth reiterating that there is no silver bullet approach to information 
security. Effective security is based on interwoven measures covering people, 
processes and technology.  This web of mutually supporting security controls is often 
referred to as ‘defence in depth’ where controls are selected and implemented in a 
layered model, building multiple defences as part of an interlocking system.  The 
‘defence in depth’ approach can be described the diagram in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 5: Defence in depth332 
Although there are a number of recognised domains from which security 
measures can be selected, there is no single security control that, by itself, could be 
regarded as providing reasonable security. Conversely, the absence of a security 
control will not necessarily be fatal to the assessment of whether reasonable security 
measures have been taken.  The answer will depend on both the specific risk 
environment and the other security controls in place.   
The use of risk assessment as the underlying approach for information security 
management is not without issues. One of the problems is the absence of reliable data 
on the number and costs of attacks, intrusions and security breaches and the costs and 
the ease of implementing security controls. 333  Other issues include the different and 
personal perceptions of risk that make it difficult to use as an organisation-wide 
standard.334  However, in the absence of more widely adopted approaches to 
information security management, this research will proceed on the basis that the 
standard practice is to use a risk-based approach. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In summary, information security practice is well developed although perhaps 
not well understood in the legal sphere.  It is complex and challenging because of the 
inherent insecurities in the computer and networking technology used to collect, 
process, store and transmit electronic information, and the human interaction with 
that technology, and because of the wide range of threats to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of that information. 
                                                 
332  ARGis Resources, ‘Security Principles’ < 
http://resources.arcgis.com/en/communities/enterprise-gis/01n200000030000000.htm>. 
333  Kathryn Picanso, 'Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification 
Law' (October, 2006) 75 FORDHAM L. REV.  355, 360. 
334  Hyeun-Suk Rhee, Young U. Ryu and Cheong-Tag Kim, 'Unrealistic optimism on information 
security management' (2012) 31(2) Computers & Security 221; C. Parker, 'Twenty years of 
responsive regulation: An appreciation and appraisal' (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 2  
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Based on an analysis of common approaches to information security, it is 
contended that a standard practice approach to ensuring reasonable information 
security can be identified.  This standard practice approach is comprised of three 
interlinking components: 
 Risk: The use of risk assessment as the basis for the identification of risks to 
assets, and the selection of security safeguards to manage that risk.  The risk 
identification process should include the consideration of threats and 
vulnerabilities; 
 Security measures: The selection of security safeguards including 
administrative controls (such as policies and personnel-related controls), 
physical and technical security controls to manage both the risks identified as 
part of the risk assessment and the recurring process of review and re-
calibration of the security system; and 
 Process-based approach: The adoption of an iterative improvement process 
that incorporates the risk assessment outcomes and regular monitoring and 
testing to ensure that the security safeguards remain appropriate for the 
management of the identified risks. 
This approach to information security practice will be used as part of the 
conceptual framework for the assessment of the exercise by the Commissioner of its 
powers in relation to industry practice. It will help answer the second sub-question: 
How has the Privacy Commissioner exercised its powers in regard to NPP 4 by 
reference to an industry practice approach to information security?   
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Chapter 4: Method of Analysis and Data 
Collection 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The functions and powers available to the Commissioner were outlined in 
Chapter 2 as part of the broad consideration of the Privacy Act provisions.  It was 
identified that the Commissioner’s functions and powers included both oversight 
powers (such as monitoring, advice, audit, education and guidance) and investigation 
powers.  The principles used to guide the exercise of those powers were then 
considered.  It was determined that an appropriate lens for assessing the exercise by 
the Commissioner of those powers would be one that considered the extent to which 
that exercise could be regarded as transparent, balanced and vigorous.  Accordingly, 
the principles of transparency, balance and vigour are used to answer the third sub-
question posed in this research: To what extent is the exercise of the Commissioner’s 
powers in regard to NPP 4 consistent with the principles for the exercise of 
regulatory powers? 
A standard approach to information security that is based on an analysis of 
both industry and government approaches to information security was developed in 
Chapter 3.  This approach is used as the second part of the conceptual framework for 
the analysis of the data in this research to help answer the second sub-question: How 
has the Privacy Commissioner exercised its powers in regard to NPP 4 by reference 
to an industry practice approach to information security?   
The relationship between the two concepts forming the basis for the conceptual 
framework (that is, consistency with an industry practice approach to information 
security and the transparent, balanced and vigorous exercise of powers) and the 
overarching research question to be answered by this research (that is, how 
appropriate was the Commissioner’s exercise of powers) is described in the diagram 
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included in Figure 1: Framework to assess what is an appropriate regulatory 
response to NPP 4.335 
This Chapter provides more detail in regard to the data collected for analysis 
and the process of collection used to support this research. 
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
Part 2 of this research contains the detailed analysis of the oversight functions 
that are available to the Commissioner and the way that those functions have been 
exercised in regard to NPP 4. This analysis involved consideration of data gathered 
from various sources including annual reports; guidance, fact sheets and guidelines; 
audit reports; speeches; media releases and other public statements issued by the 
Commissioner and the OAIC.  Detailed consideration has also been given to the case 
notes and OMI reports published by the OAIC and its predecessor, the OPC, to the 
extent they represent guidance issued by the Commissioner. 
The same approach is used in the analysis of the Commissioner’s exercise of 
its investigation powers, which is included in Part 3 of this research.  This analysis 
focuses on the process used in the conduct of investigations and the reports issued by 
the Commissioner at the conclusion of investigations.  
To support the analysis of the Commissioner’s use of the investigations 
powers, 6 investigations, all of which related to NPP 4, are selected for more detailed 
consideration. Reports based on these investigations were published between 
February 2011 and July 2012.  The 6 investigations considered in detail are: 
1. Vodafone Hutchinson Australia Own Motion investigation (February 
2011)336 (‘Vodafone OMI’); 
2. Telstra Corporation Limited Own Motion Investigation (July 2011) 
(‘Telstra Mail Out OMI’);337 
                                                 
335  See Chapter1. 
336  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Vodafone Hutchinson Australia Own 
Motion Investigation (16 February 2011) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/vodafone-hutchison-australia> (‘Vodafone 
OMI Report’). 
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3. Sony PlayStation Network/Qriocity Own Motion Investigation (September 
2011) (‘Sony OMI’);338 
4. Telstra Corporation Limited: Own Motion Investigation (July 2012) 
(‘Telstra Bundles OMI’);339 
5. Dell Australia and Epsilon: Own Motion Investigation (June 2012) 
(‘Dell/Epsilon OMI’);340 and 
6. Medvet Science Pty Ltd Own Motion Investigation (July 2012) (‘Medvet 
OMI’)341. 
These 6 investigations were part of a series of 8 investigations, reports on 
which were issued by Timothy Pilgrim as Privacy Commissioner between February 
2011 and April 2013, and all of which investigations included consideration of 
potential breaches of NPP 4 (or IPP 4, the equivalent applying to Commonwealth 
agencies).342  The 6 cases selected are representative of the 8 investigations completed 
                                                 
337  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Telstra Corporation Limited Own Motion 
Investigation (7 July 2011) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/telstra-corporation-limited-telstra> (‘Telstra 
Mail Out OMI Report’). 
338  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Sony PlayStation Network/Qriocity Own 
Motion Investigation (29 September 2011) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/sony-playstation-network-qriocity>  (‘Sony 
OMI Report’). 
339  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Telstra Corporation Limited: Own Motion 
Investigation (July 2012) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/telstra-corporation-limited > (‘Telstra Bundles 
OMI Report’). 
340  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Dell Australia and Epsilon: Own Motion 
Investigation (June 2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/commissioner-
initiated-investigation-reports/dell-australia-and-epsilon> (‘Dell/Epsilon OMI Report’). 
341  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Medvet Science Pty Ltd Own Motion 
Investigation (July 2012) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/medvet-science-pty-ltd-own-motion-
investigation-report>(‘Medvet OMI Report’). 
342  A list of all of the OMI Reports that have considered NPP 4 is included in Appendix B.  Reports 
from OMIs conducted by the OAIC are published online.  See Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Commissioner Initiated Investigation Reports (30 June 2014) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-
reports/>. 
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during that time.  They involve a range of different private sector respondents, 
different types of security incidents and different findings regarding breach of NPP 4. 
The 2 OMI Reports not considered as part of this research were excluded on the 
following basis: 
 Professional Services Review Agency: Own Motion Investigation 
(December 2011):343  This investigation involves the review of a 
government agency and consideration of IPP 4, rather than NPP 4.  As 
referred to in Chapter 1.4, consideration of public entities’ obligations 
pursuant to IPP 4 is outside the scope of this research; 
 First State Super Trustee Corporation: Own Motion Investigation (June 
2012).344 This investigation related to a superannuation fund member 
reporting a web application error.  The case turned more on the question of 
whether or not there had been a disclosure (given that it was a member of 
the fund who had identified the issue and accessed other members’ 
personal information), rather than issues relating to NPP 4. 
Data considered relevant to these investigations included the published OMI 
reports, media releases and statements issued by the OAIC together with information 
from the OAIC’s investigation files accessed pursuant to two Freedom of 
Information Act 1982(Cth) requests, both of which are discussed further in the next 
section. 
Since April 2013, the Commissioner has issued further reports on completed 
investigations regarding NPP 4.345  These reports have not been considered in this 
research because they were issued after the researcher had submitted the request for 
access to records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 
                                                 
343  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Professional Service Revew Agency: Own 
Motion Investigation (15 December 2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/professional-services-review-agency>. 
344  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, First State Super Trustee Corporation: 
Own Motion Investigation <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/first-state-super-trustee-corporation-own-
motion-investigation-report> (‘First State Super OMI Report’). 
345  See Appendix B for a full list of OMI reports published by the OAIC, current as at July 2014. 
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4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
Data was gathered from a number of different relevant primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources included case law and legislative material including 
legislation, draft bills and explanatory memoranda.  Secondary sources included 
journal articles; books; Parliamentary Committee reports and evidence given to 
Parliamentary Committees; Law Reform Commission discussion papers, issue papers 
and reports; newspaper articles and press and media releases.  The main source of 
relevant data was the OAIC’s own publications and material published on the 
OAIC’s website including case notes and OMI reports; determinations; guides, fact 
sheets and information sheets; annual reports; audit reports, media releases and 
statements and reported speeches made by the Commissioner. 
Additional data to support the detailed analysis of the 6 investigations was 
obtained from: 
 Interviews conducted by the researcher with the Privacy Commissioner and 
the Acting Commissioner Compliance in December 2012; and 
 Documents produced in response to requests to access records held by the 
OAIC made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). 
4.3.1 Interviews 
It was initially anticipated that the researcher would conduct a series of 
interviews with the OAIC investigators responsible for conducting each of the 6 
investigations.  It was hoped that these interviews would provide detailed 
information about each investigation, including the reasons for undertaking the 
investigation, the steps taken in each investigation and the process used in coming to 
the conclusion reached in each case. Following approaches to the OAIC, it was 
agreed that Timothy Pilgrim, the Privacy Commissioner, and Angelene Falk, the then 
Acting Assistant Commissioner Compliance (ACC) would each make themselves 
available for a one hour interview with the researcher.  These interviews took place 
on 14 December 2012 at the OAIC’s Sydney premises.   
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The interviews took the form of semi-structured conversations, based on an 
interview guide which had been provided in advance to the interviewees.346  This 
guide was used to help direct the interview to the key themes, which included: 
 The skills and background of the OAIC personnel responsible for the 
investigations; 
 The reason for undertaking the investigation; 
 The planning for the undertaking of the investigations; 
 The way that the investigations were conducted; 
 The making of the decision in each case as to whether there had been a 
breach of NPP 4 and the standard used to determine that issue; and 
 The process of reporting on the investigations and the publication of the 
reports. 
Each interview was recorded and transcribed.  A copy of the transcribed 
interview record was provided to each of the interview subjects, both of whom 
confirmed the accuracy of the transcript.347    
Given the limited time available with the two interviewees, there was little 
opportunity to discuss in detail any of the individual investigations.  The Acting 
Commissioner Compliance had also only recently taken that position, and so had not 
had an opportunity to familiarise herself with the details of the 6 cases selected for 
detailed consideration as part of this research.  In view of these limitations, it was 
decided to submit a request for access to the OAIC’s investigation files to allow the 
researcher access to more detailed information about how the investigations had been 
conducted. 
                                                 
346  A copy of the interview guide is included as Annexure F. 
347  Email from Timothy Pilgrim to Jodie Siganto, 26 February 2013; Email from Angelene Falk to 
Jodie Siganto, 18 April 2013. 
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4.3.2 FOI Application 
An application was made to the Privacy Commissioner pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) for disclosure of all records 
relating to the Telstra incident investigated in 2011 (the Telstra Mail Out incident) on 
8 September 2011.  A response was received by email on 7 November 2011348  
identifying 10 documents as coming within the terms of the request.  Nine out of the 
10 documents were largely made available.349  Only 1 document was redacted in full, 
on the basis that there would be so many deletions that producing the redacted 
document would ‘provide no meaningful information’ about the investigation.350 
After first requesting administrative access,351 which was refused,352 a formal 
freedom of information (FOI) application covering the other 5 investigations was 
submitted to the OAIC on 21 May 2013.353  The request was in the same terms as the 
previous FOI request and the request for administrative access.  Following various 
extensions, a decision on the request was received on 30 August 2013.354  A total of 
220 documents were listed in the schedules attached to that document. Each 
investigation comprised between 26 and 40 documents, other than the Telstra 
Bundles case, which accounted for 82 documents.  This was due in part to the greater 
number of file notes and to the number of emails individually disclosed that formed 
part of longer email chains.355    
                                                 
348  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner, Compliance OAIC to Jodie Siganto, 
November 2013 (OAIC Decision Letter PF49) 
349  Some material was redacted pursuant to s 45C and s 47F of the FOI Act. 
350  Letter from Mark Hummerston, above n 348. 
351  Email from Jodie Siganto to Timothy Pilgrim, 21 March 2013. 
352  Email from Angelene Falk to Jodie Siganto, 18 April 2013. 
353  Email from Jodie Siganto to OAIC, 21 May 2013.  A copy of the FOI Request is included in 
Appendix L. 
354  Letter from Caren Whip to Jean Siganto, 30 August 2013. 
355  For example, 30 individual files notes recording activity such as ‘Sent close letter to NR for 
checking’ were recorded in regard to the Telstra investigation.  No other file had the same 
number of file notes. 
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An initial review of the documents received revealed that records relating to 
the interactions with Epsilon as part of the Dell/Epsilon investigation may have been 
overlooked. In response to a query in this regard, a further four documents were 
produced by the OAIC on 11 September 2013.356   Following a more detailed review 
of the documents, there appeared to be further records that had not been disclosed.  
These missing records were identified, for example, from references made in other 
letters or emails and by reference to the documents listed in the case summary 
reports produced from the OAIC’s case management system (called the ‘Resolve 
“Actions” Report Print Out’).   A list was prepared and sent by email to the OAIC, 
with a request for confirmation that these records were not held by the OAIC.357   
Subsequently, the OAIC confirmed that it had located an additional 51 records that 
had been overlooked as part of the initial search.358  Administrative access (which 
had initially been denied when first raised in March 2013) was given to 19 of these 
51 documents on 26 November, 2013.359   
Further discussions then took place regarding how the remaining 32 documents 
were to be made available, with the OAIC advising that the failure to produce the 
documents subsequently located was deemed to be a decision to refuse to give access 
to the relevant records, dated the same date as that original disclosure.360   After some 
consideration and consultation with the OAIC, the researcher agreed to make a new 
FOI request for access to the outstanding documents in early February 2014.  As at 
31 March 2014 those documents had not been made available and accordingly have 
not been considered as part of this research.361  
                                                 
356  Email from Caren Whip to Jean Siganto, 11 September 2013. 
357  Email from Jean Siganto to Caren Whip, 28 October, 2013 , (Subject Header: Outcome of your 
Freedom of Information Request [DLM=Sensitive:Legal]). 
358  Email from Caren Whip to Jean Siganto, 13 November 2013, (Subject Header: Your Freedom of 
Information Request, ref:# FOIREQ13 [DLM=Sensitive:Legal]). 
359  Email from Caren Whip to Jean Siganto, 26 November 2013 {Subject header: Your Freedom of 
Information Request, ref:# FOIREQ13 [DLM=Sensitive:Legal]). 
360  FOI Act, s 15AC. 
361   A number of these documents were subsequently made available in late April 2014 
  
97 
 
Approximately 165 of the original 220 documents produced in response to the 
second FOI request made in May 2013 were redacted in whole or in part.  The FOI 
Act provides that a number of exemptions are conditional, including the exemptions 
pursuant to sections 47C (deliberative process), 47E(d) (would have a substantial 
adverse effect on the operations of the agency) and 47G (would unreasonably affect 
the organisation in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs or 
prejudice the future supply of information to the agency).  However, the Act also 
provides that these provisions should not prevent access to the records unless, on 
balance, access would be contrary to the public interest.362  When considering the 
balance between these conditional exemptions and the public interest in non-
disclosure, the decision-maker in the second case determined that: 
 Providing access to the material deemed to be exempt pursuant to Section 47E(d) 
and 47G would materially adversely affect the willingness of organisations being 
investigated to cooperate with and provide information to the OAIC, upon which 
the OAIC is reliant; and 
 The published OMI Reports already provided transparency of the OAIC’s 
decision-making so that the public interest in scrutiny of the OAIC’s decision-
making was not given much weight.363 
This reasoning, to the extent that it demonstrates the OAIC’s concern to ensure 
the continued voluntary cooperation of respondents in OMIs, is relevant to the 
consideration of the use of the Commissioner’s investigation powers in Part 3 of this 
research.  The OAIC’s view that the OMI reports are intended to provide 
transparency of decision-making, which is supported by the OAIC’s response to the 
FOI request, is relevant to the consideration of the extent to which the OMI reports in 
fact provide transparency of decision-making included in Chapter 9. 
                                                 
362  Ibid s 11. 
363  The extent to which the OMI Reports included in the case study in this research provide 
transparency of decision making is considered further in Chapter 9.10.2.1 
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4.4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
A data management software tool, NVivo, was used to support the analysis of 
the data.  All data was entered into this program, including the: 
 Transcripts of the interviews with the Commissioner and the Acting 
Commissioner Compliance; and 
 All records obtained through the FOI process prior to 30 March 2014, including 
the OAIC’s decision letters. 
All of the data was reviewed and analysed, having regard to the conceptual 
framework identified for analysis, using a technique known as ‘coding.’  The 
analysis, or coding, was a multi-step process.  As a first step, all records were 
categorised by the type of record, for example, annual reports, OAIC media releases, 
other media publications and OAIC guidance.  All of the documents relating to the 6 
investigations were then coded separately by reference to the particular investigation 
to which they related.  These records included interview transcripts, FOI documents, 
OAIC media releases and statements, other media reports and the published OMI 
reports.  These records were then further coded by reference to the part of the 
investigation process that they related to, for example, initiation of investigation, 
request for information letters, responses from respondents and close letter.  This 
analysis supported a better understanding of how each investigation had progressed 
and allowed for a comparison of each stage between the different cases.  It 
supported, for example, the comparison of the terms of the different request for 
information letters that is included in Chapter 9.6.   
The investigation records were then further coded by reference to concepts that 
related to the conceptual framework used in this research.   As an example, the OMI 
Reports were coded based on the statements of principle made in regard to the 
Commissioner’s interpretation of NPP 4, the security measures that should be in 
place, references to risk or contextual factors, and references to standards or 
guidance provided by the Commissioner.  This coding supported an analysis of the 
extent to which the investigations could be said to be consistent with industry 
practice. The OMI reports were also coded based on the findings in regard to the 
security measures that were or were not in place, the findings of material facts and 
the reasons for the decisions. This coding supported an analysis of the extent to 
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which the investigations were consistent with the principles of procedural fairness 
and good decision-making, which principles in turn form part of the ‘transparent, 
balanced and vigorous” framework used to assess the exercise of the Commissioner’s 
powers. Based on this initial analysis, some themes began to develop, such as the ‘on 
the papers’ investigation process used, limited but conciliatory interaction with 
respondents and the time taken to complete each stage of the investigation.   
These findings were then compared to the initial coding results from the 
analysis of the interviews, and all of the other data including speeches, media 
releases, annual reports and audit reports.  From these some further themes started to 
develop, such as interaction with the media, reference to guidance, resource 
constraints and an interest in reaching agreement with the respondent on the 
outcomes and ability to report publicly that any issues had been addressed.   These 
codes were then associated with different categories that were further refined by 
iterative analysis and coding of all of the data, until 3 main categories were derived: 
the OAIC’s powers and its view on the use of those powers, the investigation process 
and the different steps within that process, and the Commissioner’s interpretation of 
‘reasonable steps’ for the purposes of NPP 4.   Each of the identified themes could be 
aligned with one of these categories, and the 3 categories themselves directly related 
to the two conceptual frameworks used for the analysis.  An outline of this category 
model and the themes within each is included in Appendix H.  This model was used 
to shape the narrative of the findings contained in Chapters 5, 6, 9 and 10. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the data collected for analysis to assist in answering the 
questions posed by this research and the method used to analyse that data have been 
discussed. 
For the analysis of the Commissioner’s use of its oversight powers, data from a 
wide range of largely publicly available sources was collected and considered.  By 
contrast, the enquiry into the Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers uses 
data obtained substantially as a result of the researcher’s request to access the 
OAIC’s investigations records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Cth).  The data requested related to 6 recent investigations selected for detailed 
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consideration. These 6 investigations were selected from the 8 investigations that 
were reported on between February 2011 and March 2013.   
Information obtained from interviews conducted with the Privacy 
Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner Compliance was also used to support 
the analysis of the use of the Commissioner’s oversight and investigation powers. 
All data was analysed with the assistance of a data management software tool. 
This tool helped identify themes relevant to the conceptual framework to be used for 
the analysis of the data.  This conceptual framework is based on two lenses as 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3: consistency with an industry standard approach to 
information security; and the extent to which the exercise of powers could be 
regarded as transparent, balanced and vigorous.  The results of the analysis of the 
data using this conceptual framework are contained in Parts 2 and 3 of this research.  
Part 2 will consider the use of the Commissioner’s oversight powers, including the 
power to monitor, advise, educate and provide guidance, while Part 3 will consider 
the use of the Commissioner’s investigation powers.  The final consideration of the 
answer to the research question raised by this research and general conclusions are 
included in Chapter 11. 
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PART 2: OVERSIGHT POWERS 
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Chapter 5: Monitoring, Audit, Advice and 
Education 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Part 2 examines the Commissioner’s use of its oversight powers to 
monitor, audit, advise, educate and provide guidance to the community in regard to 
NPP 4.  
Echoing Julia Black’s analysis of the importance of monitoring, advice, 
education and guidance as indicators of an effective principle-based regulatory 
system,364 the ALRC referred to the oversight powers as being necessary for a 
‘consistent dialogue between the regulator and regulated to [develop] a shared 
understanding of the objectives.’365  The ALRC believed that the Commissioner’s 
use of its oversight functions would enable them to be proactive in increasing 
people’s awareness and understanding of privacy in order to prevent non-
compliance, which was a critical role in the ALRC’s recommended regulatory model 
for privacy. According to the ALRC, it was important that these functions be 
interpreted broadly, and resourced effectively.366 
Consistent with a responsive regulatory approach, the OAIC itself has long 
articulated a preference for the use of its oversight powers over its more punitive 
enforcement powers: 
The Office’s emphasis will be on providing advice, assistance and 
information. This is our first and preferred approach at all times.  Our 
                                                 
364  Black, above n 179, 439.  See also the discussion in Chapter 2.5. 
365  For your information, above n 32, [4.68]. 
366  Ibid [47.19]. 
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experience indicates that such an approach will be all that is necessary to 
resolve the large majority of matters that come to our attention.367 
The Commissioner’s preference for the use of the oversight powers has also 
been noted in the literature.368 
The Commissioner’s oversight powers pursuant to the Privacy Act included: 
 Monitoring and research – including undertaking research into and 
monitoring developments in data processing and computer technology to 
ensure that any adverse privacy effects of such developments were 
minimised, monitoring and reporting on ‘the adequacy of equipment and user 
safeguards,’369 conducting agency audits,370 and examining proposed 
enactments for potential privacy impact;371  
 Advice – including advising and reporting to a Minister ‘on any matter 
relevant to the operation’ of the Privacy Act372 and informing the Minister of 
action needed to be taken by any government agency to achieve compliance 
with the Information Privacy Principles;373 and 
 Education – for the purposes of promoting the protection of individual 
privacy, to undertake educational programs on the Commissioner’s own 
behalf or in co-operation with other persons or authorities acting on behalf of 
the Commissioner;374 and 
                                                 
367  Information Sheet 13, above n 203. The use of the term “at all times” could indicate that the 
Commissioner’s preference for the use of guidance and education powers may in fact exceed 
that recommended by Ayres and Braithwaite in their pyramid of regulatory responses. 
368  See, eg, Tim Dixon (ed), Australian privacy reporter: a guide to privacy law and practice (, [3-
450].   
369  Privacy Act  s 27(1)(q) (previous provision). 
370  Ibid  s 27(1)(h) and (ha) (previous provision). 
371  Ibid  s 27(1)(b) (previous provision). 
372  Ibid  s 27(1)(f) (previous provision). 
373  Ibid s 27(1)(j) (previous provision). 
374  Ibid s 27(1)(m) (previous provision). 
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 Guidance – including publishing binding guidelines and non-binding fact 
sheets, information sheets and guidelines.375  
Chapter 5 examines the use of the monitoring, audit, advice and education 
powers. In view of the importance of the guidance power to both principle-based 
regulatory systems and the responsive regulatory approach, the use of this power is 
considered separately in Chapter 6.  The question of how appropriately each of these 
oversight powers has been exercised in regard to NPP 4 will be considered through 
the dual lens of consistency with an industry standard approach to information 
security; and the extent to which the exercise of powers could be regarded as 
transparent, balanced and vigorous.    
5.2 MONITORING 
5.2.1 Monitoring and Research Power 
In the Privacy Act, the Commissioner’s monitoring power is included as part of 
the research function.  In addition to monitoring developments in data processing and 
computer technology, there is also a power to ‘monitor and report on the adequacy of 
equipment and user safeguards.’376   
In its review of the monitoring and research function, the ALRC recommended 
that, given the serious impact technology can have on privacy, the Commissioner’s 
research and monitoring function should be extended to cover all relevant 
technologies, and not just computer technology.377 The ALRC saw research and 
reports to the Minister as ‘an excellent medium to guide policy in these areas and to 
increase awareness of the issues raised by particular technologies.’378   This 
                                                 
375  Ibid s 27 (1) (e), ‘to prepare and publish in such manner as the Commissioner considers 
appropriate, guidelines for the avoidance of acts or practices ... that may ... be interferences with 
the privacy of individuals ...’ (previous provision). This is in addition to the power to issue 
guidelines relating to approved privacy codes, and under the Data Matching Program 
(Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 and section 135AA of the National Health Act, 1953. 
376  Ibid. The new provision is contained s 28A(2)(f). 
377  For your information, above n 32, [47.20]. 
378  Ibid [47.21]. 
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recommendation was accepted and the amended provision now refers to monitoring 
development in ‘data processing and technology.’379 
Monitoring for compliance is an important part of the compliance-based 
enforcement approach. Within a compliance-focused regulatory regime, monitoring 
recognises that agencies and organisations can decide the steps they will take to 
achieve the outcome set by the principle, and provides an avenue for the regulator to 
assess whether those steps are adequate in an educational, non-confrontational and 
facilitative manner. ‘Monitoring determines whether the system is achieving its 
aims.’380 The ALRC noted the importance of the use of the oversight powers to 
provide a constant update on compliance levels, as well as intelligence into how 
compliance programs were working.381   However, the Privacy Act does not 
expressly confer power on the Commissioner to monitor compliance with the Act. 
This means that the Commissioner’s express monitoring functions as provided in the 
Act are more limited than the ‘informed monitoring for non-compliance’ function 
referred to by Parker382 and noted by the ALRC as an important proactive tool to 
secure compliance.383    
5.2.2 Use of Monitoring Power 
The 2013 OAIC Annual Report refers to the range of activities carried out by 
the OAIC, including monitoring statutory compliance.384  However, no more specific 
information is provided as to what those monitoring activities might comprise. 
                                                 
379  Privacy Act, s 28A(2)(D). 
380  C Parker, ‘Reinventing Regulation within the Corporation: Compliance Oriented Regulatory 
Innovation’ (2000)  32 Administration and Society 29, 35, quoted in For your information, 
above n 32, 238.   
381  Ibid. 
382  Ibid.   
383  For your information, above n 32, [4.69]. 
384  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Annual Report 2012 - 2013' (2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/about-us/corporate-information/annual-
reports/Annual-report-2012-13/Complete_pdf_AR_2012-13.pdf>, 10  (‘OAIC 2013 Annual 
Report’). 
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Monitoring, other than monitoring of data matching activities, is not referred to.385  
Its annual report from the previous year also referred to ‘sustained attention’ being 
given to each of the OAIC’s roles, which included monitoring compliance with 
privacy laws.386 However, that report also fails to provide any specific reference as to 
what those monitoring activities might have comprised.  Similarly, there are no 
references in either report to monitoring of ‘the adequacy of equipment and user 
safeguards’ (in accordance with previous Section 27(q), of information security 
requirements or practices, or of compliance with NPP 4 more generally. 
An internet privacy sweep carried out by the Commissioner as part of an 
international initiative by members of the Global Privacy Enforcement Network may 
be regarded as an example of proactive compliance monitoring.387 The OAIC 
examined 47 websites that it believed were the most used by Australians in order to 
assess each site’s privacy policy for accessibility, readability and content as well as 
its transparency.388   The anonymised results were reported via media release.389  It is 
not clear whether the Commissioner discussed the results of the sweep directly with 
the entities involved or took any other action to ensure remediation of identified 
issue, other than publication of the general findings by press release.  The OAIC did 
issue a statement confirming that it would use the findings to inform the development 
of guidance about privacy policies.390 In May 2014, a new guide was released to help 
entities prepare and maintain a privacy policy, although this guide makes no specific 
                                                 
385  The Data-matching Act provides that the Australian Information Commissioner is responsible 
for monitoring the functioning of the statutory data-matching program. The OAIC discharges 
this function by running data-matching inspections.  See OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 
381, 80. 
386  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 4. 
387  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Commissioner: Website privacy 
policies are too long and complex’ ( Media Release, 14 August 2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/privacy-
commissioner-website-privacy-policies-are-too-long-and-complex>. 
388  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 30. 
389  Office of the Information Commissioner, above  n 387. 
390  Ibid. 
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reference to any findings from the earlier policy sweep.391  There is no evidence of 
any similar activity being taken in regard to compliance with NPP 4. 
In the context of NPP 4 and the ALRC’s exhortation that the oversight powers 
should be interpreted broadly, the specific power to monitor the adequacy of 
equipment and user safeguards might be regarded as authorising a more proactive 
role in relation to new technology and business processes and any accompanying 
security issues.  However, there is little indication that the OAIC has used its 
monitoring function in a proactive manner to either check compliance with NPP 4 or 
provide advice generally on security issues raised by new technology. 
5.2.3 Analysis 
The absence of  evidence of any use by the OAIC of its monitoring power, 
whether generally in regard to compliance or more particularly in regard to 
compliance with NPP 4,  has important consequences for the operation of the 
responsive regulatory approach.  As discussed, monitoring of compliance is essential 
to the success of that approach.392 
Conducting audits is another method for checking compliance.  Use of the 
audit power has been referred to as the most visible sign of the Commissioner’s use 
of its general monitoring powers and, according to the ALRC, is ‘one of the few 
proactive regulatory tools’ vested in the Commissioner.393  
5.3 AUDIT 
5.3.1 Audit Power 
The Commissioner has various audit powers. For the purposes of this research, 
the most relevant is the power to audit the compliance of public entities, that is 
Australian and ACT government agencies, with the Information Privacy 
                                                 
391  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Guide to developing an APP privacy 
policy’ (May 2014)  < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/guide-
to-developing-an-app-privacy-policy. 
392  See the discussion in Chapter 5.2.1. 
393  For your information, above n 32, [47-103]. 
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Principles.394 In addition, under the previous regime, the Commissioner may have 
audited private sector organisations covered by the Act if requested by them.  
However, there is no indication that this power has been used.395   
As part of its 2008 review, the ALRC recommended that the Commissioner be 
empowered to conduct privacy performance assessments, referred to as PPAs, on the 
levels of compliance in organisations more generally. 396  This was accepted, and the 
audit power has been extended to apply to private entities well as public entities.397   
The word ‘audit’ has also been replaced by the term ‘privacy performance 
assessment,’ reflecting the ALRC comment that use of the term ‘audit’ may have 
inherent negative connotations.  This new assessment function, however, is 
‘curiously located outside the “monitoring” functions, and without the benefit of the 
important “powers” clauses that currently apply.’398  Further consideration of the 
amended provision is outside the scope of this research. 
The ALRC noted that audits can be used to take a snapshot of the level of 
compliance in an agency or organisation or across an industry.’399  It referred to the 
deterrent effect of audit powers noting that ‘the presence of an audit power can act as 
an important preventative measure,’ because ‘the existence of the audit functions and 
programs encourages organisations subject to the Act to take compliance 
seriously.’400  However, it also regarded audits as having an educative role, 
recommending the change of terminology from ‘audit’ to ‘privacy performance 
assessment’ to emphasise the ‘educational and non-confrontational nature of the 
process.’401  This is consistent with the view of the OAIC.  The most recent annual 
                                                 
394  Privacy Act s 27(1)(h) (previous provision). 
395   Ibid s 27(3) (previous provision). In a November 2013 speech, the Privacy Commissioner noted 
that private entities had not ‘ invited’ him in, see Timothy Pilgrim, above n 201. 
396  For your information, above n 32, [47.104]. 
397  Privacy Act s 33C. 
398  Greenleaf and Waters, above n  64. 
399  For your information, above n 32, [47-98]-[47-100]. 
400  Ibid. 
401  For your information, above n 32, [47.104]. 
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report describes the OAIC audits as ‘an educative process’ and notes that they ‘have 
been the catalyst for improvements to agencies’ data security, accuracy of 
information, staff training and disclosure policies.’402 
It has also been suggested that audit findings provide another source of 
guidance regarding what the Commissioner considers to be “reasonable steps” to 
secure personal information.403 Although consideration of compliance with IPP 4 is 
outside the scope of this research, these audits are still relevant to the extent they 
provide guidance as to the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of IPP 4, 
which has some overlap with NPP 4 and in the absence of any power to audit 
compliance with NPP 4. 
5.3.2 Use of Audit Powers 
The audit power has been used by the Commissioner more frequently than the 
general monitoring power.  The actual number of audits conducted each year has 
varied, ‘depending on the nature of privacy complaints and other priorities of the 
Office.’404   However, generally the numbers are low and seem to be declining.405 
According to the Commissioner’s annual reports, nine (9) audits were 
conducted in 2009 – 2010, which was a ‘significant increase’ over the previous 
year,406  while only five audits were conducted in 2010 – 2011.407 The OAIC 2011 
Annual Report noted this decline and stated that the Compliance Branch was 
                                                 
402  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 86.  See also Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Privacy Performance Assessment Manual (2012)  
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/privacy-operational/privacy-
performance-assessment-manual> ‘Purpose of a privacy performance assessment’, (‘Privacy 
Perfomance Assessment Manual’). 
403  Interpreting the Security Principle, above n 57, 22 - 23. 
404  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, The Operation of the Privacy Act Annual Report: 1 July 
2006–30 June 2007 (2007), 60, referred to in For your information, above n 32, [47.88]. 
405  See, eg, Interpreting the Security Principle, above n 57, 22 – 23, which notes that ‘Resource 
constraints have meant a marked reduction in the number of audits conducted in recent years.’  
406  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2009-10 Annual Report of the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (2010) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/annual-
reports/office-of-the-privacy-commissioner-annual-reports/200910-annual-report-of-the-office-
of-the-privacy-commissioner>  45 (“OPC 2010 Annual Report”) . 
407  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 42. 
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focusing additional resources on high-profile OMIs ‘which required more extensive 
information-gathering and analysis.’408  Three audits were conducted in 2011 – 
2012409 while four audits were commenced and five were finalised in 2012 – 2013.410   
Audit reports are published on the Commissioner’s website.411 From March 
2004 to October 2010 the reports of thirteen (13) audits of federal and ACT 
government agencies conducted by the OPC were published.412 After the OAIC took 
over that function in November 2010, its audit team has separately published a 
further fourteen (14) reports (as at July 2014).413 This amounts to a total of 27 audit 
reports published over a ten- year period. 
Summarised details of completed audits are also included in the OAIC’s annual 
reports.414 
The OAIC’s audits tend to relate to complex systems’ handling of sensitive 
information (such as the operation of the Healthcare Identifiers System).415 This is 
consistent with the risk-based targeting approach to conducting audits, which is 
discussed further below.  A number of systems have been audited multiple times.  
The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service’s dealings with EU 
                                                 
408  Ibid.   
409  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 48. 
410  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 86. 
411  See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Audit Report’ (2 July 2014) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/annual-reports/all/ >. A list of all the 
OPC and OAIC published audit reports is included in Appendix K. 
412   Ibid. 
413  Ibid. 
414   See, eg, OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 86 – 89; OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 
42 – 45. 
415  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Healthcare Identifiers Service — 
Department of Human Services: Audit Report’ (April 2014)  < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/healthcare-
identifiers-service-department-of-human-services>;  Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, ‘Healthcare Identifiers Service: Audit report’ (June 2014) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/healthcare-
identifiers-service-audit-report>. 
112  
Passenger-Name Records have been audited on four different occasions,416 while the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s National Document Verification System 
has been audited six times.417  
The OAIC has published a Privacy Performance Assessment Manual that 
describes in detail the OAIC’s approach to audits, or privacy performance 
assessments as they are now known.418  As a first step in the assessment cycle, 
entities are identified for assessment by using risk, based on background research.419  
The Manual provides an example of the identification of two ACT government 
agencies to be assessed, pursuant to the OAIC’s Memorandum of Understanding 
with the ACT government.420  However, is not clear that this risk-based targeting 
method has been used in the identification of Commonwealth agencies for 
assessment. There is no reference to the use of targeting as the basis for the audit in 
any of the reports.   In any case, as at June 2014, OAIC audits were still only 
undertaken where supported by a specific funding agreement or Memorandum of 
Understanding.421 This was confirmed in the researcher’s interview with the 
                                                 
416  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Requests for Information for Passenger 
Name Record Data - Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report’ (June 
2013); Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Passenger Name Records (PNR 
data) Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report’ (July 2013); Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner, ‘Passenger Name Records (PNR data) Audit Report No 1’ (December 
2009); Office of the Privacy Commissioner, ‘Passenger Name Records (PNR data) Audit Report 
No 2’ (January 2010).  Further details of the reports are included in Appendix K. 
417  Reports were issued in May 2007, June 2011 and December 2012, however Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, ‘National Document Verification Service - Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Audit Report 2012’ (December 2012) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/national-
document-verification-service-department-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade-audit-report-2012>,  
[1.18] refers to there being six (6) audits of the system. Further details of the reports are included 
in Appendix K. 
418  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402. 
419  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘Risk Assessment.’ 
420  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘Stage one: Targeting.’ 
421  See, eg, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Requests for Information for 
Passenger-Name Records Data – Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit 
Report’ (June 2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-
assessments/requests-for-information-for-passenger-name-record-data-australian-customs-and-
border-protection-service-audit-report>, [1.1], which report refers to the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the OAIC to 
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Assistant Commissioner Compliance who also said that this limitation on the 
proactive use of the audit power was a consequence of resource issues.422   The 
reliance on independent funding might indicate that assessments are not always 
carried out based on the risk assessment process referred to in the Manual. 
According to the Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, once the 
assessment is approved, the scope of the assessment and its objective are 
determined.423    IPP 4 (the federal agency equivalent of NPP 4) was specifically 
considered as part of the scope of all audits where reports were released up to June 
2013.424  However, IPP 4 was within the scope of only one of the five audits where 
reports were issued between June 2013 and June 2014.425  It is not clear whether 
there is any reason for the more recent audits being more limited in scope than 
previous assessments. 
The objective of most assessments is to establish how well an agency is 
complying with its IPP obligations in handling records containing personal 
information,426 although compliance with any special agreements and an agency's 
own documented controls, policies and/or procedures may also be considered.427  
Once what is being assessed and the objectives of the assessment are established, 
these are then used to develop the assessment criteria.428  It might be expected that 
the Manual would provide some detailed guidance regarding how those criteria may 
be defined.  The Manual does refer to sources such as the Plain English Guidelines 
                                                 
provide a regular audit program for Custom and Borer Protection’s use of European-Sourced 
Passenger Name Record data. 
422  Interview with Acting Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
423  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘Stage two: Planning’. 
424   Details of whether or not IPP was included in the scope of each audit are included in Appendix 
K. 
425  Details of whether or not IPP was included in the scope of each audit are included in Appendix 
K. 
426  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘What is performance assessed 
against?” 
427  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘What is performance assessed 
against?” 
428  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘Developing assessment criteria.’ 
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to the Information Privacy Principles429 and Privacy Impact Assessment 
Guidelines.430 The Manual also provides an example of criteria that may be used, 
where the assessment is to consider the agency’s storage and security of records 
(covered by IPP 4).  The suggested criteria applicable to that assessment included: 
 Personal information held by the agency is protected against unauthorised 
access, use, modification or disclosure; 
 Personal information held by the agency is protected against loss or misuse; 
 The agency has adopted physical, technical and administrative safeguards to 
protect personal information; 
 Security safeguards are appropriate given the sensitivity of the information; 
and 
 Processes are in place to record access to electronic records and datasets 
containing personal information.431 
These statements are a repetition of the wording of the principle itself, other 
than the reference to the adoption of physical, technical and administrative 
safeguards and some sort of access logging process. Although they are a reasonable 
high-level outline of what is required for compliance with IPP 4, it is difficult to 
characterise any of these statements as measurable criteria against which the 
adequacy of complex security controls should be assessed.   There is also little 
reference to risk, other than the connection drawn between the sensitivity of the 
information and the appropriateness of the security safeguards in place. 
In practice, the published reports suggest there is some common approach in 
the OAIC’s auditing of compliance with IPP 4.  Physical security and storage (or the 
                                                 
429  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 
(October 1994) 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/migrated/migrated/HRC_PRIVACY_PUBLICATIO
N.pdf_file.p6_4_14.4.pdf. 
430  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, ‘Developing assessment criteria.’ 
431  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, ‘Types of assessment criteria’ 
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security of paper-based documents and physical facilities), 432 IT security (which 
extends to access controls and logging) and data retention issues are commonly 
considered.433  However, there is no explanation regarding why these areas were 
selected for consideration and why, for example, application security, network 
security and personnel security were not. 
Various recommendations regarding security controls that should be 
implemented are made in the audits, such as that the payload data transferred 
between systems should be encrypted434 and that random audits of access to systems 
should be undertaken.435  However, in most cases it is not clear what assessment 
criteria were used to arrive at these recommendations or to determine the adequacy 
of the controls which were in place.436 In particular, there is no reference to the 
Information Security Manual which includes mandatory requirements and 
recommended approaches to security for federal government agencies.437  Nor do 
any of the Audit Reports refer to compliance with any guidance issued by the 
                                                 
432  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, Footnote 9, which notes that these examples of 
general criteria relating to storage and security were drawn from the Office of the Information 
Commissioner (Queensland) Privacy Self-Assessment Guide. 
433  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Public Transport Systems: MyWay audit’ 
June 2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-
assessments/public-transport-systems-myway-audit#part3-issues>, [3.77] – [3.136]. 
434  See Recommendation 3 ‘Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs and Centrelink: Document Verification Service Prototype’, 3 and 19 - 
20 
435  See, for example, Recommendation 2 ‘Australian Customs Service: SmartGate Automated 
Border Processing’, 13. 
436  One exception to this is the consideration of the storage and security of EU-sourced Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data, which was assessed by reference to security obligations in the data 
sharing agreement between the Australian government and the EU, Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, ‘Requests for Information for Passenger Name Record Data - 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report’ (June 2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/requests-for-
information-for-passenger-name-record-data-australian-customs-and-border-protection-service-
audit-report> 
437  The PSPF and the ISM were discussed in Chapter 3.4. 
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OAIC.438  The exception to this is the Passenger Name Records audits, which use 
contractual security requirements as the basis for the audit assessment.439   
An example of the issues raised by the absence of specified measurable criteria 
or consideration of context in the assessment of security controls is provided by the 
audit of the MyWay public transport system.440  The MyWay system operates like 
most transport stored-value card systems, where devices loaded on buses retain usage 
data in on-board systems.  This data is downloaded and transferred to the main 
system via a wireless connection established between the on-board machine and 
wireless access points located at bus depots.  Down loading occurs when the buses 
return to the depot each evening.  The MyWay Audit Report notes this downloading 
practice, and refers to the wireless communication as a secure means of daily data 
transfer on the basis that there is no human access occurring during the transfer.441  
In the findings section it is noted ‘with approval that MyWay appears to have robust 
measures in place to ensure the security of data in transit, including … the use of 
wireless transfers of information, instead of portable devices, which can get lost or 
misplaced.’442  This finding seems to suggest that wireless transfer is inherently more 
secure than a more manual process.  However, there is no consideration of either the 
authentication method used to access the wireless access points in the depots or the 
level of encryption used to protect the data that is transmitted.  Without strong 
authentication restricting access to authorised users, wireless access points can be 
compromised and used as a beachhead to enable access to the entire corporate 
network.443  Similarly, it is a reasonably trivial exercise to capture un-encrypted 
                                                 
438  The OAIC’s guidance in relation to NPP 4 (which is also applicable to IPP 4) is considered 
further in the following Chapter. 
439  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Requests for Information for Passenger 
Name Record Data - Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report, [4.94] – 
[4.145]. 
440  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Public Transport Systems: MyWay audit’ 
(June 2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-
assessments/public-transport-systems-myway-audit#part3-issues> (‘MyWay Audit’). 
441   Ibid [3.135]. 
442   Ibid [3.149] 
443  Wolfgang Osterhage, Wireless Security (Science Publishers, 1st ed, 2011), 58.  
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wireless transmissions or to de-crypt wireless transmissions that have relied on older 
encryption protocols such as WEP.444  However, the report does not consider the 
security of the use of the wireless connection itself, either generally or in terms of the 
authentication method used or the level of encryption implemented to protect the 
data in transit.  Accordingly, it is difficult to identify how it was determined that 
‘robust measures’445 were in place to secure the wireless transfer of data. 
The third phase of the assessment process is fieldwork, during which evidence 
is collected to assist in the determination of whether the assessment criteria have 
been met.  This stage requires the OAIC assessor to answer two main questions: How 
much evidence is sufficient? Is the evidence valid and reliable?446 
In deciding whether the evidence obtained is sufficient to rely on to make audit 
findings, the Assessment Manual directs the assessment team to consider both the 
volume of evidence and its completeness447  Properties such as the source, nature (for 
example, documented versus verbal evidence) and authenticity of the assessment 
evidence needs to be considered when evaluating the reliability of the evidence. The 
Manual suggests that, in general terms, the reliability of the evidence gathered is 
greater where it is obtained directly by the auditors rather than from the agency being 
assessed.  Evidence obtained from, or corroborated or certified by, independent 
sources outside an agency may be more reliable for the purposes of an assessment 
than that obtained solely from within the agency.448 
It is not clear from the audit reports how systematic recent audits have been or 
the extent to which they involve independent verification of either the 
implementation or the operation of controls that the auditee advises are in place.   
The more recent reports contain more detailed information about the 
methodology used to collect relevant evidence.  For example, the Passenger Name 
                                                 
444  Ibid 62. 
445  MyWay Audit, above n 440, [3.149]. 
446  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402, ‘Stage three: Fieldwork.’ 
447  Ibid.  
448  Privacy Performance Assessment Manual, above n 402,  ‘Stage three: Fieldwork.’ 
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Record Audit Report from June 2013 describes the methodology as semi-structured 
interviews with key staff, the inspection of records, the review of relevant material 
prepared by the organisation under audit to assist with the audit and a site inspection 
‘assessing physical and IT security and storage arrangements, including (but not 
limited to) relevant access controls, audit logs, and use of third party contractors if 
relevant.’449 However, there is no reference to independent testing and important 
findings seem to be based on the information provided by the agency without 
independent verification.  For example, the audit report states that Customs and 
Border Protection ‘advised that backups of all PNR data are maintained on a separate 
tape, undertaken on a daily basis and stored securely.’450  Backup procedures are an 
important security control and capable of being independently verified without great 
cost, for example by asking for the backup logs or to view the storage location. 
However, there is no evidence of this independent testing.  Similar assertions are 
relied on in other reports.451  Further examples are provided by the MyWay Report, 
which indicates reliance on statements about the login and password controls in place 
for the system being tested,452 and on the auditee’s intention to run three-monthly 
audits of the system to verify if any misuse had occurred;453 and by the Canberra 
Institute of Technology (CIT) audit where reliance is placed on CIT’s advice that 
                                                 
449  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Requests for Information for Passenger 
Name Record Data - Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report’ (June 
2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-
assessments/requests-for-information-for-passenger-name-record-data-australian-customs-and-
border-protection-service-audit-report>, [2.10]. 
450  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Requests for Information for Passenger 
Name Record Data - Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Audit Report’ (June 
2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-
assessments/requests-for-information-for-passenger-name-record-data-australian-customs-and-
border-protection-service-audit-report>, [4,135]. 
451  See, eg, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘ACT Education and Training 
Directorate: Final audit report  (Information Privacy Principles audit)’ (December 2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/collection-
and-requests-for-student-information>, [2.6] – [2.11]; Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner ‘National Document Verification Service, Centrelink - Audit Report’ (June 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/national-
document-verification-service-centrelink-audit-report>, [2.3] – [2.4], [3.2.1]-[3.2.22]. 
452  MyWay Audit Report, above n 440, [3.109]. 
453  Ibid  [3.111]. 
  
 119 
access to different parts of the network (which stored personal information) was 
restricted.454 
The reliance on evidence provided by the auditee without independent 
corroboration could be a consequence of the limited time allotted to conducting the 
audits.  In most cases, the field work to support the audit findings is conducted over a 
one or two day period, which is short given the complexity of some of the systems 
being audited and the scope of the audits.455    
5.3.3 Analysis 
If, as part of its audits, the OAIC were using the industry practice approach to 
information security put forward by this research to determine compliance with IPP 
4, the reports would refer to: 
 The identification of the main risks to the security of the entity’s 
information (or the assessment of those risks would be used to guide 
consideration of relevant aspects of the entity’s security posture); 
 The connection between those risks and the security controls in place, or 
which should be in place; and 
 The governance processes around the operation of security controls. 
However, the audit reports make no reference to risk or to any direct linkage 
between the specific circumstances of the different systems or processes being 
considered and the level of security. 
There is no indication that a specific audit plan is developed for the different 
systems that are audited. As discussed, there is indication of the basis for the 
                                                 
454  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,  ‘Collection and security of student 
personal information – Canberra Institute of Technology: Audit Report’ (April 2014) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/collection-
and-security-of-student-personal-information-canberra-institute-of-technology-cit>.  
455  See, eg, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Australian Federal Police (ACT 
Policing Branch) Audit Report’ (July 2011) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/list-of-privacy-assessments/australian-federal-police-act-policing-branch-audit-report>, 
[2.3]; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘National Document Verification 
Service, Centrelink - Audit Report’ (June 2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-
privacy-law/list-of-privacy-assessments/national-document-verification-service-centrelink-audit-
report>, [2.4]. 
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selection of physical security and storage, IT security and data retention controls as 
the areas for consideration in each audit. In particular, there is no reference to the use 
of risk assessment to identify the specific controls that might be expected to be in 
place in the particular circumstances of the systems under assessment in each of the 
different audits. There is no reference to any other standard, such as the list of 
controls in ISO 27002 or the controls contained in the PSPF and the ISM, which 
might be used as the audit benchmark. 
Similarly, there is no reference to how the auditor has assessed that the security 
measures which are in place are reasonable in each case.  One of the consequences of 
the absence of any such objective standard for measuring the controls that are in 
place is that it is difficult to understand how it has been determined that the controls 
in place are appropriate in different circumstances.  For example, it is not clear how 
it was determined in the MyWay audit that the use of wireless for the transfer of data 
is preferable to a manual process, or that the process of wireless transfer was using 
‘robust measures,’ because there is no discussion of the basis for that assertion in the 
published report.   
The educative value of the published audit reports suffers from the absence of 
reference to any process, standard or benchmark for the identification, selection or 
implementation of security controls, which makes it difficult to identify any general 
principles that could be used to support decisions regarding whether the security 
controls in place are adequate. The reports also could not be regarding as supporting 
an industry practice approach to security. 
The publication by the OAIC of audit reports on its website and the inclusion 
of audit details in annual reports provides some transparency as to the exercise of 
those powers. However, there is less f transparency regarding the identification of the 
control areas for audit and the basis for the audit findings, as outlined in the above 
analysis. 
In terms of the balanced use of the audit power, the following observations 
could be made: 
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 Out of the 18 different government departments and over 200 
Commonwealth Government agencies required to comply with the 
provisions of the Privacy Act,456 only 4 different Commonwealth 
agencies have been audited since 2010.  Although this may be a 
consequence of the OAIC’s risk based approach to selecting audit 
targets, a broader selection of agencies might have been expected;  
 Since audits are undertaken only where funding arrangements are in 
place, they tend to relate to complex government systems.  The reports 
could not be regarded as providing a snapshot of compliance across a 
broad range of different entities and systems;   
 The reduction in the number of audits to enable the completion of OMIs 
means a greater focus on reactive rather than proactive actions. This in 
turn has implications for the balanced use of the Commissioner’s 
powers. OMIs relate to breaches that have occurred and are essentially 
reactive, while audits are proactive undertakings that may prevent 
privacy breaches while also having general educative value; and 
 The failure to consider compliance with IPP 4 as part of the scope in 
more recent audits may also affect the balanced use of the audit power.  
In regard to the vigorous use of the audit power, the following observations 
could be made: 
 The total number of 27 audits conducted is low and seems to be 
declining, apparently resulting from a shift of resources to OMIs.  The 
number becomes even lower if based on the number of unique systems 
being audited. The 13  audits of Commonwealth Government agencies 
have considered only four different systems or processes, being the use 
of Health Care Identifiers, handling of Passenger Name Records, the 
                                                 
456  A list of Commonwealth government departments and agencies is published at < 
http://australia.gov.au/directories/australian-government-directories/list-of-departments-and-
agencies> 
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Document Verification System and the new ePassport SmartGate 
system;457 
 The length of time spent on site would suggest that little independent 
testing of large and complex systems is completed.  This is further 
confirmed by reliance in the reports on information given by the entity 
under assessment without any independent verification.  Considering 
these issues, it is difficult to regard the evidence relied on in the reports 
as complete, valid and reliable as contemplated by the Privacy 
Performance Assessment Manual. 
Based on the above, although the published audit reports may be of some 
educative value, it is difficult to characterise the Commissioner’s use of its 
audit power to date as transparent, balanced or vigorous.  It is also difficult 
to see how these reports could act generally as the catalyst for 
improvements to agencies’ data security, as asserted by the OAIC. 
5.4 ADVICE  
5.4.1 Advice Power 
The Commissioner has several advisory functions under the Privacy Act. These 
include: 
 Advising a minister, agency or organisation on any matter relevant to the 
operation of the Privacy Act;458  
 Examining any proposed enactment that would require or authorise acts or 
practices which might be an interference with the privacy of individuals;459 
and 
 Making reports and recommendations to the Minister in relation to any matter 
that concerns the need for, or the desirability of, legislative or administrative 
action in the interests of individuals’ privacy.460 
                                                 
457  Details of all published audit reports are included in Appendix K. 
458  Privacy Act s 27(1)(f) (previous provision).  The new provision is s 28B(1)(a). 
459  Ibid s  27(1)(k) ) (previous provision).  The new provision is s 28B(1)(b). 
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Pursuant to these powers, the OAIC provides advice to: 
 Commonwealth Government agencies; 
 ACT Government agencies; 
 The Norfolk Island Administration, from 1 January 2011;461 and 
 Businesses.462 
The Commissioner’s advisory functions were given limited attention as part of the 
ALRC review and no substantive recommendation was made for amendment.463  
However, the ALRC was of the view that advice (or a generalised form of it) should 
be made public where relevant to a broader audience and where it would increase 
understanding of the Privacy Act.464 
5.4.2 Use of Advice Powers 
The OAIC 2011 Annual Report was the first to provide details of the 
Commissioner’s advice work.465 Details about advice given and submissions made 
by the OAIC were also included in the 2012 Report466 and the 2013 Report.467  The 
2013 Annual Report lists advice provided to a large number of government agencies, 
cross-government consultative forums and other jurisdictions (such as the NT 
Information Commissioner and the Global Privacy Enforcement Network).468 It also 
refers to advice given to private entities including a number of industry groups and 
                                                 
460  Ibid  s 27(1)(r) (previous provision).  The new provision is s 28B(1)(c). 
461  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 25. 
462  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 50 – 60; OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1,  78 – 
83; OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 45- 48. 
463  For your information, above n 32, [47.1]-[47.24] 
464  Ibid [47.22]. 
465  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1 , 45 - 48. 
466  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, 78 – 83. 
467  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 50 – 60. 
468  Ibid. 
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committees (such as the Communications Alliance and the Human Research Ethics 
Committee) and to Google and Facebook.469   
Little detailed information is provided in regard to the actual advice given, 
particularly in regard to advice given to the private sector. For example, where 
describing advice given to the Communications Alliance on the monitoring of voice 
communications, the 2103 Annual Report notes that the OAIC provided general 
comments on existing guidelines, which it regarded as providing a useful and 
detailed approach for relevant entities, and advised that the guidelines would need to 
be reviewed with the introduction of the APPs.470  Similarly, the description of the 
advice provided to a Human Research Ethics Committee about the collection, use 
and disclosure of health information for research purposes states that advice was 
given in relation to research involving data linkage using health information and other 
personal information, including de-identified information. No detail is provided as to 
what that advice may have comprised.471  By contrast, reference is made to advice given 
to the ACT Justice and Community Safety Directorate on their review of the Workplace 
Privacy Act 2011, which included that key privacy matters were absent from that Act, 
and describing some of those (such as the absence of a complaint process).472 
Based on statistics released for 2014, the total number of submissions and 
policy advice provided by the OAIC has declined.473  A comparison over the last 
three years is provided in Table 2 below. 
OAIC Activity 2012 2013 2014 
Privacy policy advice Not 
available 
142 103 
                                                 
469  Ibid 55 – 58. 
470  Ibid 57 - 58. 
471  Ibid 57. 
472  Ibid 55. 
473  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘OAIC Quarterly Statistics 2013-14 as at 30 
June 2014’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/about-us/corporate-
information/Budget-and-statistics/OAIC_statistics_2013-14_as_at_30_June_2014.pdf>. 
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Privacy submissions Not 
available 
25 15 
Media enquiries (for all OAIC) 285 314 307 
Presentations and speeches (for all 
OAIC) 
44 55 79 
Table 2: OAIC community engagement activities 
The OAIC’s submissions are published on the OAIC’s website474 although this 
does not seem to be a complete record of all submissions (based on the information 
in the OAIC Quarterly Statistics).475  Similarly, details of some but not all of the 
privacy advice work undertaken by the OAIC are included in the OAIC’s Annual 
Reports.476 
5.4.3 Analysis 
The OAIC’s own statistics suggest a steep decline in 2014 in every area of 
support and advice in comparison to the previous year.477  This decline is unexpected 
given the introduction of the new amendments, which might have been anticipated to 
lead to increased requests for advice from the OAIC.  
Although there is some transparency in regard to the advice provided via the 
information published on the OAIC’s website and included in its annual reports, this 
                                                 
474  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Privacy Submissions’ (30 June 2014) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/submissions/privacy-submissions/>.  There are 10 
submissions on the website for the period from April to June 2014, while the recent statistics 
state that 15 submissions were made. See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
‘OAIC Quarterly Statistics 2013-14 as at 30 June 2014’ < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/about-us/corporate-information/Budget-and-
statistics/OAIC_statistics_2013-14_as_at_30_June_2014.pdf>. 
475  For example, there are 10 submissions on the website for the period from April to June 2014, 
while the recent statistics state that 15 submissions were made. See Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner ‘OAIC Quarterly Statistics 2013-14 as at 30 June 2014’ < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/about-us/corporate-information/Budget-and-
statistics/OAIC_statistics_2013-14_as_at_30_June_2014.pdf>. 
476   See, e.g. OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, Chapter 4. 
477  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘OAIC Quarterly Statistics 2013-14 as at 30 
June 2014’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/about-us/corporate-
information/Budget-and-statistics/OAIC_statistics_2013-14_as_at_30_June_2014.pdf>. 
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is not exhaustive and, where published, is summarised at so high a level as to be of 
little general value (for example, the description of the advice provided to Human 
Research Ethics Committee discussed above).  This is notwithstanding the ALRC’s 
recommendation that advice be made publicly available, particularly where it is of 
general interest.478  Accordingly, it is difficult to characterise the Commissioner’s use 
of the advice power as either fully transparent or vigorous. 
From the information that is available, it appears that the advice provided and 
the submissions made are largely reactive, that is, given in response to requests made 
for advice or for submissions.  Other than the engagement with Facebook and 
Google, there is little indication of the proactive provision of any advice to the 
private sector. This suggests that the power is not used in a balanced manner.  
Finally, none of this advice work referred to appears to have involved any 
significant general public advice in regard to NPP 4.  This suggests again that the 
Commissioner may not be using its advice power in a vigorous or balanced way. 
5.5 EDUCATION 
5.5.1 Education Power 
The Commissioner’s oversight functions in relation to education include: 
 Promoting an understanding and acceptance of the NPPs;479 and 
 Undertaking educational programs on the Commissioner’s own behalf or in 
cooperation with others to promote the protection of individual privacy.480  
This explicit role is in addition to the use of other powers, such as the audit 
power and the guidance powers, which are also intended to have an educative effect.  
The Commissioner’s use of its guidance powers, including the issuing of non-
binding guidance and the release of case notes and OMI reports, is considered 
separately in the next chapter. 
                                                 
478  For your information, above n 32, [47.22]. 
479  Privacy Act s 27(1)(d) (previous provision). 
480  Ibid 27(1)(b) (previous provision).  The new provision is included as part of the guidance related 
function in s 28(1)(d). 
  
 127 
In its review, the ALRC referred to the pivotal role education plays in a 
principles-based regime such as the Privacy Act.481  While submissions to the 
ALRC’s review supported education and the Commissioner’s role in providing 
education, they referred to the apparent lack of priority given by the Commissioner 
to the education function and the need for more guidance from the OPC to encourage 
an understanding of, and compliance with, the privacy principles.482  The report does 
not contain any analysis of the use of the education power by the Commissioner as at 
the time of issuing the report, nor does it make any specific recommendations in 
regard to the education power. In the amended Act, the Commissioner’s education 
powers are included as part of the guidance-related functions, but otherwise they are 
largely unchanged.483   
5.5.2 Use of Education Powers 
Historically, the Commissioner’s ability to engage in educational programs has 
been constrained by available resources.484  In 2006, the government committed to 
provide additional funding to allow the Commissioner to provide a comprehensive 
education program to raise community awareness of privacy rights and 
obligations.485   Perhaps as a consequence of this commitment, the ALRC 
subsequently referred to the information provided by the OAIC through its 
information hotline and its website as part of the exercise of the education power. 
Since then, the avenues for the OAIC to provide information and education have 
grown, and now include newsletters and social media, including YouTube,486 
Twitter487 and Facebook488 together with an electronic newsletter.489 
                                                 
481  For your information, above n 32, [47.23]. 
482  Ibid, [47.14] – [47.18]. 
483  Privacy Act, s 28(1)(c) - (d). 
484  See, eg, Getting in on the Act, above n 155. 
485  Ibid rec 26. The Senate Committee privacy inquiry made a similar recommendation: Parliament 
of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, The Real Big Brother: 
Inquiry into the Privacy Act 1988 (2005), rec 19. 
486  <http://www.youtube.com/user/OAICgov>. 
487  ‘OAICgov’ https://twitter.com/OAICgov. 
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The Commissioner’s education activities are said to be covered in Chapter 4 of 
the 2012 and 2013 annual reports, which chapter is headed ‘Communication and 
Engagement.’490 However, the only reference to ‘education’ in Chapter 4 of the 2013 
Annual Report is in the context of the OAIC’s ‘education and information’ campaign 
supporting an understanding of the Privacy Act amendments, which included a 
dedicated page on the OAIC website, short videos, posters, training materials, a 
public consultation process and ‘regular engagement with stakeholders.’491   
Based on the information included in the annual reports and the recent 
statistics, it would seem that the OAIC’s focus is on providing general information, 
promoting awareness and engaging with the media, rather than on providing specific 
education directed at a particular privacy principle or the application of a principle to 
a current issue.  
There is evidence of increased engagement by the OAIC with the media. The 
2013 annual report refers to a 10% increase in media responses over the previous 
year, mostly attributable to legislative changes and high-profile data breaches and the 
associated reports released by the OAIC.492  The Commissioner also participated in a 
large number of interviews,493 the transcripts of some of which are published on the 
OAIC’s website.494  The OAIC itself published 20 media releases in 2012–13.495 
NPP 4 and organisational responsibility to ensure the security of personal 
information is an issue often referred to by the Commissioner as a significant issue in 
                                                 
488  https://www.facebook.com/OAICgov. 
489  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 26. 
490  Ibid; OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 27. 
491  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 26. 
492  The changes included the passing of the Privacy Amendment Act and  the introduction of the 
Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2013.  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 28. 
493  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 28. 
494  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Privacy Speeches’ < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/> 
495  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 28. 
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its speeches and interviews, albeit in a general way.496    The OAIC participated in 
Cyber Security Awareness Week in 2013497 and Stay Smart Online Week (as it was 
renamed) in 2014.498  This activity is consistent with the view expressed by the 
Commissioner in 2012 that the OAIC needed to be able to ‘provide advice to the 
community on issues relating to the use of the online environment.’499 However, 
there are few indications of more directed educative initiatives relating specifically to 
either NPP 4 or IPP 4, other than in regard to promotion of the Guide to Information 
Security, including its release by the then-Attorney General as part of the launch 
event for Privacy Awareness Week 2013.500    
The OAIC has been active in promoting data breach notification, which might 
be regarded as part of taking reasonable steps to protect data.501  The OAIC has 
released a guide on voluntary notification of data breaches.502 The Commissioner 
                                                 
496  See, e.g., Timothy Pilgrim ‘Privacy law reform – Get in on the Act’ Presentation at the iappANZ 
Privacy Awareness Week seminar, Brisbane, 1 May 2013. 
497  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Take time to protect your privacy during 
Cyber Security Awareness Week’ (Media Release, 20 May 2013) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/take-time-to-
protect-your-privacy-during-cyber-security-awareness-week>. 
498  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, “Stay Smart Online”, OAIC Homepage (3 
June 2014)  < http://www.oaic.gov.au/>. 
499 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Subcommittee, Parliament of Australia, 
Estimates Hearing (14 February, 2012), 41 – 43. 
500  Timothy Pilgrim ‘Privacy Awareness Week 2013 Privacy Commissioner’s Update’ Presentation 
to Privacy Awareness Week 2013 Business Breakfast, Sydney, 29 April 2013 < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-awareness-week-
privacy-commissioner-s-update>. 
501  See, eg, Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Mapping data breach notification’ (Presentation at iappANZ data 
breach panel discussion, Sydney, 6 May 2014 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/speeches/privacy-speeches/>,  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy and Transparency’ 
(Presentation to the Privacy Awareness Week ‘Up close and personal’ business breakfast, 5 May 
2014). 
502  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Data breach notification – A Guide to 
Handling Personal Information Security Breaches’, April 2011 < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/data-breach-notification-a-
guide-to-handling-personal-information-security-breaches>. 
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regularly refers to voluntary notification as a desirable practice503 and encourages 
entities to go to the OAIC for advice when they have experienced a data breach.504   
The OAIC regards its handling of data breaches as part of its function to 
promote an understanding and acceptance of the NPPs (and presumably NPP 4 in 
particular).505  The OAIC’s annual reports include information about voluntary 
notifications of data breaches, including limited anonymised details about reported 
incidents.  However, no more than one sentence is used to describe each incident, 
and in largely generic terms.  Examples include ‘a system error occurred, allowing 
customers to access other customers’ records’506 and ‘the hacking of databases 
containing customers’ personal information.’507  Given their brevity, there is little 
from those statements that could be regarded as educative for other entities.  In 
addition, the advice provided in the annual reports in regard to how to respond to a 
data breach incident (including updating systems and advising customers) appears to 
be formulaic. The OAIC reported the same actions taken by entities in response to a 
data breach notification in each of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 annual reports, 
notwithstanding that a wide range of different types of incidents were reported as 
occurring in each of those years.508  
Recently, the OAIC has released Statements outlining the action taken by the 
OAIC in response to publicised data breaches, for example the AFP data breach,509 
                                                 
503  See, eg, Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Australians better protected with mandatory data breach notification’ 
(Media Release, 28 May 2013) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-
releases/privacy-media-releases/australians-better-protected-with-mandatory-data-breach-
notification>. 
504  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Mapping data breach notification’, above n 501. 
505  Complaints Manual above n 226,, “Our role in DBNs” which refers to data breach notification 
cases as falling under Privacy Act Section 27(d). 
506  OAIC 2011 Annual Report above n 1, 38. 
507  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 79, 
508  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 79, OAIC 2012 Annual Report above n 1, 65; OAIC 
2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 38. 
509  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,  ‘AFP data breach’, (Statement, 28 August 
2014)  < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/afp-data-
breach/>. 
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the ACCC data breach510 and the eBay data breach.511  Most of these Statements are 
short and simply confirm that the OAIC is seeking more information about the 
particular incident, without providing any more general advice to affected 
individuals.  For example, the Statement released in relation to the recent highly 
publicised data breach affecting eBay Systems provided in its entirety: 
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) received a 
voluntary data breach notification from eBay Inc. early on 22 May 2014. We 
are currently conducting enquiries into the data breach to inform whether the 
OAIC will need to open an investigation.512 
The purpose of this and the other similar Statements released by the OAIC is 
not clear, other than perhaps to reassure the community that appropriate action is 
being taken.  It is difficult to regard this or any of the other Statements as educative, 
whether in regard to the factors that led to the breach, the precautions that people 
who might be affected should consider or how the OAIC might deal with the 
situation.   
Little more detailed information is provided about any of the DBN cases 
outside of the annual reports and the Commissioner’s Statements.  In particular, there 
are few reports of DBN-based investigations.  According to the OAIC’s report, there 
were 46 DBNs in the 2011 – 2012 year.513  However, of the OMI reports released 
since 1 July 2011, only two of those investigations seem to relate to DBN cases.514  
                                                 
510  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘ACCC data breach’ (Statement, 11 April 
2014)  < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/accc-data-
breach/accc-data-breach>. 
511  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘eBay data breach’(Statement, 22 May 
2014)  http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/ebay-data-
breach/ebay-data-breach. 
512  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, above n 511. Reporting on the breach 
included See, eg, Fran Foo, “Warning after eBay passwords ‘stolen’” The Australian (online), 
23 May 2014 < e6frgakx-1226927542280>;  Brid-Aine Parnell “eBay faces Multiple Probes into 
mega-breach” The Register (online), 23 May 2014 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/23/ebay_security_breach_investigations/. 
513  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 64. 
514  The two investigations are the Dell/Epsilon Investigation and the Telstra Bundles investigation.  
Both of these investigations are considered in more detail in Part 3 of this research. 
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This may reflect the fact that few data breach notifications lead to investigations. In 
any case, the limited reporting on DBNs raises the question as to how the practice of 
entities reporting data breaches may result in the OAIC promoting a more general 
understanding and acceptance of the NPPs.   
5.5.3 Analysis 
In summary, it seems that although the Commissioner has significantly 
increased its general information and awareness activities, as well as its media 
engagement, there is little that could be regarded as directed educational activity 
undertaken in relation to NPP 4.  Although the OAIC has promoted the benefits of 
DBN, it is not clear how that process has been of any educative benefit to the wider 
community. To the extent that information has been made available about data 
breach notification cases it is difficult to derive any principles of more general 
application. There is certainly no link between the Commissioner’s approach to data 
breach cases and an industry practice approach to information security, 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The Commissioner has a range of oversight functions that include the provision 
of monitoring, auditing, advice and education and guidance, all of which were 
identified in Chapter 2 as fundamental to the success of both principle-based 
regulation and a compliance-based enforcement approach. In this chapter, those 
powers (excluding the guidance power) have been considered through the lens of the 
two conceptual frameworks: a standard approach to information security practice and 
the extent to which the exercise of regulatory powers could be regarded as 
transparent, balanced and vigorous. The following summarises the findings made. 
There is little evidence of the Commissioner’s exercise of its monitoring, 
advice and education powers to support an industry approach to information security.  
Of all the powers available, the Commissioner’s use of its audit powers has most 
directly involved consideration of reasonable security.  However, the reports from 
those audits do not suggest that the Commissioner is following the industry standard 
approach to information security put forward in this research.  There is no reference 
to risk (in the context of IPP 4), nor is there evidence of the use of any particular 
standard or benchmark to either guide the audit activity in terms of the controls that 
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should be reviewed or to support the determination as to whether or not the controls 
that were identified could be regarded as adequate. 
Other than general statements about the importance of security (and data 
breach notification in particular), the Commissioner has provided little other advice 
or education on how to ensure that personal information is properly secured.  
The availability of materials including audit reports, speeches, submissions, 
Statements and Media Releases on the OAIC’s website provides transparency about 
the exercise by the Commissioner of some of its oversight powers.  However, the 
extent to which these publications provide transparency regarding the 
Commissioner’s interpretation and application of NPP 4 is questionable.  In 
particular, it is difficult to regard the Commissioner’s audit reports as truly educative 
in terms of the Commissioner’s interpretation or application of IPP 4. 
There is little indication of any proactive monitoring of either ‘the adequacy of 
equipment and user safeguards’ as was specifically referred to in Section 27(q), or 
more generally of compliance, which the ALRC regarded as a fundamental element 
of the compliance approach to enforcement.515 It is also difficult to characterise the 
Commissioner’s audits as balanced or vigorous given the low number, the narrow 
group of entities that have been audited and the reactive, rather than proactive, nature 
of the use of the power. 
These matters could well be a consequence of resourcing issues, which may 
also be responsible for the limited time spent on site by the OAIC team and the 
reliance on information provided by the entity under audit rather than on the 
auditors’ own independent findings.  Resourcing issues may also be responsible for 
the decline in the number of audits, submissions and responses to requests for advice 
made by the OAIC. Although more information about the Commissioner’s initiatives 
in these areas is available than has previously been released, that information is still 
high-level and not particularly educative. 
Although efforts have been taken to educate the public about both the privacy 
reforms and the new Guide to Information Security (which is covered in more detail 
                                                 
515 See discussion in Chapter 5.2. 
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in the next chapter), there is little evidence of any systematic or comprehensive 
education program in regard to NPP 4.  The OAIC refers to its dealing with reported 
cases of data breach as being pursuant to its advice and education functions.  
However, although the Commissioner may provide useful advice and guidance as 
part of its direct engagement with the entity that has notified of the breach, it is not 
clear how the reporting of data breaches assists in a more generally educative way.  
Based on the above, it could be said that oversight functions have not so far 
been exercised in an entirely transparent, vigorous or balanced way in regard to NPP 
4 (although there have been some recent improvements generally in the OAIC’s 
transparency and community engagement). There are also gaps between the exercise 
of these oversight functions and an industry practice approach to information 
security. 
However, this chapter has considered only the Commissioner’s monitoring, 
audit, advice and education powers. The Commissioner’s oversight powers also 
include the power to provide guidance, which is perhaps the most important power 
given the nature of PBR.  The Commissioner’s exercise of its guidance powers is 
considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Guidance  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Commissioner is required to make or approve a number of legally binding 
privacy guidelines although this power is limited to specific areas (such as health 
research516).  The Commissioner has no power to issue legally binding guidelines in 
regard to NPP 4.  However, the Privacy Act also confers wide powers on the 
Commissioner to issue non-binding guidance including the power to make 
‘guidelines for the avoidance of acts or practices … that may … be interferences 
with the privacy of individuals.’517  
Guidance helps combat issues caused by the vagueness and lack of certainty as 
to the meaning of the privacy principles.  Guidance together with education is also a 
key component of the base level of the Ayres and Braithwaite enforcement 
pyramid.518 The ALRC referred to guidance as an essential requirement for the 
effective operation of the principle-based regime in the Privacy Act.519    
A regulator can provide guidance in a number of forms, including education 
programs, audit reports and other uses of the Commissioner’s oversight functions. 
These other types of guidance were considered in the previous chapter.  This chapter 
will assess those documents issued pursuant to the Commissioner’s express power to 
issue non-binding under the Privacy Act. These documents include non-binding 
guides, guidelines, fact sheets and resources.520   These publications ‘represent the 
                                                 
516  Privacy Act s 95. 
517  Ibid s 27(1)(e) (previous provision).  The new provision is s 28 (1)(a). 
518  See the discussion in Chapter 2.5. 
519  For your information, above n 32, [4-59].   
520  These documents are published on the OAIC website at different pages. See, eg, Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner ‘Advisory Privacy Guidelines’ < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/advisory-privacy-guidelines/> Office of 
the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Privacy Fact Sheets’ 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/>. 
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public position of OAIC and should guide the application of the law to complaints’ 
however they are not binding and should not be regarded as law.’521  Consideration 
will also be given to published investigation reports, which can also be regarded as 
providing guidance. 
The ALRC considered the Commissioner’s powers to issue guidance to be 
sufficiently broad.522  However it noted concerns with the Commissioner’s record of 
issuing ‘vague and ambiguous’ guidelines and its failure to engage in a well-
resourced and properly conducted consultation process as part of the development of 
previous guidelines.523 A submission to the ALRC Inquiry by Professor Greenleaf 
and others contended that before issuing guidance ‘the Commissioner should be 
required to consult with interested parties and to have regard to the differential 
resources and capacities of different groups of stakeholders.’524  This submission was 
not accepted.   
Details of the year and type of publication issued by the OAIC that could be 
regarded as guidance are included in the table below.525  
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2005 - 
2010 
2001 - 
2004 
Earlier 
& 
Undated 
Total 
Guideline 2 2      4 
Guide 8 2   1 3 7 21 
fact sheet 27 1 7 5 13 6 3 62 
                                                 
521  Complaints Manual, above n 227, 8. 
522  For your information, above n 32, [47.35]: ‘The Commissioner’s function in s 27(1)(e), as 
currently drafted, is broad enough to enable the Commissioner to issue guidance on a range of 
matters, particularly when read in conjunction with the Commissioner’s powers to provide 
advice, promote an understanding of the NPPs and IPPs, and undertake education programs. For 
these reasons, the ALRC is not recommending any reform to the guidance function.’ 
523  Ibid. 
524   Waters, Greenleaf, Bygraves and Roth ‘Promoting and Enforcing Privacy Principles’, above n 
65, 7. 
525  A full list of these publications is included in Appendix M.  This list is correct as at 30 
September, 2014. 
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Privacy 
Agency 
Resource 
2 1     1 4 
Privacy 
Business 
Resource 
4 2   2 4 1 13 
TOTAL 43 8 7 5 16 13 12 104 
Table 3: OAIC published guidance at 10 September, 2014  
With the amendments becoming effective in March 214, significant new 
guidance was published and old guidance has been removed.526 The bulk of the new 
publications are fact sheets.527 Of the 27 fact sheets issued in 2014, 23 were directed 
to two issues: 16 fact sheets dealt with issues relating to changes to the credit reports 
provisions and 7 related to dealing with e-health records.    Guidance on the new 
APPs has also been issued.528  This new guidance is similar to that published 
previously in regard to the NPPs which had been criticised as vague and high-
level.529   The preparation of this material has involved a considerable amount of 
work for the OAIC,530 and will continue to do so as the Commissioner has indicated 
that further guidance is still to be issued.531  The Commissioner has said the OAIC 
                                                 
526  For example, Privacy Fact Sheets 13, 14 and 16 are no longer published on the OAIC’s website.  
See ‘Privacy Fact Sheets’ <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-
sheets/>.  The Complaints Manual is also no longer published in the OAIC’s website. 
527  Facts Sheet and other guidance published by the OAIC and its predecessor the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner are available online at  Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner ‘Privacy Fact Sheets’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-fact-sheets/>.  
528  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘APP Guidelines’ 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/app-guidelines/>, (‘APP Guidelines’). 
529  Greenleaf, Bygraves and Roth ‘Promoting and Enforcing Privacy Principles’, above n 65, 7. 
530  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, xiv. 
531  Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy Reform – Act Three’ (Presentation to the 
iappANZ 'Privacy Unbound' summit, Sydney, 25 November 2013) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-reform-act-three>.  
See also Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘OAIC Privacy Law Reform 
Guidance Consultation and Publication Guide’ (11 December 2013) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-law-
reform/Public_schedule_for_privacy_law_reform_guidance.pdf>; APP Guidelines above n 528. 
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will start to move from the broad guidance which has been issued to date, for 
example the new APP Guidelines,532  to guidance dealing with specific areas and 
issues, based on specific business practices and feedback from all entities.533 
The guidance documents published by the OAIC carry a disclaimer confirming 
they are not binding on the Commissioner. 534  Individual documents also state they 
are based on the OAIC’s understanding of how the Privacy Act works and are 
intended to provide explanations of some of the terms used in the NPPs and good 
practice or compliance tips. In effect, they are intended to help organisations apply 
the NPPs in ordinary circumstances.535 
This chapter will first consider the guidance documents issued by the 
Commissioner regarding NPP 4. The Commissioner also issues case notes and OMI 
reports providing details of its investigations. These publications can also be 
regarded as guidance and, to the extent they refer to NPP 4, are considered later in 
this chapter.  
6.2 NPP 4 GUIDANCE 
Guidance issued in relation to NPP 4 includes the Guidelines to the National 
Privacy Principles (2001)536 and Information Sheet (Private Sector) 6 – Security and 
Personal Information (Information Sheet 6).537 Information Sheet 6 was superseded 
by a new Guide to Information Security538 in April 2013, and is no longer published 
                                                 
532  APP Guidelines above n 528. 
533  Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy Reform – Act Three’ (Presentation to the 
iappANZ 'Privacy Unbound' summit, Sydney, 25 November 2013) < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-reform-act-three>.   
534  See, eg, Office of the Privacy Commissionere, ‘ Information Sheet (Private Sector) 30 - 2010: 
ID scanning in clubs and pubs’  < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-
fact-sheets/other/information-sheet-private-sector-30-2010-id-scanning-in-clubs-and-pubs>. 
535  Ibid. 
536  Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, 'Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles' 
(2001) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/guidelines-to-the-
national-privacy-principles> (‘Guidelines to the NPPs’). 
537    Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, 'Information Sheet (Private Sector) 6 – Security 
and Personal Information' (2001)  (‘Information Sheet 6’). 
538  Guide to Information Security, above n 63. 
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on the OAIC’s website.  However, Information Sheet 6 remains relevant to this 
research because it was the most specific guidance document available at the time of 
the 6 investigations that are considered in more detail in Part 3.   
The Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles were published in 2001 
following the introduction of the new NPPs.  These guidelines contain three pages of 
guidance in regard to NPP 4, one and a half pages of which relate to destruction or 
de-identification for the purposes of NPP 4.2.  They state that security could consist 
of maintaining physical security, computer and network security, communications 
security and personnel security. They then state that what is reasonable will depend 
on factors such as the sensitivity of the personal information held, the harm that 
could arise from its compromise, how the organisation stores, processes and 
transmits the personal information (for example, paper-based or electronic records) 
and the size of the organisation (the larger the organisation, the greater the level of 
security likely to be needed).  The guidelines then list some of the steps which an 
organisation could take to ensure compliance, including: 
 Identifying the security risks to personal information held by the organisation 
and the consequences of a breach of security; 
 Developing a policy that implements measures, practices and procedures to 
reduce the identified risks to security; 
 Training staff and management in security awareness, practices and 
procedures; 
 Monitoring compliance with the security policy, periodic assessments of new 
security risks and the adequacy of existing security measures; 
 Referring to Australian and international standards as a guide; and 
 Depending on the size of the organisation and the information it collects, 
perhaps having an external privacy audit conducted.539 
Information Sheet 6, also released in 2001, adopts the same general approach to 
compliance with NPP 4 but provides more detailed guidance.  Information Sheet 6 is 
                                                 
539  Guidelines to the NPPs, above  n 536, 45. 
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made up of two parts, the first titled ‘Reasonable Steps’ and the second titled 
‘Aspects of security to consider’.  In the first section, it is noted that what is 
‘reasonable’ is context dependent, and refers to a number of factors to be considered, 
such as the sensitivity of the information and the cost of the mitigation.  In the 
section headed ‘Aspects of security to consider,’ Information Sheet 6 lists a range of 
security measures, within the same domains as referred to in the Guidelines to the 
NPPs: physical security, computer and network security, communications security 
and personnel security.   Examples of some of the ‘range of security measures’ 
within each those headings are given, as are ‘tips for compliance’ which include the 
use of standards such as ISO 17799 (now ISO 27002) and AS7799.2 (now ISO 
27001).   
As in the Guidelines to the NPPs, Information Sheet 6 does not clearly link the 
selection of security measures to contextual factors or to outcomes of a risk 
assessment.  There is reference to the need to assess security risks and then to take 
‘appropriate measures’ but this is only in regard to ‘computer and network security’ 
and perhaps less explicitly in relation to ‘communications security.540’  In relation to 
specific controls, there is the occasional link between the suggested measure and 
risk, for example, the reference to ‘encryption of data for high risk transmissions’ as 
part of communications security,541 but this is not part of any recommended process 
or method for the identification of the appropriate control to implement.  However, 
the noting of contextual factors such as the sensitivity of the information and the 
costs of any security systems referred to as being pertinent to the assessment of 
‘reasonableness’542 is akin to risk assessment (although not couched in the language 
of risk).  In information security practice, these contextual considerations would be 
part of the risk assessment and treatment process underpinning the selection of the 
specific controls and the design of the overarching management system.  For 
example, the sensitivity of the information would be relevant to the assessment of the 
consequences of breach (as part of the risk identification and assessment phase) and 
                                                 
540  Information Sheet 6, above n 537, 2 – 3. 
541  Ibid 3. 
542  Information Sheet 6, above n 537, 1. 
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costs of the control would be relevant to a consideration of the appropriate risk 
mitigation in the risk treatment phase.  The failure to explicitly link the selection and 
management of controls to the risk process is a significant departure from an industry 
practice approach to information security, 
Monitoring and review are not identified as core requirements of an effective 
management system.  Monitoring is referred to only in the context of compliance 
with information security policies543  and the operation of network controls.544  
Moreover, Information Sheet 6 does not refer to any governance around the 
implementation and operation of the security measures, which would ensure those 
measures are both appropriate and operating correctly.   
The descriptions of the types of controls that come within the broad categories 
of computer and network and communications security could be regarded as high 
level and incomplete.  Computer security measures referred to include access 
controls (such as passwords), virus checking, and IT support to deal with security 
risks, auditing procedures and data integrity checks.545  Suggested communications 
security controls include checking facsimile numbers before transmission and 
authenticating identity before giving information over the phone.  Other listed 
controls include encryption of data for high-risk transmissions.  Reference is also 
made to network security which could include firewalls, routers, network intrusion 
detection systems, host intrusion detection systems, appropriate encryption and 
expert monitoring.546  There is little description of what might be required for the 
effective implementation of each of these controls or how that might be used in 
combination. For example, should passwords be made up of a minimum number of 
characters, should they be a mix of alpha-numeric and symbols, should they be able 
to be re-used, should they be changed after a certain time?  Perhaps not surprisingly 
as this guidance was issued in 2001, there are important areas not covered by the 
guidance. For example, no reference is made to ensuring the security of software and 
                                                 
543  Ibid 1. 
544  Ibid 3. 
545  Ibid 2- 3. 
546  Ibid 3- 4. 
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web-facing applications,  issues with the use of mobile devices or the use of third 
parties to provide support services or outsourced processing or to ensuring data 
recovery in the case of a disruption of operations. 
In addition to these Guidelines and the Information Sheet, NPP 4 is referred to in 
each of the following publications:  
 Privacy Impact Assessment Guide (Issued first in 2008 and revised in May 
2010 and again in May 2014);547 
 ‘Privacy fact sheet 7: Ten steps to protect other people's personal 
information;’548 
 ‘Privacy fact sheet 8: Ten steps to protect your personal information;’549 and  
 ‘Data Breach Notification: Guide to Handling Personal Information.’550 
Generally, each of these publications adopts the same approach as Information 
Sheet 6, although each publication refers to different controls that could be 
implemented. 
The use of the guidance function specifically in relation to NPP 4 was 
considered by the ALRC, where it recommended a stronger guidance role for the 
Privacy Commissioner in regard to what is meant by ‘reasonable steps.’551  In terms 
                                                 
547  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Guide to undertaking privacy impact 
assessments (May 2014) ‘< http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-
guides/guide-to-undertaking-privacy-impact-assessments>, (‘Guide to undertaking privacy 
impact assessments’). 
548  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Privacy Fact Sheet 7 Ten Steps to protect 
other people’s personal information' (April 2012) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/privacy_fact_sheets/privacy_fact_sheet7_10steps_protect
_personal_info.html>. 
549  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Privacy Fact Sheet 8 Ten Steps to protect 
your personal information' (April 2012) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/privacy_fact_sheets/privacy_fact_sheet8_10steps_protect
_your_information.html>. 
550   Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Data Breach Notification: A guide to 
handling personal information security breaches  (April 2012) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/guidelines/privacy_guidance/data_breach_notification_gu
ide_april2012.html> (‘Data Breach Notification Guide’). 
551  For your information, above n 32, [28.26-28.30]  [28.34] – [28.36]. 
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of that guidance, the ALRC recommended that the Commissioner not ‘re-invent the 
wheel’ but that the Commissioner’s guidance should complement other existing 
guidance, such as the Protective Security Manual.552  The ALRC also recommended 
that the Privacy Commissioner be empowered to establish expert panels that could be 
consulted on the implications of technological developments for data security or be 
used to develop education and guidance materials.553  This is consistent with the 
encouragement provided by the ALRC to the growth of ‘compliance professionals’ 
and networks and more consistent dialogue between the regulator and the regulated 
entities, in order to provide a constant update on compliance levels in industries.554   
The ALRC did not undertake any extensive investigation of the guidance 
issued at that time in relation to NPP 4555 nor of the way that the Commissioner had 
referred to that guidance in NPP 4-related investigations prior to the release of the 
ALRC report.   
The ALRC considered the extent to which the Commissioner could be 
expected to issue guidance in regard to technological developments.  In response to 
that issue the Commissioner had indicated that it was concerned about the specialised 
level of expertise required to provide such guidance, along with the resource 
implications of continually ensuring the accuracy of guidance in a rapidly changing 
technological environment.556  The ALRC acknowledged those concerns but 
suggested there were a number of ways of dealing with those such as referring 
readers to other sources of information including relevant international and national 
                                                 
552  Ibid [28-34]. The Protective Security Manual has been replaced by the Protective Security 
Framework and other supporting documents which have been discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3.4.1. 
553  Ibid Recommendation 28–3, 951.  The right for the Commissioner to appoint expert panels was 
included in s27(3) of the Privacy Amendment Act. 
554  Ibid [4.65] – [4.68]. 
555  IP 31 [4-115], where it was noted that the Office of the Privacy Commissioner had ‘issued an 
Information Sheet’ (albeit in 2001). 
556  Ibid [28-28]. 
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standards, without endorsing them.557  Consequently it recommended that the OPC 
should provide guidance on relevant technological developments.558 
Some five years after that recommendation, and twelve years after Information 
Sheet 6, the OAIC released a new Guide to Information Security.559  As this Guide 
was published after the completion of the investigations considered in Part 3 of this 
research, it is not relevant to the detailed analysis of those investigations.  However, 
the new Guide is relevant as a reflection of the Commissioner’s latest thinking on 
NPP 4 and for that purpose it is considered further below.  
6.2.1 Guide to Information Security 
In their interviews, both the Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner 
Compliance expressed the view that the Guide to Information Security represents the 
OAIC’s current thinking as to what are reasonable steps for the purposes of NPP 4.560  
The Privacy Commissioner has also stated that the Guide ‘will send a clear message 
about my expectations in this area’ and that the OAIC would refer to it when 
assessing compliance with the data security obligations in the Privacy Act.561 
The Guide applies to all entities covered by the Privacy Act.562  Although 
stated to be non-exhaustive, the Guide also states that the OAIC will refer to it ‘when 
assessing an entity’s compliance with its security obligations in the Privacy Act.’563   
The Guide is divided into three main sections: 
 Information security; 
 Circumstances that affect reasonable steps; and 
                                                 
557  Ibid [28-35]. 
558   Ibid [28-36]. 
559   Guide to Information Security above n 63. 
560   Interview with Acting Commissioner Compliance, 14 December, 2012.   
561  See, e.g. Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Update your privacy setting’ Presentation by 
to the Communications and Media Law Association, Sydney, 7 March 2013 
562  Guide to Information Security, above n 63, 1. 
563  Ibid. 
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 Steps and strategies which may be reasonable to take. 
 This structure is similar to Information Sheet 6, albeit with a new introduction 
section. The bulk of the guide is made up of the last section, which includes a much 
longer list than included in previous guidance, which only referred to physical 
security, computer and network security, communications security and personnel 
security.  The new Guide now includes reference to Governance, Data Breaches, the 
Information Life Cycle, Standards and Regular Monitoring and Review.564  
Additional measures have been included in the section headed ICT Security 
(previously ‘Communications and Network Security’) such as Whitelisting or 
Blacklisting.565 
Given the focus of this research on the relationship between industry practice 
and the manner that the Commissioner has exercised its powers in regard to NPP 4, 
the Guide to Information Security will be assessed by reference to the three-part 
industry practice approach that has been used as the basis for this research. 
6.2.1.1 Risk 
Perhaps the major issue with the Guide is its treatment of risk.  Not only is 
there no clear establishment of risk as the basis for the selection and implementation 
of controls, risk is used in a manner that indicates that the Commissioner may equate 
the term ‘risk’ with ‘harm.’  The Guide includes a section titled ‘Risk to personal 
information’566 that was called ‘Protecting Personal information’ in the consultation 
draft.567  Rather than discuss how the risk assessment process should be used to 
identify threats and vulnerabilities in the context of the particular organisation and to 
then support the selection and management of appropriate security controls, the 
section simply lists some common situations that give rise to potential harm to 
                                                 
564  Ibid 15 – 28. 
565  Ibid 4. 
566  Ibid 7. 
567  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘Guide to information security Consultation 
draft – December 2012’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-engaging-with-you/previous-
privacy-consultations/guide-to-information-security-december-2012/guide-to-information-
security> 5. 
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information assets.  This view of risk in the limited context of ‘risk of harm’ ignores 
the importance of consideration of the likelihood of occurrence as part of risk 
prioritisation and the broader role of risk as part of a risk management based-
information security management system.568   
Following this section are two sections titled ‘Privacy and your business’ and 
‘Privacy by design, privacy impact assessment and information security risk 
assessments’ (with the reference to information security risk assessment included 
after the consultation period). 569 These sections treat risk and information security as 
part of ‘data handling practices’ which should have privacy ‘built in’ through the use 
of Privacy by Design, which in turn can be achieved by conducting a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA). Information security risk analysis is seen as a possible 
requirement for the completion of a comprehensive PIA: 
To inform the analysis of personal information security in the PIA, entities 
may need to conduct a more detailed information security risk assessment in 
conjunction with a PIA.570 
It also states that any such PIA and information security risk assessments ‘would 
inform the development of entity’s risk management or information security 
plans.’571   
 It is not within the scope of this research to consider the principles of Privacy by 
Design in detail.572 However, it is unlikely that the end to end design approach 
underpinning Privacy by Design would be achieved solely by a PIA which is a ‘point 
                                                 
568  This confusion in  the use of the term ‘risk’ was noted in the submission in response to the draft 
Guide  by Standards Australia in Standards Australia ‘OAIC Consultation Submission: Guide to 
Information Security: ‘Reasonable steps’ to protect personal information’ 4 January 2013 < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-engaging-with-you/previous-privacy-
consultations/guide-to-information-security-december-2012/guide-to-information-security-
reasonable-steps-to-protect-personal-information-consultation> , 5. 
569 Guide to Information Security above n 63, 7 – 9. 
570   Ibid 6. 
571  Ibid. 
572  See, e.g. Ann Cavoukian, 'Privacy by Design: Origins, Meaning, and Prospects for Assuring 
Privacy and Trust in the Information Era' in Privacy Protection Measures and Technologies in 
Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards (IGI Global, 2012) 170. 
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in time’ assessment, usually of a system or a business process.573  Conducting a 
detailed information security risk assessment as part of a PIA for a new system or 
business process is certainly a prudent measure to take.  Nevertheless, a PIA by itself 
is unlikely to ensure that appropriate information security controls are in place 
throughout the organisation.  As discussed in Chapter 3, information security 
involves a complex system of layered controls across an organisation.  Identifying 
the particular security requirements of a particular system or process in isolation of 
that broader organisational context is unlikely to achieve that goal. 
The introduction of concepts such as Privacy by Design into a consideration of 
information security obscures the scope and purpose NPP 4.  In NPP 4, the harms to 
be protected against are listed and include unauthorised disclosure or access, misuse 
and loss.    NPP 4 does not extend to ensuring the proper operation of all aspects of 
privacy, such as the right to access or the right to correct personal information.  
These rights are part of the broader function of Privacy by Design.  
From an industry practice point of view, the OAIC view of information 
security as an enabler of privacy and of risk assessment as, at best, an optional 
component of a PIA (something that entities ‘may need to conduct’) is problematic.  
This view of information security could not be regarded as reflective of industry best 
practice. In addition, the reference to the results of the PIA and the security risk 
assessment as informing the development of the entity’s risk management or security 
plan suggest the sort of inappropriate conflation of privacy and security referred to in 
Chapter 1. 
6.2.1.2 Selection of Controls 
Other than in a very general manner, the Guide does not link risk assessment to 
the selection of controls. As noted, it does refer to information security risk 
assessment in the context of a Privacy Impact Assessment as a process that 
‘identifies and evaluates threats and vulnerabilities,’ which ‘would inform the 
                                                 
573  See, eg, Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments’ above n 547 which defines a privacy 
impact assessment as “a systematic assessment of a project that identifies the impact that the 
project might have on the privacy of individuals, and sets out recommendations for managing, 
minimising or eliminating that impact.” 
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development of entity’s risk management or information security plans’ and which 
also examines the ‘adequacy of an entity’s information security measures in 
mitigating the risks to information held by the entity (including personal information) 
and whether those risks should be further mitigated.’574 Given these references, it 
might be expected that measures listed in the section ‘Steps and strategies which may 
be reasonable to take’575 would be prefaced by reference to an information security 
plan or the outcomes of a risk assessment.  However, that link is not made.  
Issues identified with the manner in which the security controls were described 
in the old guidance remain in the new Guide.  Although not expressed to be 
exhaustive, there are important security measures missing. For example, the section 
on access controls focuses on passwords only and there is no reference to asset 
classification.576  The Guide also uses a confusing format, posing a series of 
questions after making high-level statements of control objectives or definitions.577  
The Guide does not indicate the relevance of the answers to the questions (should 
they all be answered ‘yes’ for there to be reasonable security?) nor how those 
answers should be derived or what the consequence of the response might be.  This 
format is not typical for information security guidance documents.578 
                                                 
574  Guide to Information Security above n 63, 6. 
575  Ibid 15 – 28. 
576  The omission of security measures and the need to clarify others was noted in submissions on 
the draft Guidance by the Australian Government Information Management Office (email from 
Glenn Archer to Dimitrios Kormas dated 21 January 2013 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/engaging-with-you/previous-privacy-
consultations/info-security-guide/AGIMO_response_draft_Information_security_guide.txt>), 
the Australian Information Security Association (AISA ‘The AISA Response to the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner’s Guide to information security Discussion Paper’ 7 
January 2013) and Standards Australia.  
577  See, eg, the section on “Testing” which notes that testing may take a number of forms and may 
be done internally or contracted out.  The Guide then poses questions including: How often is 
testing conducted? Who is responsible for conducting testing? How is test data handled? If 
testing identifies weaknesses, how is this reported and address.  Guide to Information Security 
above n 63, 21. 
578  See, eg, Section 4 onwards of ISO 27002 which provides a description of the overall objective of 
the suggested security measure, defines specific controls that might be considered to meet that 
objective and then gives detailed implementation guidance as to how those controls might be 
designed and implemented. 
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As recommended in the ALRC report, the Commissioner’s Guide refers more 
explicitly to relevant standards. In a section headed ‘Standards’ the Guide says 
‘[e]ntities should consider using relevant international and Australian standards on 
information security to inform their risk based assessments of threats and 
vulnerabilities’ and refers to the ISO 27000 series and to AS/NZS ISO 31000 of risk 
management standards.  This wording and the reference to ISO 31000 (which is a 
generic risk management standard) could be interpreted as limiting the relevance of 
the ISO 27000 series to informing the risk assessment process, rather than as 
providing the specification for an information security management system 
supported by a code of practice (the intended purpose of ISO 27001 and 27002).  
This more limited recommendation regarding the use of standards may not be what 
the ALRC anticipated. 
6.2.1.3 Continuous Improvement Cycle 
The Guide does recognise the importance of an iterative continuous 
improvement process. A section titled ‘Managing the information life-cycle’ was 
added to the Guide following the consultation period.  Continuous improvement is 
also referred to in the ‘Workplace Policies’ section579 and in a single paragraph 
section headed ‘Regular monitoring and review,’ added following the consultation 
period, which provides that entities should ‘regularly monitor the operation and 
effectiveness of their ICT security measures.’580 This is an important addition to the 
guidance, although it does sit uneasily with the other recommended security 
measures and is not identified as an essential part of any approach to managing 
information security.  
6.2.1.4 Consultation Process 
The Guide was issued in late April 2013, following a one month consultation 
period between mid-December, 2012 and mid-January, 2013.581  This short time 
                                                 
579  Guide to Information Security above n 63, 20. 
580  Ibid 23. 
581  Ibid. 
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frame provided limited opportunity for extensive consultation on the proposal.  
Notwithstanding this, at least 24 submissions were lodged.   
The absence of a risk-based framework for the selection of controls was raised 
in most of the submissions. Lockstep Consulting submitted that the Guide should use 
the conventional method of risk assessment as the unifying framework or theme.582  
Similarly, the AGIMO recommended that the guidance should be set in the context 
of overall risk management, saying that ‘there is no contextualisation from a risk 
perspective of any of the steps and strategies or the questions posed in the 
document.’ The National Archives of Australia supported the approach taken by the 
ISM whereby ‘risk is provided as context for the various controls.’583 
Similarly, a number of submissions referred to the need for continuous 
monitoring and review: NEHTA submitted that an ‘entity’s practices of regularly 
reviewing security to ensure that the measures it adopts meet the needs of the 
changing technology landscape’ should be considered as part of an investigation into 
NPP 4, and this should be stated in the Guide.’584  McAfee referred to the need to 
‘implement a data governance program, measure its effectiveness, and test it on an 
ongoing basis to ensure that it remains successful over time.’585 
These concerns were addressed to some extent in the final draft, with the 
inclusion of the various references to risk that have already been discussed (none of 
which appeared in the original Guide) and the section titled ‘Regular Monitoring and 
                                                 
582   Letter from Lockstep Consultant to Ms Angelene Falk, Acting Assistant Commissioner 
Compliance, 8 January 2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/engaging-
with-you/previous-privacy-consultations/info-security-
guide/Lockstep_response_draft_Information_security_guide.pdf>. 
583   National Archives of Australia, ‘Comments on Draft Guide to Information Security’ 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-engaging-with-you/previous-privacy-
consultations/guide-to-information-security-december-2012/guide-to-information-security-
reasonable-steps-to-protect-personal-information-consultation>. 
584   NEHTA, ‘Submission to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner’, 8 January 
2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/engaging-with-you/previous-privacy-
consultations/info-security-guide/NeHTA_response_draft_Information_security_guide.pdf> 
585  Email from Michael Morgan to Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 14 January 
2013 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/engaging-with-you/previous-privacy-
consultations/info-security-guide/McAfee_response_draft_Information_security_guide.txt> 
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Review.’586  However, as discussed, these inclusions, particularly in regard to risk, 
are not entirely successful and largely fail to address the concerns raised in the 
submissions made in response to the draft. Between the closure of submissions and 
the publication of the final Guide there was no evidence of any further engagement 
in any regulatory conversation regarding the terms of the final document.  The 
submissions themselves were not published until after the release of the final version 
of Guide.587  
6.2.2 APP Guidelines 
Final guidelines regarding the Commissioner’s interpretation of the new APPs 
were released in February 2014.  These guidelines include guidance on APP 11 
(which replaces NPP 4) in Chapter 11.588  This guidance is not dissimilar to that 
provided in the superseded Guidelines to the NPPs.  For the purposes of this 
research, the relevant part of the guide is headed ‘Taking Reasonable Steps’ and 
refers to the need to consider relevant circumstances listing the same contextual 
factors as appeared in the previous guidance.589  It refers to some of the steps and 
strategies that may be reasonable to take, under the same headings as used in the 
Guide to Information Security, and finishes by directing readers to that Guide for 
‘further discussion of the relevant considerations, and examples of steps that may be 
reasonable for an APP entity to take.’ 590 Under the heading ‘What are the security 
considerations?’ it provides explanations of the different behaviours that the 
principle refers to, such as interference, unauthorised access etc.591   
                                                 
586  Guide to Reasonable Security, above n 63, 28. 
587  Submissions were made by the author and other parties to the knowledge of the author, 
including the Australian Information Security Association and the Australian Privacy 
Foundation. 
588  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Chapter 11:APP 11- Security of Personal 
Information’, February 2014, <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/app-
guidelines/chapter-11-app-11-security-of-personal-information>. 
589  Ibid [11.7] – [11.9] 
590  Ibid [11.9]. 
591  Ibid [11.10] – [11.18]. 
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Similar to the issues identified above in regard to the Guide to Information 
Security, there is no reference to risk assessment, nor is there any linking of the risk 
assessment results to the selection of controls from the list of ‘steps and strategies.’  
There is no reference even to the high level concepts such as Privacy by Design 
which are used to frame the discussion of risk in the new Guide to Information 
Security.  As a consequence, the APP guidance does not materially add to the 
guidance provided in the more detailed Guide to Information Security.  
The extent to which the OAIC’s published guidance is referred to in the 
Commissioner’s investigations is considered in more detail in the consideration of 
issued case notes and OMI reports below and in the review of the Commissioner’s 
use of its investigation powers in Part 3 of this research. 
6.2.3 Analysis 
Although improved as a consequence of the consultation process the most 
recent Guide to Information Security still has many issues, particularly in its failure 
to align its interpretation of reasonable steps with risk-based information security 
management practice, the high-level nature of the information provided in regard to 
the specific security measures that may be taken, the omissions from the list of 
recommended security measures and the lack of emphasis of the importance of on-
going monitoring and review as part of an over-arching governance process. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to regard the Guide as entirely consistent with standard 
information practice. 
In terms of transparency, balance and vigour: 
 The twelve year gap between the issuing of guidance in regard to what is one 
of the most important issues affecting the protection of personal information 
suggests a lack of vigour; 
 There was only limited transparency in the consultation process preceding the 
release of the new Guide to Information Security. Submissions were not 
published until after the release of the Guide and it is not clear that further 
consultation occurred on the basis of those submissions; 
 It could be argued that the high-level nature of the advice provided in the 
Guide means there is still little transparency regarding the Commissioner’s 
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expectations in terms of compliance with NPP 4. This lack of specificity 
could reflect concerns about the advice becoming dated with the rapid change 
of technology592 and the associated resource issues for the OAIC in keeping 
the advice current.593  Whatever the reason, the lack of specificity impacts the 
effectiveness of the guidance provided. 
6.3 GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATIONS  
Guidance has been issued by the OAIC in regard to how it conducts 
investigations.  This includes two Information Sheets issued in 2008: one explaining 
the conciliation of privacy complaints594 and the other providing a step by step guide 
on how to conduct an internal investigation.595   More recently, the Commissioner 
released new fact sheets explaining the processes the OAIC itself uses in its response 
to complaints, providing guidance on how to conduct internal investigations and 
more information on the OAIC’s conciliation process.596  The OAIC had also 
published its ‘Privacy Complaints and Procedures Manual’ (Complaints Manual)597 
although this document is no longer published nor archived on the OAIC’s 
                                                 
592  For your information, above n 32, [28-28], [28-36] where the ALRC refers to the OPC concerns 
regarding the skills and resources required to issue guidance on relevant technological 
developments. See also Jackson and Shelly, above n  at 129.  
593  Ibid [28-28]. 
594   Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner, 'About the Office Information Sheet - 
Conciliation of Privacy Complaints' (February 2008) . 
595  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 'Public Sector Information Sheet 2 - A step by step guide to 
internal investigations of privacy complaints by Australian and ACT government agencies' 
(August 2008). 
596   Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Fact Sheet 9: Guide to Internal 
Investigation’, (April 2012) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-
sheets/other/privacy-fact-sheet-9-guide-to-internal-investigations>; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Fact Sheet 10: What will happen to my complaint?’, (June 
2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/other/privacy-
fact-sheet-10-what-will-happen-to-my-complaint>; Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner , ‘Privacy Fact Sheet 11: How will the OAIC handle a privacy complaint against 
my organisation’, (June 212) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-
sheets/other/privacy-fact-sheet-11-how-will-the-oaic-handle-a-privacy-complaint-against-my-
organisation > (‘Fact Sheet 11’). 
597  Complaints Manual, above n 227. 
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website.598 The extent to which the Complaints Manual is followed in the conduct of 
investigations is considered further in Part 3 in the context of the OAIC’s use of its 
investigation powers. 
6.4 CASE NOTES AND OMI REPORTS AS GUIDANCE 
Summaries of investigations conducted by the OPC and the OAIC are published 
in the form of either case notes, which relate to complaint-based investigations, or 
OMI reports that relate to own motion investigations.  The same principles apply to 
the publication of OMI reports as apply to the publication of case notes.599  Each 
provides a synopsis of the case under consideration rather than a comprehensive 
record of the proceedings.600 Neither case notes nor OMI reports are intended to be 
legally binding or to provide legal advice.601 According to the Guide to Producing 
Case Notes, case notes are intended to ‘illustrate how the privacy principles apply in 
common sets of circumstances, or how the OAIC interprets aspects of the Act’ and 
will also ‘illustrate the OAIC’s complaint handling process in relation to complex or 
difficult investigations.’602 The OAIC 2012 Annual Report states that the purpose of 
publishing case notes is to provide an insight into how the NPPs are being applied 
which can, among other things:  
 Encourage good privacy practices and compliance with the Privacy Act; and  
 Demonstrate accountability and transparency in the OAIC’s processes and 
decision-making.603 
                                                 
598  Ibid. 
599  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 1 which provides that ‘case notes can include own 
motion investigations (OMIs) to illustrate the circumstances that led to the OMI and how it was 
resolved.’ 
600  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy case notes’ 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/privacy-case-notes>. 
601  Ibid. 
602  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 1-2.  
603  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 65. 
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Similar comments are included in the OAIC 2011 Annual Report.604 There are 
no references to case notes in the OAIC 2013 Annual Report, which may be a 
consequence of there being no case notes published in the period covered by that 
report.  
The Commissioner’s website does not provide any reasons for the publication 
of OMI reports.  However it does state that OMIs ‘may look at a specific act or 
practice, at a systemic problem or recurring pattern in an entity’s practices and 
processes in handling personal information, or at a practice or problem occurring in 
more than one entity.’605  Given that the Guide to Producing Case Notes considers 
OMI reports to be the same as case notes,606 it is assumed that OMI reports are 
published for the same reasons as apply to the publication of case notes.607  
Accordingly, the publication of case notes and OMI reports could be considered part 
of the exercise of the Commissioner’s guidance power, certainly to the extent that 
publication is intended ‘to help organisations and the community understand the way 
the Office applies the provision of the Act.’608  
There are two other possible reasons for the publication of case notes and OMI 
reports, namely, transparency of compliance activities; and deterrence. These are 
considered further in Part 3 of this research. 
In 2001, the Commissioner published its Guide to Producing Case Notes which 
confirmed that the OPC would publish more frequent, de-identified case notes on 
complaints it had handled.609 Prior to that time, public reporting on the 
Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers was done via the inclusion of short 
summaries of cases in the OPC’s annual report.  
                                                 
604  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 26. 
605  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Commissioner initiated investigation 
reports’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-
investigation-reports/>. 
606  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 1. 
607  See the discussion of the reasons for publishing case notes included in Chapter 7.1.4. 
608  Fact Sheet 11, above n 596. 
609   Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248 , 3. 
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The Guide also provided a series of rules for the style and format of 
reporting.610 These include that case notes should be concise and contain only the 
information necessary to demonstrate the relevant point of law, view, or successful 
outcome.  The Guide suggests that the average case note should be between half a 
page and one page in length, although more complex cases may require up to two 
pages.611  The Guide also attaches a template for case notes.612  That template divides 
the report into four sections: Law, Facts, Issues and Outcome.613  The Guide suggests 
that the Outcomes section should cover the action taken by the Commissioner as well 
as the view formed and the ultimate resolution.  However the example Outcome 
section given is contained in a single sentence which provides: ‘‘The Commission 
formed the view that the act or practice may have been an interference with privacy, 
but declined to investigate further on the grounds that the respondent had dealt 
adequately with the complaint.’614  By contrast, the Outcome section in the case note 
template provides a more detailed basis for the outcome, referring to the facts and 
applying the relevant principles to those facts.615   
From 2002 until February 2011, the format of all case notes and OMI reports 
was consistent with the OAIC’s Guide to Producing Case Notes:  
 They were short, most being no more than one page.  Most  reports were 
around 500 words, although one OMI report had only 396 words;616 and 
 They were divided into four main sections headed ‘Facts’, ‘Issues’ and 
‘Outcomes’ after identifying the relevant principles being considered under 
the heading ‘Laws.’ The Outcome section in each case note includes any 
                                                 
610  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 7. 
611  Ibid. 
612  Ibid 9 -10. 
613  Ibid. 
614  Ibid 6. 
615  Ibid 11. 
616  Own Motion Investigation v Information Technology Company [2010] PrivCmrA 24. 
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decision as well as some indication of the basis on which the case was 
closed.617   
From 2002, the OPC also adopted a new form of complaint report citation and 
agreed that the complaint report summaries could be republished on the AustLII 
website in addition to its own website.618   
 Table 4 shows the number of case notes and OMI reports published each year 
between 2008 and 2013, together with the number of OMIs undertaken.  The 
information is taken from the OPC and OAIC annual reports and the OAIC website.  
  
 2008- 2009 2009 - 2010 2010- 2011 2011 - 2012 2012 - 2013 
No of case notes 
issued (Annual 
Report)619 
18 27 22 14 Not 
reported 
No of case notes 
(OAIC 
Website)620 
8 23 19 8 0 
No. of 
investigations 
83621 73622 59623 37624 13625 
                                                 
617  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248.  
618  Greenleaf, ‘A proposal for improving accountability of Asia-Pacific Privacy Commissioners’, 
above n  65, 8 – 9. 
619  The number of published case notes for the years from 2008 – 2010 include the OMI reports and 
case notes from complaint investigations. The details are included in the OAIC 2012 Annual 
Report, above n 1, 65; OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 33; OPC 2010 Annual Report, 
above n 403, 64; OPC 2009 Annual Report, above n 1, 68. 
620  The number has been collated based on the reports published on the OAIC website and Austlii.  
A list of all case notes published between July 2008 and June 2013 is included in Appendix A. 
Investigation Reports are published on Austlii at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/PrivCmrA/>.  
621  OPC 2009 Annual Report, above n 1, 70. 
622  OAIC 2010 Annual Report, 66. 
623  The OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, refers to ‘59 new matters involving alleged 
interferences with privacy were assessed for investigation as OMIs’ at  36.  Table 5.15 shows 
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(OMIs) 
No. of OMI 
reports (Annual 
Report)626 
Not 
reported 
Not 
reported 
Not 
reported 
6 2 
No of OMI 
reports (OAIC 
website)627 
3 1 5 4 2 
Table 4:  Case notes and OMI reports published by the OPC and the OAIC. 
Regardless of issues in reconciling the number of reports referred to in the 
Annual Reports and those published on the OAIC’s website, it is clear that the 
number of published case notes has been in decline since 2010 – 2011.628  The high 
point for the publication of OMI reports was the following year, 2011 – 2012.  Since 
then, the number of published case notes, the number of OMIs conducted and the 
number of OMIs reported has all dropped considerably.  Two OMI reports were 
published in July 2012629 which related to investigations commenced in the previous 
year.   No further report was published until some 15 months later when the 
                                                 
that NPP4 was an issue raised in 37 OMIs opened in 2010 -201, and IPP 4 was relevant in 
another 2 OMIs. 
624  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, 62. 
625  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 77. 
626  The details are included in OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 62 and OAIC 2012 Annual 
Report, above n 1, 77. 
627  The number has been collated based on the reports published on the OAIC website and Austlii 
and details of all of the published OMI reports are included in Appendix B. 
628  This drop might be attributable to the increased OMI reporting during that period, which is 
discussed further below. 
629   Medvet OMI Report, above n 341, and Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 339. 
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APPT/Melbourne IT Report630 was released in October 2013.  Between October 2013 
and March 2014, two more OMI reports were released.631   
It is possible that the decrease in the number of reported own motion 
investigations, the number of own motion investigations actually undertaken and the 
number of published case notes is due to the OAIC’s limited resources.  The 2013 
Annual Report refers to an OAIC restructure that took place because of resourcing 
constraints, and the consequential reduction in own motion investigations and audits 
undertaken.632  Resourcing issues affecting the way the Commissioner conducts 
investigations are discussed further in Part 3.633  However, it also seems that the 
OAIC elected to pursue the investigation of high-profile data breach cases, 
notwithstanding the impact that had on its ability to conduct audits, carry out other 
investigations and issue case notes.634 
The 2011 – 2012 year highpoint for publication of OMI reports coincided with 
a change in approach by the OAIC to OMI reporting.  For the first time the 
respondents were named, the reports were considerably longer and in most cases the 
initiation of the investigation and the issuing of the reports were accompanied by 
OAIC-issued press releases.635  The Commissioner publicly referred to this new 
approach noting the number of high profile data breach cases which had come to the 
office’s attention together with the public interest in the Commissioner conducting an 
                                                 
630  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘AAPT and Melbourne IT: Own Motion 
Investigation Report’,  (October 2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/aapt-and-melbourne-it-own-motion-
investigation-report>. 
631  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Telstra Corporation Limited: Own Motion 
investigation report’, (March 2014) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/telstra-omi-march-2014> and Multicard Pty 
Ltd: Own Motion Investigation Report (May 214) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-
privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/multicard-omi>. 
632  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 11 – 12. 
633  See Chapter 9.7.3. 
634  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1 , 42 and evidence given as to the impact that 
investigations into data breach cases had on resources in Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Legislation Subcommittee, Parliament of Australia, Estimates Hearing (14 February, 2012), 41 
– 43. 
635  See the media reports referred to in n 940, 941. 
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investigation.636  The reasons given for the new approach (in both speeches made by 
the Commissioner and the OAIC’s annual reports) included the promotion of public 
confidence and the provision of transparency of regulatory activities.637  All of these 
high profile investigations involved data security issues.638 Given the different 
approach taken to these more recent ‘high profile’ OMIs, those OMI reports will be 
considered separately as part of the assessment of the Commissioner’s use of its 
investigation powers in Part 3 of this research.   
6.4.1 Case notes, OMI reports and NPP 4 
Prior to 2013, the main difference between case notes and OMI reports, other 
than the reason for the investigation, was the frequency of publication, with fewer 
OMI reports published than case notes.    23 of the cases notes published between 
2001 and 2013 involved some consideration of compliance with NPP 4. NPP 4 was 
considered in eight OMI reports between 2005 when the first OMI report was 
published639  and February 2011.640   
The reports deal with a range of different incidents giving rise to concerns 
about compliance with NPP 4. The most common complaint was the failure to 
prevent unauthorised access or disclosure (raised in a total of 19 of the 23 cases) 
followed by the loss of information (raised in six cases).641  Unnecessary retention in 
breach of NPP 4.2 was raised in four cases  
                                                 
636  OAIC 2011 Annual Report, above n 1, Chapter 5, 5.  
637  Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy: What’s Ahead in 2012?’ (Presentation to International 
Association of Privacy Professionals Australia & New Zealand Annual Summit, 30 November 
2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-whats-
ahead-in-2012>, OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, Chapter 6, 1; OAIC 2013 Annual Report, 
above n 381, 78. 
638  Privacy Commissioner, ‘Information security is now the major issue affecting consumer 
privacy’ (Media Release, 29 April 2013)  <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-
releases/privacy-media-releases/information-security-is-now-the-major-issue-affecting-
consumer-privacy>. 
639  OPC v Bank Institution [2005] PrivCmrA. 
640  A list of all the case notes and OMI reports which have considered NPP 4 is included in 
Appendix E. 
641  Most cases have more than one cause for complaint so the total number of complaints raised is 
more than the total number of cases.  
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In the 23 relevant complaint-based investigations, the respondent was found to 
have breached at least one of the privacy principles in 10 cases.  In all those cases 
where the Commissioner found there had been a breach, the Commissioner was able 
to close the investigation on the basis that the issue had been adequately dealt with 
(either by reaching a conciliated outcome with the complainant or the Commissioner 
forming a view that the respondent had adequately dealt with the complaint).  This 
Commissioner’s successful use of conciliation to close complaints is discussed 
further in Part 3.642 
There were also few findings of breach of NPP 4 in any of the OMI reports.  
To the contrary, the Commissioner was able to conclude in most cases that the 
respondent was not in breach even where this required reliance on action taken by 
respondent after the incident had occurred.  By way of example, in Own Motion 
Investigation v Medical Centre643 medical records were stolen from a bin outside a 
medical centre and found in an adjacent park. The medical centre advised it was 
installing secure fencing around the premises, moving the medical waste bin inside 
the secured premises and fitting it with a new secure lock. New policies and 
procedures for secure destruction of personal information were developed and 
medical and administrative staff were trained in those procedures.  The centre also 
obtained a shredder for secure on-site destruction.  In view of those actions, the 
Commissioner was satisfied the medical centre had taken reasonable steps and had 
met the obligations imposed by NPP 4.1.  The fact that those steps had not been 
taken prior to the incident does not seem to have been considered. A similar outcome 
was reached in Own Motion Investigation v Airline644 where a computer glitch 
caused the disclosure of other travellers’ details to a passenger checking in online. 
Given the processes that the respondent already had in place and that the code 
problem which led to the disclosure was remedied soon after the respondent was 
notified of the error, the Commissioner took the view that the steps taken to respond 
                                                 
642  See Chapter 7.1.2. 
643  Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre [2009] PrivCmrA 6. 
644  Own Motion Investigation v Airline [2009] PrivCmrA 7. 
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to the error were adequate and closed the investigation into the matter, without any 
finding as to whether or not there had been a failure to comply with NPP 4.  
There are exceptions to this. A telecommunications company offered a service 
whereby individuals could access their mobile phone account information by calling 
an 1800 number, following voice prompts and keying in the relevant mobile phone 
number.645  The Commissioner found that the company was in breach of NPP 4 
because anyone who knew an individual’s mobile phone number and mobile carrier 
could call the 1800 number and access the individual’s account balance without their 
authority.   The company proposed to introduce additional authentication measures 
which satisfied the Commissioner and the investigation was closed  
Generally the reports seem to suggest that the Commissioner’s primary interest 
is in ensuring that issues are resolved, rather than considering the application of NPP 
4 to the particular circumstances to determine whether or not the respondent was in 
breach. This is certainly consistent with the responsive regulation approach which 
supports non-punitive regulatory responses where the regulated organisation is 
voluntarily bringing itself into compliance.  However, the focus on the remediation 
efforts taken, rather than on the steps which should have been taken in the first 
instance to comply with NPP 4, detracts from the transparency of the interpretation 
and application of the principle and consequently the guidance and educative value 
of the OMI reports. 
6.4.2 Industry Practice 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to determine the extent to 
which these reports could be regarded as supporting the industry practice approach to 
information security put forward in this research.  As previously discussed, the 
industry practice approach to information security put forward by this research is 
comprised of three elements: 
 The use of risk assessment (ideally via the identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities) as the basis for the identification of risks to information assets 
and the selection of security safeguards to manage that risk; 
                                                 
645  Own Motion Investigation v Telecommunications Company [2010] PrivCmrA 16. 
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 The selection of security safe guards including administrative controls (such 
as policies and personnel related controls), physical and technical security 
controls to manage the risks identified; and 
 The adoption of an iterative process-based approach that incorporates the risk 
assessment outcomes and regular monitoring and testing to ensure that the 
security safeguards remain appropriate for the management of the identified 
risks. 646 
Only four of the reports provide any statement of general principle as to the 
Commissioner’s interpretation and application of NPP 4.  However, in each of those 
cases, the statement of principles could be regarded as reflecting, at least in part, this 
industry practice approach.   
In D v Health Service Provider647 the complainant was asked to return to a 
private clinic because notes from the initial consultation could not be located.  The 
complainant complained about the loss to the OPC. The respondent gave evidence 
that it believed that the single page of notes was probably in the complainant’s 
possession and in any case did not contain any information that could identify the 
complainant. The case note provides that the decision as to what are ‘reasonable 
steps’ to ensure data security depends on a number of factors, such as the 
circumstances in which personal information is held. The sensitivity of personal 
information stored is also an important factor and higher levels of security could be 
expected for sensitive information, such as health information.  In that case, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Commissioner could not be satisfied that 
the missing sheet of paper contained any ‘personal information’ about the 
complainant and so decided to close the investigation.  A similar statement was 
included in S v Health Service Provider, also published in 2008 and also involving a 
health service provider (the facts of which are considered further below).648  A 
statement of principle in regard to NPP 4 in identical terms to that included in D v 
                                                 
646  See Chapter 3.4. 
647  D v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 4. 
648  S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19. 
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Health Service Provider and S v Health Service Provider was included in only one of 
the eight OMI reports Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre,649 the facts of 
which case have already been discussed. The reference in each of these three reports 
to relevant circumstances reflects at least the first part of an industry practice 
approach: the importance of considering risk or context. 
In E v Retail Organisation650 it is provided that protecting the security of 
personal information consists of maintaining computer and network security by 
adopting measures to protect computer systems and networks used for storing, 
processing and transmitting personal information, from unauthorised access, 
modification and disclosure. 651 This could be regarded as reflecting the second 
element of the industry practice approach: the need to select a range of controls to 
protect against all identified risks. 
There are no similar statements of general principle in any of the other twenty 
case notes or seven OMI reports in which NPP 4 was considered. 
6.4.2.1 Risk 
Risk is an integral part of an industry practice approach to information security.  
Accordingly, some consideration of risk or relevant circumstances might be expected 
in the reports dealing with NPP 4.  The only case which makes specific reference to 
risk is S v Health Service Provider.652  In that case, x-rays which were part of the 
complainant’s medical history were lost in the mail.  In determining whether the use 
of the mail was a breach of NPP 4 the case note refers to the significant harm that 
could be caused by the permanent loss of these records, the size of the organisation, 
                                                 
649  Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre [2009] PrivCmrA 6.   
650  E v Retail Organisation [2007] PrivCmrA 7. 
651  Ibid. 
652  S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19. E v Financial Institute also refers to risk but 
in the sense that the absence of access logging means that the organisation runs a greater risk of 
breaching NPP 2.  There is also a reference to risk in D v Commonwealth Agency [2010] 
PrivCmrA 5 (31 May 2010), where the complainant was questioned by a government agency in 
the presence of journalists.  The Commissioner considered that a high level of security was 
necessary given the high risk to the individual of third parties accessing the information.  
However, as this case involved a Commonwealth agency rather than a private entity, it is outside 
the scope of this research. 
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the cost of alternative delivery methods and the level of risk of records and x-rays 
being lost “in a generally dependable and reliable general mail system.”653  In view 
of these factors, it determined that the health service provider had not taken 
reasonable steps. 
While not referring to “risk,” a small number of cases refer to particular 
circumstances which might be considered to have some relevance to the 
determination of “reasonable steps.”  For example, the sensitivity and amount of 
information held were noted as relevant considerations in N v Utility Provider.654   In 
that case, it was alleged that the complainant’s ex-partner, an employee of the utility 
provider, improperly accessed the complainant’s accounts in order to ascertain 
information about his assets. Although the Commissioner found there was 
insufficient evidence to conclude that there had been a breach of the Privacy Act, it 
did consider the application of the NPP 4 as the utility had not been able to provide 
any audit trail showing access to the complainant’s information.  The Commissioner 
noted that the utility provider held personal information of a large number of 
individuals and that the type of information required to establish accounts was 
extensive and that accordingly the information should be afforded a high level of 
protection, especially given the possible serious consequences for customers if there 
was unauthorised access to that information.655   
  The sensitivity of the information was also referred to in E v Financial 
Institution656 which was another case where the complainant alleged that a staff 
member had accessed their personal information and disclosed it to a third party.  
The Commissioner suggested to the respondent that it may be reasonable to 
implement access controls in an environment where sensitive information, such as 
financial information, can be accessed by many employees throughout an 
organisation.657  The case notes do not however support any consistent or systematic 
                                                 
653  S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19, 1. 
654  N v Utility Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 13. 
655  Ibid. 
656  E v Financial Institution [2003] PrivCmrA 3  
657  Ibid. 
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approach to the consideration of relevant contextual issues as part of the assessment 
of reasonable steps for the purposes of NPP 4. 
6.4.2.2 Security measures 
The second part of the industry approach to information security put forward in 
this research is the selection of security safe guards including administrative controls 
(such as policies and personnel related controls), physical and technical security 
controls to manage the risks identified as part of the risk assessment. Although the 
case notes do not support any systematic approach to determining the adequacy of 
the steps taken to protect information, the cases do seem to support a number of 
general propositions about the need for different types of security controls. 
One such proposition is that some sort of access tracking should be in place.  E 
v Financial Institution658 was one of the first cases to raise the importance of having 
an enquiry audit trail to be able to track staff accesses to customers’ personal 
information.   The same point was made in N v Utility Provider659 where the 
Commissioner considered the absence of access tracking ‘in a large automated 
billing system’ to be a failure to take reasonable steps.   
Physical access controls for the storage of paper records have been referred to 
in a number of cases, usually in relation to missing medical records. 660   In one case 
where a file containing a child’s complete medical history could not be located, 
possibly because of misfiling, the Commissioner was prepared to regard the incident 
as a one off human error rather than failure to take reasonable steps. 661  The 
respondent was able to provide information about its hard copy and electronic record 
management systems which included access controls, physical security measures and 
storage, archiving and shredding protocol, which the Commissioner regarded as 
evidence of taking reasonable steps.  However, the basis on which the Commissioner 
                                                 
658  Ibid. 
659  N v Utility Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 13 
660  D v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 4; G v Counselling Service [2009] PrivCmrA 9. 
661  V v Health Service Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 21. 
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determined that an unauthorised access, disclosure, misuse or loss is the result of a 
systemic issue rather than a one off human error or vice versa is not entirely clear. 
In G v Counselling Service662 where one page of notes from a counselling 
session could not be located, the Commissioner considered the practice’s procedures 
for securing client files both during and outside business hours and determined they 
were reasonable and the loss of the page of notes was a one-off human mistake rather 
than a systemic issue.  There is no explicit assessment of the appropriateness of those 
procedures in the context of the possible consequences of the loss of information.  In 
the case note, little detail is provided of the design of the actual systems in place 
having regard to the risk of loss or unauthorised access or disclosure, how those 
systems were implemented or operated or how compliance was being monitored and 
reviewed.    In V v Health Service Provider663 the Commissioner was of the view that 
the health service provider’s record management policy, which included access 
controls, physical security measures and storage, archiving and shredding protocol, 
was reasonable.  Again, although no detail is provided as to the basis for this 
determination, the Commissioner decided that the misplacement of the medical 
record was the result of human error and not the result of a systemic procedural 
problem on the part of the health service provider.664   
Although the case notes may support some general propositions as to the 
security controls that should be in place, no framework for the assessment of 
appropriate security measures is provided.   As discussed in Chapter 3, information 
security requires a complex system of inter-related controls of different types.  The 
presence or absence of any particular control in isolation is unlikely to be 
authoritative as to whether reasonable steps had been taken to secure the personal 
information. Entities looking to the case notes for guidance on the security measures 
they should implement would be hard pressed to derive more than the most general 
advice. 
                                                 
662  G v Counselling Service [2009] PrivCmrA 9. 
663  V v Health Service Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 21. 
664  Ibid. 
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6.4.2.3 Process-based approach 
The adoption of an iterative process that incorporates the risk assessment 
outcomes and regular monitoring and testing to ensure that the security safeguards 
remain appropriate for the management of the identified risks is the third component 
of the industry practice approach to information security adopted in this research.  
This requirement has received little attention in any of the reports which have 
considered NPP 4.  There is only one case where, although there were procedures to 
manage access control, the Commissioner determined that the failure to ensure that 
these controls were consistently applied meant that there was a failure to take 
reasonable steps 665  Evidence of the application or enforcement of policies and 
procedures has not been referred to in any of the other case notes. 
6.4.2.4 Guidance, industry standards and practice 
It would be expected that explicit reference to the guidance discussed in 
Chapter 6.2 would be made in those case notes and OMI reports which have 
considered NPP 4.  Not only would this be consistent with the purpose of the 
guidance but it also would be consistent with the investigation process set out in the 
Complaints Manual which refers to these documents and states that they ‘represent 
the public position of the OAIC and should guide the application of the law to 
complaints.’666 However, an analysis of those case notes and OMI reports where 
breach of NPP 4 has been considered shows no reference to any OAIC guidance, 
including the guidelines and information sheets referred to above. 667   
There are also few references to the elements identified in the OAIC’s 
guidance as relevant to the assessment of reasonable steps (such as the size of the 
                                                 
665  R v Internet Service Provider [2005] PrivCmrA 17, 
666  See Chapter 7.1.1 
667  L v Commonwealth Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 14, relates to a breach of IPP 4 and includes 
reference to the  Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 8-11 as providing 
examples of when an individual may be considered to be reasonably likely to be aware that 
information may be disclosed under IPP 11.1(a). No reference is made to any guidance relevant 
to IPP 4. 
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organisation or the amount of personal information held) or the different groups of 
security controls that may be selected. It is not clear why the case notes and OMI 
reports do not refer to the OAIC’s own guidance.  If the OAIC does not take its own 
guidance into consideration when applying the privacy principles, it is difficult to 
suggest that the regulated entities should have such regard.  Inclusion of references to 
the existing guidance in case notes and OMI reports would also help clarify the 
application of that guidance to different facts and circumstances.  
It is also pertinent to consider any references to industry standards (such as ISO 
27001 and 27002) in the OAIC’s case notes.  Both Information Sheet No 6 and the 
Guidelines to the NPPs recommend consideration of the use of industry standards as 
part of determining what might be reasonable steps.668    In P and Retail Company669 
the Commissioner referred to relevant industry standards to determine if the 
collection of information was ‘fair.’   By contrast, there are few references to 
industry standards in the context of considering whether or not reasonable steps have 
been taken for the purposes of NPP 4.  In N and Utility Provider, the case note states 
that ‘the entity advised that it complied with the relevant Australian Standard and 
with its own procedures to ensure the security of personal information.’670  
Unfortunately, there is no further discussion of what this meant in practice.  There 
was, for example, no interrogation into whether a risk assessment had been done to 
support compliance with the Standard (assuming it was ISO 27001 or one of the 
similar approaches to information security).  Nor was there any discussion around 
whether adherence with the Standard would have required the implementation of 
access logs or audit trails of access to the entity’s billing system.  Without any more 
detailed consideration of what that compliance with the relevant Australian Standard 
meant, the reference to it in the case note is not helpful.   
In addition to the limited reference to its own guidance and industry standards, 
no reference is made to the outcome of any other investigation by the Commissioner 
                                                 
668   Guidelines to the NPPs, above n 536, 45. 
669   P and Retail Company [2011] AICmrCN 10. 
670  N and Utility Provider, 1. 
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in any of the case notes.  This is notwithstanding that the Complaints Manual 
provides that OAIC officers should take past decisions into account.671 
6.4.3 Transparent, balanced and vigorous 
It is important to consider the extent to which the reports considered above 
could be regarded as representing the appropriate use of powers by the 
Commissioner by reference to the principles of transparency, balance and vigour.   
There are a number of case notes which clearly link the findings of fact, the 
reasons for the decision and the decision, providing transparency of decision-making.  
A good example is S v Health Service Provider672 the facts of which have already 
been considered.  The case note refers to the sensitivity of the medical records and x-
rays, the harm to the complainant if they were lost and the resulting expectation that 
they should be afforded a higher level of protection than other forms of personal 
information. The Commissioner also considered the level of risk of the medical 
records and x-rays being lost in a generally dependable and reliable general mail 
system and noted that while respondent was not a large organisation, the cost of 
alternative methods to transmit the documents would not be a significant financial 
burden. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision that the health service provider 
failed to take reasonable steps by using the general mail, in breach of NPP 4, is 
supported by the findings of fact which in turn are linked to the reasons for the 
decision.673 
However, as discussed, in most of the reports detailed reasons for the 
determination as to the adequacy or otherwise of the steps taken to protect the 
information are not provided.  An example is H and Registered Club674 where the 
complainant raised concerned about the club using an identity card scanning machine 
to scan her driver’s licence on entry to the club.  The complaint was resolved through 
conciliation with the club agreeing to delete the data from the machine in return for 
                                                 
671  Ibid. 
672  S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19. 
673  Ibid 1. 
674  H and Registered Club [2011] AICmrCN 2. 
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the complainant providing a statutory declaration including her address details. 
Concerns regarding the security of the information were addressed in the case note 
by a single sentence: ‘The Commissioner also considered the security procedures and 
notice at the entrance of the club adequately dealt with that aspect of the 
complainant's complaint.’675   The case note does not contain any general statement 
in regard to what is meant by ‘reasonable steps’ or what might be relevant factors in 
making that determination.  There is no direct reference to the sensitivity or quantity 
of data being collected from patrons other than the complainant. The report provides 
no details as to the Club’s security procedures or how the Commissioner was able to 
form the view that they were reasonable.  Elsewhere in the report there is reference 
to the notice at the club entry which directs patrons to the registered club's privacy 
policy.  It is not clear how that statement contributed to the security of the system 
storing the scanned drivers licence information.   
Procedural fairness, which in turn supports transparency, is part of the 
conceptual framework for assessing the use by the Commissioner of its powers as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  In the absence of other information about the investigation 
process, the only aspects of procedural fairness which can be assessed by reference 
to the case notes are the evidentiary basis for the decision, as referred to in the case 
notes, and the provision of reasons (which has been touched on above).   
As discussed in Chapter 2.6.1.3, there must be sufficiently probative evidence 
to support the findings of fact which are necessary for a decision.676  Findings must 
be ‘based on evidence that is relevant and logically capable of supporting the 
findings.’677  The Complaints Manual does not provide detailed guidance as to how 
to identify or collect relevant evidence, although it does refer to different types of 
evidence that might be available including copies of audit trails from computer 
                                                 
675  Ibid. 
676  ARC Evidence Guide, above n 238, 1. 
677  Ibid 3. 
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systems and ‘corroborative evidence from third parties, often by way of a statutory 
declaration.’678   
In identifying the security measures in place in each of the cases, it seems that 
reliance is placed almost entirely on the evidence provided by the respondents.  For 
example, in describing the clinic’s security practices, the case note in D v Health 
Service Provider states that “the clinic advised the Commissioner that all patient files 
are kept in a lockable cabinet and only the doctor and clinic staff have access to this 
cabinet.”  There is no reference to the evidence from the clinic being independently 
tested or verified.  Even in cases which involved more complex information 
technology systems, there is no indication that independent or expert evidence was 
sought. For example, in N v Utility Provider679 there is no suggestion that any 
independent expert testimony was sought to support the Commissioner’s view that an 
access audit trail should be part of the respondent’s billing system.  However, the 
ultimate conciliation of the case (with the respondent agreeing to implement a 
password security system as an interim solution) meant that no final decision on the 
absence of the audit trail needed to be made.  Even in those cases where the 
respondent is found to have breached NPP 4, there is no indication of the 
Commissioner seeking evidence from a party other than the complainant or the 
respondent to support that finding.680   
The failure to seek any corroborating or expert evidence to support assertions 
made by either party in any of the 23 cases or by the respondents in the OMIs 
indicates that decisions may be being made that are not based on sufficient evidence.  
This reliance on evidence provided by the respondent raised issues of procedural 
fairness (and thus transparency) as well as vigour (as to the collection of relevant 
evidence) with those reports that have considered NPP 4. 
The other finding of note in regard to the evidence relied on are those OMIs 
reports where reliance was made on evidence of the post-breach remediation steps to 
                                                 
678  Complaints Manual above n 227, 17. 
679  N v Utility Provider [2006] PrvCmrA 13. 
680  See, eg, Own Motion Investigation v Telecommunications Company [2010] PrivCmrA 16. 
  
 173 
determine that there was no breach (as discussed in Chapter 6.4.1). This reliance on 
post event behaviour is not consistent with reliance on relevant and probative 
evidence that should be an important part of the process of procedural fairness which 
should underpin any investigation.  It suggests that the Commissioner is more 
concerned in some of these cases to demonstrate the remediation of any issue, rather 
than making a finding as to whether or not there has been a breach.  This is certainly 
consistent with the Commissioner’s focus on conciliation and with the principles of a 
responsive regulatory system discussed in Chapter 2.  However, the publication of 
OMI reports where post incident rectification steps are taken into account in 
determining whether there had been a breach of NPP 4 can be confusing and perhaps 
misleading.   Is the Commissioner’s position that organisations will not be found to 
have breached the NPP 4 if they take appropriate post event remediation steps.  This 
cannot be the intent of these reports. 
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn based on the above: 
 Only a small number of cases included statements of general principle in 
regard to the Commissioner’s interpretation of NPP 4 that were consistent 
with an industry practice approach.  There were also few indications of the 
actual application of an industry practice approach in the Commissioner’s 
consideration of whether or not there has been a breach of NPP 4 in the 
relevant cases; 
 There were few consistent references to the sort of contextual factors which 
may be expected to influence the determination of what is reasonable (using 
either an industry practice approach or referring to published guidance from 
the Commissioner),  such as the sensitivity of the information, the size of the 
organisation or the amount of personal information held.  This again indicates 
an inconsistency with industry practice; 
 Although a number of cases arrive at similar conclusions, for example that 
access controls should have been in place, the failure to properly 
contextualise those conclusions in the different circumstances make it 
difficult to derive more than a very general view in regard to the need for 
individual security measures (such as access controls, logging, physical 
security, records management systems and appropriate training).  This in turn 
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limits the transparency of decision-making, and the educative value of the 
reports ;  
 There is no indication of the OAIC making independent enquiries or 
receiving corroborating evidence as to the accuracy of the information 
provided by the parties in any of the cases. This in turn suggests both a lack 
of vigour by the OAIC in the investigation process and a failure of 
transparency to the extent that it is based on procedural fairness and ensuring 
that decisions are based on appropriate evidence; and 
 The findings in a number of the OMI reports are in fact problematic in the 
way they consider post incident remediation actions as part of whether the 
respondent organisation has taken reasonable steps.  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The OAIC’s use of the guidance power, through the issuing of guidance 
documents and the publication of reports on completed investigations, has been 
considered in this chapter. Although there is some evidence of the more vigorous 
publication of guidance, including a new Guide to Information Security, and greater 
transparency offered by the extensive range of resources available on-line, ranging 
from fact sheets to more detailed guides, the overall use of the guidance power in 
regard to NPP 4 is not entirely consistent with industry practice nor could that use be 
described as transparent, balance and vigorous.  
Prior to 2013, the only guidance that was available in regard to NPP 4 was high 
level, dealing somewhat generically with the types of controls that should be in 
place, incomplete and out of date.  It was also inconsistent with an industry practice 
approach, failing to use risk assessment and a process-based approach to information 
security management to frame the selection and management of the controls.  The 
Guide to Information Security issued in April 2013 does not entirely address these 
issues.  Although containing more current detail in regard to the sorts of controls that 
should be considered, the guidance remains high level, does not include some 
important controls and still does not provide any overarching framework for the 
selection and management of security controls.  However, this Guide is still the only 
guidance issued by the OAIC specifically relating to information security. In 
comparison to the wide range of materials available regarding credit reporting and e-
  
 175 
health, for example, it could be said that the use of the power to issue non-binding 
guidance in regard to NPP 4 has not been balanced or vigorous.  The consultation 
process that preceded the issuing of that Guide suggests that references made in 2008 
to the Commissioner’s track record of issuing ‘vague and ambiguous’ guidelines and 
failure to engage in a well-resourced and properly conducted consultation process as 
part of the development of guidelines remain pertinent.681   
In addition to guidance documents, the case notes and pre-February 2011 OMI 
reports which have considered NPP 4 were assessed using the twin lenses of an 
industry practice approach to information security and the transparent, balanced and 
vigorous use of powers. Conclusions similar to those reached in regard to the 
guidance documents were reached in regard to these reports. 
Generally, although there has been an increase in the transparency of this 
guidance by the publication of more detailed case notes and OMI reports on the 
OAIC’s website, the majority of those case notes and reports fail to align their 
consideration of NPP 4 with industry best practice. There is limited consideration of 
risk or even the contextual factors referred to in relevant guidance as being relevant 
to the assessment of what is “reasonable.” With a couple of exceptions, the reports 
also fail to provide transparency of decision-making or anything more than high level 
guidance as to the Commissioner’s interpretation or application of NPP 4.  It also 
appears that the investigations undertaken may not be sufficiently vigorous to the 
extent that they seem to rely on evidence provided by the respondents without 
independent verification and rely on post incident behaviour when determining 
whether or not there has been a breach. 
The findings in this chapter are consistent with those from Chapter 5, which 
considered the Commissioner’s use of its monitoring, audit, advice and education 
powers.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded overall that the Commissioner’s oversight 
powers considered in this Part 2 have not been exercised in a transparent, balanced 
                                                 
681   Greenleaf, Waters and Bygrave, above n 65. 
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and vigorous way or in a way which is entirely consistent with an industry practice 
approach to information security.  
This chapter has considered only those OMI reports issued prior to February 
2011, as part of the consideration of the Commissioner’s use of its guidance powers, 
which in turn is one aspect of the Commissioner’s use of its oversight powers. The 
way that the investigation power has been used in regard to data breach cases from 
2011 is considered separately in the next Part of this research, which examines more 
closely the Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers through the detailed 
analysis of six different Own Motion Investigations. 
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Chapter 7: Investigation Powers 
In addition to the oversight powers examined in Part 2, the Commissioner has 
powers of enforcement, referred to as investigation powers in this research because 
of the Commissioner’s focus on the use of the investigation power.  The 
Commissioner’s enforcement powers are closer to the more traditional deterrent 
powers and prior to March 2014 comprised: 
 The right to investigate complaints and other interferences with 
privacy;682 and 
 The power to make a determination following a complaint-based 
investigation.683 
In addition, the Commissioner has the power to seek an injunction to prevent 
conduct that would constitute a breach of the Act.684  Because this power has not 
been exercised by the Commissioner, it will not be considered in this research. 
Additional powers have been made available to the Commissioner but because 
these came into effect in March 2014, they will not be considered in detail in this 
research.685 
The ALRC referred to the importance of the enforcement functions of the 
Commissioner.  The ALRC noted Julia Black’s statement that enforcement can play 
a pivotal role in providing ‘incentive structures’ to promote compliance, although 
                                                 
682  Privacy Act, s 40. 
683  Ibid s52. 
684  Privacy Act s 98. Section 98 provides that following an application from the Commissioner or 
another person, the Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court can grant an injunction 
restraining a person from engaging in conduct that would constitute a contravention of the 
Privacy Act and, if the court thinks it desirable to do so, requiring a person to do any act or 
thing. 
685  The Commissioner’s new powers are considered briefly in Chapters 2.4 and 11. 
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initial focus should be on restoring compliance through negotiated outcomes (such as 
conciliation).686   
This Part 3 will consider and analyse these enforcement powers by reference to 
the 6 investigations conducted by the OAIC introduced in Chapter 4.  Each of these 
investigations will be assessed using the conceptual framework of standard 
information security practice and principles for the exercise of regulatory powers, 
developed in Part 1.  Part 3 is made up of the following chapters: Chapter 7, which 
provides an overview of the Commissioner’s investigation powers and the guidance 
that the Commissioner has issued in regard to the use of those powers; Chapter 8, in 
which the 6 investigations that are considered in detail in this research are 
introduced;  Chapter 9, which considers the extent to which the investigation in each 
of the 6 cases represents the transparent, balanced and vigorous use by the 
Commissioner of its investigation power and Chapter 10, which considers the extent 
to which each of the investigations could be regarded as supporting an industry 
practice approach to information security.  
7.1 INVESTIGATION FUNCTIONS 
The Privacy Act provides a process for individuals to complain to the 
Commissioner about acts or practices that may be an interference with individuals’ 
privacy rights,687 which are defined to include, among other things, a breach of the 
privacy principles.688 The Commissioner generally is required to investigate if a 
complaint had been made,689 although there were some exceptions to this690  and the 
Commissioner has the discretion to decide not to investigate, or to cease an 
investigation, in certain circumstances.691   
                                                 
686  For your information, above n 32, [4.72]. 
687  Privacy Act s 36.  
688  Ibid ss 13, 13A. 
689   Ibid s 40. 
690  Ibid s 40(1A), eg, if the complainant did not complain to the entity first. 
691   Ibid ss 41(1), (2) & (3). 
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The Commissioner also has the discretion to investigate an act or practice that 
may be an interference with an individual’s privacy even if there is no complaint, if 
the Commissioner thinks it is desirable that the act or practice be investigated.692  For 
example, if the media reports a serious breach of privacy, the Privacy Commissioner 
may take action and investigate before a complaint is made.693   These investigations 
were reported as ‘Own Motion Investigations’694 and in this chapter are considered 
separately to complaint-based investigations.   
7.1.1 Conducting investigations 
In terms of the investigatory process, the Act provides that the Commissioner must 
inform the respondent that the matter is to be investigated before commencing the 
investigation695 but is not required to provide either the complainant or the 
respondent with an opportunity to appear before it unless it proposes to make an 
adverse determination pursuant to Section 52.696 The Act also specifies that the 
investigation shall be conducted in private ‘but otherwise in such manner as the 
Commissioner thinks fit.’697  Accordingly, the Commissioner can determine the 
process that will be used for investigations and may, for example, make decisions 
based on a review of relevant documentation without any hearing in person.698 
The OAIC has issued guidance as to how its investigations will be handled.699  
This guidance provides in summary that: 
                                                 
692  Ibid s 40(2). 
693  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Applying Privacy Law  (1 September 2014) 
< http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-act/applying-privacy-law>. 
694  From 12 March 2014, these investigations will be referred to as Commissioner Initiated 
Investigations. See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,Commissioner initiated 
investigation reports (30 June 2014) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/>. 
695  Privacy Act s 43(1)(a). 
696  Ibid ss 43(4) - (5). 
697  Ibid s 43(2). 
698  This is consistent with the general law which provides that if the relevant legislation does not 
prescribe how the investigation should be conducted, then the regulator may decide on what is 
appropriate. See, eg,, Kawicki v Legal Services Commissioner and Anor [2002]  NSWSC 1072 
699  Fact Sheet 11, above n 596. 
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 A Compliance Officer, who has authority to make decisions about complaints 
on behalf of the Commissioner, will investigate; 
 The Compliance Officer will contact the complainant to discuss the 
complaint and ask what they are seeking for resolution and will also contact 
the organisation responsible;   
 The Compliance Officer will also ask for parties to provide evidence to 
support their views;  
 If there is enough evidence to support the complaint, the Compliance Officer 
will try to resolve it through conciliation, and if successful, the file will be 
closed; 
 If the OAIC is of the view that the respondent has made a reasonable offer 
but the complainant has not accepted it, the OAIC can close the file on the 
grounds that the respondent has adequately dealt with the matter; and 
 If the OAIC does not think the respondent has taken reasonable steps to deal 
with the matter, the Commissioner can make a formal decision or 
determination, which may include orders for the respondent to apologise, pay 
compensation or change its practices.700  
As previously discussed, in addition to this general guidance, the 
Commissioner has also published a Complaints Manual, which provides more 
detailed information about the OAIC’s investigation process.  According to the 
Complaints Manual, the OAIC must undertake a number of preliminary steps to 
ensure the complaint is one that should be investigated.701  One of those is an initial 
complaint assessment.702 If that assessment results in a decision to proceed with the 
investigation, the next steps are: 
                                                 
700  Ibid. 
701  Complaints Manual above n 226, 13. 
702  The complaint assessment process is considered in more detail by reference to the Complaint 
Assessment Sheets discussed in Chapter 9.4.   
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 Preparing a case plan that includes identification of the issues in the 
complaint and the appropriate areas of the Act that may be relevant; 
 Sending a letter advising the parties about the investigation (referred to in this 
research as the Request for Information Letters or RFI Letters); 
 Collecting relevant evidence to apply the law and relevant policy to the facts 
of the case; and 
 Finalising the case, which will occur by conciliation or by closing the case on 
the grounds that there has been no interference with privacy or by making a 
determination.703 
The Manual provides that a case plan for each investigation should be drafted 
using a template within the Complaint Management System (CMS). The case plan 
should identify the issues raised by the complaint, the relevant privacy principles that 
may have been breached and the information or evidence needed to establish whether 
there has been a breach of privacy.  In determining what information or evidence 
may be required, the Complaints Manual provides that consideration should be given 
to any evidence to hand in relation to the allegations, identifying what information or 
evidence is still needed.704 These case plans must be approved by the Complaint 
Officer’s supervisor before investigation-opening letters are sent.705 
Case plans or investigation plans are an important part of any investigation.  
For example, the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s investigation guide refers to the 
creation of such a plan and notes the benefits, which include that the plan focuses 
attention on what is to be investigated.  This will ensure that important matters are 
not overlooked and that the investigation does not wander off course. 706  Plans also 
support transparency of the investigation process and play an important role in 
                                                 
703  Complaints Manual above n 226, Section 12. 
704  Complaints Manual above n 226, 33. 
705  Ibid. 
706  Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling’, (April 2009) < 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/docs/better-practice-guides/onlineBetterPracticeGuide.pdf>, 
[4.23]. 
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identifying the evidence that is needed to form a decision regarding the issues raised 
by the complaint.  The extent to which the OAIC follows this process is considered 
in Chapter 9. 
Although the Compliance Officers are largely responsible for the carriage of 
the investigations, there is no indication of what the investigative skills or 
background of those officers should be. The Complaints Manual states that 
Compliance Officers will ‘provide excellent service to people making or responding 
to complaints.’707 It also states that Compliance Officers should be continually 
developing understanding and expertise in privacy issues and the Act.708 However, 
there is no reference to the need for Compliance Officers to have any specific 
investigative skills or experience.  When the question of investigation skills was 
raised with the ACC, who has a legal background, she advised that ‘in terms of 
formal investigative qualifications I am aware that there are specific qualifications 
for investigations and we’ve certainly put some of our people through that kind of 
training.’709   However, there is no reference to any particular investigation training 
or similar skills of the OAIC staff in any of the OAIC’s annual reports or other 
publications.  The OAIC 2013 Annual Report refers to staff training that took place, 
including external courses on leadership and staff management, media, social media, 
strategic communications, speech writing and project management, as well as 
internal learning and development opportunities.710  There is no reference to training 
or development regarding investigation skills or information security. 
The skills of the regulatory team are important.  As noted in Chapter 2.5, 
principle- based regulation shifts responsibility for determining how to comply from 
the regulator to the regulated entities, which requires a substantially different set of 
skills on the part of inspectors and compliance staff to enable them to engage in the 
negotiations and qualitative judgement that are entailed.711    Lack of skills, whether 
                                                 
707  Complaints Manual above n 226 at 6. 
708  Ibid. 
709  Interview with Acting Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
710  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 22. 
711  Black, above n 179. 
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in investigation techniques or in understanding information security practice, are 
likely to affect the Commissioner’s use of its investigation and enforcement 
functions.   This is even more so in relation to cases which involve complex technical 
issues. 
7.1.2 Conciliation 
If the investigation is not closed earlier for other reasons, the Commissioner 
can endeavour, by conciliation, to effect a settlement between the complainant and 
respondent of the matters that gave rise to the investigation.712  The Commissioner 
can also make a determination either dismissing the complaint or finding the 
complaint substantiated.713  
The OAIC is focused on conciliation.714 It sees conciliation as an ‘effective and 
quick way both parties can reach an agreement.’715  The proposed Regulatory Powers 
Policy confirms this preference for conciliation. It provides that, in response to a 
complaint, the OAIC will investigate and attempt to conciliate and only ‘if satisfied 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the complaint will be resolved by 
conciliation’ will the OAIC decide whether to investigate the matter further and 
perhaps make a determination.716  Although the OAIC has stated that there are cases, 
such as ‘particularly serious privacy breaches,’ where the OAIC would be prepared 
to use its power to make determinations rather than rely on conciliation, to date the 
                                                 
712  Privacy Act ss 27(1)(a), 27(1)(ab).  
713  Ibid s 52. 
714  See, eg, ‘Communication Privacy Complaints: In Search of the Right Path’, 4; Nigel Waters, 
‘Enforcement of  Privacy Law – Issues Arising from Australian Experience’ (2007).  See also 
comments by the Commissioner in C Merritt, ‘Pilgrim has compelling case for conciliated 
outcomes’, The Australian (online), 19 August 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/compelling-case-for-conciliated-
outcomes/story-e6frg97x-1226117737294> ; A Colley, ‘Privacy Commissioner plans hardline 
approach to new Act. Talks tough on Privacy Act amendments’, itNews (online), 25 November 
2013 <http://www.itnews.com.au/News/365375,privacy-commissioner-plans-hardline-approach-
to-new-act.aspx>. 
715  Ibid. 
716  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227 at 6. 
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determination power seems to have only been used where a conciliated outcome 
cannot be reached.717  Determinations are discussed further in Chapter 7.3 below.   
Although the Privacy Act does not prescribe how the conciliation process is to 
be conducted, the OPC and the OAIC have released a number of relevant guidance 
documents. 718   In these, conciliation is defined as ‘a formal, structured discussion 
between the parties assisted by an OAIC conciliator, an independent third party who 
helps identify and discuss issues.’719  Information is sought from the complainant 
about the desired outcome of the complaint and the respondent is then contacted to 
determine whether it agrees to the complainant’s solution, or the parties are brought 
together in a conciliation conference.   If the parties reach an agreement during 
conciliation, the OAIC regards the case as settled.  The OAIC’s view is that has been 
very successful in the use of its power to achieve conciliation, which is one of the 
reasons that so few determinations have been made.720 
The OAIC’s preference for conciliated outcomes is entirely consistent with the 
objects of the Act in relation to the investigation of complaints.  However, it is not 
clear that the same preference should apply to own motion investigations (which do 
not involve a complainant and do not have the same legislative direction to 
conciliation).  It is also not clear that conciliation is appropriate where systemic 
issues are raised.  These issues are discussed further below. 
7.1.3 Closing a complaint investigation 
There are circumstances in which the Commissioner may decide to close an 
investigation without arriving at a conciliated outcome or making a determination.   
                                                 
717  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy What’s Ahead for 2012’ (Presentation to International Association of 
Privacy Professionals Australia & New Zealand, Annual Summit, 30 November 2011). 
718  Guidance includes Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘About the Office 
Information Sheet – Conciliation of Privacy Complaints’ (February 2008). 
719  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Privacy fact sheet 12: Conciliation of 
privacy complaints', (June 2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-
fact-sheets/other/privacy-fact-sheet-12-conciliation-of-privacy-complaints>. 
720  In the Senate Committee Review of the recent Privacy Act amendments, the Commissioner 
argued that the low number of determinations reflected the Commissioner’s success in 
conciliating matters rather than the Commissioner having to use more formal powers.  See 
Senate Report 2012, [5.12]. 
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One of those circumstances is that there has been no interference with privacy.721  In 
the last reporting year, 55% of complaints were closed without a complete 
investigation.722  The other common basis for closing complaint-based investigations 
is that the Commissioner believes that the interference complained of has been 
adequately dealt with.723  In the 2012–2013 year, 83 of the 153 cases that proceeded 
to an investigation were closed on this basis.724 The Complaints Manual refers to the 
different ways that the OAIC may be satisfied that the respondent has addressed the 
complainant’s concerns, including where the respondent: 
 Apologised; 
 Instituted systemic reform of its processes and procedures; 
 Provided training;  
 Reinforced or strengthened security measures for personal information; or 
 Offered appropriate compensation to the complainant.725 
This list is consistent with that provided as the grounds for closing complaints 
on the basis that they had been adequately dealt with in the OAIC’s last Annual 
Report.726 
Before leaving consideration of instances where investigations are closed 
without a determination, it is worth noting that this decision (to cease the 
investigation) is subject to judicial review by the Federal Court under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the ‘ADJR Act’).  Judicial 
review is not a merits review. It is limited to a consideration of the legality of the 
process, including issues such as a breach of natural justice; error of law; and an 
improper exercise of power. The court cannot hear the matter afresh or substitute the 
                                                 
721  Privacy Act s 41(1)(a). 
722  See, eg, OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 71.  For a discussion on the effect of closing 
investigations based on there being no interference with privacy – see Waters, above n 65. 
723  Privacy Act s 41(2)(a). 
724  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 75 
725  Complaints Manual, above n 227, ‘Section 41(2)(a) – adequately dealt with.’ 
726  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 76. 
188  
decision of the Commissioner with its own. If the court finds that the grounds for 
review are made out, it can make an order setting aside or quashing the decision and 
can remit the matter back to the Privacy Commissioner for further reconsideration.727  
From a practical point of view, the judicial review process is expensive (because it 
involves applying to a court, with all the attendant filing and legal representation 
costs) and time consuming.  To date, most applications for review have been 
dismissed without consideration of the privacy principles.728  In only two cases has 
the Court considered the Commissioner’s interpretation of the privacy principles as 
part of its decision regarding whether there has been a mistake in law.729  Neither of 
those cases involved consideration of NPP 4.   
There is no right to a merits review of any decision to cease an investigation.  
This has not changed with the amendments, which introduce a right of appeal on the 
facts only in regard to determinations.730  The absence of this right has contributed to 
the lack of jurisprudence around privacy law in Australia.731  One of the 
consequences of this lack of jurisprudence is the increased importance of the 
Commissioner’s case notes and OMI reports, because they are one of the few 
resources available that provide insight into the Commissioner’s interpretation and 
application of the privacy principles. 
7.1.4 Publishing case notes 
The OAIC aims to publish a number of case notes each year.732  The nature and 
format of case notes and OMI reports has been discussed. 733  The role of case notes 
                                                 
727  For your information, above n 32, [46.49] – [46.41]. 
728  See, eg, A v Australian Information Commissioner [2011] FCA 520; Wijayaweera v Australian 
Information Commissioner [2012] FCA 99; Hammond v Australian Information Commissioner 
[2013] FCA 802. 
729  Smallbone v NSW Bar Association [2011] FCA 1145; Jones v Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner [2014] FCA 285.  The privacy principles were considered by the 
Federal Court in Seven Network (Operations) Limited v Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance 
[2004] FCA 637; but in the context of the issuing of injunctive relief pursuant to old s 98. 
730  Privacy Act s 96(1)(c). 
731  See Chapter 7.1.4. 
732  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 1. 
733  See Chapter 6.4. 
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and OMI reports as guidance, and the extent to which case notes and OMI reports 
published prior to February 2011 provide transparency of decision-making and 
represent the vigorous use of the Commissioner’s powers, has also been discussed.734   
In addition to transparency of decision-making, two other reasons are given for 
the publication of case notes and OMI reports: transparency of compliance activities 
and deterrence. The OAIC 2012 Annual Report refers to the Privacy Commissioner 
commencing the publication of reports on investigations into high-profile cases to 
‘increase the transparency of its compliance activities.’735  A similar statement is 
included in the OAIC 2013 Annual Report.736   The draft Regulatory Powers Policy 
refers to public communication about regulatory activity, calling it an important tool 
for the OAIC because it may promote community confidence in the OAIC by clearly 
signalling the way that the OAIC intends to deal with entities that are not complying 
with privacy laws, and because it will support transparency around the OAIC’s use 
of privacy regulatory powers. 737 The concern to ensure transparency of compliance 
activities is also consistent with at least one of the criterion for opening an OMI: that 
there is a general public expectation that the OAIC will investigate breaches of the 
Act.  If the OAIC takes action on this basis, then it is important that the community 
generally is aware of the action taken. Given that the Commissioner has been 
criticised for its failure to take action738 it is perhaps not surprising that one of the 
motivations for the publication of reports is to provide greater transparency and 
promote awareness of its compliance activity. 
This interest in the public communication of regulatory activity indicates a 
significant shift by the OAIC.  The Commissioner’s previous approach to promoting 
compliance noted that details of investigations may be published in ‘rare 
circumstances where this may be of merit’ such as repeated or very serious breaches 
or where the organisation demonstrates that it does not intend to comply with its 
                                                 
734  Ibid. 
735  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 64. 
736  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 78. 
737  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227, [49] – [50]. 
738  See the references above n 65. 
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legal obligations.739 This reflects the previous position that details of an 
investigation, particularly the respondent’s name, may have been published for 
deterrent purposes (albeit rarely) rather than more generally as part of supporting 
compliance.   
The deterrence value of the publication of details of the Commissioner’s 
investigations is no longer clear.740 The Complaints Manual notes that details of 
investigations may be published in ‘rare circumstances where this may be of merit,’ 
such as where there has been publicity around the matter before it comes to the 
Office, or repeated or very serious breaches or where the organisation demonstrates 
that it does not intend to comply with its legal obligations.741  Presumably the 
assumption is that organisations do not want to run the risk of reputational damage 
and loss of clients’ trust from published reports of privacy breaches, particularly if 
these are critical of the respondent organisation (unless the case is already in the 
public domain).   For this reason, prior to February 2011 most OMI reports were 
published on an anonymous basis, for example OMI v Airline Company.742  More 
recently however, the media coverage of data breaches means that the incidents are 
often already in the public domain before the Commissioner decides to undertake 
any investigation.  In many cases, the media, as part of its reporting on the data 
breach, will approach the Commissioner for a public statement regarding whether the 
Commissioner intends to conduct an investigation.743  In these circumstances, where 
the data breach and the entities involved are already in the public domain, the 
publication of details of the OAIC’s investigation, including the name of the 
respondent organisation, would no longer seem to be any sort of deterrent. In fact, as 
                                                 
739  Information Sheet 13, above n 203, 2. 
740  OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 38; Information Sheet 13, above n 203, 2. 
741  Complaints Manual, above n 227, 2. 
742  Own Motion Investigation v Airline [2009] PrivCmrA 7. 
743  See, eg, Fran Foo, ‘Warning after eBay passwords “stolen”’, The Australian (online), 23 May 
2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/warning-after-ebay-passwords-stolen/story-
e6frgakx-1226927542280>, which includes the following statement: ‘Australia’s Privacy 
Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim said the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner had 
received a voluntary data breach notification from eBay early yesterday. “We are currently 
conducting enquiries into the data breach to inform whether the OAIC will need to open an 
investigation,” Mr Pilgrim said.’ 
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discussed in Chapter 9, the Commissioner has argued that publication is of benefit to 
the respondent, giving it the opportunity to reassure the community that the issue has 
been resolved.744 
The extent to which these different purposes for the publication of reports - 
transparency of decision-making , transparency of compliance activities and 
deterrence – are met by the reports published in regard to the 6 investigations 
analysed in detailed in this research  is considered further in Chapter 9. 
7.1.5 Procedure for producing case notes 
The OAIC’s Guide to Producing Case Notes provides a process for the 
selection of cases from which to publish a case note.  The process involves a case 
officer flagging potential cases for publication of case notes. These are then given 
further consideration by the case note Project Manager, who then consults the OAIC 
Compliance Directors where appropriate.745  The Compliance Directors review the 
drafts with regard to content, style and suitability for publication.  Once approved, 
the drafts are sent to the Director of Corporate and Public Affairs for style checking 
before being sent to the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and Deputy 
Commissioner for their consideration.  Following clearance by the Executive, the 
case note is published.746 
It is difficult to determine from the published case notes themselves whether 
the approval process set out in the Guide has been followed generally.  However, the 
selection of OMIs for reporting will be considered in more detail in Chapter 9 of this 
research, where additional information from the OAIC’s investigation files is 
available to support that analysis.   
7.2 OWN MOTION INVESTIGATIONS 
As already mentioned, the Privacy Commissioner has the power to investigate 
possible non-compliance with the Act on its own motion, without any complaint 
                                                 
744  See Chapter 9.10. 
745  Guide to Producing Case Notes, above n 248, 3. 
746  Ibid 8. 
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being made.  These investigations have been called own motion investigations (or 
OMIs).  From March 2014 they will be known as ‘Commissioner Initiated 
Investigations’ or CIIs747   
7.2.1 Commencing an OMI 
According to the OAIC, matters that are considered for own motion 
investigation come to the OAIC’s attention in a variety of ways, including reports in 
the media and from other agencies and organisations, calls to the telephone Enquiries 
Line or letters to the OAIC from individuals regarding experiences of other people. 
Also, individuals might complain about something that happened to them, but do not 
want to make a formal complaint about the practice.748 There are also cases where 
entities ‘self-report’ breaches as part of voluntary data breach notification.749    
When determining whether to investigate a matter on its own motion, the 
OAIC uses its own risk assessment criteria.750 These criteria include:  
 The number of people affected and the possible consequences for those 
individuals;  
 The sensitivity of the personal information involved;  
 The progress of an agency’s or organisation’s own investigation into the 
matter and consideration of the actions taken by the entity in response;  
 The likelihood that the investigation will reveal acts or practices that involve 
systemic interferences with privacy and/or that are unidentified;  
 The expertise and resources available to the OAIC; 
 The necessity for the OAIC to be satisfied that the investigation is complete 
and/or proposed resolutions are implemented;  
                                                 
747  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 77. 
748  Complaints Manual, above n 227, 20. 
749  Both Sony and Dell reported the data breaches which led to the investigations considered in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters of this research. 
750  See, eg, OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 77; OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 67 – 
68. 
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 The nature of any proposed resolution; and 
 The general public and parliamentary expectations that if it becomes aware of 
a breach, the OAIC will investigate where appropriate.751 
The OAIC’s reference to these criteria was confirmed by the Assistant 
Commissioner Compliance.  The Assistant Commissioner Compliance said that, 
rather than investigate where there is one individual who has been affected by a 
matter, the OAIC’s preference is to ‘open investigations where there’s systemic 
problems, large numbers of people affected, or the information that might have been 
say revealed may have been particularly sensitive.’752   According to the Assistant 
Commissioner Compliance, these criteria were used for resource reasons, because 
the OAIC does not have the capacity to investigate every report of possible breach.753   
The extent to which these criteria have been used as the basis for the 
commencement of OMIs is considered in Chapter 9.  
7.2.2 Conducting an OMI 
According to the Complaints Manual, the Commissioner will take the same 
approach to own motion investigations as it does to complaint-based 
investigations.754  This investigation process has already been discussed in Chapter 
7.1 and will be assumed to apply to OMIs.   
However, some differences in the investigatory process between compliant- 
based and own motion investigations might be expected. The Complaints Manual 
refers to the problems for case officers inherent in the differing roles of investigator 
and conciliator, observing that: ‘In some ways these roles are complementary but in 
other ways there is a tension as their ultimate goals may be different.’755 It describes 
                                                 
751  See, eg, Getting in on the Act, above n 155, 355; OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 77, 
OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, 67 – 68; Complaints Manual, above n 227, ‘Current 
criteria for conducting own motion investigations’. 
752  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
753  Ibid. 
754   Information Sheet 13, above n 203. 
755  Complaints Manual, above n 227, ‘Case Officer’s Role’, 7. 
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the investigation function as aiming ‘to come to a view about whether a privacy 
breach has occurred or not.’ It notes that, although still needing to adhere to 
principles of procedural fairness, the role of investigator is not one that takes into 
account the particular needs or interests of the parties.756  It then contrasts the 
conciliation function, where the complaint officer is concerned with the interests of 
the parties and how they might be met by a conciliated outcome.  Where the focus is 
on conciliation, the OAIC officer:  
is not gathering information for the purpose of forming a view about the facts of the 
matter or whether the law has been breached. A view regarding the facts of the matter 
may remain suspended whilst the parties focus on a solution they can both accept.757 
Having described this fundamental difference between an investigation and a 
conciliated outcome, the Manual fails to incorporate this into any meaningful 
differentiation in its approach to the conduct of own motion investigations. 
If OMIs are pursued with a view to reaching agreement with the respondents, 
this may impact the manner of the investigation and may take precedence over the 
OAIC’s concern to form a view about the facts of each matter or about whether the 
law has been breached, having regard to those findings of fact.  This is of particular 
relevance to the investigation of those data breach cases that raise systemic issues. It 
would be expected that the report from an investigation into a systemic issue would 
identify an issue of general concern and clearly describe how the Privacy Act 
principles would apply, rather than seek to arrive at a ‘conciliated’ or agreed 
outcome with the organisation.    
Another aspect of an interest in resolving OMIs by agreement is the OAIC’s 
relationship with respondents. It is clear that the OAIC is concerned to ensure the 
continued voluntary cooperation of respondents in own motion investigations.  As 
noted in Chapter 4.3.2, the majority of redactions made as part of the FOI process 
were on the basis that if the information was revealed it would impact the flow of 
information to the OAIC.  In weighing the public interest in disclosure, the OAIC’s 
                                                 
756   Ibid. 
757  Ibid. 
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concern to ensure the continued voluntary provision of information by respondents 
was identified as a decisive concern. In the interview with the researcher, the 
Assistant Commissioner Compliance referred to how cooperative the respondents 
had been, noting that although the OAIC does have compulsory powers that it could 
use, the respondents had been ‘cooperative and accept the views that we come to in 
general.’758  The OAIC’s compulsory powers include the power to require the 
production of documents and for witnesses to give evidence.759  The effect of the 
OAIC’s interest in maintaining open communications with respondents in OMIs on 
the transparency and balance of the exercise of its investigations powers will be 
considered as part of the detailed assessment of the OMI reports contained later in 
this research. 
7.2.3 Outcome of OMIs 
Prior to the amendments that became effective in March 2014, there was no 
action that the Commissioner could take based on the outcome of an OMI into a 
breach of NPP 4: no determination or other order could be made.  This was the case 
even if the OAIC had determined that an egregious and continuing interference with 
the privacy of Australians was occurring.   
When asked by the researcher what outcome the Commissioner had in mind 
when undertaking an OMI, the Commissioner responded that, if there had been a 
failing under NPP4, it was looking ‘to get the organisation to change its systems or 
its practices.’  The Commissioner also noted that ‘in the majority of these cases 
organisations are obviously going to be willing to do that particularly if the matter 
has been at the forefront of the media.’  The Commissioner referred to the 
importance of trust to organisations and how, if organisations have failed to properly 
secure personal information, they need to ‘make sure that they’re seen to be taking 
appropriate steps to remedy it and improve their systems and that’s what we’re 
looking for.’760  The Commissioner also referred to the success of the office in 
                                                 
758  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Syndey 12 December 2012). 
759  Privacy Act, s 40. 
760  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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reaching agreement with entities regarding the steps to be taken to fix breaches. The 
Assistant Commissioner Compliance made a similar statement in regard to the 
approach to OMIs, saying that the OAIC seeks to arrive at agreed findings and 
agreed remediation steps to address a breach.  The OAIC’s stated approach to OMIs 
supports this focus on remediation: the action by the Office ‘will depend upon the 
respondent’s acknowledgment of the breach and its preparedness to take appropriate 
remedial action.’761    
The tensions between conciliating or reaching an agreement on an outcome and 
conducting an investigation have been discussed above. Consideration of this tension 
will also be part of the analysis of the 6 OMIs reported on after February 2011 
contained in Chapters 9 and 10.   
7.2.4 Systemic issues 
The OMI has been regarded as an appropriate method to deal with large and 
complex issues. The Complaints Manual provides that the OAIC will use its OMI 
power to ‘strive to identify and address systemic issues.’762  The investigation can be 
directed at resolving systemic issues, without necessarily being concerned to address 
the needs of a complainant.  Similarly, the reasons for commencing an OMI include 
the ‘likelihood that the investigation will reveal acts or practices that involve 
systemic interferences with privacy.’763 Annual reports refer to the OAIC using its 
OMI powers as ‘important regulatory oversight in relation to individual complaints 
and systemic issues’764 
‘Systemic issues’ are ‘issues that are about an organisation’s or industry’s 
practice rather than about an isolated incident.’765  Systemic issues include: 
                                                 
761  Information Sheet 13, above n 203. 
762  Complaints Manual, above n 227, ‘OAIC’s approach to complaint handling’. 
763  See Chapter 7.2. 
764  See eg, OPC 2010 Annual Report, above n 403, 4; which provides that the Commissioner 
undertakes ‘OMIs where it appears that a breach of the Privacy Act may have occurred and it is 
thought to be desirable that an OMI be undertaken. For example ... in circumstances where the 
alleged breach raises systemic and/ or ongoing issues.’ 
765  Getting in on the Act, above n 155, 130. 
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 Widespread poor privacy practice at a large company or agency; and 
 Widespread breaches of privacy across an industry.766 
The OPC’s ability to deal with systemic issues was considered in 2005, at 
which time it was noted that the OPC’s ‘limited focus on systemic issues and its lack 
of power to deal with systemic issues’ was out of step with best practice for 
complaint handlers.767  The issues identified with using the OMI power for these 
purposes included the impact on the OPC’s resources and the lack of the 
Commissioner’s power to direct the respondent to address any issues found during 
the OMI, and then to enforce those directions.768  
The ALRC also considered the effect of the strain on the available resources 
caused by the need to consider all complaints on the Commissioner’s ability to deal 
with systemic issues, 769 making various recommendations that have been included in 
the amended Act.770 
The Commissioner’s interest in identifying and pursuing systemic issues is of 
particular relevance to information security failures. 
Information security cases, particularly those that involve unauthorised access 
to personal information as a result of attacks by hackers (such as in the Sony 
PlayStation Network hack771), often raise organisational systemic issues.  Effective 
security relies on the proper operation of a complex system of security measures.  
Most data breaches result from the failure or compromise of more than one control. 
Accordingly, most enquiries into whether there were ‘reasonable’ measures in place 
for the purposes of NPP 4would involve consideration of the information security 
management system as a whole. 
                                                 
766  Ibid.  See also Complaints Manual, above n 227, ‘Grounds for expedited investigations’. 
767  Getting in on the Act, above n 155, 150. 
768  Ibid, 155. 
769  See, eg, For your information, above n 32, 1650 – 1652, [49-11], Recommendation 49-2. 
770  Privacy Act s 41.  
771  The Sony PlayStation Network hack is discussed in Chapter 8.1.3. 
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Similarly, information security incidents also often raise issues of industry- 
wide systemic problems. Many large organisations adopt the same general systems 
and so are targeted by attackers using the same types of attack, to exploit the same 
vulnerability.  Incidents affecting one organisation, in the context of the systems and 
practices in place, usually have relevance to other organisations of the same size or in 
the same industry sector.772 This can be demonstrated, for example, by the number of 
cases which deal with the inappropriate disposal of medical records.773  The 
recurrence of this issue might be regarded as an industry-wide systemic problem. 
The identification and resolution of systemic issues, particularly industry 
system issues, is a different objective to that of resolving an individual’s complaint. 
Typically, the resolution of a complaint will involve the reconciliation of the interests 
of the complainant and the entity alleged to have breached the Act.774  By contrast, 
the investigation and resolution of systemic issues is directed at ensuring that the 
entity’s systems are remediated, if required, so that similar incidents do not recur, 
and also towards providing information to the public in the case of industry-wide 
breaches of privacy. Accordingly, it would be expected that the investigation into 
whether there were a systemic issue would consider not just the immediate reasons 
for any breach but would take a broader view of the organisational controls in place 
because it would be assessing whether there were an organisation-wide failing.  It 
might also be expected that the case report might include more detail about the 
failure, the reasons why it was regarded as failing to meet the requirements of NPP 4 
and what the respondent should do to address the identified failures.  If the 
Commissioner were of the view that the failure was possibly an industry-wide case, 
then it might be appropriate to use that finding to provide more general education 
and guidance. 
                                                 
772  For example, the OAIC’s OMI reports reveal that Telstra and Vodafone (both 
telecommunication companies) both used Siebel data management software systems to manage 
customer personal information. 
773  See, eg, Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre [2009] PrivCmr 6. 
774  The investigation and resolution of complaints pursuant to the Privacy Act are discussed in 
Chapter 7.1. 
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The extent to which the OMI power has been used to identify and address 
systemic issues as reflected in published OMI reports will be considered in the 
analysis included in the following chapters.   
7.2.5 ALRC Review of Own Motion Investigation Power 
As already referred to, one of the issues for the Commissioner prior to March 
2014 was the absence of enforcement options where the Commissioner had carried 
out an own motion investigation.  In accordance with its view that OMIs are a 
valuable tool where allegations come to light via means other than lodgement of a 
complaint, the ALRC recommended that the Commissioner should have additional 
powers following an OMI.775  Although the specific ALRC recommendations were 
not adopted, the Commissioner has been given the right to make a determination at 
the conclusion of an own motion investigation in the same manner as if the 
investigation were based on a complaint.776      
7.3 DETERMINATIONS 
Prior to March 2014, the strongest enforcement power of the Commissioner 
was to make a determination either dismissing a complaint or finding it 
substantiated.777 The Commissioner, when making a determination, also had the right 
to make a declaration that the respondent acted to redress any loss or damage778 or 
paid an amount by way of compensation,779 at least in the case of complaint-based 
investigations.780  The ALRC saw a determination as a ‘strong’ penalty, because it 
can involve a public declaration of breach and thereby contain an element of 
                                                 
775  For your information, above n 32, Recommendations 50-1(a) and (c), 1654. 
776   Privacy Act s 52(1A). 
777  Ibid s 52(1). 
778  Ibid s 52(1)(b)(ii). 
779  Ibid s 52(1)(b)(iii), which loss may include injury to feelings or humiliation, pursuant to Section 
40(1A).  Section 40(1A) that has been repealed under the Privacy Amendment Act. 
780  Section 52 applies ‘After investigating a complaint’ and does not refer to investigations 
commenced on the Commissioner’s own motion pursuant to s 40(2) Privacy Act, without there 
being a complaint.   
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informal, negative publicity.’781 This power is one of the compliance options at the 
top of the Ayres and Braithwaite enforcement pyramid.   
However, the Commissioner has to date used its determination power 
sparingly.  Only ten complaint determinations have been made between the 
commencement of the Privacy Act and 30 March 2014.  As at March 2014, the most 
recent privacy breach-related determination had been issued in December 2011.782  
The determination made prior to that was released in April 2004.783 There is some 
indication that the Commissioner may be more willing in the future to use its 
determination power. In February 2012, the Privacy Commissioner said that it would 
‘not shy away from using my determination powers where it is appropriate to do 
so.’784  It recognised the importance of determination to the understanding of the 
privacy principles, noting that determinations: 
provide a public record of the OAIC’s views on how privacy laws should be 
interpreted, and can assist complainants and respondents to better understand 
how privacy laws will apply.785 
Four determinations have been issued since that speech, one relating to a 
breach of the credit reporting provisions786 and the other three, all issued after March 
2014, in regard to the privacy principles.787  
This research is limited to detailed consideration of determinations issued prior 
to March 2014. NPP 4 was referred to in only one determination prior to March 2014 
                                                 
781  For your information, above n 32, [50.48]. 
782  ‘D’ and Wentworthville Leagues Club [2011] AICmr 9 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/decisions/2011_aicmr9.html>.  One determination was 
made in 2012 which related to the credit reporting provisions of the Act. 
783  A full list of Privacy Commissioner Determinations is available at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/PrivCmrACD/>. 
784  Timothy Pilgrim, above n 251. 
785  Ibid. 
786  S v Veda Advantage Information Services and Solutions Ltd [2012]AICmr 33. 
787  The three new determinations are ‘CP’ v Department of Defence [2014] AICmr 88 (2 September 
2014); ‘CM’ and Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2014] AICmr 86 (2 
September 2014); ‘BO’ v AeroCare Pty Ltd [2014] AICmr 32 (8 April 2014). 
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and even then only in relation to NPP 4.2.788 In that determination, no detailed 
consideration was given to the meaning of the principle.  Accordingly, the use of the 
determination power has offered little in terms of supporting the general 
understanding of the requirement in NPP 4 to take reasonable steps to protect 
personal information. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the low number of determinations 
made to date.  One reason may be the reluctance of the Commissioner to test its 
interpretation of the privacy principles in the face of the Federal Court’s right to 
conduct a hearing de novo.789   Section 55 Privacy Act requires that organisations 
must comply with the terms of a determination.  However, if they do not, the 
Commissioner’s only recourse is to make an application for an appropriate order to 
the Federal Court which will undertake a hearing de novo pursuant to Section 
52(1)(b) Privacy Act.  It has been suggested that this lack of direct enforceability and 
the Federal Court’s powers have made the Commissioner “determinations-averse.”790  
As the Commissioner has not yet had to defend or enforce a determination in court, 
the extent to which the Federal Court may reasonably defer to the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of a principle or otherwise is still not clear.791  As noted, in those 
situations where the Federal Court has been asked to review the Commissioner’s 
decisions, to date it has supported the Commissioner. 792 
                                                 
788  NPP 4.2 was considered in Complaint Determination No 3 of 2004 but only in relation to its 
application.  There was no detailed consideration of the meaning of the principle.  NPP 4 could 
have been considered in ‘‘D’ and Wentworthville Leagues Club but does not seem to have been 
raised. 
789  O’Connor, above n 65, 15. See also Greenleaf, Graham, 'The 'Tabula Rasa’, above n 65.   
790  Ibid.   
791  Charles Alexander, Elisabeth  Koster and Helen Paterson, 'Punitive powers guided by 
ambiguity: the Australian Federal Privacy Commissioner's new powers in the context of a 
principles-based privacy regime' (2013) 9(5) Privacy Law Bulletin  
792  To date, most applications for review have been dismissed without consideration of the privacy 
principles, e.g., A v Australian Information Commissioner [2011] FCA 520, Wijayaweera v 
Australian Information Commissioner [2012] FCA 99, Hammond v Australian Information 
Commissioner [2013] FCA 802.  There have been only two cases where the Court has 
considered the Commissioner’s interpretation of the privacy principles as part of its decision as 
to whether or not there has been a mistake in law Smallbone v NSW Bar Association [2011] FCA 
1145, Jones v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [2014] FCA 285. 
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Another reason for the low number of determinations may be the 
Commissioner’s ‘successes in conciliating claims.793 As previously noted, the 
Commissioner closes the majority of complaint-based investigations on the basis that 
the issue had been adequately dealt with (either by reaching a conciliated outcome 
with the complainant or the Commissioner forming a view that the respondent had 
adequately dealt with the complaint).794  All of the 23 complaint-based investigations 
which have considered NPP 4 were able to be closed on either of those grounds, even 
in those cases where the Commissioner found there had been an interference with 
one of the privacy principles.  However, it is difficult to assess whether the resolution 
of these cases in this way has been regarded as a success by the complainants. 
Complainants who are not happy with the outcome of the investigation of their 
complaints have little recourse. There is no right of appeal from the decision to cease 
an investigation. That decision is only reviewable on questions of law, and not on the 
facts.795 In those cases where complainants have gone to the Federal Court for 
review, the Federal Court has elected in most instances either not to review or to 
support the Commissioner’s decisions.796  Complainants also have no right to require 
the Commissioner to make a determination. Such a right if available would benefit 
complainants who disagreed with the Commissioner’s decision to cease an 
investigation.  This was an issue considered by the ALRC. 797 A majority of 
stakeholders who made submissions to the ALRC supported complainants having a 
right to require the Commissioner to make a determination.  One submitted that such 
a right would increase the number of determinations which would mean that there 
                                                 
793  In the Senate Committee Review of the recent Privacy Act amendments, the Commissioner 
argued that the low number of determinations reflected the Commissioner’s success in 
conciliating matters rather than the Commissioner having to use more formal powers.  See 
Senate Report 2012, [5.12]. 
794  See Section 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 above. 
795  See Section 7.1.3. The right to review decisions to cease an investigation were considered by the 
ALRC in For your information, above n 32, [49.63] – [ 49.69]. See also [46.52] which stated 
that judicial review rights extended to a decision not to investigate and a decision not to make a 
determination or a failure to give reasons to a person adversely affected by a decision of the 
Commissioner. 
796  See cases referred to in n 792 above. 
797  For your information, above n 32, [49.48], [49.53] – [49.56], [49.63] – [ 49.69]. 
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was ‘at last potential for a solid body of jurisprudence to develop about the 
interpretation’ of the Act.798 The OPC did not support the inclusion of any such 
right.799 After considering the submissions, the ALRC recommended that such a right 
should be available to both complainants and respondents, at least in cases where 
conciliation had failed, supporting the view that more determination would ‘help 
address concerns … about the lack of jurisprudence on the Privacy Act.’800 
Notwithstanding this recommendation, no right for any party to require that a 
determination be made was included in the recent amendments to the Privacy Act. In 
any case, the ALRC did not support a right to require determination where a 
complaint was dismissed.801 
There have been some changes to the enforceability and review of 
determinations as a result of the Privacy Amendment Act, but not as many as 
recommended by the ALRC or as supported by privacy advocates.   
The government accepted the ALRC recommendation that there be a right of 
appeal on the merits from a determination to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.802 
In accepting the recommendation, the government noted that undertaking this 
‘enhanced review’ would ‘assist in promoting transparency and accountability in the 
Commissioner’s decisions.’803   Complainants now have a right to a merits review 
(not limited to grounds of procedural fairness or a question of law) and the Tribunal 
will be able to substitute its decision for the decision of the Commissioner.  
However, before exercising a right to a merit review, a determination must be made 
                                                 
798  Ibid, [49.54]. 
799  Ibid, [49.53]. 
800  Ibid, [49.65] and Recommendation 49-5. 
801  Ibid, [49.69]. 
802  Australian Government First Stage Response to the Australian law Reform Commission Report 
108 (Australian Govenrment, October 2009). 
94<http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf >.  See Privacy 
Act s 96(1)(c). 
803  Ibid. 
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by the Commissioner.804  As discussed, the decision to cease an investigation and not 
to make a determination is still not reviewable on the merits.  
It is not clear that, having regard to some of the reasons given as to why there 
are so few determinations, this position will change in the future. The Federal Court 
will still re-hear any action to enforce a determination, complainants still have no 
right to appeal on the merits from a decision to cease an investigation and there is no 
right for complainants to require the Commissioner to make a determination.  
The impact of the changes to the Commissioner’s enforcement powers is 
considered further in Chapter 11. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The Commissioner’s enforcement powers include the right to make a 
determination and to seek an injunction.  However, the main enforcement power 
used to date has been in the conduct of investigations, both based on a complaint and 
initiated on the Commissioner’s own motion. This chapter has largely focused on the 
Commissioner’s procedures for conducting those investigations.  These procedures 
will be used in the analysis of the 6 own motion investigations contained later in this 
research. 
Consideration was also given to the difference between complaint-based 
investigations and own motion investigations. It was noted that conciliation and 
investigation required different approaches by the investigator, potentially giving rise 
to a tension.  This tension between conciliation and investigation was raised again in 
the context of the Commissioner’s intended outcomes from the conduct of OMIs. In 
terms of those outcomes, the Commissioner indicated an interest in ensuring that the 
particular issue giving rise to the investigation was resolved (rather than using the 
investigation to promote a better understanding of the Act or address systemic 
issues).  Consideration was also given to the different evidence that may be produced 
in investigations that involved adversarial parties versus those that involved a single 
respondent. 
                                                 
804  Privacy Act s 96(1)(c). 
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The expectation that the Commissioner would use OMIs to address systemic 
issues was noted.  It was also noted that, where conducting an OMI to resolve a 
systemic issue, a less conciliatory and more evidence-focused investigation might be 
undertaken.  It might also be expected that a more detailed report with clear findings 
of fact supporting the decision would be provided. 
Each of these issues in terms of the purpose and procedures for investigations 
will be considered in more detail as part of the analysis of the 6 own motion 
investigations and resulting reports as contained in Chapters 9 and 10 of this 
research.  The following chapter provides an introduction to the 6 incidents that gave 
rise to those investigations, establishing the facts of each case and the investigation 
outcomes.  These 6 cases are then considered in more detail through the application 
of the 2 lenses of the conceptual frameworks (that is, the transparent, balanced and 
vigorous use of powers, and consistency with an industry approach to information 
security) in the succeeding chapters. 
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Chapter 8: Own Motion Investigations 
The Commissioner’s investigation powers, including in particular the power to 
conduct and report on own motion investigations were discussed in the preceding 
chapter. 
Between February 2011 and April 2013,805 8 OMI reports were published.  
This was a greater number than had been published previously over a similar period.  
As discussed, these reports represented a new approach to dealing with high-profile 
data breach cases undertaken by the new Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim, 
who had been appointed in mid-2010.806 
These reports were very different to the OMI reports which had been issued 
previously. For the first time, they included the name of the respondent organisation; 
they were not published on an anonymous basis. These reports were longer, ranging 
from 1224 words (for the Telstra Mail Out report) to 2438 words in the Sony report.  
The standard format for these reports included a ‘Background’ and more recently an 
‘Overview’ section, which sections together provided more context for the cases 
being considered.  The Findings sections also were generally much longer and 
involved a more detailed analysis of the application of the privacy principles to the 
relevant case. All except 1 report related to incidents that were in the public 
domain.807  Most importantly, all 8reports considered the application of NPP 4 and 
included a finding in regard to NPP4: either the respondent was found to be in 
breach, or not to be in breach of NPP 4.  Unlike the previous OMI reports, none of 
these investigations were closed without some finding regarding compliance with 
NPP 4. 
                                                 
805  April 2013 is the date at which the first application was made by the researcher for 
administrative access to the OAIC’s investigation files. 
806  See Chapter 6.4.1. 
807  The Professional Services Review Agency OMI report, above n 340, did not relate to an incident 
that was in the public domain. 
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Taken together, this group of OMI reports would be expected to provide the 
most comprehensive and current guidance regarding the Commissioner’s 
interpretation and application of NPP 4 across a range of different circumstances.  
The 6 OMIs which will be examined in detail to support the assessment of the 
Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers have been selected from this group 
of OMI reports.  
Details of the 6 OMIs, including an overview of each investigation and the 
outcome of that investigation as contained in the published OMI report, are provided 
below.   This information forms the background for the analysis of the investigations 
contained in the succeeding chapters. 
8.1.1 Telstra Mail Out 
On 27 October 2011, media reported that the Commissioner and the ACMA 
would look into an incident involving Telstra.808  An incorrect mail merge completed 
as part of a bulk mail-out resulted in 220,000 letters being sent to Telstra customers 
containing the name, phone number and telephone plan of customers other than the 
recipients of the letter.  The letters were sent to explain upcoming fixed-line price 
changes.809  The OMI report noted that the Commissioner opened the case following 
receipt of a notification letter from Telstra.810  This notification letter provided details 
of the mail-out error and Telstra’s strategy to ‘remediate any customer concerns.’811  
Telstra had earlier reported the incident to the ACMA, which also notified the 
                                                 
808  See Asher Moses, ‘Telstra botched mail-out exposes 220,000 customers’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 27 October 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/telstra-botched-
mailout-exposes-220000-customers-20101027-173du.html#ixzz2hC0Ak7np> and AAP 
‘Massive Telstra bungle a privacy breach’, News.com.au (online), 27 October 2010 
<http://www.news.com.au/business/massive-telstra-bungle-a-privacy-breach/story-e6frfm1i-
1225944346111>. 
809  Ibid. 
810  Telstra Mail Out OMI Report, above n 334. 
811  Letter from Helen Lewin, Chief Privacy Officer, Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy 
Commissioner, OAIC, 27 October 2010. 
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OAIC.812 The OAIC’s file includes a copy of the Telstra response to an ACMA letter 
of 26 October, 2010.813   
The Commissioner sent its own letter requesting information about the incident 
(the Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter) on 28 October 2010.814  In addition to a series of 
questions that were specific to the breach,815 3 more general questions regarding the 
incident were raised: 
 What steps did Telstra have in place to protect customer information 
from unauthorised disclosure when conducting mail-outs?  
 Were these steps in place at the time of the incident? and 
 When did Telstra expect that its data analysis of the incident would be 
complete?816   
Telstra was asked to respond by 18 November 2010, which at Telstra’s request 
was extended by the OAIC to 30 November 2010.  However, it was not until 8 
December 2010 that Telstra responded to the Commissioner, presumably providing a 
detailed explanation in response to the Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter.817  This 
document was redacted in its entirety.818 There is no evidence of any subsequent 
activity in relation to the investigation until May 2011.  On 16 May 2011, a Close 
Letter was sent confirming that the OAIC was of the view that there was a breach of 
                                                 
812  Letter from Jane van Beelen to Olya Booyar, The Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 27 October 2010, which refers to ‘your letter of 26 October 2010 … requesting 
further information about this matter.’ 
813  Ibid. 
814  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Ms Helen Lewin, 28 October 2010 (‘Teltra Mail Out RFI 
Letter’).  A copy of that letter is included in Appendix C  
815  For eg, ‘Please identify the mailing house responsible for the mail out’; ‘Please provide a 
timeline of the incident’; and ‘When does Telstra expect its data analysis of the incident will be 
complete’. 
816  The Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter, above n 802, is discussed further in Chapter 9.6. 
817  Email from Judith McAlpine, Telstra to Emily McGufficke, OAIC, 8 December 2010. 
818  The Schedule to the FOI Decision Letter refers to a ‘Letter to Timothy Pilgrim from Helen 
Lewin dated 7 December 2010 entitled ‘Own Motion Investigation – Mail List Incident Telstra 
Corporation Limited (Telstra) Response to Notice under section 44 of the Privacy Act’, which 
document was not disclosed.  
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NPP 2. However, it also found that there was no breach of NPP 4.1, because this was 
a one-off human error, and as such ‘does not mean that Telstra failed to comply with 
its obligations under NPP 4.1.’ 819 
Telstra contended that it was not in breach, stating that: 
 The disclosure of a name and an incorrect address (which was the only 
information visible from an unopened letter) was not a disclosure of 
personal information because there was no link between the 
information about the person (e.g. their name) and the person’s identity; 
 The actual number of customers likely to have had their information 
disclosed was probably significantly less than 220,000 after the number 
of letters with incorrect addresses was added to those that had been 
returned unopened to Telstra;  
 They should have had a right to be heard with respect to the application 
of the privacy principles; and 
 The OAIC should not publish a media release about the incident, 
including its findings. 820  
In support of its position, Telstra referred the OAIC to the case note OMI v 
Direct Marketer,821 which related to the disclosure of email addresses in a bulk email 
‘blast’, and where no finding of breach was made.822  The OAIC rejected Telstra’s 
proposition stating that ‘a person’s name is personal information and does not have 
to be linked with other information to fall within the definition of personal 
information as set out in the Act.’823  
                                                 
819  Letter from Mark Hummerston to Ms Helen Lewin, 16 May 2011 (‘Telstra Mail Out Close 
Letter’).  A copy of that letter is included in Appendix C. 
820  Email from Helen Lewin, Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, 26 May 2011.  A copy of that email is 
included in Appendix C .  A further email repeating these contentions was sent from Helen 
Lewin, Telstra to Linda King, OAIC, 2 June 2011. 
821  OMI v Direct Marketer [2008] PrivCmrA 23. 
822  Ibid. 
823  Email from Linda King, OAIC to Helen Lewin, Telstra, 28 June 2011. 
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It would seem that a draft of the OMI report was attached to that same email of 
28 June 2011.824  However, no draft or final copy of the OMI report was included in, 
or referred to, in the list of records provided in response to the FOI request.   There is 
no other record indicating Telstra’s response to the terms of the proposed OMI report 
or any further correspondence on the file.  
The final OMI report is one of the shortest, totalling just over three pages and 
with a format similar to that of earlier OMI reports.  It reflects the OAIC’s position in 
the Close Letter finding that there had been an unauthorised disclosure under NPP 2 
but no failure to take reasonable steps pursuant to NPP 4 because the incident was 
the result of a one-off human error. 
8.1.2 Vodafone Hutchinson Australia Limited  
Media reports appeared on 9 January 2011 suggesting that personal details of 
millions of Vodafone Hutchinson Australia Limited (Vodafone) customers were 
available on the web and ‘criminal groups have paid for the private details of some 
Vodafone customers in order to blackmail them.’825  Alleged details that were 
available included names, home addresses, drivers’ licence numbers and credit card 
details. However, the Commissioner’s investigation found that the incident actually 
involved Vodafone franchisees who could access details of other franchisees’ 
customers, which were all held in an internal Vodafone database.  The information 
was not part of a public website as had been reported.826 
The incident aroused significant media interest, including a poll by a 
metropolitan newspaper asking whether the Privacy Commissioner should 
investigate.827 In response to these media reports, the Privacy Commissioner 
                                                 
824  The email header notes an attachment called ‘2011_06 TELSTRA c14509 Investigation Report 
FINAL.docx’. 
825   Natalie O’Brien, ‘Mobile security outrage: private details accessible on net’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 9 January 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/mobile-
security-outrage-private-details-accessible-on-net-20110108-19j9j.html#ixzz2hOpjMQ1L> and  
AAP, ‘Vodafone website exposes customer details’, ZDNet (online), 9 January 2011 
<http://www.zdnet.com.au/vodafone-website-exposes-customer-details-339308437.htm>. 
826  Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333. 
827  Peter Martin, and Lucy Battersby, ‘Vodafone may be liable on privacy breach’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 10 January 2011 
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commenced an own motion investigation in early January 2011.828  A Request for 
Information Letter, similar to the Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter, was sent on 10 
January 2011.829  At the same time, the Commissioner issued a Media Release 
confirming it was investigating the incident.830 Vodafone responded to the 
Commissioner’s RFI by letters dated 14 and 19 January, 2011.831  The second letter 
presumably attached a detailed account of the incident, because it comprises 98 
pages.  All of the contents of each of these letters and a draft letter from Vodafone to 
the Privacy Commissioner dated 14 January 2011 were redacted. 
Some information was received by the OAIC from a third party on 21 January 
2011, which is described in the list prepared in response to the FOI request as 
‘internal email thread re: fraud and dishonesty complaint.’832  Although the internal 
email thread suggested this information was considered as part of the information 
relevant to the investigation, it is not clear what that information comprised or the 
extent to which it was considered by the Commissioner when coming to the 
conclusion referred to in the final OMI report.   
This investigation was completed speedily, in around five weeks.  A media 
release announcing the conclusion of the investigation, the terms of which were also 
agreed with Vodafone,833 was issued on 16 February 2011, the same date as the 
                                                 
<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/vodafone-may-be-liable-on-privacy-breach-
20110109-19jup.html>.  94% of the 7744 votes were ‘yes’. 
828  The OMI report states that the Commissioner opened the investigation “in response to media 
reports that the personal information of Vodafone Hutchison Australia (Vodafone) customers 
had been compromised.” Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333, 1. 
829  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim OAIC to Vodafone, 10 January 2011 (‘Vodafone RFI Letter’). A 
copy of that letter is included in Appendix C. 
830  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Australian Privacy Commissioner to 
Investigate Vodafone Allegations’ (Media Release, 10 January 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/australian-
privacy-commissioner-to-investigate-vodafone-allegations>. 
831  Letter from CEO, Vodafone to Timothy Pilgrim, 14 January 2011; Letter from CEO, Vodafone 
to Timothy Pilgrim, 19 January 2011. 
832  Emails, 20 January 2001 to 21 January 2011; attached to letter from Caren Whip, OAIC to Jodie 
Siganto, 30 August 2013, scheduled item: Document Schedule B_Vodafone 10. 
833  Email from Linda King, OAIC to Vodafone, 15 February 2011; attaching draft undertakings and 
media release. 
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publication of the OMI report.834  Although commenced after the Telstra Mail Out 
investigation, the Vodafone report was completed and published before the Telstra 
Mail Out OMI Report was released. 
In the OMI report, Vodafone is found not to have breached NPP 2 but to have 
failed to take reasonable steps to protect information for the purposes of NPP 4.1.  
The decision in regard to NPP 2 turned on whether personal information was 
‘generally accessible.’  The OAIC seems to have considered only the possible 
disclosure that had been reported in the press.  Based on that report, one user 
(presumably the journalist involved) was given access to his own personal 
information in the Vodafone data base. In those circumstances it was open to the 
OAIC to find that their Vodafone customer information was not publicly available on 
the internet or on the Vodafone website, nor was any Vodafone customer information 
disclosed to any third parties. 
The findings in regard to NPP 4 are considered further in the next chapters.  
8.1.3 Sony PlayStation Network/Qriocity  
The Privacy Commissioner’s own motion investigation into whether there had 
been any breach of the Privacy Act by Sony PlayStation and Qriocity networks 
commenced in 27 April 2011.835  It was prompted by extensive media reporting of an 
attack on the Sony PlayStation Network (PSN) resulting in the compromise of 
information in relation to approximately 77 million PSN customers around the 
world.836  Problems with the PlayStation Network came to light when Sony closed 
                                                 
834  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Commissioner Releases 
Investigation Findings’ (Media Release, 16 February 2011)  <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/privacy-commissioner-releases-vodafone-
findings>. 
835  The Sony OMI Report, above n 335, refers to the investigation being commenced ‘following 
media reports’.  The investigation also included copies of two media reports: ‘Playstation 
hacking scandal: police chief says contact your bank now’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 
201; and ‘PlayStation privacy breach: 77 million customer accounts exposed’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 April 2011. 
836  See, eg, Chris Griffith and Karen Dearne, ‘Breach sparks security alert: call for laws to protect 
against Playstation-style attacks’, The Australian IT (online), 3 May 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/breach-sparks-security-alert-call-for-laws-to-
protect-against-playstation-style-attacks/story-e6frgakx-
1226048705602?referrer=email&source=AIT_email_nl&emcmp=Ping&emchn=Newsletter&em
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down access to the PSN on 20 April 2011.  Users attempting to sign in were advised 
that the PSN was ‘undergoing maintenance.’  It was not until 25 April that Sony 
admitted that there had been an ‘external intrusion’ which had affected the PSN837  
and that it had brought in external experts to assist in the forensic analysis required to 
help understand the cause and scope of the breach.838  At the time of the incident and 
subsequently while the Commissioner’s investigation was proceeding, Sony did not 
release any detail describing how the attack had been carried out. However, it was 
widely considered that the attack was the work of an internet vigilante group that had 
vowed retribution against Sony for taking legal action against hackers who had 
cracked PS3 defences to change console operating software, and who had announced 
earlier that month its ‘Operation Payback’ campaign aimed at Sony.839    
On opening the investigation, the Commissioner issued a statement840 and sent 
an RFI Letter to Sony Australia.841 Sony Australia responded on 11 May 2011, which 
                                                 
list=Member>; Liana Baker, ‘Sony PlayStation suffers massive data breach’, Reuters (online) 26 
April 2011 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sony-stoldendata-
idUSTRE73P6WB20110426>; ‘Sony bows head over PlayStation security breach’ The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 2 May 2011  <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/sony-
bows-head-over-playstation-security-breach-20110502-1e3m5.html#ixzz2g95KsFNE>; Cliff 
Edwards, Karen Gullo, and Michael Riley, ‘Sony Faces Lawsuit, Regulators’ Scrutiny Over 
PlayStation Breach’ Bloomberg (online) 28 April 2011 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-28/sony-faces-lawsuit-regulators-scrutiny-over-
playstation-user-data-breach.html>. 
837  Ibid. Jared Carstensen, ‘Sony PlayStation Hack: 70 Million Users’ Details Stolen’, InfoSec 
Island (online) 27 April 2011<http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/13337-Sony-
PlayStation-Hack-70-Million-User-Details-Stolen.html>.  See also the U.S. House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade, ‘Hearing on "Sony and 
Epsilon: Lessons for Data Security Legislation,"’ (2 June 2011) 
<http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=hearing/hearing-on-sony-and-
epsilon-lessons-for-data-security-legislation-subcommittee-on-commerce-m>; ‘PlayStation 
privacy breach: 77 million customer accounts exposed’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
27 April 2011. 
838  Steve Musil, ‘Senator slams Sony’s response to security breach’, Cnet (online), 3 May 2011 
<http://www.cnet.com/news/senator-slams-sonys-response-to-security-breach/>; and Tim Kelly, 
‘Analysis: Sony bungles data breach response’, IT News (online) 28 April 2011 
<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/255788,analysis-sony-bungles-data-breach-response.aspx>. 
839  See, eg, Dean Takahashi, ‘Hacktivist group Anonymous launches “payback” cyber-attack 
on Sony’, VB News (online) 3 April 2011 <http://venturebeat.com/2011/04/03/hacktivist-group-
anonymous-launches-payback-cyber-attack-on-sony/>. 
840  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Investigation into Sony Breach: Statement 
of the Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim’ (Statement, 4 May 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/sony-playstation-
network/investigation-into-sony-data-breach-4-may-2011>. 
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response was fully redacted.842  A file note recorded details of an internal OAIC 
meeting held on 12 May 2011 following receipt of the Sony Australia response, at 
which it was ‘[a]greed appears no breach of NPP4.  Will do some research re 
whether if something is stolen it amounts to a disclosure under NPP2 and will 
discuss again on Monday 16 May.’843  There was little further activity until a draft 
Closing Letter and OMI report were sent to Sony for their review on 29 June 2011.844  
Again, the contents of these documents have been redacted in full. 
Sony Australia responded on 8 July 2011.845  Although this letter has also been 
redacted it would seem that Sony Australia raised jurisdictional issues regarding the 
application of the Privacy Act, suggesting in particular that the local Australian entity 
had not collected or held any personal information.846  Further discussion in regard to 
jurisdiction resulted in an updated draft Close Letter and OMI report being sent to 
Sony for its review on 15 September.847  These documents were finalised and issued 
by the end of September,848 together with a media release advising of the conclusion 
of the investigation.849  
                                                 
841  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Sony’s Managing Director, 27 April 2011 (‘Sony RFI Letter’). 
842  Email from Sony to AM (OAIC), 11 May 2011. 
843  See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Case Management Summary: Sony 
Computers Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd’ (18 June 2013) (‘Sony Case Management 
Summary’), attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; schedule 
item: Document Schedule B_Sony 1, this document contains a reference to this meeting on May 
12, 2011.  No record of the meeting was produced by the OAIC pursuant to the FOI Request. 
844  Email from OAIC to Sony, 29 June 2011; enclosing draft OMI report: Header: ‘FINAL Sony 1 
Own Motion Investigation Report June 2011 (‘Sony Close Letter’). 
845  Email from Sony to LK, OAIC, 8 July 2011; with attachments – OAIC draft report and draft 
close letter from Privacy Commissioner with SCEE suggested amendments. 
846  According to the published Sony OMI Report, above n 335, Sony Computer Entertainment 
Europe (‘SCEE’) is the data controller for the PSN/Qriocity personal data – and is the entity that 
had collected the personal information of Australians. 
847  Email from LK, OAIC to SCEE, 14 September 2011; re Final Investigation Report – apology for 
delay and comments – with attachments – Sony Final Investigation Report (draft format). 
848  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim (signed) to Managing Director, Sony, 29 September 2011. 
849  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Australian Privacy Commissioner 
Concludes Sony Investigation’ (Media Release, 29 September 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/australian-
privacy-commissioner-concludes-sony-investigation>. 
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The Sony OMI Report found that there was no evidence of any disclosure 
because there was no positive act of disclosure by Sony; ‘rather the information was 
accessed as a result of a sophisticated security cyber-attack against the Network 
Platform.’  It also found that Sony had taken reasonable steps to secure the personal 
information for the purposes of NPP 4.  An analysis of the findings regarding 
compliance with NPP 4 is included in the next two chapters.    
Much is made in the report of the delay in notifying of the breach and the 
method used.  It was noted that the OAIC believed that ‘affected individuals could 
have been notified earlier’ and that the delay in notification may have increased the 
risk of a misuse of the individuals’ personal information.850  These comments were 
relevant in view of the then-current discussions around the introduction of mandatory 
data breach notification requirements (which introduction was supported by the 
OAIC).851  However, the report does not attempt to place data breach notification as 
part of the Commissioner’s consideration of whether Sony had taken reasonable 
steps for the purposes of NPP 4.   
The report also referred to the jurisdiction issues raised by the incident, 
because Sony Australia (the entity covered by the Privacy Act) did not hold the 
personal information. The report states that in recognition of the challenges posed by 
global companies operating out of different jurisdictions, the Privacy Commissioner 
would provide a copy of the report to privacy regulators in the APEC member 
economies, for their consideration.   It is not clear whether this happened or whether 
there were any consequences. 
8.1.4 Telstra Bundles 
On December 9, 2011, a Whirlpool forum user discovered he could access a 
Telstra tool (called the ‘visibility tool’) that was meant to be available only to Telstra 
                                                 
850  Sony OMI Report, above n 335. 
851  See e.g. Darren Pauli, “Data breach laws to follow privacy reforms’ ITNews (online), 4 October 
2011 <http://www.itnews.com.au/News/275598,data-breach-laws-to-follow-privacy-
reforms.aspx> which refers to interest by the then Minister for Privacy in passing mandatory 
data notification laws. 
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employees to enable them to search internal customer records via a Google search.852 
A screen shot from the tool is shown in Figure 6. The tool enabled access to 
information about a Telstra customer’s Bundle orders, including their plan, billing 
account numbers, first and last names and notes about their account including, in 
many cases, their usernames and passwords. Users on the Whirlpool forums 
confirmed that their own details and accurate information such as addresses, 
passwords and mobile numbers had been stored in account notes.853 
 
Figure 6: The Tool accessible via the exposed url854 
The front page of the visibility tool carried a warning (apparent from the copy 
included in Figure 6 above) that the information was ‘Customer Data and 
Confidential Information.’ According to the report from the Commissioner’s 
investigation at the time of the incident, the visibility tool could only be accessed by 
an individual who had the specific url for the visibility tool.  However, the url could 
be discovered in a number of ways:  
                                                 
852  See, eg, Asher Moses and Ben Grubb, ‘Telstra Customer database exposed’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 9 December 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/telstra-
customer-database-exposed-20111209-1on60.html>,  
853  WireFire, ‘Our Best Ever Cable Broadband Deal’ on Whirlpool Forum (9 December 2011) 
<http://forums.whirlpool.net.au/forum-replies.cfm?t=1801978&p=27#r533>. 
854  Moses and Grubb, above n 854. 
  
 217 
 By conducting a specific search on Google using a number that should not 
have been made publicly available, or  
 By entering the search term ‘help Telstra bundles’, or 
 By entering the URL that was available for a short period from the posting to 
the Whirlpool forum in their browser window.855 
Access to the visibility tool exposed the details of 734,000 Telstra Bundles 
customers.856  Shortly after the posting to the Whirlpool forum, attempts to access the 
tool were blocked by Telstra, which also issued an apology and a confirmation that 
‘Telstra takes its customers [sic] privacy seriously.’857  
On 12 December 2011, the Commissioner opened an own motion investigation 
reported to be ‘in response to allegations that [Telstra] had breached customer 
privacy by making its web-based customer management tool publicly available on its 
website.’858  Telstra had notified the OAIC of the breach on 9 December 2011. In the 
notification, Telstra confirmed that, as soon as it had discovered the breach, it had 
disabled access and reset the passwords of those affected, and that it was undertaking 
a full investigation using an external provider and that a copy of the report and full 
details of the incident would be provided.859  Telstra provided the OAIC with a 
further briefing about the event via teleconference on 12 December 2011, following 
which an RFI Letter was sent by the OAIC.860  The OAIC also issued a statement 
confirming that it was undertaking an investigation.861 
                                                 
855  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
856  Ibid. 
857  According to media reports, at about 4.45pm AEDST, about an hour after Telstra was notified of 
the breach by this website, customer details were still accessible. At about 5pm AEDST the site 
presented internet users with ‘Access Denied’.  See Moses and Grubb, above n 854. 
858  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
859  Email from Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, OAIC, 9 December 2011. 
860  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance, OAIC to Telstra, 12 
December 2011 (‘Telstra Bundles RFI Letter’). 
861  Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner, ‘Privacy Commissioner opens investigation 
into Telstra customer accounts data breach’ (Statement, 12 December, 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/telstra-data-breach/>. 
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Perhaps as a result of the earlier briefing, the questions included in the Telstra 
Bundles RFI Letter were different to those posed in the previous investigations.862  
The letter asked for a response by 13 January 2012.  Telstra indicated that it would 
require more time,863 and the OAIC agreed to an extension to the end of January.864 
On 3 February 2012 Telstra emailed two reports to the OAIC: ‘Telstra response to 
Own Motion investigation C15983:tj’ and ‘Telstra Bundles Visibility Tool Incident 
Report.’865  Both of these reports were fully redacted.  A file note from an internal 
OAIC meeting held following receipt of these reports indicates they were not 
considered adequate.  It was ‘[a]greed to ask further questions as [it was] not a once 
off but [a] series of mistakes by a number of people in different roles.’866  The further 
questions were to cover ‘what the Compliance Questionnaire includes, what was the 
chain of responsibility and what processes of Privacy Impact Assessment may 
be/planned to be put in place.’867  The follow-up letter sent on 8 March 2012 also 
requested a meeting with Telstra to ‘discuss the breach and what next steps are 
appropriate to ensure that problems are addressed at the early stages of a project.’868 
Details of the further information sought, other than the OAIC’s interest in 
‘examining the project’s quality assurance processes’ was redacted.869 
In that letter the OAIC states that the incident may indicate that there are 
systemic issues within the Telstra systems with regard to data security.870  The letter 
                                                 
862  The Telstra Bundles RFI Letter, above n 848, is discussed further in Chapter 9.6. 
863  Email thread between Linda King, OAIC and Telstra, 14 December 2011 to 15 December 2011. 
864  OAIC, File note, 15 November 2011; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 56. 
865  Email from Telstra to the OAIC, 3 February 2012; this email had two attachments: Attachement 
1 Telstra response to Own Motion investigation; and Attachemnt 2; Telstra Bundles Visibility 
Tool Incident Report.  Both of the attachments to the email were redacted in full. 
866  OAIC, File note, 9 February 2012; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 46. 
867  Ibid. 
868  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance to Telstra, 8 March 2012.  
A copy of this letter is included in Appendix C. 
869  Ibid. 
870  Ibid. 
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continues: ‘Ultimately we would like to be able to identify all the relevant 
vulnerabilities that led to the incident, provide guidance on how to address them and 
close the matter.’871 
Telstra responded that it would prefer to provide a written report (rather than 
meet) and that it would need until 30 March 2012 to do so.872  The OAIC accepted 
this although noting that ‘[t]he Assistant Commissioner has expressed some concern 
at the time being taken by Telstra in responding fully to this matter.’873  Telstra 
responded by an email on 26 March 2012, the contents of and attachments to which 
are redacted.874  A follow-up teleconference between representatives of Telstra and 
the OAIC occurred on 29 March 2012, at which it was agreed that Telstra would 
send information about their ‘new plan for reasonable steps before Easter.’ The file 
note from that call records that it was agreed that there was a breach of NPP 2.1 and 
NPP 4. The file note further provides:  ‘Aim is to be able to say that there was a 
breach but also that Telstra is adequately dealing with it and bringing reasonable 
steps into place.’875  Further information on the remediation steps was provided by 
email on 5 April 2012,876 on receipt of which the OAIC began drafting the Close 
Letter and the OMI report.  There was a further relatively minor query from the 
OAIC on 13 April 2012.877 A Close Letter was sent via email on April 30 2012,878 to 
which Telstra responded with comments and corrections,879 and a draft of the OMI 
                                                 
871  Ibid. 
872  OAIC, File note, 15 March 2012; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 36.  Email thread between OAIC and Telstra, 
15 March 2012. 
873  Email thread between OAIC and Telstra,15 March 2012. 
874  Email from Telstra to OAIC, 26 March 2012. 
875  OAIC, File Note, 29 March 2012; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 30. 
876  Email thread from Telstra to TJ, 5 April 2012. 
877  Email thread from OAIC to Telstra, 13 April 2012. 
878  Email thread from TJ, OAIC to Telstra, 30 April 2012 (‘Telstra Bundles Close Letter’). 
879  Email thread from Telstra to TJ, OAIC, 3 May 2012. 
220  
report was sent on 8 June 2012.880  The final OMI report was then issued in July 
2012, together with a media release.881 
The Privacy Commissioner asked for a report on the progress of the 
remediation project six months from the date of the Close Letter and another no later 
than 12 months from the date of the Close Letter.882 In November, 2012 the six- 
month report was provided by Telstra to the OAIC.883  There was no indication from 
the documents provided that the 12-month report due in June 2013 had been 
requested or provided. 
The OMI report, like those issued in regard to the other investigations, details 
Telstra’s response to the incident, including that it had immediately set up an 
Incident Response Team, disabled online access to the tool (including cached 
copies), contacted relevant regulators (the OAIC, the ACMA and the 
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman) and took a series of other actions, 
including resetting passwords and notifying affected customers.884  The report notes 
how the incident occurred and that Telstra was informed in November 2011 (at least 
a month before the incident) that the visibility tool was accessible externally and was 
not protected by the Telstra firewall. No action was taken at that time to escalate this 
alert to the appropriate internal Telstra business areas.  
Telstra identified two key causes of the incident:  
 An incorrectly completed compliance questionnaire885 - an early failure by a 
project manager to correctly complete a compulsory internal questionnaire 
                                                 
880  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance to Telstra, 8 June 2012. 
881  Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner,‘Telstra Breaches Privacy Act’ (Media Release 
29 June 2012) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-
releases/telstra-breaches-privacy-act>. 
882  OAIC, File note, 9 May 2012; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 
2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 8. 
883  Email from AF, OAIC to Telstra, 1 November 2012. 
884   Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
885  This questionnaire seems likely to be the questionnaire that was subject to further review by the 
OAIC. 
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required to determine the necessary security profile of a new project relating 
to the recording of Telstra customer bundle orders; and 
 Failure to follow proper systems, processes and oversight — subsequent 
failures by the project team tasked with developing and implementing the 
visibility tool to raise relevant privacy and security risks outside the project 
team. 
According to the report, Telstra committed to extensive remedial actions, 
including an audit of all of its applications, revision of its Privacy Compliance 
Program, implementation of a new internal training program, enhancement of 
existing processes and establishment of a system where the Chief Privacy Officer is 
involved in the management of incidents concerning privacy.886 
The Commissioner’s investigation focused on whether the incident was an 
‘unauthorised disclosure’ of personal information (and a breach of NPP 2) in 
addition to a failure to take reasonable steps to protect personal information (and a 
breach of NPP 4). It concluded that specific errors by Telstra staff led to the visibility 
tool being publicly accessible and that that external access to customers’ personal 
information was an unauthorised disclosure and therefore a breach of NPP 2.1.  The 
Commissioner then considered whether there had been a breach of NPP 4, finding 
that although Telstra had existing policies and procedures in place that, if followed, 
would have prevented the errors that led to this incident, there was evidence of 
behaviours not consistent with those policies and procedures. On this basis, the 
Commissioner found that Telstra did not have reasonable steps in place with regard 
to data security in the visibility tool in compliance with NPP 4.1.887  
The Commissioner noted that Telstra took appropriate steps to investigate the 
incident, notify affected customers and contain the breach; and, at the time of the 
Commissioner’s investigation, was implementing a comprehensive review of its 
                                                 
886  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
887  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
222  
security systems. These steps aimed to mitigate the effects of the breach and ensure 
that no further unauthorised access occurred.888  
There is no reference in the report to Telstra having any systemic issues in 
regard to privacy or the protection of personal information pursuant to NPP 4. 
8.1.5 Dell Australia / Epsilon 
Epsilon is a ‘leading provider of permission based email marketing services’ 
having over 2500 customers, which include some of the ‘world’s largest and best-
known consumer and financial brands.’889  It reportedly sends over 40 billion emails 
a year.890 
At some time prior to 30 March 2011, an attacker used an Epsilon employee‘s 
credentials, captured via malware downloaded by the employee via the internet, to 
log on to Epsilon’s email marketing platform and gain access to the names and email 
addresses of customers of over 60 Epsilon client companies including Dell 
Australia.891    The employee reported unusual download activity in late March, 
which led to Epsilon becoming aware of the unauthorised access.  In addition to 
action to halt the compromise and forensically determine its source, Epsilon gave 
notice of the breach, telling its clients on April 1 that a ‘subset’ of client data had 
been exposed by an unauthorised entry to its email system.  It also set up an incident 
response centre, added information to its website, and informed U.S. law 
enforcement and undertook its own investigation. 892   After the breach, there were 
                                                 
888  Ibid. 
889  Prepared Statement of Jeanette Fitzgerald, General Counsel, Epsilon Data Management before 
the House Committee on Energy & Commerce,  Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing 
and Trade, U.S. House of Representatives, 2 June 2011 (‘Fitzgerald Statement’) 
890  ‘Security breach widens at US retailers’, The Australian (online), 4 April 2011; and Asher 
Moses, ‘Dell Australia customer details stolen in major data breach’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 7 April 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/dell-australia-
customer-details-stolen-in-major-global-data-breach-20110407-1d4yd.html#ixzz2gWxiBHkk>. 
891  Based on the facts referred to in the Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337.  See also Fitzgerald 
Statement, above n 889, 13. 
892  See Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337; Fitzgerald Statement, above n 889, 13 – 14.  
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media reports that the attack was of the same type that email houses had been warned 
about four months previously.893 
The records obtained for the Dell/Epsilon investigation were the most 
incomplete due to the omission of the separate file holding records of the Epsilon 
investigation from the original decision.894  A number of important records from the 
Epsilon investigation file had not been provided as at 30 March 2014.895  The 
following details of the investigation are based on the information available as at 30 
March 30 2014. 
Dell Australia notified its customers and the Commissioner of the breach on 6 
April 6 2011.896  The incident affecting Dell was reported in the Australian press on 
the same date.897  Shortly thereafter it was reported that the Privacy Commissioner 
would be investigating the breach.898  
An internal OAIC email sent on 7 April 2011 referred to asking Epsilon for a 
copy of their investigation report (once completed) and ‘a list of any Australian 
companies who use Epsilon’s services and had data accessed through the breach.’899 
Separate RFI Letters were sent to DA and Epsilon.900  Both organisations 
responded in mid-May,901 presumably both advising that they were still investigating 
                                                 
893  Brett Winterford, ‘Epsilon breach used four-month-old attack’, ITNews (online) 7 April 2011 
<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/253712,epsilon-breach-used-four-month-old-attack.aspx>. 
894  See the discussion of the freedom of information process in Chapter 4.3.2. 
895  These include the request for information letter sent by the OAIC to Epsilon.  Some of these 
records were disclosed by the OAIC after 30 March 2014 however they have not been 
considered in this research. 
896  Email from Dell, 6 April 2011; Letter from Dell to Timothy Pilgrim, 6 April 2011. 
897  Karen Dearne, ‘Dell Australia Impacted by Epsilon email breach’, The Australian IT (online), 
6 April 2011; and Campbell Simpson, ‘Dell Customer email addresses accessed in Epsilon 
Breach’ CSO (online), 6 April 2011. 
898   See, eg, Karen Dearne, ‘Privacy czar to investigate Epsilon email breach’, The Australian 
(online), 7 April 2011 < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/privacy-czar-to-
investigate-epsilon-email-breach/story-e6frgakx-1226035569602#sthash.w4iypq2o.dpuf> Asher 
Moses, ‘Dell Australia customer details stolen in major data breach’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 7 April 2011<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/dell-australia-
customer-details-stolen-in-major-global-data-breach-20110407-1d4yd.html#ixzz2gWxiBHkk>. 
899  Email chain, OAIC, 7 April 2011. 
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the incident because, in July, the OAIC sought updates from both DA and Epsilon on 
their respective incident reports.902     
DA advised on 19 July that it had completed a ‘high level off-site’ security 
assessment of some part of Epsilon’s infrastructure but it had not been able ‘to 
complete an onsite audit of the corrective and preventative actions taken by Epsilon 
… because the incident is still under investigation by law enforcement authorities in 
the United States.’903 Epsilon provided a copy of the investigative report prepared for 
it in mid-November (after securing appropriate confidentiality undertakings from the 
OAIC).904  The Cases against both DA and Epsilon were closed in January 2012905 
and drafts of the OMI report and Closing letters were sent in July 2012.906 
No media release was issued at the conclusion of the case. 
The OMI report published in July 2012 only considers whether there was a 
breach of NPP4.1. There was no consideration of whether there had been a breach of 
NPP2 or any other principle – including NPP9 (which may have applied in the 
context of any cross-border transfer of data).   This is notwithstanding that the 
Complaints Assessment Sheet for the Dell data breach notification investigation file 
refers to both NPP 2 and NPP 4 in the ‘Complaints Code’ section of the form.907 
The Dell/Epsilon OMI is similar to the Sony OMI in a number of ways: 
                                                 
900  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Dell, 19 April 2011 (‘Dell RFI Letter’).  Email from 
MS, OAIC to Epsilon. Copies of these documents are included in Appendix C. 
901  Email thread from MH, OAIC to MS, 11 May 2011. A copy is included in Appendix C.  Email 
from Epsilon to MS, OAIC, 16 May 2011 (this document was referred to in the list of 
documents but no copy was made available prior to 20 March 2014). 
902  Email thread between OAIC and Dell, 5 July 2011; Email from OAIC to Epsilon, 1 July 2011. 
903  Email from Dell to MS, OAIC, 19 July 2011. A copy is included in Appendix C. 
904  Email thread from Epsilon to AM, OAIC, 15 November 2011. 
905  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Dell, 11 January 2012 (‘Dell Close Letter’).  Email 
thread from AM, OAIC to Epsilon, 11 January 2012. 
906  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Dell, July 2012 (unsigned). Letter from Mark 
Hummerston, OAIC to Epsilon, 2 July 2012 (signed). 
907  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OPC - Complaint Assessment Sheet – 
DBN, 6 April 2011 (‘Dell DBN CAS’); attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013, schedule item: Schedule B_Dell 26. 
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 In both cases, the incident was referred to as ‘a sophisticated and 
malicious attack which required expert knowledge to execute;’ 
 As in the Sony investigation, Epsilon’s range of security measures in 
place were found to be sufficient for the purposes of NPP 4.1, although 
reference was also made to a number of enhancements implemented 
following the breach; and 
 Jurisdictional issues were raised, in this case in regard to the application 
of the Privacy Act to Epsilon (being a US incorporated organisation, 
and arguably not carrying on business in Australia).   Again, because 
the Commissioner was satisfied that Epsilon had met its obligations 
under the NPPs the Commissioner was not required to reach a formal 
view on this matter.   
The Commissioner decided to cease the investigation into the incident, noting 
with approval how quickly Epsilon had acted to contain risks to the personal 
information and to ‘take appropriate steps to investigate the incident, improve its 
security systems further and work with law enforcement agencies regarding this 
matter.’908  
8.1.6 Medvet Science Pty Ltd 
The report on the own motion investigation into Medvet was published in July 
2012, just over a year from the date that the events were first made public in an 
‘exclusive’ article published in The Australian newspaper.909 
Medvet is a private company owned by the South Australian government 
which offers a ‘comprehensive range of cost-effective health and safety services’ 
including drug and alcohol testing and DNA paternity testing. 910  Drug and DNA 
self-testing kits could be ordered via a Medvet webpage and delivered directly to the 
                                                 
908  Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337, 2. 
909  Hedley Thomas, ‘DNA test names exposed online’, The Australian (online), 16 July 2011 < 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/dna-test-names-exposed-online/story-
e6frg8y6-1226095576596 >. 
910  From Medvet Science Pty Ltd, About Us <http://www.medvet.com.au/about-us>. 
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nominated shipping address.  Medvet’s website was hosted by CP Moore, who 
reportedly used an ecommerce application (called Webstore) developed by another 
party, Iciniti Corporation, to support online purchasing of the test kits.911  
The press seem to have been alerted to the incident by an anonymous ‘industry 
figure’ who, according to the reports, had advised South Australia Health (the 
owners of Medvet) of the issue in April (some three months earlier).912  The first 
media contact was on Friday 13 July 2012, with the article publishing details of the 
online availability of personal information appearing on Monday 16 July 16 2011 
(see Figure 7).  From 16 July 16 2011 the event received significant attention from 
the media.913   
The headline of the initial press report suggested that the names of people who 
had ordered DNA tests were exposed online; however, all subsequent reports 
referred only to delivery details being available.914  Medvet advised the Privacy 
Commissioner that the information was limited to the ‘ship to address’ from each 
order, details of the service/product requested and the price paid for that 
service/product.  No customer names, client bank account details or details of any 
test results were available online.915   
                                                 
911  C.P. Moore Business Solutions, About Us <http://www.cpmoore.com/About_Us.aspx>. 
912  Thomas, above n 911, which states that the Medvet CEO ‘initially said he had no knowledge of 
a recent previous security issue at Medvet’s web store. When The Weekend Australian told him 
it was aware the matter had been brought to his attention earlier this year, he acknowledged it 
and said he instituted action at the time to fix the problem.’ 
913  See, eg, Sarah Martin ‘Investigation into South Australia’s Medvet lab after serious privacy 
breach’, The Advertiser (online), 18 July 2011 <http://www.news.com.au/national-old/south-
australias-medvet-blood-lab-publishes-details-of-paternity-and-drug-test-applicants/story-
e6frfkx9-1226096476780>.  ‘Online medical privacy breach to be probed’, ABC News (online) 
18 July 2011 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-18/medvet-privacy-breach-
online/2798650>. 
914  Thomas, above n 911. 
915  Medvet OMI report, above n 338. 
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Figure 7: An example of the details of one of the orders for a Paternity Test that was 
available online.916 
An OMI investigation was opened on 18 July 2011 following a press report on 
15 July 2011 in which the Commissioner stated that ‘it would launch a formal ‘own 
motion’ investigation.’917   On opening its investigation, there was an initial 
discussion regarding whether the Privacy Act applied to Medvet, as a corporation 
wholly owned by the South Australian government.918 Finding that it did apply, the 
Commissioner sent an RFI Letter on July 20, 2011, which was in similar terms to 
that issued to Sony.919  Medvet responded by letter on 11 August 201, the contents of 
which have been redacted in full.920  In early September, the Commissioner’s office 
                                                 
916  Asher Moses, ‘Paternity and drug test details leak online in privacy breach’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online) 18 July 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/paternity-
and-drug-test-details-leak-online-in-privacy-breach-20110718-1hkyn.html#ixzz2EiZDNyiV>. 
917  Thomas, above n 911. 
918  Letter from Mark Hummerston to Medvet, 18 July 2011 (not provided as part of the disclosed 
records).  There is also reference to a phone call with the respondent and an email response to 
the queries but these records was not provided by 30 March 2014, see Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, ‘Case Management Summary: Medvet Laboratories’ (20 June 2013) 
(‘Medvet Case Management Summary’), attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 
30 August 2013; schedule item: Document Schedule B_Medvet 1. 
919  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Medvet, 20 July 2011 (‘Medvet RFI Letter’).  A copy of this 
document is included in Appendix C. 
920  Email from Medvet to AM, OAIC, 11 August 2011. 
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queried the availability of a report into the incident being prepared by Deloitte.921  A 
copy of a Medvet Press Release about the Deloitte report and a copy of the report 
were forwarded to the Commissioner’s office.922  On 11 October, the case officer 
noted that ‘… we received a response from Medvet on 21 September and I have 
assessed the response and it appears that R has taken reasonable steps and we are in a 
position to finalise.’923   That same file note also referred to discussing the matter 
further internally at the OAIC before drafting a close letter because ‘TP may want to 
do a report as it was in the media.’ 
In November, the Commissioner’s office checked with Medvet on the 
implementation of the changes that were presumably recommended in the Deloitte 
report provided in September.924  Medvet advised that it had retained a third party to 
prepare a report on the implementation.925  An internal email confirmed that the 
OAIC would pursue receipt of this second report even though ‘[i]f the report is 
highly technical it may not assist us anyway.’926  
It seems that the implementation report was provided to the OAIC around 5 
December 2011, although again no correspondence relevant to the provision of this 
report was included in the FOI documents produced.927 
                                                 
921  Email from AM, OAIC to Medvet, 5 September 2011. 
922  Email thread from Medvet to AM, OAIC, 21 September 2011. The Deloitte Report is not 
included as an attachment to this email threat (and was not disclosed).  The Report is not 
referred to in any other correspondence. 
923  OAIC, File note, 11 October 2011; referred to in Medvet Case Management Summary, above n 
920. 
924  OAIC, File note, 4 November 2011; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Medvet 11; ‘looking to see if changes have been 
implemented and get a copy of the forensic report.  Will call on Monday.’  OAIC, File note, 8 
November 2011; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; 
schedule item: Schedule B_Medvet 12. 
925  OAIC, File note, 9 November 2011; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Medvet 9. 
926  OAIC, File note, 19 November 2011; attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Medvet 5. 
927  The records refer to a Letter from Medvet MD to OAIC, 28 November 2011, which may have 
included the implementation report, but this has been redacted.   
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A closing letter signed by Mark Hummerston, the Assistant Commissioner, 
was sent to Medvet on 19 December, 2011.928  The content of that letter has largely 
been redacted and it is not clear whether or not Medvet was found to be in breach of 
either NPP 2 or NPP 4, although a later letter from the Commissioner indicated that 
the finding was that only NPP 4 had been breached.929 In the December 2011 letter, 
Mark Hummerston noted that Medvet ‘acted swiftly to identify the security risks to 
the personal information it holds and has taken appropriate steps to improve its 
security systems and develop policies and procedures that reduce identified risks.’  In 
light of that and the security measures being implemented, he advised that the 
investigation would cease and the file on this matter ‘is now closed.’   
According to the file, a draft OMI report was prepared and sent to Medvet for 
comment in May 2012 (nearly 5 months after being advised that the file was 
closed).930 No record of that correspondence had been disclosed as at March 30, 
2014.   Although there is no reference to any further interaction between the OAIC 
and Medvet on the file, in July 2012  the Commissioner advised Medvet that, ‘as it 
was aware,’ the Commissioner had reviewed the file and as part of that review had 
determined that there was a breach of NPP 2, as well as NPP 4.931 The reasons for 
that decision are redacted in full.  Attached to this letter is a draft OMI report 
presumably describing a different outcome to the draft OMI report that had been sent 
in May 2012.  The finding of breach of both NPP 4 and NPP 2 are consistent with the 
OMI report that was published on the OAIC website on 26 July 2012 (and different 
to the findings that seem to have been communicated in December 2011).   
In terms of NPP4, the OMI report refers extensively to the findings in the 
Deloitte report, stating that ‘it was clear from the Deloitte’s forensics report that 
multiple security flaws existed in the software provided by lciniti and hosted by CP 
                                                 
928  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner, OAIC to CEO Medvet, 19 December 
2011 (‘Medvet Close Letter 1’). 
929  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner to CEO Medvet, 10 July 2012 (‘Medvet 
Close Letter 2’).  A copy of this letter is included in Appendix C. 
930  Email from KO, OAIC to Medvet, with attachments – covering letter and Medvet OMI 
Investigation Report (Draft) (this document was not disclosed as at 30 March 2014). 
931  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
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Moore,’932 and therefore Medvet was putting individuals’ personal information, 
including sensitive health information, at risk of being compromised.  Based on these 
findings, it was the Commissioner’s view that Medvet did not have reasonable steps 
in place to protect the personal information it held at the time of the incident and 
therefore it did not meet its obligations under NPP 4.1. 
The report goes on to note that Medvet acted swiftly to identify the security 
risks as soon as it became aware of the incident and that, since the incident, Medvet 
has taken steps to improve its security systems and develop policies and procedures 
that reduce identified risks. 
Following publication of the OMI report, the journalist from The Australian 
who had first broken the story published a series of follow-up articles critical of the 
investigation, suggesting that it was inappropriate for the Commissioner to rely on 
the Deloitte report and that the ‘industry figure’ who had first advised of the breach 
had not been included in the investigation.933  The Commissioner is reported to have 
responded that the Deloitte report had been ‘used to confirm evidence gathered from 
other sources’934 although it is not clear from the files what those sources were.  The 
Commissioner also sent a letter to the editor responding to claims that the 
investigation was not rigorous or independent.935   
8.2 CONCLUSION 
As noted, the nature of OMI reporting changed in February 2011 when the 
Commissioner adopted a new mode of responding to and reporting on high-profile 
data breaches.   From the group of 8 OMI reports published between February 2011 
and April 2013, 6 have been selected for more detailed analysis.  It is apparent from 
                                                 
932  Ibid. 
933  Thomas, above n 909; and Hedley Thomas, 'Paternity firm slapped over privacy breach', The 
Australian (online) < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/investigations/paternity-firm-
slapped-over-privacy-breach/story-fn6tcs23-1226435191069>. 
934  Thomas, above n 933. 
935  Letter from Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner, to the Editor of The Australian 
Newspaper, 26 July 2013 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-
statements/medvet-investigation/privacy-commissioner-responds-to-media-claims-about-
medvet-investigation>. 
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the description of the events giving rise to each investigation and the resulting 
reports, those 6 investigations were different in many ways: 
 The organisations involved ranged from a local Australian organisation to a 
large multinational; 
 The number of people whose personal information was affected ranged from 
0 (in Vodafone) to possibly millions in the Sony PlayStation investigation; 
 The causes of the incidents investigated ranged from ‘sophisticated’ cyber-
attacks (in Sony and Dell/Epsilon), to a ‘one-off human error’ in Telstra Mail 
Out, to more serious failures to take reasonable steps in Vodafone, Telstra 
Bundles and Medvet; 
 Not every case of breach of NPP 4 involved a breach of NPP 2.  In Vodafone, 
there was a failure to take reasonable care, but no disclosure.  The reverse 
also applied: in Telstra Mail Out there was a breach of NPP 2 but no breach 
of NPP 4. 
However, there are also at least two commonalities between the 6 cases. 
All related to incidents that were in the media at the time, or shortly after the 
Commissioner decided to open an investigation.  Most of the OMI reports refer to the 
media coverage and even in those reports that do not specifically refer to media, 
there is evidence of media interest at the time the investigation was commenced, for 
example the Telstra Mail Out.   The other similarity between the cases is that, in 
each, the Commissioner was able to close the investigation on the basis that the 
respondent had already, or was in the course of, taking appropriate remediation 
efforts to ensure that the incident did not occur again.  Both of these similarities will 
be examined further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 9: Findings - OMI Investigation 
Process 
The facts and the decisions made by the Commissioner in each of the 6 
investigations to be analysed in detail in this Part were covered in the previous 
chapter.  This chapter will examine in detail how each of those 6 investigations was 
conducted, looking at each separate phase: the initiation, evidence gathering, and 
communication of the decision and reporting of each case.  It will analyse those 
investigations using the lens of the transparent, balanced and vigorous exercise by 
the Commissioner of its powers.  The next chapter will consider the extent to which 
the investigations could be regarded as supporting an industry-accepted approach to 
information security, looking more closely at the references to accepted practice, 
industry standards and the OAIC’s own guidance. 
The investigation process mandated by the Complaints Manual (following the 
decision to commence an investigation and completion of preliminary assessment 
inquiries) was discussed in Chapter 7. That process includes the following steps: 
 Preparing a case plan;  
 Sending letters advising of the investigation (referred to in this research as 
‘Request for Information letters’ or ‘RFI Letters’); 
 Collecting of relevant evidence to apply the law and relevant policy to the 
facts of the case; and 
 Finalising the case, including considering whether or not to publish a 
report. 936 
Consideration of the transparency, balance and vigour of the actual investigation 
process used in each of the 6 investigations will be based on this process as outlined 
in the Complaints Manual. 
                                                 
936  Complaints Manual, above n 227. 
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9.1 DECISION TO COMMENCE AN OMI 
The criteria for commencing an OMI have been discussed in Chapter 7.2. 
However, none of the files for any of the OMIs being reviewed contain any record of 
or reference to consideration of any of these stated criteria as the basis for the 
decision to open an OMI. 
The Assistant Commissioner, after confirming that these were the relevant 
criteria used, referred to two ‘other way[s] of opening OMIs’, the first being where 
the office was notified of a data breach.  In that case, according to the Assistant 
Commissioner, the office would determine if the organisation had a strategy in place 
to address the breach.  If satisfied that appropriate steps were being taken, then the 
OAIC would not take any further action, although it would seek to have the 
organisation report on the remedial steps taken. However, ‘if the report falls short in 
our view then at that point we’d open an Own Motion Investigation and ask some 
formal questions under our Own Motion Investigation power.’   
Sony, Dell/Epsilon and Telstra Bundles are all cases where the organisation 
notified the OAIC of a breach.937  The OAIC decided to undertake an OMI in each of 
these cases.  This is notwithstanding that there is no suggestion in any of the files or 
reports relating to these investigations that the Commissioner was concerned that the 
organisations might not take appropriate remedial steps to recover from the breach.  
To the contrary, each refers to the post-breach actions taken by the respondent with 
approval. For example, the conclusion to the Sony OMI Report provides: 
The Privacy Commissioner was also satisfied with how the incident was dealt 
with following the breach in terms of the extra security measures that have been 
implemented to help protect personal information.938  
The Telstra Mail Out investigation seems to have been instigated following a 
referral from the ACMA, which had received notification of the breach in its 
capacity as the regulator overseeing compliance with the Telecommunications Code 
                                                 
937  See Letter from Dell Australia to Timothy Pilgrim, 6 April 2011; Email from Sony to Enquiries, 
OAIC, 27 April 2011; Email from Telstra to OAIC, 9 December 2011. 
938  Sony OMI Report, above n 335. 
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of Practice.939  In this regard it could be treated as similar to the data breach 
notification cases.  
According to the ACC, the other basis on which OMIs may be opened is in 
response to media interest.  This seems to be the most likely reason for the 
commencement of investigations in all 6 cases under review.  Each of the incidents 
the subject of these OMIs had received media attention.940  Each of the investigation 
files contains media clippings in regard to the particular incident being investigated, 
demonstrating that the OAIC was aware of the media attention.941  The Vodafone, 
Sony and Medvet incidents in particular had received national press attention, with 
the OMI reports for both these investigations identifying the media reports as the 
reason for opening the investigations.942 By way of example, the first paragraph of 
the Vodafone OMI Report provides: 
The Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim opened an own motion 
investigation … in response to media reports that the personal information of 
Vodafone Hutchison Australia (Vodafone) customers had been compromised.  
Unlike most previous investigations, the Commissioner elected to respond to 
the media reports, not only by opening an investigation, but also in a number of cases 
by issuing its own media release to that effect ( in regard to the Vodafone, Sony and 
                                                 
939  See Letter from Jane van Beelen to Olya Booyar, The Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 27 October 2010. 
940  Natalie O’Brien, ‘Mobile security outrage: private details accessible on net’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 9 January 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/mobile-
security-outrage-private-details-accessible-on-net-20110108-19j9j.html#ixzz2hOpjMQ1L>; 
AAP, ‘Vodafone website exposes customer details’, ZDNet (online) 9 January 2011 
<http://www.zdnet.com.au/vodafone-website-exposes-customer-details-339308437.htm>; 
Martin and Battersby, above n 827; Griffith and Dearne, above n 836; Baker, above n 836; 
Thomas, above n 911; Moses, above n 918; Martin, above n 915. 
941  See, eg, The Dell investigation file included Excerpt from eweek.com (6 April 2011); The 
Australian (7 April 2011); The Sydney Morning Herald (7 April 2011); attached to Letter from 
Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; schedule item: Schedule B_Dell 20, 19, and 24.  
The Telstra Bundles investigation file included Excerpt from The Sydney Morning Herald (12 
December 2011), attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; 
schedule item: Schedule B_Telstra 6. 
942  See the references above n 940. 
  
 235 
Telstra Bundles investigations).943  Even in those cases where no media release was 
issued, the fact that the Commissioner was undertaking an investigation seemed to 
find its way into the public domain.944  The Commissioner also responded to media 
queries about whether an investigation was being undertaken945 and to further queries 
as the investigation proceeded.946  The OAIC’s continuing awareness of the on-going 
media interest in the investigations is demonstrated by copies of news articles held in 
the investigation files.947  Specific reference to media interest was also made in 
correspondence between the OAIC and the respondents in the Telstra Mail Out, 
Vodafone and Sony cases during the course of those investigations.948   On 
conclusion of the investigations, media releases were issued by the OAIC on the 
publication of each of the OMI reports other than for Dell/Epsilon.949 In the Medvet 
                                                 
943  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy Commissioner opens investigation into Telstra customer accounts 
data breach’ (Statement, 12 December 2011); Privacy Commissioner ‘Australian Privacy 
Commissioner to investigate Vodafone allegations’ (Media Release, 10 January 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/australian-
privacy-commissioner-to-investigate-vodafone-allegations>; Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Investigation 
into Sony data breach’ (Statement, 4 May 2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/statements/privacy-statements/sony-playstation-network/investigation-into-sony-data-
breach-4-may-2011>. 
944  See, eg, Hedley Thomas, ‘Privacy data still online 24 hours after alert’, The Australia (online), 
18 July 2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/private-data-still-online-24-
hours-after-alert/story-fn59niix-1226096403027#sthash.aUOZR0cJ.dpuf>, which provides that 
‘Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim will investigate Medvet’s original internet security 
breach and the subsequent failure of the company to immediately remove the hundreds of 
customers’ orders that it knew were cached by Google and online.’ 
945  See, eg, Karen Dearne, ‘Privacy czar to investigate Epsilon email breach’, The Australian 
(online) 7 April 2011 < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/privacy-czar-to-investigate-
epsilon-email-breach/story-e6frgakx-1226035569602#sthash.w4iypq2o.dpuf> Asher Moses, 
‘Telstra botched mail-out exposes 220,000 customers’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 27 
October 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/telstra-botched-mailout-exposes-
220000-customers-20101027-173du.html#ixzz2hC0Ak7np>. 
946  See, eg, Email thread between OAIC employees, 5 May 2011. 
947  See, eg, Excerpt from smh.com.au (2 May 2011), and excerpt from smh.com.au (3 May 2011); 
attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; schedule item: Schedule 
B_Sony 12. 
948  See, eg, Internal OAIC Email thread, 24 May 2011; which states: ‘spoke to [redacted] yesterday. 
I confirmed we would be making a media statement accompanied by a short report upon closing 
the investigation.’ 
949  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘OAIC finalises investigation into Telstra mailing list error’ (Media Release, 
11 October 2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-
releases/oaic-finalises-investigation-into-telstra-mailing-list-error>; Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy 
Commissioner releases Vodafone Findings’ (Media Release, 16 February 2011) 
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case, there was no media release but the Commissioner issued a statement that was 
published in a national paper as a letter to the editor following negative coverage of 
the report. 950   
The fact that the investigations and the publication of the reports on completion 
of those investigations may be a response to media interest (rather than, for example 
addressing a systemic issue) is considered later in this research in terms of the 
purpose of the OMI and the reasons for publishing the OMI reports.   
None of the reports or investigation files refers specifically to any concern 
regarding systemic issues, either of a general nature affecting a particular industry or 
within an organisation. As referred to, the existence of systemic issues is one of the 
criteria for determining whether or not to undertake an OMI, and is thought to be an 
important use of the OMI power.951  The only case where any reference is made to 
systemic issues is the Telstra Bundles investigation.  The OAIC sent a letter to 
Telstra asking for more information about the breach (sent following the initial 
Telstra Bundles RFI Letter). 952  This letter states that the incident ‘indicates that 
there may be systemic issues within the Telstra systems with regard to data security.’  
The letter continues, saying that the OAIC’s aim is to ‘identify all the relevant 
vulnerabilities that led to the incident, provide guidance on how to address them and 
to close the matter.’953 Following this letter, there is no further reference to systemic 
issues in the file or in the final OMI report.   However, following the release of the 
                                                 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/privacy-
commissioner-releases-vodafone-findings>; Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Australian Privacy 
Commissioner concludes Sony investigation’ (Media Release, 29 September 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-releases/privacy-media-releases/australian-
privacy-commissioner-concludes-sony-investigation>, Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Telstra breaches 
Privacy Act’ (Media Release, 29 June 2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/media-
releases/privacy-media-releases/telstra-breaches-privacy-act>. 
950  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy Commissioner responds to media claims about Medvet investigation 
– Letter to the editor of The Australian newspaper from Australian Privacy Commissioner, 
Timothy Pilgrim’ (Statement, 26 July 2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/statements/privacy-statements/medvet-investigation/privacy-commissioner-responds-to-
media-claims-about-medvet-investigation>. 
951  See Chapter 7.2. 
952  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Telstra, 8 March 2012. 
953  Ibid. 
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Telstra Bundles OMI Report, the Commissioner was reported to be watching for 
systemic privacy weaknesses in Telstra’s operational culture.954  It is not clear what 
this reference to the Commissioner’s interest in possible systemic issues in the media 
report was based on. The media release accompanying the release of the Telstra 
Bundles OMI Report contains no reference to systemic issues.955 Nor is there any 
reference to systemic issues in the OMI report released in March 2014 in regard to 
another security failure by Telstra.956  There is no reference to systemic issues, either 
as a reason for commencing the investigation or as a concern raised during the 
investigation, in any of the files or in the published reports for the other 5 
investigations.   
9.2 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
Following the decision to open an investigation, the investigation files show that the 
same investigation process is taken in each of the investigations.  The investigation 
process is as follows: 
 A file is set up, with a claims assessment sheet completed with the details of 
the investigation;957 
 A Request for Information Letter asking that the respondent answer a series 
of questions about the incident is sent to the respondent, who is given a 
certain time period to respond;958 
 After that response is received, it is reviewed by the OAIC.  Where that 
response indicates that an investigation by the respondent or a third party 
                                                 
954  Andrew Colley, ‘Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrin will probe Telstra’s culture in light of 
privacy breach’, The Australian (online), 29 June 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/telecommunications/privacy-commissioner-
timothy-pilgrim-will-probe-telstras-culture-in-light-of-privacy-breach/story-fn4iyzsr-
1226412092746>. 
955  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, above n 883. 
956  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336. 
957  Complaint Assessment Sheets were disclosed for all of the OMIs except Epsilon and Telstra 
Mail Out. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.4 below.   
958  Request for Information Letters were disclosed for all of the OMIs except Epsilon. There are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.6 below. 
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appointed by the respondent is proceeding, the OAIC will usually follow up 
to ensure that it receives a copy of that report;959 
 Once the OAIC is satisfied with the information received, and a decision has 
been made, a letter called a ‘Close Letter’ is sent to the respondent;960 and   
 Once a decision to publish a report about the investigation is made, a draft 
OMI report is prepared and sent to the entity for their comments and, subject 
to that, published on the OAIC website.961 
This process is largely consistent with the OAIC’s Complaints Manual962 
although there are some divergences. These are discussed in more detail in the next 
sections. 
9.3 INVESTIGATION CHRONOLOGIES 
The chronology for each of the above steps as they occurred in each of the 6 
investigations is provided in Table 6. 
 Telstra 
Mail Out 
Vodafone Dell/ 
Epsilon 
Sony Telstra 
Bundle 
Medvet 
Date file opened 27/10/10 10/1/11 7/4/11 27/4/11 9/12/11 18/7/11 
Date RFI Letter 25/10/10 10/1/11 19/4/11 
(Dell) 
3/5/11 
(Epsilon) 
27/4/11 12/12/11 20/7/11 
                                                 
959  For example, in the Telstra Bundles OMI, see Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Telstra 8 
March 2012. 
960  The Close Letters sent to all of the respondents were disclosed (other than the Telstra Mail Out 
case) however, the contents of most of these letters were heavily redacted.  The Close Letters are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.9 below. 
961  Although correspondence on the investigation files indicated that draft OMI reports were sent to 
each of the respondents, no draft OMI report was disclosed on the basis that the drafts went to 
the OAIC’s decision making process. 
962  Complaints Manual, above n 227, as discussed in Chapter 7.1.1. 
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Date response 
requested 
18/11/10 14/1/11 11/5/11 11/5/11 13/1/12 11/8/11 
Date of R’s 
response 
8/12/10 14/1/11 & 
19/1/11 
11/5/11 & 
19/7/11 
(Dell) 
16/5/11 & 
15/11/11 
(Epsilon) 
11/5/11 3/2/12 
(RFI1) and 
26/3/12 
(RFI2) 
11/8/11 & 
21/9/11 
Date Close 
Letter sent to R 
16/5/11 10/2/11963 11/1/12 29/6/11  30/4/12 19/12/11 
Date draft OMI 
Sent to R 
28/6/11 10/2/11 2/7/12 15/9/11 8/6/12 15/5/12 
and 
10/7/12964 
Date OMI 
report Published 
7/7/11 16/2/11 20/7/12 29/9/11 29/6/12 20/7/12 
Media release re 
OMI 
11/10/11 16/2/11 NA 29/9/11 29/6/12 26/7/12:  
Letter to 
editor 
response 
to media  
Time between 
opening and  
publication of 
OMI report 
11.5 
months 
1 month 15.5 
months 
5 months 6.5 months 12 months 
 
Table 5: OAIC investigation chronologies 
In most cases, the investigation concluded shortly after receipt of information 
from the respondent.  In the 3 investigations that took close to or more than 12 
                                                 
963  Vodafone is the only case where the draft OMI report was sent out with the Close Letter. 
964  There were two quite different OMI reports sent out in the Medvet investigation.  This is 
discussed later. 
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months to complete, the greatest contributor to the delay was either the time taken to 
issue the Close Letter or the OMI report, rather than the investigation process itself. 
In 5 of the 6 cases, the Close Letter seems to have been sent promptly 
following receipt of information from the respondent.  The exception is the Telstra 
Mail Out investigation.  In that case, no record of activity was disclosed for the 
period between 8 December 2010 when Telstra’s response to the RFI Letter was 
received and 16 May 2011 when the Close Letter was sent.  The delay in the 
Dell/Epsilon and Medvet investigations was due to the time taken to prepare and 
send the draft OMI.   The Medvet investigation was completed in December 2011 at 
which time a Close Letter was sent that appears to find that there was no breach 
because no personal information had been disclosed.965  This was presumably 
confirmed in the draft OMI report sent out by Mark Hummerston on 15 May 15 
2012.966  However, a further Closer Letter and draft OMI report was sent by Timothy 
Pilgrim in July 2012 (nearly seven months after the original Close Letter). The 
circumstances surrounding these reports are discussed further below, but it is worth 
noting the seven-month gap between the date of the first Close Letter that was sent to 
Medvet and the date of the final draft OMI report. 
In the Dell/Epsilon investigation there was a five-month period between the 
Close Letters sent to Dell and Epsilon and the sending of a draft OMI report. 
The delays in concluding and publishing the reports in the Telstra Mail Out and 
the Medvet case are concerning.  Timeliness of the use of regulatory powers is one of 
the principles of good regulation that should guide the exercise of powers by the 
OAIC and which is specifically referred to in the draft Regulatory Powers Policy.967 
 
                                                 
965  The Medvet Close Letter 1, above n 928, was substantially redacted. 
966  The contents of the May draft of the Medevet OMI report have been redacted in full. 
967  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227, [18]. 
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9.4 COMPLAINT ASSESSMENT SHEET 
According to the Complaints Manual, an initial assessment of all complaints is 
made by a Director or Deputy Director to determine if the complaint should be the 
subject of preliminary inquiries, investigated or declined, which assessment is set out 
on a Complaints Assessment Sheet (CAS).  Information in the CAS includes: 
 Details about the complainant and respondent, including any representatives 
involved; 
 Relevant dates, including when the letter was dated, received and assessed; 
 Issues raised in the complaint; and 
 Name of the industry sector to which the respondent belongs. 
It also includes the issues that need to be considered before determining 
whether an investigation is required. CASs are given to Complaint Officers but are 
also reviewed by the Assistant Commissioner to ‘ensure a consistent approach to 
decision-making and the identification of systemic issues and trends.’ According to 
the Manual, the Assistant Commissioner will review the information recorded on the 
green sheet and, if in agreement, will co-sign the assessment.  
Complaint Assessment Sheets were disclosed for all of the OMIs except 
Epsilon and Telstra Mail Out.968  Those sheets that were disclosed were completed in 
a manner largely consistent with the process referred to in the Complaints Manual.  
                                                 
968  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OPC - Complaint Assessment Sheet, 10 
January 2011 (‘Vodafone CAS’); attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 
August 2013, schedule item: Schedule B_Vodafone 20;  Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, OPC - Complaint Assessment Sheet, 27 April 2011 (‘Sony CAS’); attached to 
Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013, schedule item: Schedule B_Sony 8; 
Dell DBN CAS, above n 895; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OPC - 
Complaint Assessment Sheet – OMI, 6 April 2011 (‘Dell OMI CAS’); attached to Letter from 
Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013, schedule item: Schedule B_Dell 16; Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, OPC - Complaint Assessment Sheet, 12 December 2011 
(‘Telstra CAS’); attached to Letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013, schedule 
item: Schedule B_Telstra 61; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OPC - 
Complaint Assessment Sheet, 19 July 2011 (‘Medvet CAS’); attached to Letter from Caren Whip 
to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013, schedule item: Schedule B_Medvet 23. 
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 It does, however, appear that not all sheets had been co-signed by the Assistant 
Commissioner, as required by the Complaints Manual.  The Assistant Commissioner 
at the time was Mark Hummerston. 
 Vodafone Dell DBN Dell 
OMI 
Sony Telstra 
Bunds 
Medvet 
Assessed 
By: 
Linda Linda Linda Jacob Linda MH969 
Checked 
by: 
 
- Jacob - Timothy 
Approved 
MH - 
Allocated 
to: 
 
- Marie Marie Adam Tina AM 
Table 6: Complaint Assessment Sheet Review Signatures 
Details of the assessment and checking of each of the CASs are included in 
Table 7, with no indication of review for three of the five OMI files.  Issues in terms 
of the consistency of interpretation and the application of principles that could be 
attributable to the Assistant Commissioner Compliance not reviewing and co-signing 
the Complaint Assessment Sheets are considered in Chapter 9.10.2.1.  
Each of the different sheets includes notes in a section titled ‘Action Officer,’ 
which in some cases includes references to the information that the respondents 
should be asked to provide (which is relevant when considering the RFI Letters sent).  
Looking at each of the relevant sheets: 
 Vodafone CAS (Case Number 14733). This case was opened as an OMI. It 
refers to NPP 1.3, NPP 2 and NPP 4 as the relevant principles to be 
considered.  The notes include that the respondent should be asked to advise 
‘what security measures are in place to protect information R holds generally 
and particularly electronically.’970 
                                                 
969  It is assumed that the initial “MH” refers to Mark Hummerston. 
970  Vodafone CAS, above n 968. 
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 Sony CAS (Case Number 15107). This case was opened as an OMI – even 
though there had been a data breach notification. It identifies NPP 2 and NPP 
4 as the relevant principles to be considered. There may have been a separate 
DBN file but there is no indication of that from the documents produced.  
There is no reference to any particular questions to be asked of Sony. 
 Dell CAS. The Dell CAS shows that that case was initially opened as a DBN 
case.971 It identifies NPP 2 and NPP 4 as the relevant principles to be 
considered. It includes the following additional notes: ‘Both Dell and Epsilon 
have already taken a range of actions to contain the breach … Open DBN.  
Write to Dell … Request a copy of incident investigation report.’972  It is not 
clear what happened to the DBN file.  There is a separate CAS relating to the 
OMI (Case Number 15073).973  It identifies only NPP 4 (and not NPP 2) as 
the relevant principle for consideration.  This second CAS was not 
checked.974  The notes on the OMI CAS include statements referring to 
concerns regarding whether Dell has taken reasonable steps through its 
outsourcing arrangements with Epsilon.  It reflects that an OMI will be 
opened and the Dell will be asked ‘what reasonable steps’ it has taken to 
protect personal information, what steps it has taken to ensure that third 
parties take reasonable steps and also includes the note ‘Refer to any relevant 
industry standards.’975  This is the only reference to considering standards in 
any of the CAS’s and is considered in more detail in the next chapter.  
Neither CAS raised consideration of National Privacy Principle 9, the 
provision which applied to the cross border transfer of personal information.  
Dell Australia must have transferred the personal information of its 
Australian customers to Epsilon in some fashion, which may have raised 
                                                 
971  Dell DBN CAS, above n 907. 
972  Ibid. 
973  Dell OMI CAS, above n 968. 
974  See Table 7 for details on which CASs had been checked. 
975  Dell OMI CAS, above n 968. 
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issues regarding compliance with NPP 9.  Compliance with this principle was 
not raised in either CAS and is not raised at any time during the investigation. 
 Medvet CAS (Case Number 15394). This CAS identifies only NPP 4 as the 
relevant principle to be considered.976  This is of interest because the final 
report finds there was a breach of both NPP 2 and NPP 4, although the initial 
investigation seemed only to consider NPP 4.977  Only the front page of this 
document was disclosed so notes made in regard to the information to be 
requested were not revealed.978   
 Telstra Bundles CAS (Case Number 15983):  There is a CAS for the DBN 
that seems to have been opened and the transferred into an OMI file.979 There 
is a second CAS for the OMI File, which includes the note ‘Reports raise 
issues of improper disclosure and lack of reasonable steps in terms of data 
security measures.’  There is, however, no reference to questions to be asked 
as part of the OMI.980 
9.5 CASE PLANS 
As previously discussed, one of the initial stages of any investigation should be 
the preparation of a case plan that identifies the relevant legal provisions and the 
information or evidence needed to establish whether there has been a breach of 
privacy, having considered the evidence to hand.981  According to the Complaints 
Manual, case plans need to be approved by the Compliance Officer’s supervisor 
before RFI Letters are sent.982 
                                                 
976  Medvet CAS, above n 968. 
977  The Medvet decision is considered further in Chapter 8. 
978  Medvet CAS, above n 968. 
979  Telstra CAS, above n 968. 
980  Telstra CAS, above n 968. 
981  Complaints Manual, above n 227, 33. See the earlier discussion of investigation plans in Chapter 
7.1.1. 
982  Ibid. 
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No record identified as a case plan was included in any of the OMI files 
reviewed as part of this research.   
 It may be that the handwritten notes by the Action Officer included in each of 
the Claim Assessment Sheets represent the case plan for each OMI.  If so, then it is 
difficult to see how they could be regarded as containing adequate or appropriate 
details in regard to the evidence needed to establish a breach of privacy and how that 
evidence is to be obtained. 
The Assistant Commissioner Compliance was asked whether different 
investigation plans were developed for different types of breaches, for example, 
whether the fact that there was a malicious attack or internal accidental error 
influence the way the investigation was carried out.983  Her answer indicated that 
these issues may only be given consideration at a very high level. While 
acknowledging that those issues did influence the investigation, the ACC said that 
that was because they raised different legislative requirements, and so different 
principles would need to be considered. She noted that if it were a malicious attack 
the OAIC would be ‘looking at the NPP4 issues with great particularity, trying to 
ascertain the extent to which the threat could have been anticipated and mitigated 
against or not’ rather than at NPP 2.984  Accordingly, the direction of the 
investigation would seem to depend on the privacy principles that may be breached, 
without any more detailed consideration of the circumstances of the breach or the 
more particular questions that may need to be asked.  
The absence of any case plan for any of the investigations suggests that no real 
consideration is given to issues such as the evidence that may be needed to establish 
breach of privacy in the particular case. 
                                                 
983   Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
984  Interview with  Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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9.6 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTERS 
Because no case plan is prepared, the next step after the investigation file is 
opened is to send a Request for Information Letter.  According to the Complaints 
Manual, the RFI Letters should: 
 Outline the … allegations (of breach); 
 Refer to the relevant parts of the Act (perhaps in an attachment to the letter); 
 Be objective, impartial, assume nothing and by no means pre-judge the 
outcome of the investigation; 
 Invite the respondent to provide any other information it may feel is relevant 
 Inform the respondent that any information provided may be given to the 
complainant; and 
 Give the respondent generally 21 days to respond.985 
RFI Letters from all the investigations, other than the one sent to Epsilon, were 
disclosed as part of the FOI process and have been relied on for the following 
analysis.986  These letters are generally consistent with the format outlined in the 
Complaints Manual.  They adopt a standard format designed to meet a number of the 
aspects of procedural fairness referred to in Chapters 2.6.1 and 7.1.1: compliance 
with the fair hearing rule, which provides that the respondent should be advised of 
the allegations, the possible outcomes and given an opportunity to reply to the 
allegations; and compliance with the evidence rule, in particular the requirement that 
any findings be based on logically probative material.  However, it is not so clear that 
the RFI Letters could be regarded as asking specific questions so as to obtain the 
evidence that the OAIC requires to support a decision on the balance of probabilities 
(as required by the evidence rule). 
                                                 
985  Complaints Manual, above n 227, Section 12 ‘Opening the Investigation’. 
986  Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter, above n 802; Vodafone RFI Letter, above n 817; Sony RFI Letter, 
above n 829; Dell RFI Letter, above n 888; Telstra Bundles RFI Letter, above n 848; Medvet 
RFI Letter, above n 907.  
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All of the RFI Letters, other than the Dell Australia RFI Letter, pose a number 
of the same high-level questions, often in identical terms, notwithstanding the very 
different fact scenarios which form the basis of the different OMIs. In its RFI Letter, 
dated 10 January 2011, Vodafone was asked to respond to the following questions: 
1. Please provide a detailed account of this incident.  In your response, 
include details about what information, if any, was made publicly 
available on Vodafone’s website 
2. What steps, if any, has Vodafone taken or is taking in response to this 
incident? 
… 
6. Please advise what steps if any Vodafone takes to help ensure its 
customers’ personal information is secure and is protected from loss, 
unauthorised access, modification and disclosure, as required by 
NPP4.1, including when information is held and is accessible 
electronically. 
7. Were these steps in place and being practiced at the time of the reported 
incident? 
8. Does Vodafone consider these steps reasonable to protect its customers’ 
personal information from unauthorised access and disclosure?  If yes, 
please provide details. 
9. Please provide any other information relevant to the incident. 
The Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter (sent shortly before the Vodafone RFI Letter) 
included questions identical to 6 and 7, but also asked: 
 When does Telstra expect its data analysis of the incident will be complete? 
 Please provide a copy of the notification letter that Telstra proposes to send to 
its impacted customers. 
These same questions were included in the Sony and Medvet RFI Letters. 
The similarity between these RFI Letters indicate that only limited 
consideration may have been given to the evidence required to establish the relevant 
facts of each case.   
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The incidents being investigated were very different in terms of the source of 
the compromise (malicious insider vs malicious external attack vs accident vs 
negligence), the way the compromise had been effected (unauthorised insider activity 
vs successful exploitation of a web application vulnerability vs human error vs 
technical failure), the risk profile of the organisations under consideration (large 
multinational organisation with 77 million users vs local mobile phone operator with 
much fewer users though possibly more sensitive information vs small medical 
testing organisation vs Australia’s largest telecommunications company), the type of 
information compromised and the extent of and potential harm resulting from the 
possible breach.   If consideration had been given to some of the relevant contextual 
issues in each case, such as the type of breach, the organisation involved and the 
sensitivity of the data compromised, it might be expected that different questions 
would be posed seeking different information relevant to the particular breach in the 
different RFI Letters. 
By contrast, the Dell Australia and Telstra Bundles RFI Letters indicate some 
customisation of questions in view of the particular issues raised by those incidents, 
although in different ways. Dell’s RFI Letter raises only two questions: 
6. What steps does Dell Australia take to protect information it collects 
from customers (individuals) in order to comply with NPP 4.1? 
7. Please provide details of how Dell Australia protects the personal 
information of its customers that it provides to third parties.  Please 
include full details of any contractual measures in place to ensure that 
third parties also take reasonable steps to comply with NPP 4.1 and 
reference any relevant industry standards. 
These questions are consistent with the notes made on the complaint 
assessment sheet.987  They are also more specifically directed to the particular breach 
being considered than the questions posed in the other RFI Letters. However, by 
asking for ‘full details of any contractual measures in place’ and ‘reference to any 
relevant industry standards,’ the OAIC seems to be pre-empting the information it 
                                                 
987  Dell OMI CAS, above n 968. 
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wishes to receive.988  In particular, reference to the contract suggests that the OAIC 
had accepted that an appropriate contract was the correct way to protect personal 
information transferred to a third party in these circumstances.   
The fact that Dell had entered into a contract with Epsilon and was pursuing an 
investigation to determine whether Epsilon had complied with relevant standards 
(presumably in accordance with its contractual commitments) was probably 
communicated by Dell in its initial contact with the OAIC on 6 April 2011.989  
However communicated, this information was subsequently used to frame the RFI 
Letter. Taking its cue from the questions posed in the RFI Letter, Dell was able to 
confirm in its response that the breach had been caused by Epsilon (and attached 
Dell’s Incident Report in that regard) and that Dell had a contract in place with 
Epsilon, which included a Schedule B setting out Epsilon’s privacy and data 
obligations owed to Dell (a copy of which was attached),990 thus satisfying the 
OAIC’s requests for information. 
Consistently with the CAS, there is no reference to NPP 9 in the Dell RFI 
Letter.  As discussed in Chapter 9.4, it would seem that compliance with NPP 9 may 
have been a relevant consideration in this investigation.  However, it was not raised 
in the Dell RFI Letter.  This omission may be a result of the lack of internal review 
of the Dell OMI CAS. 
By contrast to the very narrow request in the Dell RFI Letter, Telstra received a 
very broad RFI Letter as part of the Telstra Bundles OMI, asking that it respond to 
the following questions: 
1. What is the purpose of the database and what information does it hold? 
2. How did the database become publicly accessible? 
                                                 
988   Ibid. 
989  Although this is not clear from the file, an internal OAIC email, 6 April 2011 refers to a phone 
conversation in which Dell had advised the OAIC that ‘Epsilon holds customer data for Dell 
[words exempted on basis of s 47C and s47G FOI Act]…. Epsilon has engaged [words 
exempted on basis of s 47C and s47G FOI Act] to investigate the breach. … Dell indicated it 
would provide a final report.’ It is likely that the first redaction referred to the contractual terms 
between the organisations. See Email thread from Delll to OAIC, 6 April 2011. 
990  Letter from Dell to Mark Hummerston, OAIC, 10 May 2011. 
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3. How long was the database publicly accessible? 
4. Exactly what information on the data was publicly accessible? 
5. What kind of information features in the free-form notes field of the 
database? 
6. How many queries were performed on the database in the time that it 
was publicly accessible? 
7. Is there any evidence of other loss or intrusion on the database? 
8. What steps has Telstra taken to contain the risks associated with the 
disclosure? 
9. What training is available for Telstra staff with regard to the use and 
handling of customers’ personal information, including email and 
internet security? 
10. What steps if any does Telstra have in place with regard to data security 
and its website policy to protect customers’ personal information from 
misuse loss and from unauthorised access, modification and disclosure? 
11. Were these steps in place at the time of the incident? Does Telstra 
believe that these steps are adequate in light of its obligations under the 
Act? 
12. If Telstra’s investigation identifies a particular data security risk, does 
Telstra believe that its data security measures meet its obligations under 
the Act and that they adequately manage the risk? 
13. What changes, if any, does Telstra propose to make in order to address 
the identified risks and satisfy its obligations under the Act? 
Other than the questions directed at the database, the questions posed and the 
information sought in this RFI are different to those included in the RFI Letters in all 
the previous OMIs.  It is not clear where this direction came from. No reference was 
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made in the relevant claims assessment sheet991 to any specific questions to be posed 
as part of this investigation.   
Unlike the other RFI Letters, the Telstra Mail Out RFI Letter contains a 
number of references to risk in questions 8, 12 and 13.  This is the first time that risk 
has been referred to in any of the RFI Letters (although as discussed further in the 
next chapter, it should form the basis of any consideration of information security 
from an industry standard point of view).   In Question 7, Telstra is asked whether 
there is evidence of ‘other loss or intrusion on the database.’  None of the other RFI 
Letters raise questions about other possible loss beyond that of the specific incident 
being investigated.  It would have been interesting if this question had been asked of 
Vodafone, for example, as Vodafone may well have had to provide evidence of 
unauthorised access by other franchisees based on the published reports of ‘Siebel 
farming.’992  This may have led to a different conclusion in terms of breach of NPP 2 
(which seems to have been decided on the basis of the single interaction between the 
journalist and the Vodafone franchisee that made the initial allegations about the 
widely available access.) 
In the other investigations, a general final question is asked about providing 
any other information relevant to the incident.  By contrast, the final question in the 
Telstra case asks what changes Telstra might make ‘to address the identified risks 
and satisfy its obligations’ under the Privacy Act.  It seems to imply that Telstra will 
be making changes, almost assuming that current controls may not be adequate and 
that Telstra is in breach. 
It is not clear from the investigation files how the content of the different RFI 
Letters was arrived at.  As referred to, in 4 of the cases (Telstra Mail Out, Vodafone, 
Sony and Medvet), the letters seem to simply copy letters sent previously. In the Dell 
investigation, the RFI Letter appears to be based on the information provided by the 
                                                 
991  Telstra Mail Out CAS, above n 968. 
992  See, eg, Asher Moses, ‘Vodafone dealer shuts down after expose’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online) 24 January 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/vodafone-
dealer-shuts-down-after-expose-20110124-1a28s.html>. 
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respondent itself rather than on any independent assessment of what evidence might 
be required to enable the OAIC to reach a decision, or the remarks included in the 
complaints assessment sheet.    
The questions posed in each of the RFI Letters (other than to Dell) are high-
level and open ended, rather than specific (as required by the Complaints Manual).   
Such questions provide the opportunity for high-level and general responses that are 
unlikely to support specific findings of fact.  This may be appropriate where the 
original RFI Letters are intended as an initial investigatory step to be followed by 
further, more detailed questioning based on the responses received.   
The Sony investigation file includes a redacted copy of a public email from Dr. 
Roger Clarke, a well-known Australian privacy figure, which includes a list of more 
specific questions that could have been asked in the Sony RFI Letter, including: 
 How did the personal information come to be accessed, and in particular what 
vulnerability was exploited; 
 What security measures had been expected to protect against that kind of attack; 
 On what basis were those security measures decided upon, e.g. what form of risk 
assessment and risk management procedures did the company apply; 
 How do the security measures that were in place line up against industry standards; 
and 
 What further or changed measures are being applied as a result of the manifest 
inadequacy of the measures that were in place at the time?993 
A copy of this email was included in the OAIC’s investigation file, attached to an 
email chain that includes the OAIC comment ‘there may be some useful comments 
in [redacted] questions.’994 Dr. Clarke’s comments were redacted on the basis that it 
was part of the OAICs decision-making process.995  Although there were no changes 
                                                 
993  Email from Roger Clarke to privacy@lists.efa.org.au, 4 May 2011.  The actual questions (or 
comments) made by Mr Clarke and other content of this email chain were exempted. A copy of 
this email is included in Appendix C (‘Roger Clarke Email’). 
994  Internal email thread, OAIC, 6 May 2011. 
995  Ibid. 
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made to the questions in the subsequently issued Medvet RFI Letter, these comments 
may have influenced the longer and more detailed list of questions in the Telstra 
Bundles RFI Letter.  However, there is nothing to indicate this connection in the 
files.    
Dr. Clarke noted that the questions he was suggesting the Commissioner 
should have asked in the Sony RFI Letter may have been more appropriate for a 
second round of questions.996   There is however little evidence of any ‘second 
round’ questioning in any of these investigations. Other than in the Telstra Bundles 
investigation,997 there is no evidence of the OAIC looking for further detail or 
explanation of any of the information provided in response to the RFI Letters. In 
particular, it does not appear that the OAIC sought to elicit further information about 
how the incident occurred, the security measures that were in place, how those 
measures were determined to be adequate or the organisational response to the 
incidents in any of the OMIs following the initial RFI Letters or the receipt of 
investigation reports (other than Telstra Bundles).   
In the Vodafone, Sony, Dell/Epsilon, Medvet and Telstra Bundles 
investigations, the OAIC was advised by respondents that they were conducting an 
investigation or had commissioned independent experts to investigate on their behalf. 
In each of those cases, the OAIC followed up to ensure a copy of the report from the 
investigation was provided to the OAIC. Investigation reports was forthcoming in 
most cases, other than from Dell, which is discussed further below.998  However, 
there is no indication of any further questions being raised by the OAIC following 
receipt of these reports (other than Telstra Bundles).    
One of the results of the limited follow up is that responses to the RFI Letters, 
together with  any reports provided, comprise almost the entirety of evidence 
regarding the incident obtained by the OAIC and relied on in making its decisions  In 
effect, the questions posed in the RFI Letters set the parameters for the investigation. 
                                                 
996  Roger Clarke email, above n 993. 
997  Letter from Mark Hummerston to Telstra, 8 March 2012. 
998  Investigation reports were provided by the respondents in the Vodafone, Sony, Dell/Epsilon, 
Medvet and Telstra Bundles investigations. 
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This makes the fact that those questions are largely generic, high level and open 
ended even more problematic. 
An example of what this means in practice can be demonstrated by the fact that 
none of the questions in any of the RFI Letters are directed at identifying any 
systemic issues. The Epsilon records indicate that one of the questions to be raised 
was what other customers of Epsilon were in Australia.999  There is no evidence that 
this information was sought (although the Epsilon RFI Letter has not been disclosed 
so it may have included this request).  Similarly, there was no question raised in the 
Medvet investigation about the software they were using that had allowed the Google 
caching, including the organisation from which they procured that software or 
whether they knew of other users. Similarly, the report provides that Vodafone were 
using a Siebel database, which is the same as the database used by Telstra and which 
is specifically considered in the Telstra Bundles case.  No questions were directed to 
either Vodafone or Telstra regarding their implementation of some of the specific 
security capabilities of the Siebel system, nor were any inquiries made about other 
users of Siebel systems who may have similar implementations.  
Before leaving this review of the RFI Letters, it should also be noted that each 
RFI Letter specifically asks for information about the remediation steps taken by the 
organisation in response to the incident. 
For example, the Medvet RFI Letter contains the following: 
‘2. What steps has Medvet taken, or is taking, in response to this incident?’1000 
This is consistent with the Assistant Commissioner Compliance’s statement 
that the RFI Letter is intended to elicit information about the remediation in addition 
to whether there has been a breach of the Act.1001  The relevance of remediation steps 
is discussed further below in regard to the purpose of publishing OMI reports.   
                                                 
999  Dell DBN CAS, above n 907. 
1000  Medvet RFI Letter, above n 919. 
1001  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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9.7 INVESTIGATION APPROACH 
The next part of the process, following the sending of the RFI Letters and the 
receipt of responses, includes the consideration of the evidence and the determination 
regarding whether any additional evidence is required to support the decision-making 
process.  
The Assistant Commissioner Compliance confirmed in the December interview 
that the investigation process is ‘primarily a paper based investigation … in terms of 
asking a series of questions and then analysing the information that’s returned to us.’  
This is consistent with the Commissioner’s approach to conciliation, which is to rely 
on letters and phone calls and only in a ‘small proportion of intractable matters’ meet 
with the parties face-to-face.1002 
Included in Appendix G is a table showing the different types of records 
disclosed from the OAIC’s investigation files.1003 This analysis supports the 
proposition that each investigation is conducted largely via email or letter.  There are 
few phone calls or meetings recorded between the OAIC and the respondents.  
Consistent with the notion that these investigations were all conducted ‘on the 
papers’ there is no evidence of the Commissioner visiting the offices or other 
premises of any of the respondents or meeting with them in person, other than a visit 
to the Vodafone offices after the conclusion of the investigation to watch a 
demonstration of Vodafone’s new online learning system.1004 There is reference to a 
teleconference with Telstra, but that appears to have been limited to discussion of 
Telstra’s report on the Telstra Bundles investigation, rather than separate testing of 
the assertions from that report.  There is also reference to a teleconference with 
                                                 
1002  Information Sheet 13, above n 202. 
1003  The data is based on the records referred to in the Resolve Action Sheet or CMS Summary Sheet 
for each investigation wherever available, rather than the actual records produced pursuant to the 
FOI requests, as those sheets were more comprehensive than the file records.  Accordingly the 
record of activities per file will not equal the total number of records produced.  There are also 
records that include multiple activities, for example an internal email advising of a phone call 
with a respondent. 
1004  Internal email thread, OAIC, 7 September 2011. 
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Epsilon sometime in late April, but again it is unclear whether this phone conference 
took place.1005  
The adoption of this ‘on the papers’ approach is of interest because the 
Commissioner has the power to ‘obtain information from such persons and make 
such enquiries as he or she thinks fit’,1006 to require the production of ‘any 
information or a document relevant to an investigation’1007 and to require a person to 
‘attend before the Commissioner at a time and place specified in the notice to answer 
questions relevant to the investigation.’1008   This applies not only to the respondents 
themselves but also to any third parties, who could include software developers and 
the providers of information technology services to any of the respondents, as well as 
experts (such as information security specialists) who might provide expert evidence. 
According to the Commissioner those powers have been used ‘frequently and 
for various reasons’ although mostly as a consequence of the internal governance 
purposes of the organisations being asked to provide the information.  If not 
statutorily required, those organisations may be in breach of other laws if they 
provided information without a formal statute-based request.1009   However, there is 
no evidence of the use by the Commissioner of its Section 43 or 44 powers to require 
the production of information or to make enquiries of any persons in any of the OMI 
cases being considered.   
In only one of the 6 cases under review was it suggested that the OAIC might 
use its powers pursuant to section 43 or 44.   In an email exchange, the OAIC 
advised Telstra that if a report was not available by 30 March 2013 (Telstra having 
said that it would be able to report on the incident that occurred in mid-December by 
late January), then the Commissioner would ‘issue a notice compelling Telstra to 
                                                 
1005  Email from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 13 November 2013, which includes statement ‘Email 
dated 29 April 2011 indicating teleconference did not take place’, referring to an email which 
was not disclosed. 
1006  Privacy Act s 43(1)(3). 
1007  Privacy Act s 44(1). 
1008  Privacy Act s 44(3). 
1009  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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respond by way of a senior executive being required to appear before the 
Commissioner and answer questions.’1010 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the OAIC has underused its powers. 
The Dell/Epsilon investigation provides a good example of where the 
Commissioner may have used its powers to secure evidence that the respondent was 
unwilling to provide.  In that case, Dell had advised that it would undertake a 
security audit in response to the incident.1011 The OAIC followed this up in July, 
requesting that a copy of the audit report be made available. While responding that it 
had ‘recently completed a high-level off-site security risk assessment’ and 
confirming that that assessment indicated that Epsilon ‘met relevant industry and 
data security standards’ and that ‘data transfers were appropriate,’ Dell declined to 
provide a copy of the report to the OAIC.  The basis for so declining was that the 
report ‘contains confidential information that relates to Epsilon’s security systems 
that contractually Dell cannot disclose to the OAIC.’  Dell further suggested that the 
OAIC should contact Epsilon itself because ‘Epsilon will have detailed information 
on its own internal information security systems and procedures.’1012 
It would seem unlikely that Dell’s confidentiality obligations in its contract 
with Epsilon would not be subject to compliance by Dell with lawful requests by 
local regulators for the provision of documents or information or where required by 
local laws.  However, there is no evidence from the investigation file that the OAIC 
considered issuing Dell with a request to produce the information pursuant to Section 
43 or 44 of the Privacy Act. In fact, it does not appear that the OAIC pressed Dell for 
the disclosure of Dell’s risk assessment in any way.  It also does not appear that the 
Commissioner asked for or obtained a copy of Dell’s assessment from Epsilon. 
The Commissioner’s reluctance to press Dell to produce what would have been 
highly relevant information is indicative of the non-adversarial approach taken by the 
                                                 
1010  Email from OAIC to Telstra, 15 March 2012. 
1011  This is apparent from the reference to the security audit to be undertaken in the Email from 
OAIC to Dell, 1 July 2011. 
1012  Email from Dell to the OAIC, 19 July 2011. 
258  
Commissioner towards most of the respondents in these cases, perhaps influenced by 
the Commissioner’s interest in arriving at an agreed resolution.  This is discussed 
further in Chapter 9.10.2.2 below. 
There is also no evidence of the Commissioner seeking evidence from third 
party experts (other than in those cases where third parties had input into the reports 
that were provided to the Commissioner by the respondents or where they had 
volunteered information, such as in the Medvet investigation) or from other 
interested parties.  There is no evidence of any independent investigation by the 
Commissioner or verification of any of the information provided by any of the 
parties being investigated in any of the 6 OMIs under review.   
This reliance on information provided by the respondent rather than on any 
independent investigation or third-party evidence gathering is supported by the OMI 
reports.  Each report includes a statement to the effect that the information relied on 
by the Commissioner in forming its decision is that provided by the respondent.  For 
example, the Dell/Epsilon report provides: 
On the basis of information received from Epsilon, the Privacy Commissioner 
considers that at the time of the incident Epsilon had reasonable steps in …1013 
The Assistant Commissioner Compliance confirmed that the only area where 
Commission staff might actually go out to the field was in the area of audit, referring 
to audits as ‘proactive compliance.’1014     
As discussed in Chapter 2.6, the rules of procedural fairness include the 
evidence rule:  there must be sufficient probative evidence that is relevant and 
logically capable of supporting any findings.1015  The OAIC’s willingness to form a 
view based on the information provided by the party being investigated with little 
independent verification of that information, together with the possible under-use of 
available powers to require production of further information, are relevant to whether 
                                                 
1013  Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337. 
1014 Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1015  ARC Evidence Guide, above n 238, 3.  This is also required as part of the principles of good 
decision making referred to in Chapter 2.6.1. 
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the investigations could be regarded as being conducted in accordance with ideas of 
procedural fairness and the consequent notions of transparency, balance and vigour.  
9.7.1 Appropriate skills 
It is likely that the ‘on the papers’ investigation approach is a consequence of 
the Commission’s resourcing issues both in terms of the number of available staff 
and the skills of those staff.  When discussing the ‘on the papers’ approach to 
investigations, the Assistant Commissioner said ‘one of the things that is a challenge 
for us is ensuring that we’ve got sufficient expertise to be able to analyse the 
information that is provided back to us particularly if it’s very technical.’1016  
In the December 2012 interview, the Commissioner acknowledged the skills 
issues regarding NPP 4 investigations saying: 
(this) is an area that is going to be increasingly hard for us to determine because of the 
nature and complexity of systems and we are already finding that.  …  Because as you 
can appreciate you need to start having some fairly well developed technical skills to 
be able to start assessing at a very forensic level sometimes what is going on in 
organisations.1017 
Later in the same interview, when discussing the forensic skills required to 
carry out investigations, he said it was hard for the OAIC to attract the sort of people 
who had the requisite skill levels and, once in the OAIC, for those people to maintain 
that skill level. 1018  
Although recognising skills issues, the Commissioner does not believe this has 
impacted the investigation process to date.  While acknowledging that the office was 
very reliant on the information provided by respondents and the office’s internal 
skills, he said that he believed those skills were sufficient ‘to put me in a position 
where I can make a sound decision on what’s been presented to me.’1019  However, 
                                                 
1016  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1017  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1018  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1019  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
260  
there is some evidence from the investigation files that the investigators may not 
have sufficient technical skills. 
In the Medvet investigation, two third-party reports were prepared: the first 
was the Deloitte report which provided an analysis of the breach and the system 
flaws that led to that breach occurring.  A second consultant’s report containing an 
update on the implementation of remedies to the issues raised in the Deloitte report 
was provided to the OAIC in late November 2011 (in response to the 
Commissioner’s request).1020  When considering whether to pursue a copy of this 
second report, an internal OAIC email states: 
Let’s pursue the 2nd report then … .  If the first report is highly technical it may not 
assist us anyway.1021 
 The implication from this email exchange is that technical reports may present 
difficulties to the office.  It may also be that the OAIC had little understanding of the 
major international information security standards, ISO 27001 and ISO 27002.  This 
is discussed further in the next chapter.1022 
If the Commissioner’s office does not have the technical skills to analyse 
security breaches or how they are being remediated or to assess reports providing 
technical details about how security breaches occurred, it is not clear how the OAIC 
is able to assure itself that third party expert reports are accurate, complete and based 
on the use of an appropriate standard of care when determining whether there has 
been any failure to properly protect personal information.  However, this does not 
appear to prevent the Commissioner from foreshadowing a future reliance on third 
party reports. 
                                                 
1020  All copies of these reports were redacted in full.  An internal OAIC email contains the following 
statement ‘… there has been a second Consultant’s Report showing what had been 
recommended and what has been implemented.’  Internal email thread, OAIC, 9 November 
2011. 
1021  Internal email from MH to LK, 10 November 2011. 
1022  See Chapter Error! Reference source not found.. 
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9.7.2 Reliance on third party reports 
The Assistant Commissioner for Compliance, in her December interview, 
referred to the office’s use of third party reports, calling a report on the Medvet 
breach 'an independent assessment of the remedial activity that had occurred’ which 
‘the Commissioner had some regard to … in deciding whether or not it was 
adequate.’1023 
However, reliance on third party reports commissioned and paid for by the 
organisation being investigated could raise issues of independence.   At issue may be 
the relationship between the organisation and the third party (who may be the 
existing auditor or the consultancy firm responsible for prior security reviews or the 
implementation of security controls in the past).  Also of concern could be the 
parameters of the review to be undertaken.  A narrow scope may reduce the extent of 
the enquiry and result in the omission of important considerations. 
Notwithstanding the ACC’s approving reference to reliance on the Deloitte 
report in Medvet, this reliance was somewhat controversial.  Questions about the 
Commissioner’s reliance on the report, to the exclusion of its own independent 
investigation, were raised.1024 In response, the Commissioner issued a letter to the 
editor of The Australian newspaper in which the inference from that article that the 
investigation ‘was not rigorous or independent’ was strongly rejected.1025   In that 
letter, the Commissioner states that it ‘gathered and considered information from a 
number of sources, including the independent forensic report completed by Deloitte’s 
on behalf of SA Heath and information from (an) ‘industry figure’.’ 1026 
The role of the ‘industry figure’ is not clear. In the article published following 
the release of the OMI report, The Australian reported that the ‘industry figure was 
neither interviewed nor contacted by the Privacy Commissioner in his “own motion” 
                                                 
1023  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1024  Hedley Thomas, ‘”Rigorous” probe rubber stamps audit’, The Australian (online), 27 July 2012  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/rigorous-probe-rubber-stamps-audit-
praising-lab-that-broke-rules/story-e6frgd0x-1226435164479#>. 
1025  Letter to the editor, above n 950. 
1026  Ibid. 
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investigation.’1027  This lack of contact is supported by the records from the 
investigation file that were made available.  There is an email from an undisclosed 
person to the OAIC dated 19 July 2011 with the header ‘C15394 – Att: Mr Timothy 
Pilgrim: Advice provided to Medvet in April 2011 regarding internet privacy.’1028   
An updated ‘corrected’ document was emailed on 20 July 2011, which was then on-
forwarded within the OAIC with a message ‘Hi the response from XXX.’  It is not 
clear from the file what the email was responding to, perhaps a request for deletion 
of the irrelevant items.   The one page attachment to both emails has been redacted in 
full but may have been the information provided by this third party to Medvet, which 
(according to the third party and the media reports at the time) Medvet failed to act 
on.1029  There must presumably have been some prior contact with the OAIC because 
the email uses the case number that the OAIC had allotted to the Medvet 
investigation.   However, there is nothing on the file to indicate what that prior 
contact may have involved. 
Following these two emails, other than a file note from 27 September 2011 that 
could relate to a follow-up call from the industry figure,1030 there is no record of any 
other contact between the OAIC and the ‘industry figure’ and certainly nothing to 
suggest that the OAIC made contact with the industry figure as part of the decision-
making process.   
In regard to the independence of that third party report, the Commissioner 
expressed the view to the researcher that he would be able to identify any lack of 
independence, saying ‘confidently’ that he would not accept a report that was not 
totally independent. In response to a specific question, the Commissioner confirmed 
that the OAIC has the skills to assess whether or not it would be appropriate to rely 
on a third party report.1031   In regard to the Deloitte report relied on in the Medvet 
                                                 
1027  Ibid. 
1028  Email from unknown person to the OAIC, 19 July 2011. 
1029  Redactions are on the basis of FOI Act ss 22(1)(a)(11), 47E(d) and 47G. 
1030  Medvet Case Management Summary, above n 918. 
1031  Ibid.  
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report, the Commissioner appeared to consider the fact that it found a lot of failings 
in the system as evidence of the research’s independence.  The Commissioner also 
commented that he did not think it appropriate for the OAIC to replicate the work 
done by Deloitte and to ‘expend the office’s resources to repeat an exercise that had 
been done, in my view, quite independently and with a reasonable outcome.’1032 
The commissioning of third parties to undertake investigations appears to be an 
attractive way forward for the Commissioner. Recently the New Zealand Privacy 
Commissioner has commissioned two independent reports into two major breaches 
affecting two New Zealand government agencies.1033  The Australian Privacy 
Commissioner referred to this practice as something it would be exploring when the 
new powers came into force.  In particular he said it would be ‘encouraging’ 
organisations and perhaps even using more formal powers to require entities to have 
third parties undertaken an audit, with a copy of the report to be provided to the 
OAIC.1034 
The other solution to the Commission’s skills issues is engaging third party 
experts to assist the Commission directly with its investigations.  According to the 
Commissioner, it has already ‘started to actively engage with some of those 
companies to see how we might be able to work together and get their services to 
possibly do some of that work for us through contract and the like.’1035  However, 
since this interview in December 2012 there has been no public announcement or 
other reference to these efforts. 
The other issue with third party reports is the standard used for determining 
whether there has been a failure to take reasonable care.  In response to that query, 
                                                 
1032  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1033  Deloitte, Ministry of Social Development - Independent Review of Information Systems Security 
(November 2012) <http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-
work/newsroom/media-releases/2012/independent-review-deloitte.pdf>; KPMG and Information 
Integrity Solutions, Independent Review of ACC’s Privacy and Security of Information (August 
2012) <http://www.iispartners.com/downloads/22-August-2012-ACC-Independent-Review-
FINAL-REPORT.pdf>. 
1034  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1035  Ibid. 
264  
the Commissioner pointed to the new Guide to Information Security,1036 stating that 
it should be treated as ‘broad guidance to organisations on what we will be looking 
for to determine whether an organisation has taken those reasonable steps.’1037 
Given the gap between the industry practice and the Guide to Information 
Security (discussed previously) it may be challenging for independent information 
security experts to be certain about the appropriate standard to use, if retained to 
determine whether there has been a failure to take reasonable steps for the purposes 
of NPP 4. 
9.7.3 Resources 
The ‘on the papers’ approach to investigations, skills issues and reliance on 
third party reports are largely consequences of the resourcing issues facing the 
OAIC.  The OAIC’s resource issues have been recognised for some time.  The 
ALRC referred to the significant expansion of the responsibilities of the OAIC, 
which ‘resulted in more functions and powers for the Commissioner, although not 
always a commensurate increase in resources.’1038  In the last 12 months, the OAIC’s 
resource issues have been exacerbated by the ‘daunting task’ of developing guidance 
to assist with the new APPs ‘given that it has received no additional resourcing for 
this implementation work.’1039   
More recently, the Privacy Commissioner has been public about the resource 
pressures facing the office, with staffing numbers decreasing ‘in line with the 
[office’s] need to meet efficiency dividends imposed by government.’1040 One of the 
most obvious consequences of this is the long waiting period before a privacy 
complaint is allocated to an investigating officer: it is presently taking about 19 
                                                 
1036  Guide to Information Security, above n 63. 
1037  Ibid. 
1038  For your information, above n 32, [45.2]. 
1039  2013 OAIC Annual Report, above n 381, Statement from Privacy Commissioner, xiv. 
1040  Ben Grubb, ‘Long delays before privacy complaints assessed’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 12 September 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/consumer-security/long-
delays-before-privacy-complaints-assessed-20130912-2tn72.html#ixzz2yY0zIYho>. 
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weeks longer than the usual four-week period.1041  This raises issues in regard to the 
timeliness of investigations, which is one of the aspects of procedural fairness.1042 
In response to the decrease in staffing levels, the OAIC undertook an 
organisational restructuring, which aimed to deliver ‘greater efficiencies in a 
constrained budgetary environment.’1043  This involved a move to integrated 
branches, each of which undertake work in relation to the OAIC’s three functions of 
information policy, privacy and FOI. According to the 2013 Annual Report, this 
integrated structure ‘offers flexibility in resource allocation, provides staff the 
opportunity to grow knowledge and skills, and enables the OAIC to find efficiencies 
through maximising use of skill-sets, prioritisation and work allocation.’1044  The 
‘Dispute Resolution’ branch now carries out investigations in relation to compliance 
with the Privacy Act  and the Freedom of Information Act.  Own motion 
investigations and audits are conducted by the ‘Regulation and Strategy’ group, 
which also provides advice and guidance about the Privacy Act and the FOI Act.1045  
It is not clear why complaint-based and Commissioner-initiated investigation should 
be handled by different sections of the OAIC, how this restructure will support 
greater efficiencies or what the effect may be on the resourcing and skills issues 
facing the Privacy Commissioner. It may be that these issues become more acute by 
this reorganisation, where the same staff will be investigating both FOI and privacy 
compliance issues. 
The dilution of expertise caused by the reorganisation may also be exacerbated 
by the real reduction in the number of staff available to undertake investigations. The 
staffing estimate for the OAIC when it was first established was for approximately 
100 staff to carry out the FOI, privacy and information policy functions.1046 As of 3 
                                                 
1041  Ibid. 
1042  See the earlier discussion in Chapter 2.6. 
1043  Ibid. 
1044  Ibid. 
1045  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 11 – 12; and Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Our Structure (March 2013) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/who-we-
are/our-structure/> 
1046  OAIC 2013 Annual Report, above n 381, 5. 
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July 2013 there were the equivalent of 74.23 full-time staff, 25.78 of whom worked 
in the dispute resolution branch (covering both FOI and privacy-related 
complaints).1047    
The resource issues of the OAIC are not unique.  Information commissioners 
around the world face serious budgetary constraints and expect higher workloads, 
according to a survey of commissioners, which found that 77% believe that their 
financial and staff resources, are ‘insufficient’(58%) or ‘not at all 
sufficient’ (19%).’1048 
The UK ICO, which has a similar remit to the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner, has recently issued a consultation document to assist in the 
consideration of ways that the office may restructure itself.  The document identifies 
a ‘series of challenges under three main headings’: 
 The growing importance of information rights; 
 Reduction in funding; and 
 Major changes to the regulatory landscape (with the expected 
introduction of the new Data Protection Regulation).1049 
Similar challenges face the OAIC. 
Solutions being considered by the ICO include changing how it handles 
casework and enquiries to allow it to identify and address wider compliance issues, 
and only where appropriate to address individual concerns, in addition to increased 
coordination with other organisations and regulators.1050 
The Canadian Information Commissioner recently reported that the effect of 
budget cuts on the operations of its office ‘puts us at the limit of our financial and 
                                                 
1047  Grubb, above n 1034. 
1048  Centre for Freedom of Information, Commissioners Report Low Budgets, Growing Workloads 
(12 April 2013) <http://www.freedominfo.org/2013/04/commissioners-report-low-budgets-
growing-workloads>. 
1049 Information Commissioner’s Office, Looking Ahead Staying Ahead: Towards a 2020 Vision for 
Information Rights <http://www.ico.org.uk/about_us/consultations/our_consultations>. 
1050  Ibid.  
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organizational flexibility.’1051  According to reports, staff reductions in the Canadian 
Information Commissioner’s office meant that Departments ‘lost institutional 
memory with the departure of senior officials … and document-filing systems 
suffered with the loss of clerical staff.1052  The same would appear to be happening to 
the OAIC based on the issues raised during the course of responding to the FOI 
submitted as part of this research.1053 
In a recent Senates Estimates Hearing, the Australian Information 
Commissioner was asked directly whether the OAIC’s work is being compromised 
because of the lack of resources.1054   The Commissioner responded: ‘We do not 
think the quality of the work has been compromised. The way we have put it is that 
we are unable to meet the performance standards that we set for ourselves.’1055 
It is difficult to see how the Australian Information Commissioner can make 
that assertion given that this research has identified that resourcing issues have 
contributed to: 
 The lack of timeliness and completeness of responses to FOI requests; 
 A decline in the number of audits undertaken;  
 A decline in the publication of case notes; 
                                                 
1051  Office of the Information Commissioner Canada, Ensuring operational integrity and corporate 
support for investigations < http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/annual-reports-rapports-annuel_2012-
2013_9.aspx> 
1052  Dean  Beeby, ‘Budget cuts undermine federal access-to-information system: watchdog’, The 
Canadian Press (online), 7 April 2013 <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/budget-cuts-undermine-
federal-access-to-information-system-watchdog-1.1227794>. 
1053  See the discussion of the OAIC’s response to the FOI requests made as part of this research in 
Chapter 4.3.2. 
1054  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Subcommittee, Parliament of Australia, 
Estimates Hearing Budget Supplementary (18 November 2013), 63 - 65 .  In the Senate 
Committee Hearings the previous year, the Privacy Commissioner had said that he considered 
that the OAIC’s level of activity in all areas of its compliance work, complaints and national 
investigations, would be impacted on obviously by the number of resources the office had and 
that there was potential for the Office’s ability to respond to high profile data breach cases to be 
impacted; see Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Subcommittee, Parliament of 
Australia, Estimates Hearing (14 February, 2012), 41 – 43. 
1055 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Subcommittee, Parliament of Australia, 
Estimates Hearing Budget Supplementary (18 November 2013), 64. 
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 A decline in the number of OMIs undertaken; 
 A decline in the number of OMI reports published; 
 Delays in assigning new complaints to a handling officer, which are 
close to five months, or five times longer than the preferred period; 
 The conduct of own motion investigations via an ‘on the papers’ 
approach, a less rigorous method than a full investigation; and 
 Issues regarding the office’s ability to retain staff with the appropriate 
skills to carry out complex investigations in data breach cases. 
9.8 DECISION-MAKING 
The investigation files provide very little evidence regarding how the OAIC 
arrived at a decision as to whether there has been an interference with privacy in the 
6 cases under review.  This is not surprising given that one of the main grounds for 
redaction of records was that they related to the OAIC’s decision-making process.1056  
This extended to all draft OMI reports as well as to most of the substantive parts of 
the Close Letters sent to the different respondents.  Broadly, any record that might 
have provided any information relevant to decision-making was redacted. 
Review of the summary sheets for each of the investigations files included in 
the disclosed records, which sheets list all of the actions that took place in each 
investigation, does not throw any light on the process that may have been used to 
arrive at a decision in a particular case.1057  For instance, there is no reference to any 
internal meetings to determine outcomes or briefing notes being drafted or sent to 
case supervisors for consideration and decision on outcomes.   
Although the files do not reveal the process by which decisions were made in 
any of the investigations, they do indicate that in most cases the decision regarding 
whether there has been an interference with privacy was arrived at quite quickly.  In 
                                                 
1056  See the reasons provided for redacting records, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.3.2. 
1057 See, eg, Sony Case Management Summary Sheet, above n 843; Medvet Case Management 
Summary, above n 918. 
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the Sony investigation for example, a file note records that, at an internal OAIC 
meeting occurring the day after Sony’s response to the RFI Letter was received by 
the OAIC, it was agreed that there was no breach.  Similarly, there is a note from the 
case officer in the Medvet investigation file dated 11 October 2011 that states ‘… we 
received a response from Medvet on 21 September and I have assessed the response 
and it appears that R has taken reasonable steps and we are in a position to finalise.’ 
It may be that there is no consistent process for decision-making as part of the 
own motion investigations.  This proposition is supported by the decision in Medvet.  
The facts of that investigation have been included in Chapter 8.1.6.  To recap, 
following receipt by the OAIC of two external reports (one about the incident and the 
other about the remediation steps) a Close Letter was sent to Medvet on 19 
December, 2011.1058  That letter advised that Medvet was found to be in breach of 
NPP 4 but not in breach of NPP 2.1059 From the files, it is not clear how that decision 
had been reached.  The file note made following receipt of the Deloitte investigation 
report (which report was heavily relied on to establish failure to take reasonable steps 
in the OMI report) states that the investigating officer had assessed Medvet’s 
response (which included the Deloitte report) and found that ‘it appears that R has 
taken reasonable steps and we are in a position to finalise.’1060  There is no reference 
to any new evidence, other than the report on the implementation of the remediation 
steps, being received after that time or further internal meetings being held to discuss 
the case.  Nearly seven months after that Close Letter, in July 2012, a new Close 
Letter was sent to Medvet that advised of a new finding of breach of NPP 2 (in 
addition to the previous finding of breach of NPP 4).1061 The basis for this change to 
the previously communicated findings is difficult to understand.  It may be that the 
different decision was due to an alternative view being taken of the facts by the 
Commissioner, who, according to the new Close Letter, conducted a review of the 
                                                 
1058  Medvet Close Leter 1, above n 928. 
1059  Ibid. 
1060  OAIC, File note, 11 October 2011; referred to in Medvet Case Management Summary, above n 
920. 
1061  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
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file as part of finalising the draft OMI report.1062   Because almost the entirety of this 
letter had been redacted, it is difficult to determine the basis on which the 
Commissioner determined that there had been a breach of NPP 2, and how that 
varied from the reasoning used to arrive at the earlier and opposite conclusion. 
The fact that the Commissioner felt it appropriate to change the communicated 
findings of an investigation may suggest a problem with the decision-making 
process.  
Problems with the decision-making process may be a consequence of the 
OAIC’s own approach to decisions.  If cogent and comprehensive reasons are not 
provided for decisions made about the application of the NPPs to different fact 
situations considered by the OAIC, it makes it more difficult for the OAIC itself, as 
well as the regulated community to assess how those NPPs might be interpreted and 
applied in different fact situations.  A document forming part of the Dell 
investigation file indicates that the OAIC itself may have been concerned regarding 
how to reconcile its findings in regard to NPP 2 and NPP 4.1063  This is discussed 
further in Chapter 9.10.2.1.   
One other aspect of the decision-making process is clear from the 
investigations and published reports.  In these investigations, the OAIC is interested 
in reaching an agreement with the respondent as to the remediation of any issues.  
Specific references in the different reports to the agreed remediation of issues is 
discussed in Chapter 9.10.2.2.  This focus on being able to cite agreed outcomes 
from the investigations in the published OMI reports is akin to the conciliatory 
approach used to resolve complaint-based investigations (and discussed in Chapter 
7.1.2 and 7.1.3 above). There is support for the proposition that in OMIs the 
Commissioner is seeking to arrive at an agreed solution with the respondents.  The 
Australian government noted that OMIs should have a similar enforcement regime as 
for complaints and that, in line with current processes, the Commissioner would 
                                                 
1062  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
1063  Internal email from NR to KO, 24 May 2012 (‘NPP 2 and NPP 4 Email’). All of the header and 
footer of the document have been redacted so there is no context for the content.  A copy of the 
1 page untitled email excerpt is included in Appendix C. 
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continue to seek to settle own motion investigations via conciliation and only 
proceed to a determination where a settlement is unable to be facilitated or is 
inappropriate.1064  The OAIC’s preference for working with the respondent was 
confirmed in the researcher’s interview with the Assistant Commissioner 
Compliance. After noting the difficulty with OMIs caused by the current lack of 
enforcement powers, the ACC said that in conducting OMIs the OAIC seeks to 
arrive at agreed remediation steps: although not conciliations, because they only 
involve one party, they are ‘still about trying to influence and bring to some 
consensus or resolution.’1065  It is likely that the focus on agreed outcomes to OMIs is 
a consequence of the limited powers available to the Commissioner regarding own 
motion investigations.1066  However, the effect of this approach on the investigative 
process should be noted.  Investigations focused on reaching agreement with the 
respondent as to the outcomes may involve a different approach to those 
investigations conducted with a view to determining whether there has been a breach 
of the Act.   The Complaints Manual notes the different skills that are required of 
investigators depending on whether a conciliation or an investigation is being 
pursued, suggesting that where a conciliated outcome is the focus, less weight is 
placed on the formal investigation.1067 This in turn has implications for the published 
investigation report.  Reports based on negotiated outcomes with the respondents 
may not be based on vigorous investigations directed at determining whether there 
has been a breach of the Act and may not provide the transparency of decision-
making that might be expected in a more contested case. The analysis of the 6 
investigations supports the view that those investigations have been less than 
rigorous and that the OAIC has been concerned to reach some consensus with the 
respondents.  This in turn suggests that the value of those reports as general guidance 
                                                 
1064  Australian Government, above n 805. 
1065  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1066 Limitation of the actions available to the Commissioner following the completion of an OMI has 
been discussed in Chapter 7.2.3 above. 
1067  See Chapter 7.1.1. 
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is diminished, representing conciliated outcomes rather than decisions based on the 
outcome of vigorous investigations. 
9.9 CLOSE LETTERS 
Once an investigation is complete, the Commissioner issues a letter (called a 
‘Close Letter’ in this research).   
The Close Letter is drafted to comply with the OAIC’s interpretation of 
‘procedural fairness’ as contained in the Complaints Manual and the right to a fair 
hearing as part of the generally accepted ideas of procedural fairness discussed in 
Chapter 2.6.1.  According to these principles, the OAIC must take steps to advise 
entities being investigated of three pieces of information before closing an 
investigation: 
 First, that it proposes to close the complaint; 
 Second, why it intends to close the complaint; and 
 Third, that it is offering the complainant a reasonable opportunity to make a 
submission before it closes the complaint.1068 
Close Letters were disclosed for all of the OMIs except Epsilon.1069  Each of 
these Close Letters follow a similar format and generally comply with the above 
requirements, although large sections of all the Close Letters, other than the Telstra 
Mail Out Close Letter, have been significantly redacted on the basis that the contents 
went to the OAIC’s decision-making process or contained confidential information 
of the respondent.  
On receipt of the Close Letter in the Telstra Mail Out investigation, Telstra 
argued that it had not been provided with a right to be heard with respect to the 
application of the privacy principles, in particular NPP 2.   Telstra proposed that the 
                                                 
1068  Complaints Manual, above n 227, 14. 
1069  Dell Close Letter, above n 907; Medvet Close Letter 1, above n 928; Medvet Close Letter 2, 
above n 929, Telstra Mail Out Close Letter, above n 807; Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to 
Vodafone, 16 February 2011 (‘Vodafone Close Letter’); Sony Close Letter, above n 832; Telstra 
Bundles Close Letter, above n 866. 
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matter of its right to be heard would be the subject of separate correspondence.1070  
However, there is no record of any separate communication between Telstra and the 
OAIC in regard to this point and it is not clear how the issue was resolved. The 
opportunity to make submissions forms part of the right of the respondent to be 
heard.  Ensuring that parties have a right to be heard is part of the OAIC’s 
commitment to undertake its investigations in accordance with the principles of 
procedural fairness.1071  Telstra was the only respondent to raise issues in regard to 
its right to be heard.   
The only Close Letter which is problematic is that sent to Medvet, because of 
the change in findings and the issuing of a second Close Letter, as discussed in the 
previous section.  The second Close Letter included a new draft OMI report.  Medvet 
was given only ten days to respond to the new draft OMI report before it was to be 
published, which arguably may not have been sufficient time in all the 
circumstances.1072   
Generally, there seems to have been little disagreement by the respondents in 
the cases under consideration in regard to the way that the Close Letters and OMI 
reports describe the OAIC’s findings in regard to NPP 4.  More controversial have 
been questions of whether the OAIC has jurisdiction under the Privacy Act (raised in 
Sony) or the operation of NPP 2 (raised in Telstra Mail Out), neither of which issues 
are of relevance to this research. 
9.10 OMI REPORTS 
All draft OMI reports were fully redacted on the basis that they went to the 
OAIC’s decision-making processes.  Accordingly, it is difficult to determine any 
negotiated changes from the initial draft OMI reports sent out by the OAIC and the 
reports as finally published.  However, some comparison can be made between the 
                                                 
1070  Email from Helen Lewin, Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, OAIC, 26 May 2011, which provides that 
‘Telstra would like an opportunity to be heard’ in regard to the application of NPP 2, continuing 
‘We will write separately in relation to this.’ 
1071  The principles of procedural fairness as they have been interpreted by the OAIC have been 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
1072  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
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final published OMI reports and those parts of the Close Letters made available for 
each of the investigations.  Generally, other than Medvet, the findings in the Close 
Letter seem consistent with the findings in the published OMI reports. 
The relationship between the Close Letter and the OMI report is different in 
each investigation.  For example, in Vodafone, the Close Letter and OMI report were 
agreed between the OAIC and Vodafone at the same time,1073 as also seemed to be 
the case in Sony.1074   In the Telstra Mail Out case there was a six-week gap between 
the Close Letter and the OMI report.1075  There was a longer delay in Dell/Epsilon, 
but it was not so problematic in that case because there was no finding of breach.  
There was also a delay between the Close Letter and the OMI report in Medvet’s 
case, in addition to the change in position between draft OMI reports. 
It is not clear in these cases whether, at the time that the OAIC sent out the 
Close Letter, the respondent was aware that the OAIC intended to publish a report, or 
in fact whether the OAIC itself had formed a view on publication.  Close Letters, 
which included findings of breach in the Vodafone, Medvet and both the Telstra 
cases, might have been viewed differently by the respondent if they knew that those 
findings would be publicly released.  A file note included in the Sony file confirms 
that the respondent was advised very early in the investigation that, given that the 
Sony breach was in the public domain, the Commissioner would like to make a 
statement about the findings once the investigation was completed.  The note also 
confirms that the OAIC would liaise with Sony to ensure that no commercially 
sensitive information would be published.1076 
Given that such a small proportion of OMIs are the subject of public reports, it 
might be appropriate that the Close Letters inform the respondent of the intention to 
publish the result of its investigation, assuming that the respondents had not been so 
                                                 
1073  See, eg, Letter from Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner to CEO Vodafone, 16 February 
2011. 
1074  Email from OAIC to Sony, 29 June 2011. 
1075  See Chapter 9.3 for detail on the chronology of each investigation. 
1076  OAIC, File note, 3 May 2011.  See also, Internal email thread, OAIC, including email dated 24 
May 2011; which states: ‘spoke to [redacted] yesterday. I confirmed we would be making a 
media statement accompanied by a short report upon closing the investigation.’ 
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previously advised.  Respondents are given the opportunity for input into the OMI 
report but this may be of little value if they have accepted the findings in the Closed 
Letter without any expectation that those findings would be made public. 
The format of the OMI reports and the change in format from February 2011 
with the publication of the Vodafone OMI Report has already been discussed.1077  
9.10.1 Decision to Publish OMI report 
As discussed, the Guide to Producing Case Notes sets out a process for the 
selection of cases from which to publish a case note that involves a case officer 
flagging potential cases for publication of case notes, which are then given further 
consideration by the case note Project Manager and consultation with Compliance 
where appropriate.1078  The same process applies to the publication of reports of 
OMIs.1079 
According to the Assistant Commissioner Compliance, the practice is that the 
case officer writes the first draft of the report, which then goes through a clearance 
process which includes the Deputy Director, Compliance, the Director, Compliance 
and then to the Director of Policy who would have ‘input into, for instance, is the 
report structured in the right way to be a good educative tool of precedent value, that 
sort of thing.’ It also goes to the Corporate and Public Affairs team to consider 
‘media messaging and how that might occur’ and then to the ACC and finally to the 
Privacy Commissioner.1080  The ACC did not indicate who made the initial decision 
on whether to publish a report.  
A review of the files of the 6 OMIs under review indicates that the preparation 
process outlined by the ACC is followed.  However, it is not so clear that the Guide’s 
process for the selection of case for reporting has been followed.  
                                                 
1077  See Chapter 7.1.4. 
1078  Guide to producing case notes, above n 248, Selecting a suitable case for a case note. 
1079  Ibid. 
1080  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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The files for the OMIs under review indicate that the Deputy Commissioner for 
Compliance and the Privacy Commissioner personally played a significant role in 
determining whether a report on an OMI should be published, reviewing the 
proposed OMI reports and negotiating their terms with the respondent in at least 5 of 
the 6 investigations.  The Privacy Commissioner seems to have been particularly 
active in decision-making around whether a report should be published.1081 As an 
example, a note in the Medvet file records: 
Discussed possibility of report with MH.  …  MH said we will wait for TP 
[22(1)(a)(ii) exemption] to see if he wants to issue public report.1082 
The Sony investigation files indicate that although most of the communication was 
handled by Linda King, then Acting Director Compliance for the OAIC, Timothy 
Pilgrim was involved in settling the final Close Letter and attached OMI report.1083  
The OAIC email, sending a draft of Close Letter and the OMI report to Sony, refers 
to the Commissioner’s clearance being obtained to sending out those documents.1084 
In the Telstra Bundles case the Close Letter was sent out after the 
Commissioner ‘made minor changes’1085  and the OMI report (having been reviewed 
by Policy)1086 was sent out under cover of a letter signed by Mark Hummerston, the 
then-Deputy Commissioner Compliance.1087   
Timothy Pilgrim’s involvement in the decisions to publish some of the own 
motion investigations was also confirmed in the interview with the Assistant 
Commissioner Compliance.1088 
                                                 
1081  See Chapter 8: 
1082  OAIC, File note, 19 December 2011. 
1083  See email from Timothy Pilgrim to Linda King, 24 May 2011. 
1084  Email from Linda King to Sony, 29 June 2011. 
1085  OAIC, File note, 30 April 2012. 
1086  OAIC, File note, 9 May 2012. 
1087  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Telstra, 8 June 2012. 
1088  Ibid. 
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In addition to its involvement in determining whether or not to publish a report, 
the Commissioner was also active in deciding to name the organisation in published 
OMI reports, which was a significant departure from previous practice.  The Telstra 
Mail Out case, which was one of the first OMIs where it was proposed to publish a 
report naming the respondent, supports this. Correspondence from that investigation 
indicates that Telstra was very concerned about the publication of the report, 
particularly the inclusion of the Commissioner’s findings that there had been a 
breach of NPP 2.1.   In an email exchange occurring after the Close Letter had been 
sent by Mark Hummerston to Telstra, Timothy Pilgrim himself reassured Telstra, 
confirming that there would be further discussions before the publication of a 
report.1089 
The only investigation where there is little evidence of the Commissioner’s 
involvement regarding the decision to publish a report is the Dell/Epsilon 
investigation, where there are few records relating to the preparation of the OMI 
report at all.  The resolve reports for both the Dell and Epsilon files show no activity 
on either file between the issuing of the Close Letters on 11 January 2012 and the 
sending of the draft OMI report to both Dell and Epsilon for comment on 3 July 
2012. 
Based on the above, it seems fair to assume that the current Privacy 
Commissioner has been at the very least instrumental in, if not ultimately responsible 
for, determining whether an OMI report should be published in regard to an 
investigation and whether the respondent organisation should be named.  This would 
suggest that the Privacy Commissioner had some particular purpose to achieve from 
the publication of these reports. 
9.10.2 Purpose of publishing OMI reports 
The general reasons given for publishing case notes and OMI reports have been 
discussed previously.1090  The main three reasons are: 
 To provide transparency of decision-making; 
                                                 
1089  Email from Timothy Pilgrim, OAIC to Helen Lewin, Telstra, 27 May 2011. 
1090  See Chapters 6.4.1 and 7.1.4. 
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 To provide transparency of compliance activity; and 
 To act as a deterrent.1091 
9.10.2.1 Transparency of decision-making 
Transparency of decision-making, in terms of providing adequate reasons to support 
the decision as part of procedural fairness, has been discussed in Chapter 2.6.1. In 
that chapter it was proposed that, to be considered as transparent in this sense, each 
OMI report should clearly state: 
 The decision; 
 The findings on material facts; 
 The evidence or other material on which those findings are based; and 
 The reasons for the decision.1092  
In addition to the general statements regarding the publication of case notes 
and OMI reports to provide transparency of decision-making,1093 the OAIC’s 
response to the researcher’s request for access to records in regard to these 6 
investigations asserted that the OMI reports provided transparency of decision-
making. 1094 Accordingly, it would be expected that the 6 OMI reports considered 
here would meet the above criteria for transparency. 
Generally, there is much in each of the OMI reports that could be regarded as 
educative; however, it is not so clear that any of the reports meet all of the above 
requirements in terms of providing sufficient reasons so as to provide real 
transparency of decision-making.  All of the reports are clear in terms of the decision 
on whether there has been any interference with a privacy principle, with appropriate 
                                                 
1091  Ibid. 
1092  ARC Decision Guide, above n 242, 7. The sufficiency of the evidence relied on and the 
connection of the evidence to the findings of material fact and the decisions in each case is 
considered elsewhere in this research.See Chapters 9.7, Error! Reference source not found. 
and 10.1 
1093  Transparency of decision making and its links to procedural fairness and the provision of 
reasons for a decision have been discussed in Chapter 2.6 above.  
1094  See the discussion of the FOI request in Chapter 4.3.2 above. 
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references to the legislation and the relevant privacy principles.  This is a significant 
and important departure from the earlier OMI reports, which contained few findings 
of breach, and often relied on post-incident remediation in reaching a decision.1095 
All of the reports also include a statement which could be regarded as a statement of 
findings in regard to the material facts (which support whether there has been an 
interference with privacy). 
Where the reports are not so clear is in detailing ‘all the steps in the reasoning 
process that led to the decision, linking the facts to the decision’ in a way that would 
enable a reader to understand exactly how the decision was reached.1096 This is best 
illustrated by detailed reference to each of the OMI reports, other than the Vodafone 
OMI Report, which is the only case out of the 6 where clear and adequate reasons for 
the decision is made by reference to relevant findings of fact.  The Vodafone 
decision is considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
The Telstra Mail Out Report identifies the security measures that were in place 
(as advised by Telstra), which findings are used to support the conclusion that this 
was a case of one-off human error, rather than a failure to take reasonable steps. The 
adequacy of this reasoning is discussed further in the next chapter.  In the decision, it 
is also decided that the disclosure of a person’s name by itself is an unauthorised 
disclosure of personal information for the purposes of NPP 2.  This is a very 
important example of the Commissioner’s interpretation of ‘personal information.’  
However, the OMI report only devotes two sentences to the issue: 
The incorrectly addressed letters sent out by Telstra included the names and telephone 
details of individuals. In the OAIC’s view, a person’s name is ‘personal information’ 
and does not have to be linked with other information to fall within the definition of 
personal information set out in the Act.1097 
There is no reference to any principle, guidance or previous case to support what it 
states to be ‘the OAIC’s view.’  The Commissioner must have been aware that this 
                                                 
1095  See Chapter 6.4 above. 
1096  ARC Decision Guide, above n 242, 8. 
1097  Telstra Mail Out OMI Report, above n 334. 
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interpretation of ‘personal information’ was in some way novel because Telstra had 
taken particular issue with it in correspondence with the OAIC.1098  However, it is 
difficult to regard the two sentences in the report as providing ‘all the steps in the 
reasoning process’ that led to the Commissioner’s finding 
In contrast, two full paragraphs in the conclusion of the report are devoted to 
Telstra’s response to the incident, referring to the way that Telstra ‘acted promptly to 
prevent further breaches’ and  ‘helped to ensure that the breach was contained and no 
further unauthorised disclosures occurred.’  The report also notes with approval that 
Telstra had notified the affected customers, giving those individuals ‘an opportunity 
to take appropriate action, if necessary, to mitigate any harm they may suffer.’1099   
In both the Sony and Dell/Epsilon investigations, the findings of a 
sophisticated cyber-attack seem to be sufficient explanation for the loss of data 
without a more detailed consideration of the attacks themselves, including the 
vulnerabilities successfully exploited and whether those vulnerabilities would have 
been existed if reasonable security steps had been taken.  As is discussed in the next 
chapter, none of the security measures referred to in either report are particularly 
relevant to the actual security compromise in each case, so their inclusion is 
somewhat confusing, and the consequential finding that reasonable steps had been 
taken is not compelling.1100   
More importantly, in terms of interpretation of the privacy principles, the Sony 
OMI Report supports the view that where information is accessed by an unauthorised 
malicious third party (in this case the on-line activist group Anonymous) there is no 
‘disclosure’ for the purposes of NPP 2.  However, little detailed reasoning is 
provided to support this interpretation.   The relevant part of the OMI report is as 
follows: 
                                                 
1098  Email chain between Linda King, OAIC and Helen Lewin, Telstra, 28 June 2011. 
1099  Telstra Mail Out OMI Report, above n 334. 
1100  See also Bloom and Frketic, above n 55, which refers to the OAIC’s reasons in Sony as ‘broad 
brush and cursory.’ 
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 In general terms an organisation discloses personal information when it releases 
information to others outside the organisation.[3] 
Media reports of this incident claimed that customer information, including personal 
information was disclosed to a third party.  However, this was not substantiated by any 
of the evidence provided to the OAIC.   The evidence showed that no personal 
information was disclosed to unauthorised parties; rather the information was accessed 
as a result of a sophisticated security cyber-attack against the Network Platform.1101   
The footnoted reference is to the OAIC’s Guidelines to the National Privacy 
Principles, which includes a definition of ‘disclose’ in exactly the terms quoted. 
In discussions with the Assistant Commissioner Compliance the researcher 
queried how ‘disclose’ had been interpreted and applied by the OAIC in the recent 
cases.  The ACC referred to the Sony case as being the precedent for the 
interpretation of ‘disclosure’ as meaning the ‘release’ of information in a positive 
sense, rather than the accessing of information as a result of a sophisticated cyber-
attack, without any positive act by the respondent.  When the researcher queried 
whether the malicious attack was the key regarding whether there was a disclosure, 
the ACC replied that ‘the external access … means that the organisation itself didn’t 
do something to release the information.’1102  The OAIC’s failure in the report to 
explicitly build on the word ‘release’ as part of  the definition of ‘disclosure’ by 
referring to the need for some sort of positive act by the entity detracts from the 
transparency of the decision-making.   
The decision in regard to ‘disclosure‘ and cyber-attacks in the Sony OMI 
Report may explain why the question of whether there was any unauthorised 
disclosure pursuant to NPP 2 was not raised in the Dell/Epsilon OMI Report.  The 
report is silent on the application of NPP 2 to the circumstances.  The failure to 
consider NPP 2 may also be a consequence of reference to NPP 2 being omitted from 
                                                 
1101  Sony OMI Report, above n 335. 
1102  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
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the Dell OMI CAS which was not reviewed in accordance with the OAIC’s 
process.1103 
There is some suggestion that the OAIC recognised this oversight and 
considered correcting the report.  An email already referred queried whether the NPP 
2 issue had been inserted into the Dell case ‘or was it decided not to as the close 
letters had gone out?’1104  As the final OMI report does not include any consideration 
of NPP 2, the decision must have been made not to amend the OMI report.  
 Leaving aside the omission of reference to NPP 2, it is difficult to determine 
what the intended educative purpose from publication of the Dell/Epsilon report 
might have been. It deals very briefly with the issue of the contractual terms between 
Dell and Epsilon, a current and highly topical issue for many organisations that are 
considering outsourcing or cloud computing arrangements which involve the 
disclosure of personal information.  In this case, the report states that the 
Commissioner found that: 
by entering into the contractual agreement with Epsilon, Dell Australia had reasonable 
steps in place to protect the personal information it holds from misuse and loss and 
had met its obligations under NPP 4.1105 
This statement provides little information in terms of transparency of decision-
making.  It does not provide any detailed consideration of the type of contractual 
provisions that the Commissioner would consider as satisfactory for Dell to meet its 
obligations to take reasonable steps pursuant to NPP 4.   Dell’s response to the 
Commissioner’s RFI Letter included a statement to the effect that because Epsilon ‘is 
a multinational company of high regard who provide similar services to an extensive 
client base’ it was reasonable for Dell to assume that Epsilon ‘would have 
appropriate measures in place to safeguard Dell’s subscriber information in a manner 
consistent with Epsilon’s contractual obligations to do so’1106 - a proposition that the 
                                                 
1103  Dell OMI CAS, above n 909.  See the discussion in Chapter 9.4 above. 
1104  NPP 2 and NPP 4 Email, above n 1063. 
1105  Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337. 
1106  Letter from Dell to Mark Hummerston, OAIC, 10 May 2011. 
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Commissioner appears to accept.  It also skirts the issue of whether Dell had any 
ongoing obligation to ensure that Epsilon had implemented and was maintaining 
security measures in accordance with those contractual obligations.  By providing 
that Dell had taken reasonable steps ‘by entering into the contractual agreement’ the 
Commissioner seems to absolve Dell from any oversight obligation regarding the 
discharge by Epsilon of its contractual duties.  This does not seem to be an 
appropriate finding, particularly in view of the subsequent Telstra decision where 
failure to ensure that processes (which could be equated to contracted obligations) 
were being followed meant that Telstra was found to be in breach.     
The issues in relation to the application of the Privacy Act to the Sony entities 
involved in the breach and to Epsilon as a US incorporated entity, and whether any 
of those international entities could be regarded as carrying on business, were 
referred to but without any attempt to resolve them.  In both cases, the fact that there 
was no breach meant that the Commissioner did not have to form a view about the 
application of the Act to the non-Australian incorporated entities. 
The Medvet OMI Report is perhaps the least compelling in terms of the 
transparency of decision-making.  Issues in terms of the interpretation and 
application of NPP 4 are examined in the next chapter.  However, the reasoning in 
the report to support the finding that there had been an unauthorised disclosure for 
the purposes of NPP 2 is worth further examination.  After repeating the same single 
statement of principle contained in the Sony report, that is, that a disclosure involves 
the release of personal information, two significant findings are made in a single 
sentence: 
After reviewing the Deloitte report and other information provided by Medvet, the 
Commissioner formed the view that having regard to the nature of Medvet’s business, 
including that its customers were individuals as well as commercial entities, that the 
accessibility of address information on the internet constitutes unlawful disclosure of 
personal information.1107 
Breaking this down, the Commissioner found that: 
                                                 
1107  Medvet OMI report, above n 338. 
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 In the circumstances, the address information by itself was ‘personal 
information;’ and 
 The availability of that address information on the internet was a ‘disclosure.’ 
The second finding in particular represents a fairly significant departure from 
the reasoning used in Sony, as explained in the interview with the Assistant 
Commissioner, that there needs to be some positive act of release by the respondent 
for there to be a disclosure.  However, the single paragraph sheds little light on the 
reasoning the Commissioner used to arrive at either of these findings.   
That compliance with NPP 2 was a difficult issue in the circumstances, and 
perhaps deserving of greater discussion in the OMI report, is demonstrated by the 
fact that the OAIC’s own view changed between the issuing of the Close Letter in 
December 2011 and the draft OMI report sent in May 2012, and the updated OMI 
report sent in July 2012 following the Commissioner’s internal review of the file.  
From a document on the Dell file, it is clear that in May 2012 it was the OAIC’s 
view that Medvet ‘had caused information to be available on the internet however 
there was insufficient evidence to show the disclosure of personal information, so no 
breach of NPP 2’1108  However, at some time between 22 May 2012 and July 2012, 
the Commissioner reached a different decision, as evidenced by the finding in the 
published OMI report, and as communicated in the second close letter sent in 
July.1109  In these circumstances, the failure of the Commissioner to provide any 
detailed reasoning for this final decision is problematic.   
The Telstra Bundles OMI Report is somewhat similar to the Medvet report.  
The most pertinent finding was that Telstra’s failure to prevent unauthorised external 
access to an internal url (which gave access to a database containing personal 
information) was a disclosure.  Again, this finding is covered in a single paragraph 
providing little detailed discussion of the interpretation of ‘disclosure’ in the 
particular circumstances: 
                                                 
1108  NPP 2 and NPP 4 Email, above n 1054. 
1109  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
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In general terms an organisation discloses personal information when it releases 
information to others outside the organisation. The Commissioner’s investigation 
concluded that specific errors by Telstra staff led to the Visibility Tool being publicly 
accessible. The external accessibility of customers’ personal information was an 
unauthorised disclosure and therefore a breach of NPP 2.1.1110  
The link between a ‘release’ and unintentional errors leading to the external 
accessibility of the information is not clearly drawn in either this decision or in 
Medvet.1111 
In summary, it is difficult to argue that transparency of decision-making in 
terms of the development of general principles regarding how privacy laws should be 
interpreted and the application of those principles in the different cases, particularly 
in regard to NPP 2, is provided by 5 of the 6 OMI reports considered in this research.   
In fact, it could be suggested that the OAIC has not given sufficient attention in its 
decision-making to the importance of developing general principles that can be 
applied in different fact scenarios.  It seems that issues with the way that the different 
investigations had interpreted and applied NPP 2 and NPP 4 were foreshadowed in 
an email included in the Dell file.  The header and footer of the document have been 
redacted so that the document context is unclear, although it is described as part of an 
email dated 24 May 2012.1112  The document starts with the statement, ‘The 
challenge for us in the future will be to apply the reasoning to different factual 
scenarios.’  It appears to be referring to the OAIC’s interpretation and application of 
NPP 2, and the relationship between ‘disclosure’, for the purposes of NPP 2, and 
failing to take reasonable steps for the purposes of NPP 4. It summarises the findings 
in completed investigations,1113 noting that: 
                                                 
1110  Medvet Close Letter 2, above n 929. 
1111  The proposition that the Medvet and Telstra Bundle decisions support the principle that the 
failure to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access may be regarded as a disclosure is 
considered further in the next Chapter.  
1112  NPP 2 and NPP 4 Email, above n 1063. 
1113  The document refers to the Sony, Dell/Epsilon, Telstra Bundles and Medvet investigations, 
together to one other, the details of which have been redacted. Telstra Mail Out and Vodafone 
are not referred to. 
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 In relation to Sony, a breach of NPP 2 was not investigated ‘because 
none of their acts or practices were involved in the actual 
release/access’;  
 In relation to Medvet, they had caused information to be available on 
the internet; however, there was insufficient evidence to show the 
disclosure of personal information, so there was no breach of NPP 2 
(although as discussed this outcome was ultimately changed); 
 In relation to Dell/Epsilon, there were no acts or practices of the 
respondents that released the information, so disclosure was not 
discussed; and 
 In relation to Telstra, the posting of an insecure link meant that Telstra 
‘actually did something’ to cause the disclosure.1114 
This review in May 2012 by the OAIC of the application of NPP 2 and NPP 4 
in completed investigations, in the context of considering the future challenge to 
applying the same reasoning in different factual situations, suggests some awareness 
that the decisions to that time may not be entirely consistent or reconcilable.  Two 
paragraphs of the email have been redacted on the basis that they go to the OAIC’s 
internal decision-making processes.1115  It may be that those redacted paragraphs 
described a coherent framework for the reconciliation of the different decisions that 
could be applied by the Commissioner in future investigations.  If they did, the 
publication of that framework would be invaluable to those interested in 
understanding how the Commissioner interprets and applies NPP 2 and NPP 4.  This 
one-page document, out of the over 200 documents produced, is the only internal 
document disclosed that demonstrates any general consideration of the interpretation 
or application of NPP 2 or NPP 4 or the two principles working together. 
The stated reasons for the OAIC’s “new approach” to these investigations 
(which would have included the publication of the OMI Reports) included the 
                                                 
1114  NPP 2 and NPP 4 Email, above n 1054. 
1115  FOI Act s 47C. 
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promotion of public confidence and the provision of transparency of regulatory 
activities.1116 It seems likely that these interests, rather than transparency of decision-
making, may have been the main reason for the publication of the OMI Reports.  If 
that is this case, it is likely to have also influenced the contents of those reports. 
9.10.2.2 Transparency of compliance activities 
Public communication about regulatory activity is an important tool for the 
OAIC, because it may promote community confidence in the OAIC by clearly 
signalling the way that the OAIC intends to deals with entities that are not complying 
with privacy laws, and ensuring transparency around the OAIC’s use of privacy 
regulatory powers. 1117 Both of these aims are consistent with the two regulatory 
frameworks underpinning the Privacy Act. 
As discussed, media interest seems to be one of the main reasons for 
commencing most of the investigations considered in this Part.1118  The 
Commissioner engaged extensively with the media over these investigations, 
confirming that they were being undertaken, and also selecting those investigations 
to be reported on. 1119  The Privacy Commissioner also believed that media coverage 
of incidents justified the publication of reports investigation reports.  Media interest 
in the outcome of investigations was specifically referred to as a reason for 
publishing the OMI report in the Telstra Mail Out case.1120  The Commissioner also 
stated an interest in publishing an OMI report on completion of the Medvet 
investigation ‘as it was in the media.’1121  This heightened level of media 
engagement regarding these OMIs is consistent with the generally increased media 
                                                 
1116  Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy: What’s Ahead in 2012?’ (Presentation to International 
Association of Privacy Professionals Australia & New Zealand Annual Summit, 30 November 
2011) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-whats-
ahead-in-2012>, OAIC 2012 Annual Report, above n 1, Chapter 6, 1; OAIC 2013 Annual Report, 
above n 381, 78. See the discussion in Chapter 6.4 
1117  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227, [49] – [50]. 
1118  See Chapter 9.1. 
1119  Ibid. 
1120  Email from Helen Lewin, Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, 26 May 2011. 
1121  OAIC, File note, 11 October 2011; referred to in Medvet Case Management Summary, above n 
920. 
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engagement noted in Chapter 5.5, both of which may be explained by the OAIC’s 
interest in ensuring transparency of its compliance activities.  
However, the Commissioner does not publish reports for all investigations into 
data breaches that were in the public domain.  For example, in February 2012, the 
Commissioner announced it would be investigating the reported theft of over 10,000 
unencrypted credit card details stolen as part of an attack on a system that hosted two 
Fairfax media sites.1122  There has been no published report of this investigation.   
Similarly, when announcing the Sony investigation, the Commissioner referred to a 
second Sony breach that it would be also be investigating. 1123  No report or statement 
was made in regard to this second breach. Accordingly, some criteria, in addition to 
media interest or providing transparency of compliance activities, must be used by 
the OAIC when deciding which investigations to report.   
It could be that OMI reports are published to provide some sort of public 
reassurance that the Commissioner has resolved major data breach cases.  In all of 
the reports, the Commissioner refers approvingly and in some detail to the 
remediation efforts of the respondents.  For example, the Conclusion section in 
Telstra Bundles OMI Report provides that:  
The Commissioner decided to cease the OAIC’s own motion investigation upon 
reviewing information from Telstra about its remediation project. He found that the 
remediation steps that Telstra was taking put into place comprehensive data security 
systems, in compliance with the Act.1124  
Even in the problematic Medvet investigation it is noted that Medvet ‘acted swiftly 
to identify the security risks to the personal information it holds and has taken 
                                                 
1122  See, eg, Darren Pauli, ‘Privacy Commissioner Probes Fairfax Hack’, SC Magazine (online) 
1 February 2012 <http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/288847,privacy-commissioner-probes-
fairfax-hack.aspx >.  See also Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy Commissioner opens investigation into 
Telstra hacking incident’ (Statement, 22 May 2012) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/statements/privacy-statements/telstra-data-breach/privacy-commissioner-opens-
investigation-into-telstra-hacking-incident>. 
1123  Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Investigation into Sony data breach’ (Statement, 4 May 2011) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/sony-playstation-
network/investigation-into-sony-data-breach-4-may-2011>. 
1124  Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336, 3. 
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appropriate steps to improve its security systems and develop policies and procedures 
that reduce identified risks.’1125   
Findings in regard to the respondents’ desire to become compliant are an 
important consideration when determining the appropriate regulatory response.  As 
has been discussed previously, the Ayres and Braithwaite pyramid supports the use 
of a more conciliatory approach where the respondent indicates a willingness to 
become compliant. 1126 The references in these investigations to the respondents’ 
attitude to remediation may be explained on that basis.  However, the responsive 
regulatory approach does not necessarily explain the Commissioner’s interest in 
high-lighting remediation efforts in those cases where no breach is found.  For 
example, the ‘Conclusion’ section of the Dell/Epsilon OMI Report (where no breach 
was found) refers to the way that Epsilon swiftly identified the cause of the incident 
and contained the risks to the information it held and took appropriate steps to 
improve its security systems, which steps ‘helped to ensure that the breach was 
contained and no further unauthorised access occurred.’1127  The Sony OMI Report is 
similar.  Although the OAIC found that Sony had not failed to take reasonable steps 
to protect the personal information, the OMI report still lists a series of steps taken 
by Sony under the heading ‘Action taken after the cyber-attack.’   
An alternative explanation for the OAIC’s inclusion of details of the 
respondents’ remediation in each of the OMI reports, including those where there is 
no finding of breach, may be its interest in reassuring the community that the 
Commissioner and the respondent have agreed on an appropriate remediation 
strategy (regardless of whether there was a breach of the Act).  This is consistent 
with the conciliatory approach to resolution of OMIs discussed in Chapter 9.8 above. 
A final reason may the Commissioner’s belief that it is of benefit to the 
respondents themselves to be seen to be compliant.  In the interview with the 
researcher, when discussing what outcome the Commissioner looked for from OMIs, 
                                                 
1125  Medvet OMI report, above n 338, 2. 
1126  See Information Sheet 13, above n 203, and the earlier discussion regarding the compliance 
approach to enforcement that underpins the Act in Chapter 2.5. 
1127  Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 337. 
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the Commissioner noted that ‘in the majority of these cases organisations are 
obviously going to be willing to [agree to remediation activities] particularly if the 
matter has been at the forefront of the media.’1128  He referred to the importance of 
trust to organisations and how, if organisations have failed to properly secure 
personal information, they need to ‘make sure that they’re seen to be taking 
appropriate steps to remedy it and improve their systems and that’s what we’re 
looking for.’1129  This is the position used by the OAIC to justify publication of the 
OMI report in the Telstra Mail Out investigation.1130  It also appears to have been a 
position accepted by at least one of the respondents.   An email exchange in the 
Vodafone file referred to Vodafone’s desire to settle the terms of the report so that it 
could ‘communicate key elements’ of the contents of the report ‘to allay any 
remaining customer concerns.’1131  However, given that reports are not issued for all 
breach cases that receive media attention, the OAIC’s interest in providing 
respondents with an opportunity to restore trust does not entirely explain the 
selection of the particular investigations for publication.  
9.10.2.3 Deterrence 
The third reason given for publishing OMI reports is to act as a deterrent to 
other entities, by providing some public record of failure.1132  
There is little indication from the reports themselves that publication was 
motivated by a desire to deter either the organisation involved or the general 
community. There is little evidence of language that is critical of any of the 
respondents. It is difficult to argue that the decision to name the organisation 
involved or generally to issue more detailed reports about the incidents was intended 
                                                 
1128  Interview with Timothy Pilgrim (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1129  Ibid. 
1130  Email from Helen Lewin, Telstra to Timothy Pilgrim, 26 May 2011.  A copy of that email is 
included in Appendix C .  A further email repeating these contentions was sent by Helen Lewin, 
Telstra to Linda King, OAIC, 2 June 2011. 
1131  Email from Vodafone to OAIC, 10 February 2011. 
1132  See Chapter 7.1.4. 
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to act as a ‘deterrent’ given that each of the incidents being investigated were already 
in the public domain.    
In Chapter 7 it was concluded that the stated reasons for the publication of case 
notes and OMI reports were to provide transparency of decision-making and 
compliance activities and to perhaps work as a deterrent.  Based on the analysis in 
this chapter, it would seem that the actual reasons for the publication of the 6 OMI 
reports examined were to provide transparency of regulatory activity and to support 
community confidence, in the sense of an active regulator appropriately exercising 
its powers and ensuring that any issues have been addressed. To the extent that 
transparency of decision-making is intended to be provided, the reports published 
could not be regarded as meeting that intention.   
9.10.3 APP Guidelines 
Before leaving the issue of the purpose of publishing OMI reports it is worth 
noting that some of the OMI reports considered in this research have been used to 
support the Commissioner’s interpretations of the new privacy principles in the 
recently released guidelines to the APPs (‘APP Guidelines’).1133   
The OAIC’s view that OMI reports have value as precedents or at the very 
least provide educative examples of the application of principles in different 
circumstances, which view is not entirely supported by this research, seems to be 
confirmed by the inclusion of these references in the new guidelines.   
For example, the APP Guidelines define ‘Disclosure’ as: 
An APP entity discloses personal information when it makes it accessible to others 
outside the entity and releases the subsequent handling of the personal information 
from its effective control. This focuses on the act done by the disclosing party. … 
The release may be a proactive release, a release in response to a specific request, an 
accidental release or an unauthorised release by an employee. 1134 
                                                 
1133  APP Guidelines, above n 525. 
1134  Ibid [B.58] – [B.59], ‘Chapter B: APP Guidelines Key Concepts’. 
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Examples are given of what this means, which include ‘where an organisation 
publishes personal information whether intentionally or not[15] and it is accessible to 
another entity or individual.’  The footnote refers to the Medvet and Telstra OMI 
reports.  Given the limited analysis of the definition of  ‘disclosure‘ or the basis on 
which the Commissioner determined there was a disclosure in either case,1135 the 
reference to the Medvet and Telstra reports as precedents for the idea of disclosure 
by publication ‘whether intentionally or not’ is problematic.  In any case, there is no 
discussion of publishing as disclosure in either of those reports; in fact the term 
‘publish’ is not used at all.   
If this interpretation of ‘disclosure’ had been put to Medvet, the company 
might have argued that it did not ‘publish’ the delivery details on the internet; that 
those details had been cached by Google Analytics without Medvet’s knowledge or 
permission, and that in this case Google was a third party interloper similar to an 
attacker who accessed the information and made it available publicly without 
Medvet’s authorisation, in response to a search conducted by another unrelated party 
(in Medvet’s case, the ‘industry figure’).  The discovery of the cached details 
required significant effort by the industry figure who had alerted the media to the 
issue.  Medvet may still have failed on the reasonable security test and breached NPP 
4 because it should have been aware that improper implementation of a web facing 
application may result in order information being extracted by web tools such as 
Google analytics.  However, Medvet did not have the opportunity to put this case to 
the OAIC because none of the jurisprudential background for this interpretation or its 
application in Medvet’s circumstances was provided to Medvet.  As stated, the term 
‘publish’ was not used at all in the report.  Assuming that the second draft OMI 
report sent to Medvet for its review was the same as the final OMI report (which is 
reasonable because Medvet made no comment on the draft), accessibility on the 
internet as disclosure was covered by only two sentences in that report, with no 
further background or discussion of the meaning of that concept.1136 
                                                 
1135  See Chapter 9.10.2.1. 
1136  The relevant section from the OMI report is quoted in Chapter 9.10.2.1. 
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A similar case could have been put by Telstra, although less convincingly as 
there was evidence that they knew that the internal url was publicly searchable but 
they had done nothing to address that.  However, this does raise the question as to the 
point at which the organisation’s actions or failure to act amount to ‘publication’ and 
thus ‘disclosure’ for the purposes of NPP 2. 
Is any use of the internet by an entity to make personal information available, 
as commonly happens in every web-based application (for example, those used for 
event registration, newsletter and update subscriptions and on-line purchasing) a 
publication and thus a disclosure?  If not, where should the line be drawn?  Is the test 
whether access has been limited to authorised users?  This would be consistent with 
the result in First State Super,1137 where an authorised user exceeded his authority 
and gained unauthorised access to other users’ personal information.  The OAIC 
decided that this did not amount to a disclosure by First State Super (FSS) because 
there was no release of the information outside the organisation. However, it is 
difficult to differentiate the actions by the FSS member from the industry figure who 
alerted the press (and ultimately the Commissioner) to the fact that Medvet customer 
address details could be accessed via a Google search. Does an organisation that 
makes information accessible via the internet, but which states that it must not be 
accessed other than by authorised users ‘publish’ that information if it is accessed by 
unauthorised users? The reference in the APP Guidelines to ‘releasing the subsequent 
handling of the personal information from its effective control’ indicates some 
further requirement. If the decision depends on the extent to which control over 
access to the information has been retained, does that become a question of the 
access controls that were in place?  Is the level of access control really a question 
regarding whether there was adequate security to prevent unauthorised access, as 
contemplated by NPP 4, rather than a question of ‘disclosure‘?     
Further in the same section in the APP Guidelines, a distinction is drawn 
between disclosure and ‘unauthorised access,’ where it is stated that there is no 
disclosure ‘where a third party intentionally exploits the entity’s security measures 
                                                 
1137  First State Super OMI Report, above n 344 
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and gains unauthorised access to the information.’1138 Cyber-attack is referred to as 
an example of unauthorised access but not disclosure, and the Sony OMI Report is 
again footnoted as a reference for this proposition.  Again, given the earlier 
discussion of the way that the term ‘disclosure’ is treated in the Sony OMI Report, 
the use of that report as support for the proposition that a disclosure does not include 
a case of intentional exploitation by a third party is also problematic. 
This statement seems to indicate that any unauthorised access by a third party 
is not disclosure. 
This differentiation does not sit easily with the Medvet case where, arguably, the 
access to the information was not authorised; certainly not in the sense that Medvet 
knowingly put that information in the public domain or released it outside the 
organisation or knowingly allowed third parties to access it.   It may be that the 
difference is the intention and action of the third party malicious attacker, which 
breaks the connection between act of the organisation and the unauthorised 
availability of the information.  The proposition that it was the malicious attacker 
that influenced the determination of whether there had been a disclosure was put to 
the Assistant Commissioner Compliance.  She confirmed that ‘[t]he fact of an 
external access … means that the organisation itself didn’t do something to release 
the information or a failure to take reasonable steps to release that information.’ 
However, this analysis could be equally used for Medvet and Telstra.  In both those 
cases, if the third party had not done its own search, there would have been no 
unauthorised access. 
If the OAIC intends that the term ‘disclosure’ requires that there be some real 
causal link between the publisher and the information being publicly available (to 
distinguish the case of the malicious attacker) then there should be a clearer 
description of what that link should be.  Without this explanation or any other 
indication of the reasoning underpinning the terminology used in the guidance there 
is no real transparency regarding the OAIC’s interpretation and no guidance in a 
substantive sense for the regulated community. 
                                                 
1138  APP Guidelines, above n 525, [B.60]. 
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9.11 CONCLUSION 
In summary, the review of the investigations conducted in these 6 cases 
highlights the following: 
 There is no clear use by the OAIC of its own criteria in deciding which 
incidents should be the subject of an OMI.  In particular, none of the 6 
investigations reviewed were overtly undertaken on the basis that they 
involved any systemic issue or that they were a responsive to a perceived risk 
of significant harm.  The main reason for commencing the investigations 
seems to be the media attention that had been given to the cases, and the 
Commissioner’s own decision to investigate high-profile data breach cases; 
 Three of the 6 cases took more than 12 months from the commencement of 
the investigation to the issuing of the final report.  In those cases, the delay 
related to the time taken to issue the Close Letter or OMI report rather than to 
the investigation process itself which in most cases was promptly pursued; 
 No case plan was prepared to guide any of the investigations. There is no 
indication from the files of any pre-planning to identify the evidence that 
should be obtained in each case to determine whether there has been an 
interference with privacy and no case plan developed for the investigation 
steps to be taken; 
 Rather than specific questioning based on the details of the case, generic and 
non-specific questions are typically posed in the RFI Letters sent to the 
respondents, which letters are also the principal device for gathering 
information about the incidents; 
 The investigation process does not seem to involve any vigorous pursuit of 
information (an example being the OAIC’s acceptance of Dell’s refusal to 
provide a copy of its report) although there is a willingness to at least threaten 
to use more coercive powers in the face of lack of cooperation, as 
demonstrated by the OAIC’s response to Telstra’s delay in the Telstra 
Bundles OMI; 
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 Communication between the OAIC and the respondents is almost entirely by 
exchange of emails and letters, with little evidence of any physical meetings 
or site inspections taking place; 
 The evidence relied on by the OAIC in reaching its decisions is provided by 
the respondents either directly or via third party reports commissioned by the 
respondents; 
 There is no independent testing or verification of the information that is 
obtained from or at the direction of the organisation being investigated in 
response to the questions raised in those RFI Letters; 
 The OAIC has issues in assessing the evidence that is provided. The office 
has problems in ensuring it has the skilled resources available to allow it to 
carry out investigations into complex data breach case. However, the 
Commissioner believes that the OAIC has sufficient skills to determine the 
extent to which it should rely on third party reports that are commissioned 
and paid for by respondent organisations; 
 The investigation files provide little information to indicate the process used 
within the OAIC to arrive at a decision regarding the outcome of an 
investigation.  They do however support an interest by the OAIC in arriving 
at agreed outcomes from the investigations with the respondents; 
 The OMI reports (other than Vodafone) do not provide detailed reasoning, 
based on findings of fact, to support the decisions made.  In the Dell /Epsilon 
and Sony cases the facts relied on as supporting reasonable steps are of either 
limited or no relevance to the alleged breach. The findings in the other cases 
are not clearly linked to the particular facts relied on; 
 The decision to publish the reports about these investigations seems to have 
been influenced by the Commissioner.  The decision does not seem to have 
been made on the basis of the criteria stated in the guidance on publishing 
case notes; 
 The reason for publishing the OMI reports is not clear.  The tenor of the 
published investigation reports seems to reflect concern that the OAIC be 
able to demonstrate that the incidents had been remediated, either as a 
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response to media interest or to promote awareness of the OAIC’s 
compliance activity. The reports also seem to reflect conciliated outcomes, 
rather than administrative decisions. 
Applying the conceptual framework developed in Part 1 to these findings: 
Generally, the Commissioner’s investigations follow a consistent investigatory 
path that ensures that the main aspects of procedural fairness are addressed.  The use 
of the standard-form RFI Letters and Close Letters helped ensure that the 
respondents were advised appropriately of the matter being investigated, their rights 
and the Commissioner’s decision.  The respondents were also advised of the possible 
outcomes from the investigation and (in most cases) given an adequate opportunity 
to respond.  Reports from the investigations are published on the OAIC’s website, 
providing some level of transparency. 
 However, there are a number of other aspects of the Commissioner’s use of its 
investigation powers that may not be regarded as supporting a transparent, balanced 
and vigorous use of regulatory powers. 
The Commissioner’s decisions to commence each of the 6 investigations could 
at best be described as motivated by public interest, rather than by a broader range of 
goals.  Accordingly, it is difficult to characterise the use of the investigation power in 
these cases as balanced or vigorous.  
In terms of the evidence, the use of standard RFI Letters and the absence of 
individual case plans raise issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence obtained 
in each of the different cases.  Further issues are raised by the Commissioner’s 
willingness to accept the respondents’ evidence without any independent 
corroboration.  Although perhaps an inevitable consequence of the nature of OMIs 
where there is no complainant or adversary, and no other party to put forward 
additional facts or an alternative interpretation of the incident, this reliance is not 
consistent with the suggestion in the ARC Evidence Guide that information provided 
by applicants should be given limited weight.1139  These issues about the sufficiency 
                                                 
1139  ARC Evidence Guide, above n 238, 3. 
298  
of the evidence obtained in regard to the incident go to both the balance and the 
vigour of the use by the Commissioner of its investigation power.       
In terms of the investigation process itself, the Commissioner seems to adopt a 
perhaps overly conciliatory role in regard to the respondent, eschewing any vigorous 
independent enquiry into each case or forcing a reluctant respondent to provide 
information. This approach may be a consequence of the limited powers available as 
a consequence of an OMI.  It may also be a consequence of the limited resources and 
skills available to the OAIC, particularly when faced with investigating highly 
complex data security incidents.  Whatever the cause, the absence of any testing of 
the respondent’s evidence or detailed questioning regarding the reasons for the 
breach and the interest in arriving at an agreed outcome all suggest a less than 
vigorous investigative approach. 
The final element of procedural fairness is the extent to which the published 
reports provide adequate reasons for the decisions made.  As discussed, none of the 
reports, other than Vodafone to a limited extent, could be regarded as meeting the 
standard for adequacy of decision-making.  This in turn means that most of the 
reports fail to provide real transparency of decision-making, in terms of providing 
clear evidence of the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of the privacy 
principles. 
In summary, although there are some efforts to follow a process that supports 
procedural fairness, it is difficult to define the Commissioner’s use of its 
investigation powers regarding NPP 4 in the 6 investigations considered as 
transparent, balanced or vigorous.   
Notwithstanding all of the above, an important question for this research 
remains:  Do these 6 investigations support an interpretation of NPP 4 that is 
consistent with industry practice? 
This is considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10: Findings - OMIs and 
Information Security Industry 
Practice 
From the preceding chapter, it is clear that there are issues in terms of the 
transparency, balance and vigour with which the Commissioner has used its 
investigation powers in the 6 investigations considered in this Part.  However, these 
issues may not be as critical to answering the questions posed by this research if it 
can be demonstrated that the OMI reports published as a consequence of those 
investigations support or, at the very least, could be considered to be consistent with 
industry practice in regard to ensuring the security of personal information. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the industry approach to information security is 
comprised of the following: 
 Risk: The use of risk assessment as the basis for the identification of risks 
to assets and the selection of security safeguards to manage those risks; 
 Security measures: The selection of administrative controls (including 
policies and personnel-related controls), physical and technical security 
controls to manage the risks identified as part of the risk assessment; and 
 Process-based approach: The adoption of an iterative process that 
incorporates the risk assessment outcomes and regular monitoring and 
testing to ensure that the security safeguards remain appropriate for the 
management of the identified risks. 
This chapter will consider the extent to which the 6 investigations have used an 
industry practice approach to information security to assess whether the respondents 
have complied with NPP 4. 
10.1 INDUSTRY PRACTICE APPROACH TO INFORMATION SECURITY 
Although the words ‘industry practice’ are not used in any of the 6 OMI 
Reports, there are statements of general principle regarding what is meant by NPP 4 
that include all of the elements of the industry practice approach: risk, the selection 
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of security measures and the ensuing operation of those measures.  Such statements 
are included in 4 of the 6 OMI reports. By comparison, similar statements were 
included in only 4 of the 23 case notes and 8 OMI reports that considered NPP 4 
which were reviewed in Chapter 6.1140 
The Vodafone OMI Report refers to the need for the selection of security 
measures by the identification of risk and the implementation of policies and 
procedures to reduce that risk and settings to monitor and measure performance (the 
three main elements of the industry based security management approach). These are 
some of the ‘range of measures’ that should be considered when organisations are 
‘deciding what security safeguards are reasonable to comply with their obligations 
under NPP 4.1.’1141Almost identical wording is used in the Medvet OMI Report1142 
and in the Telstra Bundles OMI Report.1143  Reference to some of the controls listed 
in ISO 27002 in the Sony OMI Report could also be interpreted as reference to the 
basic elements of an industry approach to information security.   
No similar general statement is included in the OMI reports for the Telstra 
Mail Out or Dell/Epsilon investigations.  
It is not clear why the reports diverge in this way.  It would be expected that 
the same statement of general principles regarding how appropriate security 
measures should be identified and implemented would be referred to in each case.  It 
may be that greater attention to general principles was given in those cases where the 
respondent was found not to be compliant with NPP 4 (that is, Vodafone, Telstra 
Bundles and Medvet).   
Assuming that the Commissioner would assess reasonable steps by reference to 
the statements of general principle contained in 4 of the reports, it would be expected 
                                                 
1140  See the earlier discussion in Chapters 6.4.2. 
1141  Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333. 
1142   The only difference is the omission of the specific reference to ISO 27002 in the later reports.  
This is discussed further below in the Section covering references to Standards. 
1143  The statement of general principles in the Telstra Bundles OMI Report limits the security 
measures that should be considered to the development of policies and procedures and the 
training of staff in those policies and procedures, rather than the more general categories of 
security measures referred to in both Vodafone and Medvet. 
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that the investigations and reports would focus on the 3 elements identified in those 
statements: risk assessment, the selection of security measures to remediate identified 
risks and a process-based system for ensuing the operation of those measures. 
The references to each of those elements in the 6 OMIs are considered below. 
10.1.1 Risk  
As noted in Chapter 6, the case notes and OMI reports published prior to 2011 
contain few references to risk. 1144   Similarly, there is little consideration of risk in 
the OMIs under review in this part of the research.   
No request for details about the general risk profile of the organisation, the risk 
assessment processes used by the organisation or any assessment which may have 
been undertaken around the risk of occurrence of the type of event under 
investigation was included in any of the RFI Letters.  Nor were any questions asked 
about known vulnerabilities or threats. 
As noted, there are references to risk in the Telstra Bundles RFI Letter.1145 
Question 8 asked for information about the ‘risks’ associated with the disclosure, and 
how they were being mitigated.  This question was not directed at the assessment 
Telstra had done as part of taking ‘reasonable steps’ but at the harm that may 
eventuate from the incident, and the steps Telstra had taken to address that harm. 
Questions 12 and 13 were directed at what security measures were in place and 
whether they were believed to be sufficient.  Similar questions were asked in the 
other RFI Letters, however, only the Telstra Bundles RFI Letter uses the term ‘risk’, 
asking whether the security measures ‘adequately manage the risk.’ Telstra’s 
response to this request has been redacted so it is not clear how Telstra responded to 
this query.1146 It is also not clear why the Telstra Bundles RFI Letter refers to risk 
when the others did not.  
                                                 
1144  See Chapter 6.4. 
1145  Telstra Bundles RFI Letter, above n 862. 
1146  Email thread from Telstra to Mark Hummerston, between 14 December 2011 and 3 February 
2012. 
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Following the RFI Letters, there is no evidence of the collection by the OAIC 
of any information that might be relevant to an independent assessment of possible 
risks in any of the investigation files.   There may have been some reference to risk 
in the letter seeking further information in the Telstra Bundles investigation, which 
letter alludes to the OAIC’s interest in identifying ‘all the relevant vulnerabilities that 
led to the incident.’1147  The use of the term vulnerabilities is unusual.  It is part of 
the lexicon of information security risk and has not been used in any of the reports, 
the RFI Letters or other file records.  Again, Telstra’s response to this letter has been 
wholly redacted so it is not clear what information was provided in response. 
Despite there being no evidence of the collection of risk-related information 
either directly from the respondents or from third party sources (other than possibly 
in the Telstra Bundles investigation), risk is specifically referred to in 3 of the OMI 
reports: the Vodafone, Sony and Medvet OMI reports.  The report on the Telstra 
Bundles investigation, the only case where risk was raised in the RFI Letter, contains 
no reference to risk. 
The issue of risk is dealt with best in the Vodafone OMI Report.  That report 
refers to the reasonableness of the steps being based on the risks in the particular 
business circumstances. It specifically identifies the following as circumstances that 
added risk in Vodafone’s case, that: 
 Vodafone’s business model included licensed dealerships; and 
 Vodafone’s business functions required it to collect identity information from 
customers to comply with obligations to complete 100 point ID verification 
checks (which meant it held a large database of personal information). 
The report also refers to the use of shared login IDs and the resulting ‘reduction 
in the effectiveness of audit trails’ leading to inappropriate franchisee practices 
(referred to as ‘Siebel farming’ in the OMI report) as a risk.  Information security 
practitioners would characterise the use of shared login IDs as a vulnerability (being 
the absence of unique login IDs which are a control) rather than a risk.   Leaving that 
                                                 
1147  Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance to Telstra, 8 March 2012.  
A copy of this letter is included in Appendix C. 
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aside, the identification of relevant risks in the Vodafone OMI Report, and the 
subsequent reference to those risks in determining the adequacy of the security 
measures which were in place, is appropriate and consistent with both industry 
practice and the Commissioner’s own statement of general principle. 
The reference to risk in the Sony OMI Report is more problematic.  Although 
the report notes that risk should drive the requirement for controls, the risk identified 
in the report is the risk ‘for individuals where information is collected online in one 
jurisdiction, used in another and stored in another.’1148   This is a risk for the 
individual who decides to sign up and use the PlayStation Network (PSN).   It is a 
consequence of the use of the internet to deliver games and one of the problems of 
the international model used in online business.  Although perhaps relevant to Sony’s 
consideration of risks to its relationships with its gaming clients, it is not a significant 
relevant risk in the context of considering Sony’s obligations to secure the personal 
information that it holds. 
Having referred to the importance of risk for security and identifying a largely 
irrelevant risk, the Sony OMI Report does not refer to a number of possible risks that 
the Commissioner might have noted.  The PSN database held the information of over 
77 million individuals representing a treasure trove of information for a malicious 
attacker.  Additionally, Sony knew it was a target for malicious attacks.   It was on 
notice that groups such as Anonymous and Lulzec had launched a campaign called 
‘Operation Payback’ in response to litigation Sony had commenced to prevent the 
modification of PSN controllers.1149 It was also well known that the PSN system 
itself was technically vulnerable.  Those vulnerabilities had been reported in an open 
                                                 
1148  Sony OMI Report, above n 335. 
1149  Details of previous attacks are referred to in Sony’s evidence at the US Congressional Hearings: 
see, eg, letter from Kazuo Haria, Chairman, Sony Computer America LLC to Fred Upton 
Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 26 May 2011, 
U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade 
Hearing, ‘Sony and Epsilon: Lessons for Data Security Legislation.’  See also Peter Bright, 
‘Sony hacked yet again, plaintext passwords, e-mails, DOB posted’ Arstechnica (online), 3 June 
2011 <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/sony-hacked-yet-again-plaintext-
passwords-posted.ars>; Erica Ong, ‘Sony Pictures says 37,500 customer records exposed’ CNet 
(online) 8 June 2011 <http://news.cnet.com/8301-31021_3-20070063-260/sony-pictures-says-
37500-customer-records-exposed/>. 
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forum monitored by Sony employees several months prior to the attack.1150 It is not 
clear why reference is not made to these factors.  It may be that the problem for 
appropriate risk identification in the Sony case was one of timing.  The 
Commissioner’s investigation concluded before Sony’s own investigation into the 
breach was completed.  At that time, little information about the actual 
vulnerabilities exploited by the attacker was in the public domain.  This is discussed 
further below.1151  
The Medvet OMI report refers to Medvet putting personal information, 
including sensitive health information, ‘at risk of being compromised by using 
software with these security flaws.’1152  Although this is an appropriate identification 
of the relevant risk, there is little detailed consideration of the assessment of that risk 
in terms of likelihood of occurrence and consequence (although the ‘nature of 
Medvet’s business’ is referred to elsewhere in the report) or the threats that could 
exploit the vulnerability.  In this case, there was no malicious attack. An ‘industry 
figure’ alerted the media to the issue.1153 
There is no reference to risk (in the sense of either risk identification or 
assessment) in the Telstra Mail Out report or the other two OMI reports. 
It is difficult to understand why, after making general statements to the effect 
that security measures should be selected based on the identification of risks and 
applying that principle to the facts in the Vodafone investigations, the Commissioner 
does not do so in the other investigations.  It may be that the OAIC does not fully 
appreciate the role of risk in the industry approach to information security, a 
proposition which has been considered in the review of the Guide to Information 
Security in Chapter 6.2.1.  In the interview with the Assistant Commissioner 
Compliance there was some discussion around whether different investigations plans 
                                                 
1150  ‘Data security expert: Sony knew it was using obsolete software months in advance’, Consumer 
Reports News (online), 4 May 2011 <http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2011/05/data-
security-expert-sony-knew-it-was-using-obsolete-software-months-in-advance/index.htm>. 
1151  See Chapter 10.1.2.  
1152  Medvet OMI report, above n 338. 
1153  Ibid. 
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were followed for different types of incidents.  As part of that discussion, the 
Assistant Commissioner Compliance referred to hacking cases, where the office 
would be ‘looking at the NPP4 issues with great particularity, trying to ascertain the 
extent to which the threat could have been anticipated and mitigated against or 
not.’1154  The anticipation and mitigation of threats referred to by the Assistant 
Commissioner is at the heart of risk management. This general observation by the 
Assistant Commissioner Compliance regarding the way investigations might proceed 
is of particular interest given the absence of evidence of any investigation of that sort 
from the investigation files or from the published reports, other than Vodafone. 
The Acting Commissioner Compliance also acknowledged the importance of 
considering individual circumstances in OMIs, noting the nature of principle-based 
regulation is to make such decisions ‘contextual’:  
It’s about the size of the organisation, the nature of the information that’s being held. 
So there isn’t a magic standard because all of those things are going to differ in each 
context so we do have to apply those factors in relation to each matter that comes 
along.1155   
Similarly, each of the OMI reports states that the Privacy Commissioner will 
consider an organisation’s particular circumstances when assessing whether it has 
taken ‘reasonable steps’ as required by NPP 4.1, which will include consideration of 
‘the organisation’s size, structure, activities, how it handles personal information and 
the type of personal information it holds.’1156    
However, there is no evidence that any of these contextual matters were 
actually considered by the Commissioner in any of the OMI reports, other than in 
Vodafone and perhaps Medvet.  In the four other cases, there is no link between the 
general statement of principle (that is, that context is important) and any relevant 
findings of fact or any application of the general principle to the facts.    There are no 
questions in any of the RFI Letters directed at identifying the specific circumstances 
                                                 
1154  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012). 
1155  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Syndey, 14 December 2012). 
1156  Medvet OMI report, above n 338. 
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of the organisation. There is no evidence of the collection of contextual information 
from the entities being investigated or from third parties and no material in any of the 
investigation files that would indicate that relevant contextual information has been 
gathered from other sources.   
The relevant circumstances that gave rise to risk in the Vodafone case have 
already been considered.  In Medvet, the reference to ‘putting individuals’ personal 
information, including sensitive health information, at risk of being compromised’ 
could be regarded as contextual.  However, the sensitivity of the information is not 
referred to again in the report nor is there any reference to other contextual details 
relevant to the determination of what is reasonable, such as the size of the 
organisation, the extent of its online presence, its value to consumers or the revenues 
derived from that business.  The Commissioner may well be taking these factors into 
account; however that is not apparent from the OMI reports themselves and does not 
seem to be supported by the Commissioner’s investigation process.   
10.1.2 Security measures 
The second part of standard information security practice is the selection of 
security measures to reduce the identified risks of loss or harm.    
Given the general statements about the need to assess risk (in 4 of the reports) 
or to consider what is reasonable in the circumstances in each case (which appears in 
all 6 reports), it would be expected that each report would identify risks and then link 
the identified risks or relevant circumstances (e.g. the sensitivity of the information, 
the way it was being handled and the resources of the organisation) to the findings in 
regard to the security measures in place or not in place, as the case may be. However, 
in view of the preceding discussion about the failure of the reports to identify risks or 
circumstances that may be relevant to assessing what is ‘reasonable,’ it is not 
surprising that (other than Vodafone) it is difficult to draw from the reports any clear 
link between risks or the relevant circumstances and the security measures that were 
missing (thus resulting in a breach of NPP 4) or which were present (ensuring 
compliance with NPP 4).   In the Vodafone OMI Report, relevant risks are identified, 
as are the relevant security safeguards that were in place (in this case, the use of 
passwords to access the Siebel system and the maintenance of audit trails within the 
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system).  The report then connects the general principles, the identified risks and the 
adequacy of the security measures in place, stating that: 
[w]hile Vodafone had a range of security safeguards in place … the use of store logins 
and the wide availability of full identity information via Siebel caused an inherent data 
security risk in terms of how personal information was protected by Vodafone.  For 
this reason, in the Privacy Commissioner’s view, Vodafone had not taken reasonable 
steps to protect the personal information it held.1157 
In the other five cases there is no consideration of risk or relevant 
circumstances which could be used to support the assessment of whether or not the 
security measures in place are reasonable.  If risk or the relevant circumstances are 
not used to identify what ‘reasonable’ security measures, it is important to consider 
whether any alternative method is used. 
Each OMI report includes a statement of general principle similar to the 
following: ‘The OAIC will look at the overall security safeguards in place within an 
organisation when assessing whether it has taken reasonable steps to comply with 
NPP 4.1.’ The idea that there should be more than a single safeguard is consistent 
with the OAIC’s guidance that refers to a ‘range of security measures’ which should 
be considered when determining what are reasonable steps,1158 and with industry 
practice.  Four of the OMI reports (Vodafone, Sony, Dell/Epsilon and Medvet) 
include a further general statement describing the security measures that should be in 
place, including physical, computer and network security measures, communication 
security and personnel security protocols, which are the same areas referred to in the 
Commissioner’s guidance.   Within each of these areas, specific measures are 
referred to such as access controls, firewalls and awareness training.  There are small 
differences in the way the 4 reports describe the relevant security measures. The 
Medvet report includes a reference to secure storage and destruction facilities.  
Dell/Epsilon also refers to secure storage and destruction facilities but does not 
include the reference to ‘communication security.’  It is not clear why the wording of 
the general statement changes between the 4 cases or why neither of the Telstra OMI 
                                                 
1157  Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333. 
1158  See Information Sheet 6, above n 534; and the Guide to the NPP, above 533, 45. 
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reports includes a similar statement of principle.  In any case, the value of including a 
statement of general principle (that is, that a range of security controls should be in 
pace) ultimately depends on how that principle is applied in the particular 
circumstances. 
All of the 5 OMI reports other than Vodafone refer to security measures that 
the Commissioner found to be in place.  There is difficulty, however, in identifying 
how the Commissioner was able to form a view in the circumstances that those 
security measures found to be in place represented either the taking of reasonable 
steps or the failure to do so. 
In Medvet, the Commissioner appears to have relied on the findings in the 
report prepared by Deloitte. These findings include that the incident occurred 
because Medvet used online ordering software that was flawed.  According to the 
OMI report, the Deloitte report found that Medvet needed to implement additional 
security measures, such as security policies and the standardisation of information 
security testing and compliance activities and improve its internet facing security.  
These findings could have been used by the Commissioner as evidence of the failure 
to take reasonable steps.  However, these particular measures were not referred to in 
the determinative wording in the report, which provided as follows: 
[i]t was clear from the Deloitte’s forensics report that multiple security flaws existed 
in the software … . Medvet was therefore putting individuals’ personal information, 
including sensitive health information, at risk of being compromised by using software 
with these security flaws.  
On that basis, Medvet was found not to have taken reasonable steps.  It is 
possible for software to be flawed, and for organisations to use that software and for 
reasonable steps to have been taken.  Microsoft releases patches to rectify security 
flaws in its software on the second Tuesday of every month.1159  Medvet’s failure 
was more probably based on the suggestion in the Deloitte report that if Medvet had 
conducted testing prior to ‘going live’ with the online ordering facility, that testing 
would have identified the flaws, which may have resulted in those flaws being 
                                                 
1159  See Patch Tuesday <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patch_Tuesday>. 
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corrected.  Medvet’s failure to test the software, rather than the use of flawed 
software, represented the failure to take reasonable steps. A simple linking sentence 
back to the issues identified in the Deloitte report would have made this clear. 
The Telstra Mail Out OMI Report lists a number of security measures that 
were in place. The report states that ‘despite these measures being in place’ an 
employee inadvertently used the wrong data table, which meant that the wrong 
address information was used in the mail-out.  There is no indication of the basis on 
which the Commissioner was able to determine that these measures were appropriate 
and that the mistake in this case was not indicative of any failure of the system but 
was a one-off human error. There is no assessment of the risks involved in the mail 
out or reference to the security measures that might have been implemented based on 
that risk assessment. 
  The problem caused by the use of different statements of general principles is 
demonstrated by comparing the Telstra Mail Out decision to the result in the second 
Telstra case.  In the Telstra Bundles investigation, the Commissioner found that 
Telstra had policies and processes in place that, if followed, should have prevented 
the breach, which was similar to the findings in the first Telstra case.  However, 
rather than characterise the failure as a one-off human error (as was the decision in 
Telstra Mail Out) the Commissioner decided that, in the absence of evidence of 
behaviours consistent with those policies and procedures, there was a failure to take 
reasonable steps. This is a clearer decision than that made in the earlier Telstra case 
because it expressly states that the existence of policies and procedures will not be 
taken as evidence of compliance with NPP 4 unless it can be shown that 
organisations are acting on them.  It is also consistent with the statement of general 
principle in the report, which specifically includes monitoring of compliance as part 
of the Commissioner’s view of what are reasonable steps.  However, it introduces an 
element (evidence of compliance) that was not considered as part of the assessment 
of reasonable steps in the earlier Telstra case.  If a similar statement of general 
principle with reference to the need for monitoring of compliance had been included 
in the Telstra Mail Out OMI Report, a different conclusion may have been reached in 
that case.  
The Sony OMI Report demonstrates even more fundamental problems with the 
Commissioner’s reports, with there being little linkage between general statements of 
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principle, the actual findings of fact and the reasons given for the decision made.1160  
The OMI report includes the following general statements of principle: 
 The Commissioner considers a range of measures an organisation has in 
place when deciding whether it has taken ‘reasonable steps;’   
 The Commissioner will ‘consider an organisation’s particular 
circumstances when assessing whether it has taken “reasonable steps” as 
required by NPP 4.1’;  and 
 As part of the assessment of ‘reasonable steps’, the Privacy Commissioner 
will have regard to relevant international standards, including ISO 
27002.1161 
Following those general statements, there is the reference to the risk caused by 
online collection of personal information that has been discussed already.  The report 
then refers to a range of security measures the Commissioner found in place (based 
on the evidence provided by Sony) including: 
 Physical, network and communication security measures to protect the 
information collected and stored in connection with the Network Platform; 
 Encryption of credit card information; and 
 Internal information technology security standards that are based on the 
international information security standard ISO/IEC 27001.1162 
These high-level descriptions provide virtually no information regarding the types of 
physical, network and communication security measures that were in place or the 
actual security standards implemented.  It would be possible to be more descriptive 
about the types of security measures in place without compromising Sony’s security; 
for example, was the network segmented, were application firewalls in place, and 
was data transmitted using some sort of secure tunnelling protocol such as SSL?  
                                                 
1160  See Bloom and Frketic, above n 1100, 5, who compares the written reasons provided by the ICO 
as part of its investigations to those of the OAIC.  
1161  Sony OMI Report, above 535, 1. 
1162  Sony OMI Report, above 535, 2. 
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The Sony OMI Report continues: 
Despite these measures, the security of the Network Platform was 
compromised as a result of a targeted cyber-attack.  … A targeted attack on 
an organisation does not necessarily mean that the organisation has failed to 
take ‘reasonable steps’ as required by NPP 4.1. Based on the information 
provided by SCE Australia to the Privacy Commissioner, including 
information about the range of security measures in place at the time of the 
incident, the Privacy Commissioner found that reasonable steps had been 
taken … 1163 
There is no direct link between ‘the range of security measures in place at the 
time of the incident’ and the earlier list.  Even if there had been, it would have 
provided very little further detail in terms of the security measures which the 
Commissioner determined were reasonable in the circumstances (given the high level 
and non-exhaustive list provided), or the basis on which the Commissioner was able 
to come to that decision.  There is no evidence that the ‘appropriateness’ or otherwise 
of the high-level measures referred to in the report was assessed by the 
Commissioner by reference to any real consideration of risk or the particular 
circumstances.  
The report’s failure to describe why the particular controls referred to were 
regarded as reasonable may be because the Commissioner did not have sufficient 
detail about how the incident occurred at the time of the investigation.  Unlike the 
Dell/Epsilon report, which contains a quite detailed analysis of the way an 
employee’s device was exploited to gain access, there is no description in the Sony 
OMI Report of how the attack took place. At the time the Commissioner finalised its 
investigation (effectively in May 2011), Sony had not concluded its own 
investigation into the incident.  This is clear from a written statement that Sony 
submitted at about the same time to a US Congressional Hearing to the effect that the 
incident was still being investigated and the cause of the incident was not clear.1164  It 
                                                 
1163  Sony OMI Report, above 535, 2. 
1164  See, eg, letter from Kazuo Haria, Chairman, Sony Computer America LLC to Fred Upton 
Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, dated 26 May 
2011 referred to in n 1149. 
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seems unlikely that Sony would have provided different information to the 
Australian regulator.  Without knowing how the attack succeeded (in particular, what 
vulnerabilities were exploited so as to allow the attackers access to the information 
and the ability to extract it) it is not clear how a determination regarding whether or 
not reasonable steps were in place could be made by the Commissioner.   
The UK ICO’s report into the same incident was not issued until early 2013, 
over 12 months after the finalisation of the Commissioner’s investigation.1165  That 
report benefited from detailed information from Sony about the vulnerabilities in the 
Sony systems that enabled the attack.  By reference to those vulnerabilities, and the 
failure to implement fairly rudimentary measures such as software patching, the UK 
ICO decided that Sony had failed to take reasonable steps.1166 Sony’s out of date 
software patching (which was one of the contributors to the success of the attack 
according to the UK ICO’s report) was not referred to as a relevant consideration by 
the Commissioner.  
Following publication of the UK ICO’s report, the Commissioner released a 
statement which confirmed that ‘[t]here are no plans to re-open the OAIC’s 
investigation into this matter’, the Commissioner being satisfied, ‘as is the ICO’, that 
Sony has made appropriate changes to its systems following the incident in terms of 
the extra security measures that have been implemented to help protect personal 
information.1167  This statement is consistent with a view that a significant purpose of 
publishing OMI reports is to provide community confidence that issues have been 
addressed, which has been discussed in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
1165  UK Information Commissioner’s Office, "Data Protection Act 1988 Monetary Penalty Notice 
Dated: 14 January 2013 Name: Sony Computer Entertainment Europe 
Limited"<http://ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Notices/sony_monetary_
penalty_notice.ashx>. 
1166  See Tsacalos and Verzi, above n 67. The authors query whether the ICO and the OAIC ‘came to 
different conclusions with the same understanding of the facts, or whether the Australian 
regulator’s understanding was less complete than that of its UK counterpart.’ 
1167  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Sony PlayStation Network – Statement 
from Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim’ (Statement, 25 January 2013) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/statements/privacy-statements/sony-playstation-
network/sony-playstation-network>. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as noted in the previous chapter, the Sony 
OMI Report lists a series of steps taken by Sony to improve its security following the 
attack.  It is not clear why the failure to take these steps before the attack was not 
considered relevant to the decision whether or not Sony had taken reasonable 
steps.1168 
As discussed, the Dell/Epsilon OMI Report is somewhat different to Sony in 
that more detailed information was available about the breach at the time of the 
Commissioner’s investigation, Epsilon having completed its own investigation. 
However, the report demonstrates the same failure to connect the security measures 
in place with risk or to provide detailed reasoning regarding how the Commissioner 
was able to form the opinion that both Dell and Epsilon had taken reasonable steps in 
the circumstances.   
The report is particularly lacking in detail about Dell’s obligations to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that its contractual partner, Epsilon, secured the personal 
information it received from Dell about Dell’s customers.  This was exactly the type 
of case that the Commissioner had identified as of risk in the Sony report (where the 
information of Australians is sent out of the jurisdiction).  The Commissioner had an 
opportunity to make a very clear statement about its expectations in regard to 
Australian-based organisations that send personal information to entities outside of 
the jurisdiction, but failed to do so.  Instead, the report focuses on Epsilon, stating 
that ‘the incident could not have been avoided by any action taken by Dell 
Australia.’1169 
This is not necessarily true, as the steps taken by Epsilon were part of the 
contractual arrangements between Dell and Epsilon. So, to the extent that Dell 
negotiated those terms, it did have some effect on the security that was in place, 
which in turn was relevant to the success or otherwise of the attack.  A schedule 
containing the security provisions in the contract between Dell and Epsilon was 
                                                 
1168  See Chapter 9.10.2.2. 
1169  Del/Epsilon OMI report, above n 537. 
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provided to the Commissioner.1170  This meant that the Commissioner had the 
opportunity to consider the adequacy of those provisions and provide some general 
guidance regarding how it was able to determine that they were appropriate. 
However, no detailed comments are made in the report in regard to those contractual 
terms.  The report contains one paragraph in relation to the contract between Dell and 
Epsilon, which makes no reference to the actual contractual terms: 
In the Commissioner’s view, by entering into the contractual agreement with 
Epsilon, Dell Australia had reasonable steps in place to protect the personal 
information it holds from misuse and loss and had met its obligations under 
NPP 4.1.1171 
Having absolved Dell of any responsibility because it had a contract in place 
with a reputable organisation, the report goes on to consider whether Epsilon had 
taken reasonable steps. Reference is made to the security measures that were in 
place, such as an ISO 27001 and ISO 27002-compliant information security system. 
The report also refers to the attack as the consequence of an employee inadvertently 
allowing malware to be installed on Epsilon’s system, which subsequently allowed 
an attacker to gain access to personal information stored on Epsilon’s database.  
Notwithstanding that this was a very different sort of attack, the findings section is 
virtually identical to the Sony findings, noting that this was a ‘sophisticated and 
malicious attack,’ the occurrence of which does not necessarily mean that the 
organisation has failed to take ‘reasonable steps’ as required by NPP 4. On the basis 
of information received from Epsilon, the Commissioner considered that at the time 
of the incident Epsilon had reasonable steps in place. 
As in the Sony case, there is no reference to risk, there is no direct link between 
the incident and the specific controls which the Commissioner regarded as pertinent 
(although presumably they are those listed earlier in the report) and the basis on 
which those controls are determined to be ‘reasonable’ is not made clear.  The 
                                                 
1170  Dell incident report with attachment: a cop of the Dell subscriber notification email plus 
Schedule B – Information Security Schedule Dell/Epsilon attached to Letter from Caren Whip to 
Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013; schedule item: Schedule A_Dell 6.  This document was redacted 
in its entirety. 
1171  Dell/Epsilon OMI Report, above n 537, 2. 
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reference to the attack as ‘sophisticated and malicious’ and requiring ‘expert 
knowledge to execute’ seems to obviate any need to look more closely at what the 
organisation might have been able to do to thwart the attack. 
As in the Sony report, reference is made to actions taken by Epsilon to 
‘remediate’ the damage caused by the breach.  These actions included steps to block 
and prevent access to bad IP addresses, improvements to virus and malware 
scanning, changes to procedures for setting and using passwords, and changes to user 
access to Epsilon’s email marketing platform application.  Media reports indicate 
that Epsilon also implemented a number of other post-incident security 
enhancements including two-factor authentication.1172   As in Sony, there is no 
consideration in the report of whether these security measures should have been in 
place at the time of the attack. 
In summary, other than in the Vodafone report, it is difficult to determine the 
basis on which the Commissioner has been able to determine the adequacy or 
otherwise of the security measures in place in the cases under review.  In most cases, 
the material findings either do not specifically refer back to the more general findings 
of facts, or are so general as to provide no guidance regarding what was relied on. 
10.1.3 Process-based approach 
The third element of the standard approach to information security is an 
iterative process-based approach to security management.  This approach is 
recognised as part of reasonable security in those 4 reports that include some 
statement representing general practice.1173  However, this element is not specifically 
considered in any of the reports, other than Telstra Bundles. 
The information security management system based on ISO 27001 that was 
implemented at Sony and the ISO 27001 compliant system in place at Epsilon may 
well have supported the sort of governance and iterative continual improvement 
process that forms part of an industry practice approach. However, the reports do not 
                                                 
1172  Mike Lennon, ‘Epsilon Bolsters Security: Shares Details Following Massive Data Breach’ 
SecurityWeek (online), 29 June 2011 <ttp://www.securityweek.com/epsilon-bolsters-security-
shares-details-following-massive-data-breach>. 
1173  These are the Vodafone, Sony, Telstra Bundles and Medvet OMI reports. 
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specifically refer to the presence of that continuous process as a relevant and 
necessary element of ‘reasonable steps’. 
In the Telstra Bundles OMI Report, it is lack of evidence of monitoring of 
compliance with policies that was determined to be the failure to take reasonable 
steps in that case. As discussed in the previous section, this finding is in contrast to 
the earlier Telstra decision where the existence of policies and procedures seemed to 
be sufficient (without evidence of their operation).   
The failure to recognise that information security management is an ongoing 
process that must be continually monitored and adjusted based on the effectiveness 
of the controls and the changing risk profile of the organisation, is consistent with the 
proposition that the OAIC may see information security as a single point problem, 
resolved by a single solution.  For the reasons discussed in Chapter 3, information 
security is more complex than this.  If this is the Commissioner’s view of 
information security, it is out of step with industry practice and inconsistent with the 
most widely used industry standards: ISO 27001 and ISO 27002.    
10.2 REFERENCE TO STANDARDS 
Three of the OMI reports contain references to the ISO security standards: ISO 
27001 and ISO 27002.  
The OAIC had obtained a copy of ISO 27002 as part of the Vodafone 
investigation.  A file note (from the Sony investigation file) records that that standard 
was to be used to ‘assess Vodafone’s NPP 4 compliance.’1174 However, there is no 
evidence of any reference to or other use of that standard in the Vodafone 
investigation.  There is no indication from the investigation file of the use of  ISO 
27002 in reaching the decision regarding whether or not reasonable steps had been 
taken (although it should be noted again that any material that related to the OAIC’s 
decision-making processes was redacted from these records).  Notwithstanding this, 
ISO 27002 is referred to in the Vodafone OMI report as part of the statement of 
general principle about the range of measures that should be considered in deciding 
                                                 
1174  Internal email thread  from LK to AM, 6 May 2011. 
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what security safeguards are appropriate.  (This statement has been considered in the 
previous section).   The report describes ISO 27002 as containing advice about 
‘information security management protocols that organisations should take into 
account when designing systems including user access controls and system 
monitoring.’1175  Although not inaccurate, this description does not clearly articulate 
the risk-based system of processes incorporating a range of security measures from 
different domains that is described in ISO 27002, together with the companion 
standard ISO 27001. 
Only one of the RFI Letters refers to standards, the letter sent to Dell.  This 
letter asked that Dell provide information in regard to the steps Dell had in place to 
protect personal information, including ‘reference [to] any relevant industry 
standards.’1176 This is consistent with a note on the Complaint Assessment Sheet: 
‘Ask what reasonable steps R takes to comply with its NPP 4 obligations.  Refer to 
any relevant industry standards.’1177  No questions were raised in any of the other 
RFI Letters in regard to the use of standards generally or ISO 27001 or ISO 27002 in 
particular, including those investigations where reference is made to these standards 
in the final reports.    
It is not clear where this interest in standards came from. Dell’s data breach 
notification letter does not refer to standards.  It may have come from background 
information given in the initial phone contact in which Dell notified the OAIC of the 
data breach. It may be that attachments to the data breach notification letter raised 
compliance with standards.1178  It is likely that Schedule B - Information Security 
Schedule, which covered the security measures Epsilon was contractually obliged to 
maintain, included reference to standards, probably ISO 27001, particularly given the 
later statements by Dell that it reviewed Epsilon’s compliance with relevance 
                                                 
1175  Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333. 
1176  Letter from Mark Hummerston, OAIC to Dell, 16 April 2011. 
1177  OAIC, File note, 6 April 2011. 
1178  According to the letter from Caren Whip to Jodie Siganto, 30 August 2013, a copy of Dell’s 
Incident Report and of Schedule B – Information Security Schedule, the schedule to Dell and 
Epsilon contract, were included as attachments to the notification letter. 
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standards. 1179  Unfortunately, all attachments were exempted in full so it is not 
apparent the extent, if any, to which standards were referred to in either of those 
documents.  
The premise that the interest in standards was not initiated by the 
Commissioner but was a reaction to information provided by Dell is supported by a 
file note that suggests a failure within the OAIC to appreciate the difference between 
the two main standards, ISO 27001 and ISO27002.  The note made by the 
Compliance Officer on 1 July 2011 (the first activity on the file after receipt of the 10 
May response from Dell) states: ‘File discussed with supervisor (LK).  Issues for 
follow up standards and investigation report…  LK to contact Standards Australia to 
clarify the content of ISO 270001 (as we have AS/NZS 27002 only under 
licence).’1180 
There is no record in the investigation file of whether that contact took place, 
what clarification was sought or the outcome of any other discussion around 
standards. 
The OMI report states that   ‘…Epsilon applied recognised industry standards 
including: …for the past five years it has implemented and maintained an 
information-security program conforming to data security standards set forth by … 
ISO 27001 and ISO 27002.’   
It is likely that this finding is based on information provided by Epsilon, rather 
than on the OAIC’s own independent investigation.  The investigation records 
provided to date give no indication regarding what information Epsilon provided to 
the OAIC to enable it to make this finding.  However, Epsilon has provided 
information about its ISO 27001 compliant system that implemented ISO 27002 
controls in a statement submitted to a US House Committee: 
To enhance security across its infrastructure, Epsilon for the past several years has 
implemented and maintains an information security program conforming to data 
                                                 
1179  Ibid. 
1180  OAIC, Complaint Management System Report Epsilon Investigation File.  A copy is included in 
Appendix C. 
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security standards set forth by [ISO].  More specifically, Epsilon has implemented 
an ISO 27001 compliant information security management system that implements 
ISO 27002 controls. … Epsilon has been ISO 27001 certified since 2006 … [and] 
has maintained its ISO 27001 certification every year since then.1181 
It might be assumed that this same information was provided to the 
Commissioner in response to the RFI Letter.  However, there is no indication from 
the OAIC files that Epsilon was asked to provide any further detail about the 
information security management system it had in place. Pertinent questions that a 
person knowledgeable with ISO 27001 may have asked might have included: what 
was the scope of the certified management system (did it include the server, data 
base, network and remote devices that were compromised as part of the  attack); did 
the risk assessment completed as part of the ISO 27001 certified system identify the 
possibility of the attack that had occurred; what specific security measures were in 
place to address that risk; when had those measures last been checked; when was the 
system last audited by a third party and were there any relevant outstanding items 
from that audit? 
The Sony investigation progressed at roughly the same time as the Dell/Epsilon 
investigation, certainly in the opening stages. In contrast to the Dell/Epsilon 
investigation, no information was sought about compliance with standards in the 
Sony RFI Letter.   
The absence of any questions about compliance with standards in the Sony RFI 
Letter was raised in the email thread posted by Dr Clarke discussed in the previous 
Chapter.1182  Dr Clarke noted the non-specificity of the questions that the 
Commissioner said had been put to Sony, referring in particular to questions around 
risk and standards.  He suggested that the questions posed to Sony could have 
included ‘how do the security measures that were in place line up against industry 
standards?’1183 
                                                 
1181  Fitzgerald Statement, above n 891. 
1182  Roger Clarke email, above n 981. See Chapter 9.6. 
1183  Roger Clarke, above n 989. 
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The proposition that the use of industry standards in particular was discussed 
internally within the OAIC as a consequence of Mr Clarke’s comments is confirmed 
by the following email which was part of the same email exchange:  
We have got a licensed copy of the ISO IT Security Standard to assess 
Vodafone NPP4[.]  I expect that standard is going to come in handy again and can 
relevantly be applied to the Sony issues because it is an international standard.1184 
It is likely that this is a reference to ISO 27002, as that was the standard 
referred to in the Vodafone OMI Report.1185  The wording of the comment suggests 
that at least at that time the OAIC regarded ISO 27002 as the only ISO IT Security 
Standard.  There is no reference to ISO 27001 or to the fact that ISO 27002 is 
designed as a code of practice supporting ISO 27001. The proposition that at the time 
the OAIC compliance team was not aware of ISO 27001 or its relationship to ISO 
27002 is supported by the subsequent note in the Epsilon file already mentioned, 
which refers to contacting Standards Australia to ‘clarify the content of ISO 
27001.’1186   
It is hard to determine why the Sony OMI Report uniquely includes a paragraph 
stating that ‘[a]s part of the assessment of “reasonable steps” the Privacy 
Commissioner will have regard to relevant international standards,’ referring then to 
sections of ISO 27002.  It may be that the OAIC needed to demonstrate publicly (in 
response to Mr Clarke’s published comments) that industry standards had been 
considered and so included reference to ISO 27002 in the Sony OMI Report.  It is 
also not clear why ISO 27002 was singled out for reference as the relevant 
international standard. As mentioned, at the time the Close Letter was being drafted 
and perhaps even at the time of the preparation of the Sony OMI Report, which was 
finalised in mid-September 2011, it is possible that the OAIC had not clarified the 
difference between ISO 27001 and ISO 2002. There is certainly no reference in the 
                                                 
1184  Internal email, OAIC, 6 May 2011. 
1185  Vodafone OMI Report, above n 333. 
1186  CMS Report Epsilon Investigation File, Epsilon Redacted Documents Document 1.  A copy is 
included in Appendix C. 
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Sony, Dell or Epsilon investigation files to the OAIC obtaining a copy of ISO 27001 
or meeting with Standards Australia. 
Having specifically referred to ISO 27002 as part of the general understanding 
of what was required by NPP 4, the final Sony OMI Report refers to compliance with 
ISO 27001 (a different standard) as part of the ‘range of security measures’ that the 
Commissioner found that Epsilon had in place in order to meet the obligation to be 
reasonable.  Again, as in the Dell/Epsilon case, it is not clear where the information 
regarding Sony’s compliance with ISO 27001 came from (as those records have been 
redacted); however, it is again consistent with information provided by Sony to a US 
Congressional Hearing.1187  It may be that the OAIC repeated the information 
provided by Sony without any detailed understanding of what that might mean This 
would be consistent with the nature of the ‘on the papers’ investigation that was 
conducted, where reliance is placed on the information provided by the respondent 
with little or no independent investigation. .  In any case, the result is that the OMI 
report refers to Sony as being ISO 27001 compliant without reconciling that finding 
of fact to the earlier general statements about the ISO 27002 security measures that 
should be considered. 
There is a single reference to standards in the Medvet OMI report:  
‘Monitoring and measuring performance against Australian and International 
Standards’ is included in the range of security measures that may be taken.  There is 
no other reference to the adoption of, or compliance with, any standard by Medvet, 
or the implications of that in terms of determining whether reasonable steps had been 
taken. 
There is no reference to the use of standards at all in either the Telstra Mail Out 
or the Telstra Bundles investigations.   
In summary, it could be suggested that the Commissioner did not have a 
detailed understanding of the risk-based management approach to information 
security that ISO 27001 and ISO 27002 describe or of how that approach should be 
                                                 
1187  U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, see above n 839. 
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referenced when considering whether an organisation has taken ‘reasonable steps’ 
for the purposes of NPP 4, at least at the time that these 6 investigations were 
undertaken.  There is certainly no evidence of a consistent approach to standards in 
these cases, whether as part of a general position as to what are reasonable steps or as 
one of the range of security measures that might be selected or as evidence of the 
implementation of reasonable steps in the particular case.  
10.3 USE OF GUIDANCE 
Guidance issued by the Commissioner in regard to its interpretation of NPP 4 
has been considered in Chapter 6.2.   
There is no explicit reference to the specific guidance in relation to NPP 4 
provided in Information Sheet 6 in any of the cases under review. There are two 
references to the Data Breach Notification Guide — both in relation to a discussion 
of the breach notices sent out by Telstra in the Telstra Bundles investigation1188 and 
Sony.1189  There are however, a number of references to the more general guidance 
document published in 2001 following the passage of the new NPPs, the Guidelines 
to the National Privacy Principles.1190  These guidelines are referred to as the source 
of the definition of the term ‘discloses’ for the purposes of the application of NPP 2 
in the Sony, 1191 Telstra Bundles1192 and Medvet OMI reports. 1193 It is not clear why 
only 3 of the reports reference these guidelines when 5 of the reports include a 
statement in approximately similar terms. 
                                                 
1188  See Telstra Mail Out OMI Report, above n 334, footnote 4. 
1189  Under the heading ‘Conclusion’ in the Sony OMI Report, above n 335: ‘… given his concerns 
over the period that elapsed before Sony notified its customers, the Privacy Commissioner 
strongly recommended that Sony review how it applies the OAIC’s Guide to handling personal 
information security breaches.’ 
1190  Guidelines to the NPPs, above n 533. 
1191  See Sony OMI Report, above n 335, footnote 3. 
1192  See Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336, footnote 2. 
1193  See Medvet OMI report, above n 338, footnote 1. 
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In relation to the interpretation of NPP 4, the Telstra Bundles OMI Report 
includes a footnoted reference to the Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles as 
the source for the statement that: 
Whether measures taken to secure personal information are considered to have been 
‘reasonable steps’ will depend on the organisation’s particular circumstances. For 
example, the size of the organisation, how the organisation handles the personal 
information it holds, and the type of information that it holds will be relevant 
factors.1194 
It is not clear why these general Guidelines were chosen for reference over the 
more specific guidance in Information Sheet 6.   This same statement is included in 
all 6 OMI reports under review, as is the statement that an organisation will need to 
have a range of security safeguards in place to protect the personal information it 
holds, which is included in the Tips for Compliance section of the Guidelines to the 
National Privacy Principles.1195    It is not clear why these statements that were 
included in the other OMI reports do not also refer back to the guidelines.  
10.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the extent to which the findings in each of the 6 
case study investigations could be regarded as based on an industry practice 
approach to information security, which should in turn be ascertained by reference to 
3 interlinking steps: 
 The use of risk assessment as the basis for the identification of risks to 
information assets and the selection of security safeguards to manage those 
risks; 
 The selection of administrative controls (including policies and personnel- 
related controls) and physical and technical security controls to manage the 
risks identified as part of the risk assessment; and 
                                                 
1194  See Telstra Bundles OMI Report, above n 336, footnote 2. 
1195  Guide to the NPPs, above n 536 , 45. 
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 The adoption of an iterative process that incorporates the risk assessment 
outcomes and regular monitoring and testing to ensure that the security 
safeguards remain appropriate for the management of the identified risks. 
The relevant investigation files and OMI reports suggest that the OAIC may 
have little understanding of what is meant by either a risk-based information security 
management system or the idea of risk itself. Risk is referred to in a way that is 
confusing (for example, in the Telstra Bundles RFI Letter where it is conflated with 
harm) or irrelevant (for example, the risk of dealing with online businesses referred 
to in Sony).  None of the reports (other than Vodafone) indicate that consideration 
was given to any relevant risk factors, just as the investigation files do not show the 
collection of any relevant information to support that consideration.  Nor is there any 
evidence that the adequacy of security measures that were in place was assessed by 
reference to risk or any other measure. This is notwithstanding the reference to the 
use of risk as the basis for the selection of security controls in the statements of 
general principle as to what is required by NPP 4 included in 4 of the 6 OMI reports. 
The same comment applies to the consideration of relevant contextual issues in 
the determining of reasonable steps.  Although a general statement is made in all of 
the OMI reports that what is reasonable will depend on the organisation’s particular 
circumstances, there is little evidence of consideration being given to circumstantial 
matters such as the size of the organisation, the type of information held and how 
that information is handled (other than in the Vodafone investigation).   
The findings in regard to the security measures that were in place in all of the 
reports other than Vodafone are so high-level as to be of no real assistance in 
determining what might be reasonable.  In any case, it is arguable whether the 
security measures referred to in the reports were of real relevance to the incidents 
being investigated, certainly in the cases of Sony and Dell/Epsilon.  The reports also 
generally fail to link the general findings of fact to the material findings that 
underpin the decision regarding whether there had been a breach of NPP 4. 
The OMI reports show little concern about the existence of the iterative 
continuous improvement process that should underpin an information security 
management system. There is no evidence of any inquiry into the existence of this 
process approach, other than identification of the need to monitor compliance in the 
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Telstra Bundles report.  In summary, other than Vodafone, the OMI investigations do 
not support an industry practice approach to information security. 
The references to ISO 27001 and ISO 27002 in the OMI reports suggest that 
the OAIC does not have a good understanding of the systems and practices contained 
in those standards. This is consistent with findings in the previous chapter in regard 
to the skills and resourcing challenges faced by the OAIC, particularly in regard to 
complex data breach cases.   
To the extent that the Commissioner has issued guidance regarding its 
interpretation of NPP 4, there is little evidence that this guidance has been followed 
or applied in the investigations.  There are few references to the OAIC’s own 
guidance in any of the decisions and none to detailed guidance such as Information 
Sheet 6.    
Contrary to the their intended purpose, the reports do not explain the 
Commissioner’s interpretation of NPP 4 nor do they, in substance, illustrate the 
application of NPP 4 in particular fact circumstances.  In fact, the OMI reports 
provide little indication of the use of any benchmark, reference point or principles to 
inform the decision regarding whether there has been a breach of NPP 4.  These 
findings are consistent with the assessment of the adequacy of reasoning and 
transparency of decision-making contained in the general analysis of the reports in 
the previous chapter.  The absence of both adequate reasons and transparency of 
decision-making raises questions regarding the purpose of these OMI reports.  If they 
do not assist in the interpretation and application of NPP 4 by the organisations who 
must comply with them, then at best they must be considered a mere record of the 
Commissioner’s compliance activities.   Moreover, the failure of these investigation 
reports to provide valuable guidance or education raises questions regarding the 
regulator’s ability to provide the guidance and education in relation to compliance 
with NPP 4 that is fundamental to the successful operation of a principles-based 
regulatory system. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions 
The occurrence of data breaches that compromise the security of personal 
information held by Australian corporate entities is an issue of growing concern.  
NPP 4 and its successor APP 11 are the only generally applicable legislative 
provisions in Australia that require organisations to secure personal information.  
Accordingly, the operation of this provision is important to the protection of the 
personal information of Australians. 
The question considered by this research is: To what extent is the exercise of 
the Commissioner’s investigation and oversight powers in relation to NPP 4 an 
appropriate regulatory response?  The answer to this question was broken into three 
sub-questions: 
1. What oversight and investigation powers are available to the Privacy 
Commissioner? 
2. What is the relationship, if any, between the exercise of those powers 
and recognised industry practice in Australia? 
3. To what extent is the exercise of those powers consistent with 
principles for the exercise of regulatory powers? 
The Commissioner’s oversight and investigation powers were identified in 
Chapter 2. It was noted that these powers were consistent with the regulatory 
frameworks that underpin the Privacy Act.  Expectations regarding the use of these 
powers that were derived from those regulatory frameworks were also referred to. In 
particular, the issuance of guidance and education regarding the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of the privacy principles and the Commissioner’s use of a responsive 
regulatory approach to ensuring compliance were recognised as key to solving the 
interpretative risks inherent in principle-based regulation, and to ensuring that 
appropriate outcomes were achieved.  A two-part framework for considering the 
exercise of the Commissioner’s powers was developed.  It first used principles of 
transparency, balance and vigour to assess the Commissioner’s use of its oversight 
and investigation powers in answer to the third sub-question.  This component was 
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developed in Chapter 2.  A second component, an industry practice approach to 
information security, was developed and described in Chapter 3 and used to answer 
the second sub-research question. 
The Commissioner’s use of its oversight functions, including the provision of 
guidance, monitoring and auditing, advice and education, was considered in the 
context of NPP 4 in Chapters 5 and 6.  A number of findings made in Chapters 5 and 
6 are worth repeating. 
There is little evidence of any proactive use by the Commissioner of its 
oversight powers in regard to NPP 4.  In particular, there is no indication that the 
Commissioner monitors compliance with either NPP 4 or the Act more generally.  It 
is difficult to regard the Commissioner’s use of the audit power as either proactive or 
fulfilling any general monitoring requirement.  The total number of audits conducted 
is low and limited to ACT agencies and a handful of federal agency systems.  
Accordingly, the audits done to date could not be regarded as offering any more 
general view of compliance across federal government agencies. There is no clear 
benchmark used in any of the reports for assessing whether the security measures in 
place are sufficient for the purposes of IPP 4 and no references to the elements of the 
industry practice approach to information security used in this research.  However, 
the publication of audit reports does provide some transparency as to the 
Commissioner’s audit process. 
Although there has been some increase in the education and advice work 
undertaken by the OAIC generally, particularly in terms of explaining the recent 
changes to the Privacy Act, there is little evidence of the use of those powers to 
clarify the OAIC’s interpretation of NPP 4 (other than general exhortations to 
business to be aware of their security obligations and support of data breach 
notification). The OAIC encourages the reporting of data breaches and refers to its 
dealing with reported data breaches as part of its advisory functions.  However, it is 
not clear how these activities assist in a more generally educative way.   
Prior to April 2013, the OAIC’s guidance in regard to NPP 4 was high-level, 
referring generally to the types of controls that should be in place, and was also 
somewhat out of date.  The new Guide to Information Security, although more 
current, remains high-level and incomplete. It deals poorly with risk assessment (a 
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fundamental element of the industry practice approach to information security) and 
does not provide any overarching framework for the selection and management of 
security controls.  It cannot be regarded as entirely consistent with the industry 
approach to information security put forward in this research.  Given the 12-year gap 
between this guide and the issuance of the previous guidance specific to NPP 4, it 
also is hard to argue that the Commissioner’s guidance power has been exercised in a 
vigorous way regarding NPP 4. 
Consideration of the Commissioner’s use of its guidance functions also 
included a review of case notes and OMI reports published prior to February 2011, 
which concluded that: 
 There is only limited reference to general principles that could be equated to 
any of the elements of an industry practice approach to information security.  
There were also only isolated instances where the particular circumstances of 
the case and the impact of those circumstances on determining what were 
reasonable steps was considered;  
 There were few references to the Commissioner’s own guidance, industry 
standards such as ISO 27001 and 27002 or other decisions made;  
 The reports generally provided only limited transparency in terms of clearly 
stating the reasons for the decisions based on the relevant findings of facts in 
the particular circumstances; and 
 Both the case notes and OMI reports showed an interest in closing the case 
without necessarily making any finding regarding whether the respondent had 
complied with NPP 4.  This was particularly evident in the OMI reports 
where post incident rectification steps were taken into account in determining 
whether there had been a breach of NPP 4. 
Generally,  findings from the review of the case notes and OMI reports are 
consistent with the earlier view that the Commissioner’s use of its oversight powers 
does not support an industry practice approach to information security and could not 
be regarded  as transparent, balanced and vigorous. 
Part 3 of this research involved a detailed consideration of the Commissioner’s 
use of its investigation powers, by reference to 6 own motion investigations. The 
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findings made in Chapters 9 and 10 support the findings from Part 2 and also 
revealed further issues. First, in regard to the investigation process itself: 
 In each of the 6 OMIs considered, the decision to commence an OMI 
appeared to be based on the same single criteria: the need to respond to the 
media coverage of the incident.  There was no evidence, for example, of 
consideration of whether there was a systemic issue to be addressed or the 
harm that may have been caused by the incident; 
 From the investigation files, the process by which these particular 
investigations were selected as the subject of OMI reports is not clear. 
However, it does seem that in most cases the Commissioner was directly 
involved in both the selection of the case for public reporting and in the 
finalisation of the published reports; 
 There is no indication of the preparation of any case plan or other 
consideration of issues raised by the particular facts of any of the different 
cases that may have been relevant to consideration of the evidence needed to 
determine whether there had been an interference with privacy; 
 The Request for Information Letters issued as the basis for the collection of 
information in each investigation were largely generic and non-specific and 
could not be regarded as, in themselves, sufficient to ensure all relevant 
evidence was collected; 
 The OAIC used an ‘on the papers’ investigatory approach which means the 
investigations were almost entirely based on the information provided by the 
respondents or consultants retained by those respondents in response to the 
RFI Letters without any independent testing of the veracity or completeness 
of that evidence or assessment of whether additional information should have 
been obtained; 
 In the published OMI reports, the links between the findings of facts and the 
reasons for reaching a particular decision are either unclear or not made at all. 
The only exception to this is the Vodafone decision.   However, even in the 
Vodafone case, there is no indication of the standard used by the OAIC in 
arriving at its decision in regard to whether ‘reasonable steps’ had been taken 
for the purposes of NPP 4; and 
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 The references in each of the reports to the remediation efforts made to 
address any issues and to the cooperation by the respondent during the 
investigation suggest that the investigations were conducted with a view to 
being able to state that the incident had been adequately dealt with by 
referring to the remediation actions taken or being taken. 
In terms of the OAIC’s reference to industry practice or relevant standards or use of 
its own guidance in coming to decisions, the 6 OMI cases reviewed support the 
following: 
 The files and the OMI reports indicate that there is no real understanding of 
risk as part of the information security management process within the OAIC. 
There is no identification of relevant risks in terms of threats or 
vulnerabilities and no attempt to link the selection and implementation of 
security measures to mitigation of identifiable risks, having regard to the 
level of risk based on an assessment in terms of likelihood and consequence 
of the risk occurring; 
 There are few references to the need for an iterative, continuous improvement 
process-based approach to managing information security.  The Telstra 
Bundles case recognises the need for ensuring that processes are followed but 
falls short of placing that requirement within the framework of the process-
based approach to information security that this research suggests is 
recognised industry practice; 
 The references to standards such as ISO 27001 and ISO 27002 in the reports 
suggest that the authors of the report may not be truly conversant with the 
intended operation of those standards, either alone or as part of an 
overarching management system; 
 There are few references in the OMI reports to the OAIC’s own guidance and 
no reference to other case notes or OMI reports that might be expected to be 
of some relevance. 
Based on these findings, it is difficult to interpret any of the 6 reports as 
materially supporting the adoption of organisational information security practices 
aligned to industry practice. 
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Issues regarding the transparent, balanced and vigorous use by the 
Commissioner of investigation powers include: 
 The selection of incidents to investigate does not appear to be balanced, as 
the same single criterion was used for the selection of all 6 cases for 
investigation; 
 The investigation process itself appears to be neither balanced nor vigorous. 
Reliance is placed almost entirely on the responses provided by the 
organisations being investigated, with very little engagement in regard to that 
information and little detailed questioning; 
 The investigation files suggest that the OAIC does not have the number of 
resources or the specialist skilled staff required to carry out investigations 
into cases that involve complex technology systems.  This in turn suggests 
that the investigations are not conducted with the vigour which might 
otherwise be expected; 
 The lack of clear links between the findings of facts and the reasons for 
reaching a particular decision in all the investigations other than Vodafone 
means there is limited transparency of decision-making provided by the OMI 
reports; 
 The absence of any reference to the standard used by the OAIC in arriving at 
its decision in regard to whether ‘reasonable steps’ had been taken for the 
purposes of NPP 4 also affects the transparency of decision-making; 
 There is almost no transparency in terms of the application of the 
Commissioner’s own guidance to the circumstances of the different 
investigations; 
 The decision to publish the reports may not be regarded as balanced, 
seemingly being motivated by the need to reassure the public in response to 
media reports, rather than supporting other regulatory outcomes, such as 
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providing examples of the OAIC’s application of or interpretation of the 
privacy principles or addressing a systemic issue;1196 and 
 The investigation files show issues, in some cases, with the timeliness of 
informing respondents of the outcomes of investigations and the decision to 
publish a report.  The Medvet case is particularly concerning, given the 
change in decision by the Commissioner after a Close Letter and draft OMI 
report had been sent to the respondent. 
The Commissioner’s failure to exercise the available powers in a fully 
transparent, balanced and vigorous way means that in practice the regulatory system 
is not functioning in accordance with the assumptions made regarding the effective 
operations of the two regulatory foundations underpinning the Privacy Act: principle-
based regulation and a responsive regulatory approach to compliance. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, PBR requires a closely engaged regulator using a 
responsive enforcement approach to achieve clearly communicated outcomes and 
goals. There is little evidence of this from the Commissioner’s use of its oversight 
and investigation powers in relation to NPP 4. The interactions considered in this 
research could not be characterised as any sort of ongoing engagement between the 
OAIC and any sector or industry group in conversations or dialogue of any sort 
regarding the purpose or application of NPP 4.  The use of the oversight powers is 
limited, high-level, reactive and largely one-sided.  The use of the investigation 
powers is necessarily more inclusive of input from the regulated community but the 
published outcomes and the associated media engagement could not be regarded as 
any sort of ‘regulatory conversation.‘  One of the particular outcomes noted in this 
research is the lack of transparency of decision-making in the published reports.  
                                                 
1196  The draft Regulatory Powers Policy refers to instilling public confidence as part of the OAIC’s 
main goal to promote and ensure the protection of personal information, which accords with the 
conclusion reached by this research that the main reason for publishing OMI reports is 
community reassurance rather than transparency of decision making or the provision of guidance 
or education, see Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227. 
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Those reports do not work as a body of decisions to show the development and 
application of principles on which the Commissioner bases its interpretation of NPP 
4 (or NPP 2) in different fact circumstances.  This means that the regulated 
community, as well as scholars, privacy experts and advisers, have little basis for a 
critical analysis of how the Commissioner is interpreting the Act.1197 
In theory, principles shift the responsibility for ensuring that the objectives of 
the principles are met from the regulator to the regulated, which in turn means that 
regulators must focus on the internal systems of management and control 
implemented by the regulated community.1198 The failure to recognise and apply an 
industry best practice approach to security suggests that the Commissioner may not 
in fact be able or willing to involve itself in overseeing the internal information 
security management systems that is required in a substantive PBR system.   Even 
assuming that the OAIC did have the requisite skills and understanding in regard to 
information security management systems, it is difficult to see how the 
Commissioner would be able to regulate the operation of these internal systems in 
the way contemplated by PBR and a compliance-based approach, with the limited 
resources available.  As noted in Chapter 9.7, resource issues are responsible for the 
‘on the papers’ approach to investigations undertaken by the OAIC and have also 
resulted in a reduction in: 
 The number of audits undertaken; 
 The timeliness of responding to complaints; 
 The number of case notes published; and 
 The number of own motion investigations opened. 
In 2014, the Commissioner said ‘[e]mbedding change and best practice 
successfully into organisations and agencies that are entrusted with the personal 
information of the community must be what we are aiming for’ and confirmed that 
the OAIC would remain keen to work with all entities to achieve this through the 
                                                 
1197  See the earlier discussion of the problems with providing inadequate reasons for decisions in 
Chapter 2.6.1. 
1198  Black, above n 180, 7. 
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coming year.1199   However, to date, the Commissioner’s exercise of its oversight and 
investigation powers in relation to NPP 4 has contributed little to embed an industry 
standard approach to information security.   
It may be that PBR coupled with a compliance regulatory approach is the best 
regulatory system for the protection of personal information and the resolution of 
competing rights that are often implicit in privacy issues. However, it is not clear that 
this regulatory system when considered in the context of the resources and skills 
available to the OAIC is best suited to supporting the adoption of better security 
practices by Australian organisations.    
11.1 THE FUTURE 
From March 2014, NPP 4 is replaced by APP 11. One of the changes made in 
the new principle is the replacement of the term ‘reasonable steps’ with ‘such steps 
as are reasonable in the circumstances.’ The Explanatory Memorandum provides that 
this change is to make it clear that the assessment is an objective one albeit that 
‘when considering what are objectively reasonable steps the specific circumstances 
of each case must be considered.’1200  It may be that this change in wording will 
direct the Commissioner’s enquires towards a more detailed consideration of the 
specific circumstances of each case. Such consideration may then be reflected in a 
more transparent process of decision-making, where the specific circumstances are 
part of the findings of fact on which material findings are made to support decisions.   
More importantly perhaps, the Commissioner’s powers have been extended.   
From March 2014 the OAIC may conduct privacy performance assessments on 
the levels of compliance of private entities well as public entities.1201  However, 
given the limited use of the Commissioner’s assessment powers to date as discussed 
in Chapter 5 it is doubtful whether, in the absence of significant resourcing increases, 
                                                 
1199  Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Privacy and Transparency’ (Presentation to the 
Privacy Awareness Week ‘Up close and personal’ business breakfast, 5 May 2014) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-and-
transparency>. 
1200  Explanatory Memorandum, n 122, 54. 
1201  Privacy Act s 33C. 
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this new power will be used any more extensively in regard to private entities.  It is 
also unclear whether any of the issues identified in the Commissioner’s use of its 
audit powers in relation to public entities will be remedied. 
Also as of March 2014, the Commissioner has the benefit of additional 
investigation and enforcement powers that may be used in relation to APP 11. These 
powers include the power to: 
 Make a determination following an own motion investigation;1202 and 
 Accept written enforceable undertakings by entities to take, or refrain from 
taking, specified actions to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act.1203  
In the interview with the Assistant Commissioner Compliance, she referred to 
these additional powers, commenting that they bring a ‘heightened deterrent and 
educative element to those matters.’1204 
As already discussed,1205 prior to March 2014, the Commissioner did not have 
the power to make any determination at the conclusion of an own motion 
investigation.  This is one of the factors thought to have influenced the conciliatory 
approach taken to investigations by the Commissioner and the interest shown by the 
Commissioner in being able to conclude investigations on the basis of outcomes 
agreed with the respondent.1206  Without recourse to more punitive powers, such as 
the ability to issue a determination with adverse findings, there has been little that the 
Commissioner could do if confronted by an uncooperative or recalcitrant respondent 
in an OMI.1207   
                                                 
1202  Privacy Act s 52(IA). 
1203  Ibid s 33E. 
1204  Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 14 December 2012) 
1205  See Sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
1206  O’Connor, above n 65;  see also Interview with Assistant Commissioner Compliance (Sydney, 
14 December 2012),  
1207  The OPC acknowledged that it had ‘experienced some difficulties’ in dealing with potential 
privacy breaches where there was no individual complainant and where the respondent was not 
cooperative.  See Getting in on the Act, above n 155, 155 and For your information, above n 32, 
[50.7]. 
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Another change effective as of March 2014 may have implications for the 
Commissioner’s use of its investigation powers. Determinations will now be subject 
to merit reviews by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (not limited to grounds of 
procedural fairness or a question of law).1208  The possibility of an own motion 
investigation culminating in the making of a reviewable determination may change 
the nature of the investigation undertaken and the content of any report issued, 
bearing in mind the potential appeal and review rights.1209 It any case, where the 
Commissioner does make a determination, the respondent has the right to be 
provided with the reasons for the decision, which should include findings on material 
questions of fact that refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings 
were based.1210  Where this occurs, it is likely to improve the transparency of the 
Commissioner’s reporting. 
On its face, this extension of the determination power to investigations 
commenced on the Commissioner’s own motion would seem to be a significant 
addition to the Commissioner’s armoury.  However, it is not clear that the 
Commissioner will use this new power to make a determination following an OMI.  
As discussed, the Commissioner has to date issued few determinations.1211  The 
Commissioner has recently referred to its intention to issue more determinations, 
referring specifically to the value of determinations in explaining the 
Commissioner’s interpretation of the privacy principles.1212  Perhaps reflecting this 
new intention, six new determinations have been issued from March 2014, making a 
                                                 
1208  Privacy Act s 96(1)(c). 
1209  Pursuant to Privacy Act s 96(1)(c) determinations will now be subject to merit reviews by the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  See also Ofice of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
‘Privacy review rights’ (1 September 2009) < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-review-
rights>.The same reasoning may apply to the potential use by the Commissioner of the power to 
seek a penalty, by application to the Federal Court; Privacy Act Pt IVB. 
1210  Privacy Act s 52. See also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 28. 
1211  See Section 7.3. 
1212  Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy law reform: challenges and opportunities’ 
(Presentation to Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law Conference, 23 February 2012) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news/speeches/timothy_pilgrim/timothy_pilgrim_emerging_challenges
_feb12.html#_ftn1>. 
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total of 16 determinations.1213  This heightened recent activity may indicate a new 
resolve to make determinations, including as an outcome of own motion 
investigations. Whether or not there will be more determinations made generally or 
in regard to cases which raise questions of data security is not clear, as the issues that 
some have regarded as impacting on the Commissioner’s use of the determination 
power (including the Federal Court right to hear any enforcement action by way of a 
hearing de novo and the absence of any right for a complainant to require that a 
determination be made) remain.1214  
Given the Commissioner’s historical reluctance to make determinations and the 
continued relevance of the factors thought to influence that reluctance it seems more 
likely that the Commissioner will elect to take an alternative approach to concluding 
own motion investigations and, instead of making a determination, will seek to 
secure an enforceable undertaking from respondents.1215  As the Commissioner has 
previously concluded a number of investigations based on undertakings made by the 
respondent this seems likely to be a more attractive resolution than making a 
determination. 1216  If this is the avenue pursued by the Commissioner it is unlikely to 
contribute greatly to either the jurisprudence or even the more general understanding 
of the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of APP 11.  Enforceable 
undertakings are, by their nature, enforceable without any judicial review or other 
consideration of the merits of the undertaking.  This means that the conduct and 
outcome of those investigations which culminate in an enforceable undertaking will 
not be subject to any form of judicial review.  Enforceable undertakings could be 
                                                 
1213  Prior to 2011, there were eight determination, the last issued in 2004. The eight 
determinations issued from 2011 to February 2015 are ‘EQ’ and Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Authority [2015] AICmr 11; ‘DO’ and Department of Veterans’ Affairs [2014] AICmr 124; 
‘DK’ and Telstra Corporation Limited [2014] AICmr 118; ‘CP’ and Department of Defence 
[2014] AICmr 88); ‘CM’ and Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2014] 
AICmr 86 ‘BO’ and AeroCare Pty Ltd [2014] AICmr 32; 'S' and Veda Advantage Information 
Services and Solutions Limited [2012] AICmr 33 ; 'D' and Wentworthville Leagues Club [2011] 
AICmr 9. 
1214  See Section 7.3 and the discussion of some of the reasons for the low number of determinations.. 
1215  Privacy Act s 33E. 
1216  In both the Vodafone and the Telstra Bundles investigations the respondents gave undertakings 
to the Commissioner to take agreed remediation steps and report back to the Commissioner on 
the action that had been taken.  
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compared to conciliated outcomes: they are the agreement reached between the 
regulator and the respondent as to the appropriate remediation action to be taken to 
enable the regulator to close an investigation.  Although of some use in terms of 
providing reassurance that identified problems may be addressed, the contents of 
enforceable undertakings will not have any significant weight in terms of the 
interpretation or application of APP 11.  Similarly, the published reports about 
investigations that culminate in enforceable undertakings are unlikely to be 
significantly different to the reports considered in this research, with the attendant 
issues of transparency, balance and vigour and inconsistency with industry practice. 
In March 2014 the OAIC released a draft Regulatory Powers Policy1217 for 
public consultation. The Regulatory Powers Policy is intended to explain the OAIC’s 
goals of taking privacy regulatory action, the guiding principles to be used and how 
the OAIC decides whether to take regulatory action in a particular circumstance.  
The Policy reaffirms the OAIC’s commitment to the Ayres and Braithwaite 
compliance approach, stating its preferred regulatory approach is to encourage 
voluntary compliance and to work with entities to ensure best privacy practice and 
prevent privacy breaches.1218  The draft Policy also refers to a number of general 
principles that should guide its regulatory decisions and actions, including 
independence, proportionality, consistency, timeliness and transparency about how it 
intends to use its privacy regulatory powers, and about the regulatory outcomes it has 
achieved.1219 These principles are broadly consistent with the principles of 
transparency, balance and vigour which have been used in this research.  
 If the Commissioner issues a final Regulatory Powers Policy in similar terms 
to the draft, it is difficult to see how the Commissioner will be able to comply with 
these principles if it continues to exercise its powers in relation to the Security 
Principle in the same manner as considered in this research. This will certainly be the 
case if the OAIC is not provided with access to additional resources and increased 
skills to support the exercise of the oversight and enforcement powers in relation to 
                                                 
1217  Regulatory Powers Policy, above n 227. 
1218  Ibid, [3]. 
1219  Ibid, [13]. 
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complex information security cases.  However, in view of the proposal to re-structure 
the OAIC, it seems likely that the Commissioner’s current resource and skills issues 
will become more acute.1220 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the Commissioner’s expanded powers could 
be exercised in a more transparent, balanced and vigorous way to support the 
adoption of an industry best practice approach to information security, without the 
resources and skills to draft appropriate general guidance, proactively monitor 
compliance, carry out investigations that will meet principles of procedural fairness 
and publish investigation reports that provide true transparency of the 
Commissioner’s decision-making process, as well as support for an industry practice 
approach to information security.  One option may be the establishment of expert 
panels that could be consulted on the implications of technological developments for 
data security or be used to develop education and guidance materials,1221 which 
would also be consistent with the encouragement provided by the ALRC to the 
growth of ‘compliance professionals’ and closer engagement with the regulated  
community.1222   
If the Australian government is committed to the use of PBR and a responsive 
regulatory approach as the regulatory models for privacy and the protection of 
personal information, it should also ensure that the regulator has the resources and 
skills to support the proper implementation of the principles.  Until such time as the 
Commissioner is able to exercise its powers in the complex ways contemplated by 
the regulatory foundations of the Privacy Act, it is unlikely that the OAIC’s use of its 
powers in regard to the Security Principle will result in any significant improvement 
to the security of the personal information held by Australian organisations. 
  
                                                 
1220  See, eg, Bruce Arnold, ‘Ending the OAIC and new frameworks for privacy law’ (2014) 11(5) 
Privacy Law Bulletin 66.  See also the references in n 133. 
1221  For your information, above n 32,  Recommendation 28–3, 951.  The right for the 
Commissioner to appoint expert panels is now included in Privacy Act s 27(3). 
1222  Ibid [4.65] – [4.68]. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
OAIC and OPC case notes Published from 2008 – 20141223 
Year Name of case note  
2013 - 2014 [None published] 
2012 - 2013 [None published] 
 
2011 - 2012 
1. A and Financial Institution [2012] AICmrCN 1 (1 May 
2012), 
2. H and Registered Club [2011] AICmrCN 2 (22 December 
2011),  
3. K and Finance Company [2011] AICmrCN 5 (22 December 
2011), 
4. M and Law Firm [2011] AICmrCN 7 (22 December 2011) 
5. O and Professional Association [2011] AICmrCN 9 (22 
December 2011) 
6. P and Retail Company [2011] AICmrCN 10 (22 December 
2011)  
7. Q and Financial Institution [2011] AICmrCN 11 (22 
December 2011),  
8. R and Credit Reporting Agency [2011] AICmrCN 12 (22 
December 2011),  
 
2010 - 2011 
1. A v Credit Provider [2011] PrivCmrA 1 (3 May 2011), 
2.  B v Law Firm [2011] PrivCmrA 2 (3 May 2011),  
3. C v Charity [2011] PrivCmrA 3 (3 May 2011),  
                                                 
1223 This list is complete as at 1 September, 2014. 
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4. D v Charitable Organisation [2011] PrivCmrA 4 (3 May 
2011),  
5. E v Insurance Company [2011] PrivCmrA 5 (3 May 2011),  
6. F v Contract Service Provider to a Commonwealth 
Government Agency [2011] PrivCmrA 6 (3 May 2011),  
7. H v Health Service Provider [2010] PrivCmrA 9 (24 
December 2010),  
8. I v Commonwealth Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 10 (24 
December 2010),  
9. J v Credit Reporting Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 11 (24 
December 2010),  
10. K v Commonwealth Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 13 (24 
December 2010),  
11. L v Commonwealth Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 14 (24 
December 2010),  
12. M v Body Corporate [2010] PrivCmrA 15 (24 December 
2010),  
13. N v Restaurant [2010] PrivCmrA 17 (24 December 2010),  
14. v Financial Institution [2010] PrivCmrA 18 (24 December 
2010), 
15. P v Insurer [2010] PrivCmrA 19 (24 December 2010),  
16. Q v Law Firm [2010] PrivCmrA 20 (24 December 2010),  
17. R v Retailer [2010] PrivCmrA 21 (24 December 2010),  
18. S v Debt Collector [2010] PrivCmrA 22 (24 December 
2010),  
19. T v Investment Services Provider [2010] PrivCmrA 23 (24 
December 2010). 
 1. F v Medical Specialist [2009] PrivCmrA 8 (31 August 2009),  
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2009 – 2010 2. G v Counselling Service [2009] PrivCmrA 9 (31 August 
2009),  
3. H v Telecommunications Company [2009] PrivCmrA 10 (31 
August 2009),  
4. I v Insurance Company [2009] PrivCmrA 11 (31 August 
2009),  
5. J v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 13 (19 
November 2009),  
6. K v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 14 (19 
November 2009),  
7. L v Health Service Provider [2009] PrivCmrA 15 (19 
November 2009),  
8. M v Financial Institution [2009] PrivCmrA 16 (19 November 
2009),  
9. N v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 17 (19 
November 2009),  
10. v Automotive Company [2009] PrivCmrA 18 (22 December 
2009),  
11. P v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 19 (22 
December 2009),  
12. Q v Credit Provider [2009] PrivCmrA 20 (22 December 
2009),  
13. R v Company [2009] PrivCmrA 21 (22 December 2009),  
14. S v Debt Collection Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 22 (22 
December 2009),  
15. T v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 23 (22 
December 2009),  
16. U v Telecommunications Company [2009] PrivCmrA 24 (22 
December 2009),  
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17. A v Private Health Service Provider [2010] PrivCmrA 2 (31 
May 2010),  
18. B v Charity Organisation [2010] PrivCmrA 3 (31 May 2010),  
19.  C v Telecommunications Company [2010] PrivCmrA 4 (31 
May 2010),  
20. D v Commonwealth Agency [2010] PrivCmrA 5 (31 May 
2010),  
21. E v Private School [2010] PrivCmrA 6 (31 May 2010),  
22. F v Health Service Provider [2010] PrivCmrA 7 (31 May 
2010),  
23. G v Finance Company [2010] PrivCmrA 8 (31 May 2010) 
 
2008 - 2009 
1. S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19 (29 August 
2008),  
2. T v Private Community Centre [2008] PrivCmrA 20 (29 
August 2008),  
3. U v Betting Agency [2008] PrivCmrA 21 (29 August 2008), 
V Commonwealth Agency [2008] PrivCmrA 22 (5 December 
2008), W v Pathology Clinic [2008] PrivCmrA 24 (5 
December 2008),  
4. A v Medical Practitioner [2009] PrivCmrA 1 (5 May 2009),  
5. B v Cleaning Company [2009] PrivCmrA 2 (5 May 2009),  
6. C v Commonwealth Agency [2009] PrivCmrA 3 (5 May 
2009),  
7. D v Finance Company [2009] PrivCmrA 4 (5 May 2009),  
8. E v Advertiser [2009] PrivCmrA 5 (5 May 2009) 
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Appendix B 
OAIC and OPC OMI reports Published from 2007 – 20141224 
 
Year Name of OMI report 
2013 - 2014 1. Pound Road Medical Centre: Own motion investigation 
report (July 2014) 
2. Cupid Media: Own motion investigation report(June 2014) 
3. Multicard Pty Ltd: Own motion investigation report (May 
2014) 
4. Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra): Own motion 
investigation report (March 2014) 
5. AAPT and Melbourne IT: Own Motion Investigation 
Report (October 2013) 
2012 - 2013 1. Medvet Science Pty Ltd: Own motion investigation report 
(July 2012),  
2. Dell Australia and Epsilon: Own motion investigation 
report (July 2012) 
2011 - 2012 1. Sony PlayStation Network / Qriocity: Own motion 
investigation report (September 2011)  
2. Telstra Corporation Limited: Own motion investigation 
report  (June 2012),  
3. First State Super Trustee Corporation: Own motion 
investigation report (June 2012)  
4. Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra): Own motion 
investigation report (July 2011) 
2010 - 2011 1. Vodafone Hutchison Australia: Own motion investigation 
                                                 
1224 This list is complete as at 1 September, 2014. 
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report (February 2011)  
2. Professional Services Review Agency: Own motion 
investigation report (December 2010),  
3. Own Motion Investigation v Telecommunications 
Company [2010] PrivCmrA 16 (24 December 2010),  
4. Own Motion Investigation v Information Technology 
Company [2010] PrivCmrA 24 (24 December 2010),  
5. Own Motion Investigation v Airline [2010] PrivCmrA 12 
(24 December 2010),  
2009 - 2010 1. Own Motion Investigation v Insurance Company [2010] 
PrivCmr 1 
 
2008 - 2009 2. Own Motion Investigation v Airline [2009] PrivCmr 7 
3. Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre [2009] 
PrivCmr 6 
4. Own Motion Investigation v Retailer [2009] PrivCmrA 25 
2007 - 2008 1. Own Motion Investigation v Direct Marketer [2008] 
PrivCmrA 23 
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Appendix C 
Investigation Records from OMI Files 
 
Telstra Mail Out: 
1. RFI Letter: Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Ms Helen Lewin, Telstra entitled 
‘Own Motion Investigation’, 28 October 2010;   
2. Close Letter: Letter from Mark Hummerston to Ms Helen Lewin entitled ‘Own 
motion investigation – mailing list incident’ 16 May 2011; and   
3. Email thread between Helen Lewin, Telstra and OAIC including email to 
Timothy Pilgrim, 26 May 2011.  
Vodafone 
1. RFI Letter: Letter from Timothy Pilgrim OAIC to Vodafone, 10 January 2011 
Vodafone Schedule B Document 14; and  
2. Letter from Timothy Pilgrim OAIC to Vodafone 16 February 2011, Vodafone 
Schedule A Document 5.  
Sony 
1. RFI Letter: Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Sony’s Managing Director dated 27 
April 2011, Sony Schedule B Document 5; and 
2. Email from Roger Clarke to privacy@lists.efa.org.au, 4 May 2011, Sony 
Schedule B Document 15. 
Dell Epsilon 
1. RFI Letter from Mark Hummerston (OAIC) to Dell, 19 April 2011 Dell Schedule 
A Document  9 
2. Email threader, with header email from MH (OAIC) to MS re Dell response to 
OMI (Dell response is attached) 11 May 2011, 2011 Dell Schedule A Document  
7; 
3. Email from Dell to MS (OAIC) re status of audit, 19 July 2011 Dell Schedule A 
Document 2; 
4. 1 page excerpt setting out relationship of NPP 2 and NPP 4, email dated 24 May 
2012, Dell Schedule B Document 2; 
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5. CMS Report Epsilon Investigation File, Epsilon Redacted Documents Document 
1; and 
6. Letter from Mark Hummerston (OAIC) to Dell: Advising decision to cease 
investigation, 11 January 2012, Dell Schedule A Document 10. 
Telstra Bundles 
1. RFI Letter: Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance 
to Telstra dated 12 December, 2012 Telstra Schedule B Document 60; 
2. Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner Compliance to Telstra 
dated 8 March 2012.  Telstra Schedule B Document 40; and 
3. Email thread between OAIC and Telstra dated 15 March 2012. Telstra Schedule 
B  Document 35. 
Medvet 
1. RF Letter: Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Medvet re OMI against Medvet, 20 
July 2011 Medvet Schedule B Document 21; 
2. CMS File note, 11 October 2011; 
3. Close Letter: Letter from Mark Hummerston, Assistant Commissioner, OAIC to 
CEO Medvet, 19 December, 2011 (Medvet Schedule A Document 1); and 
4. Letter from Timothy Pilgrim to Medvet re OMI outcome, 10 July 2012.  Medvet 
Schedule B Document 3. 
 
Attachment G.pdf
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Appendix D 
State Privacy Laws 
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1997 (NSW) 
Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) 
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) 
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) 
Health Records Act 2001 (Vic) 
Information Protection Act 2002 (NT) 
Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas) 
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Appendix E 
Case notes and OMI reports Relating to NPP 4 
case notes 
E v Financial Institution [2003] PrivCmrA 3 
N v Internet Service Provider [2004] PrivCmrA 10 
J v Superannuation Provider [2005] PrivCmrA 7 
R v Internet Service Provider [2005] PrivCmrA 17 
I v Retail Company [2006] PrivCmrA 
N v Utility Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 13 
Q v Financial Institution [2006] PrivCmrA 16 
U v Banking Institution [2006] PrivCmrA 20 
V v Health Service Provider [2006] PrivCmrA 21 
D v Insurance Company [2007] PrivCmrA 6 
E v Retail Organisation [2007] PrivCmrA 7 
H v Health Service Provider [2007] PrivCmrA 10 
I v Insurance Company [2007] PrivCmrA 11 
R v Retailer [2007] PrivCmrA 20 
X v Transport Company [2007] PrivCmrA 26 
Y v Ticketing Company [2007] PrivCmrA 27 
D v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 4 
P v Private Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 16 
S v Health Service Provider [2008] PrivCmrA 19 
G v Counselling Service [2009] PrivCmrA 9 
M v Body Corporate [2010] PrivCmrA 15 
G v Parking Services Organisation [2011] AICmrCN 1 
H v Registered Club [2011] AICmrCN 2    
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Own Motion Investigations 
OPC v Banking Institution [2005] PrivCmrA 11 
Own Motion Investigation v Bankrupt Trustee Firm [2007] PrivCmrA 5 
Own Motion Investigation v Direct Marketer [2008] PrivCmrA 23 
Own Motion Investigation v Medical Centre [2009] PrivCmrA 6 
Own Motion Investigation v Retailer [2009] PrivCmrA 25 
Own Motion Investigation v Airline [2010] PrivCmrA 12 
Own Motion Investigation v Telecommunications Company [2010] PrivCmrA 16 
Own Motion Investigation v Information Technology Company [2010] PrivCmrA 24 
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Appendix F 
Interview Guide 
 
General Question 
Could you tell me a little about your professional life so far? What did you do before 
coming to the OAIC? 
Background 
Could you tell me about how the OAIC operates in regard to its Privacy functions? 
Could you describe for me your role – in particular your different functions: e.g. 
guidance, advisory, monitoring and investigations?  
How is each of those discharged? 
What are your strategic objectives and any KPIs (across all functions) 
Could you tell me generally about how the investigation process usually works within 
OAIC?   
Have there been any changes in that approach over the last few years? 
Does the OAIC review the exercise of its investigatory powers? 
Establishing the Framework of the Investigation 
Can you tell me generally how you approach cases involving an alleged breach of NPP 
4?  
Does the approach differ depending on whether there has also been an unauthorised 
disclosure of personal information? 
I would like to talk mostly about the most recent Own Motion Investigations involving 
NPP 4.   
What were the main reasons for deciding to open Own Motion Investigations in these 
cases? 
Does the investigation approach change in the case of Own Motion Investigations? 
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Investigations can be categorised as ‘evidence focused’ or ‘outcome focused.’1225 
How would you categorise these investigations? 
The Investigation 
Can you take me through the role you played in each of these cases e.g.  Did you review 
the investigation plans? 
What input did you have to the gathering of evidence? 
Do you know what standard of proof was used in these investigations?   
How was that applied to the evidence gathered in these investigations? 
Determining Investigation Outcomes & Reporting  
How was the final conclusion reached in each case? 
What contact was had with the other side as part of that process? 
A report of each investigation was prepared.  Who was responsible for writing the report, 
who approved it and what happened prior to its publication? 
A report of this investigation was published.   Who made the decision to publish the 
report?  Why was this report published?  What contact was had with the other side in 
regard to the publication of the report? 
The report refers to [indicate any undertaking made by the other party].  Can you tell me 
what has happened in regard to those undertakings? 
Reflections on Investigation 
Do you have any reflections on any of these investigations?   
                                                 
1225 NSW Ombudsman Guide to Investigating Complaints 2004 p15 - 16 
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The proposed amendments to the Privacy Act give the Commissioner some additional 
powers.  Do you think that, if those powers had been available, there would have been a 
different outcome? 
Were there any other outcomes from this investigation that you can think of? 
A number of the investigations raised jurisdictional issues which seemed to add 
complexity to the investigation.  Would you be able to talk about that? 
The Privacy Commissioner has recently undertaken significantly more OMIs than in the 
past.  Could you tell me about that (as a compliance approach) 
The Privacy Commissioner has indicated a greater willingness to pursue organisations 
that fail to meet their obligations to secure personal information.  Can you tell me more 
about that? 
There has been a reduction in the number of published case notes so far in 2012.  Do you 
have any comments on that? 
Conclusion 
Is there anything else that you  would like to add about any of the things we’ve covered 
today?  Or anything else that might be relevant to this research? 
Do you have any questions for me? 
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Appendix G 
Type of Records - Investigation Files 
Type of Record Medvet Telstra 
Bundle 
Dell/ Sony Voda Telstra 
Mail Out 
TOTAL 
Epsilon fone 
External 
Email (to or 
from OAIC) 
8  17  12  13  6  4  60 
Internal Email 
(w/I OAIC) 
5  3  9  6  8  0  31 
Letter  9  4  10  6  9  5  43 
Phone Call  7  3  3  7  1  1  22 
Meeting with 
Respondent 
0  2  0  0  1  0  3 
Internal 
Meeting 
3  2  2  4  0  0  11 
Admin task  14  28  11  10  2  0  65 
Press  2  0  5  8  8  0  23 
Media 
Release 
0  1  1  0  2  0  4 
OMI report  1  1  0  1  2  0  5 
External 
(Third 
Party)Report 
2  0  2  0  0  0  4 
Duplicate  0  4  2  0  0  0  6 
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Appendix H 
Qualitative Analysis –nVivo Coding 
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Appendix I 
OAIC Submissions Made in 2013 – 2014 
 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/submissions/  
Submission to the ALRC on Discussion Paper 80: Serious invasions 
of privacy in the digital era  
June 2014 
Notification of employment decisions in the Gazette – a discussion 
paper  
May 2014 
Submission to the Senate regarding the TIA inquiry  March 2014 
Submission on the Review of the AML/CTF regime  February 2014 
Whois policy review for the .au domain  February 2014 
Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era  December 2013 
Queensland Government Review of the Information Privacy Act 2009 
and Right to Information Act 2009  
November 2013 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Study of 
Whois Privacy and Proxy Service Abuse  
November 2013 
Submission to NHMRC re proposed amendments to chapter 2.3 of the 
National Statement  
August 2013 
Review of Subdivision A of Division 6 of Part VIIC of the Crimes 
Act 1914 — the working  with children exclusion   
July 2013 
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Appendix J OAIC Privacy Speeches 2011 – 2014 
 
2013 - 
2014 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Defining the sensor 
society’ Presentation to the 'Defining the Sensor Society 
Conference' at University of Queensland, Brisbane, 8 May, 2014 
< http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/defining-the-sensor-society> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy matters’, 
Presentation to the 'Privacy matters' public lecture at Griffith 
University, Brisbane, 8 May 2014 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/privacy-matters>. 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Mapping data breach 
notification’ Presentation at iappANZ data breach panel 
discussion, Sydney, 6 May 2014 <http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-
and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/mapping-data-breach-
notification>. 
Professor John McMillan, Australian Information Commissioner, 
‘Up Close and Personal’ Presentation to the Privacy Awareness 
Week 'Up close and personal' business breakfast, 5 May 2014, < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/up-close-and-personal> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner "Privacy and 
Transparency" Presentation to the Privacy Awareness Week 'Up 
close and personal' business breakfast, 5 May 2014 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/privacy-and-transparency> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Credit Reporting 
Changes’ Presentation to the Australian Retail Credit Association 
'New era of credit' forum, Sydney, 18 March 2014, < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
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speeches/credit-reporting-changes> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy Reform – Act 
Three’ Presentation to the iappANZ 'Privacy Unbound' summit, 
Sydney, 25 November 2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-reform-act-three>. 
John McMillan, Australian Information Commissioner 
‘Developing Tools for Global Privacy Compliance’ Presentation 
to panel session at the 35th International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Warsaw, 23-26 
September 2013, < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/speeches/privacy-speeches/developing-tools-for-global-
privacy-compliance> 
2012 - 
2013 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Setting the scene – 
Privacy law in Australia’, Presentation to the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority's Citizens Conversation 
series, Sydney, 25 June 2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-
and-events/speeches/privacy-speeches/setting-the-scene-privacy-
law-in-australia> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner "Privacy law 
reform — Get in on the Act" Presentation at the iappANZ 
Privacy Awareness Week seminar, Brisbane, 1 May 2013 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/privacy-law-reform-get-in-on-the-act> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy Awareness 
Week 2013 Privacy Commissioner's Update’ Presentation to 
Privacy Awareness Week 2013 Business Breakfast, 29 April 
2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-awareness-week-
privacy-commissioner-s-update> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner ‘Privacy 
Update’ Presentation to 
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Australian Corporate Lawyers Association South Australian 
corporate counsel day, Adelaide Convention Centre, Friday 22 
March 2013 < http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-
events/speeches/privacy-speeches/privacy-update> 
Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, ‘Update your privacy 
settings’ Presentation to the Communications and Media Law 
Association, Sydney, 7 March 2013 < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches/privacy-
speeches/update-your-privacy-settings> 
 
  
  
 361 
Appendix K 
OAIC Audit Reports 
OAIC Audit Reports Published Between November 2010 – June 20141226 
 
 
 
Title of Report 
Date 
Report 
Issued 
IPP 4 in 
Scope 
1 Healthcare Identifiers Service: Audit report  June 2014  No 
2 Calvary Private Hospital ACT: Assessment 
report  June 2014  
No 
3 Healthcare Identifiers Service — Department of 
Human Services: Audit report  April 2014  
No 
4 Collection and security of student personal 
information – Canberra Institute of Technology: 
Audit report  
April 2014  
Yes 
5 Collection and Requests for Student Information: 
Audit report  
December 
2013  
No 
6 Public Transport Systems: MyWay audit  June 2013  Yes 
7 Requests for Information for Passenger Name 
Record Data - Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service Audit Report  
June 2013  
Yes 
8 National Document Verification Service - 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Audit 
Report 2012  
December 
2012  
Yes 
                                                 
1226 OAIC ‘Privacy Assessments’ http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-
law/privacy-assessments. 
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9 Healthcare Identifiers Service - Department of 
Human Services - Audit Report  
August 
2012  
Yes 
10 Passenger Name Records (PNR data) Australian 
Customs and Border Protection Service Audit 
Report  
July 2012  
Yes 
11 ACT – Department of Disability, Housing and 
Community Services, The Office for Children, 
Youth and Family Support Audit Report  
July 2011  
Yes 
12 Healthcare Identifiers Service - Medicare 
Australia Audit Report  July 2011  
Yes 
13 Australian Federal Police (ACT Policing 
Branch) Audit Report  July 2011  
Yes 
14 National Document Verification Service, 
Centrelink - Audit Report  
June 2011  
 
Yes 
 
OAIC Audit Reports Published Between March 2004 - October 20101227 
 
 Title of Report Date Report 
Issued 
IPP 4 in 
Scope 
15 
ACT Residential Tenancies Tribunal: Client and 
Employee Records audit  
May 2004 Yes 
16 
Canberra Institute of Technology: Staff and 
Student Records audit  
August 
2004 
Yes 
                                                 
1227 OAIC ‘Privacy reports – archive’< http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
archive/privacy-reports-archive/Page-2> 
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17 
ACT Department of Disability, Housing and 
Community Services: Client Records audit  
August 
2005 
Yes 
18 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade & 
Australian Customs Service: ePassport & 
SmartGate Trials audit  
October 
2005 
Yes 
19 
ACT Department of Justice And Community 
Safety: Registrar General's Office audit  
October 
2005 
Yes 
20 
ACT Office of the Community Advocate (now 
ACT Public Advocate): Client Records audit  
July 2006 Yes 
21 
ACT Corrective Services: Client and Staff 
Records audit  
November 
2006 
Yes 
22 
Australian Customs Service: SmartGate 
Automated Border Processing audit  
April 2007 Yes 
23 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs and Centrelink: Document Verification 
Service Prototype audit  
May 2007 Yes 
24 ACT Planning and Land Authority audit  May 2008 Yes 
25 
Public Trustee for the Australian Capital 
Territory audit  
May 2009 Yes 
26 
Passenger Name Records (PNR data) Audit 
Report No 1  
December 
2009 
Yes 
27 
Passenger Name Records (PNR data) Audit 
Report No 2 
January 
2010 
Yes 
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Appendix L 
FOI Request 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From: Jean Siganto  
Sent: Tuesday, 21 May 2013 9:15 PM 
To: foi@oaic.gov.au 
Subject: Office of Australian Information Commissioner Own Motion 
Investigations – Freedom of Information Request 
 
I request access to documents of the Office of Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC) relating to the following Own 
Motion Investigations conducted by the Privacy Commissioner: 
•  Vodafone Hutchison Australia (February 2011) 
•  Sony PlayStation Network / Qriocity (September 2011) 
•  Telstra Corporation Limited (June 2012) 
•  Dell Australia/Epsilon (June 2012) 
•  Medvet Science Pty Ltd (July 2012) 
 
The documents I would like to be disclosed are all those held by 
OAIC which relate in any way to the above investigations 
including: 
‐  All documents relating to the making of the decision by the 
OAIC to launch own motion investigations in each of the cases 
‐  All documents relating to the development, finalisation and 
implementation of an investigation plan or other methodology for 
the conduct of each of the investigations 
‐  All correspondence between the OAIC and the parties being 
investigated and any third parties relating to or forming part of 
the investigations, including correspondence from the OAIC 
advising that an investigation may be or has been commenced and 
requesting that information be provided 
‐   All documents relevant to the assessment by the OAIC of 
whether or not there had been any breach of the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) as part of any of the investigations 
‐  All documents relevant to the Privacy Commissioner’s 
decision‐making process and the making of the final decision in 
each case, including any internal memorandum or other briefing 
papers 
‐  All documents relevant to any on‐going communications 
between the OAIC and any investigated party relevant to the 
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investigations including, for example, documents relating to the 
OAIC decision to publish a report of the investigation or the 
communication by an investigated party to the OAIC on any follow 
up activities taken by them. 
 
Please note that my interest is largely in regard to the 
operational workings of the OAIC in the conduct of own motion 
investigations.  In particular: 
•  I am not interested in obtaining the personal details or 
other identifying information of any of the third parties 
(including any of their staff or officers) involved in any of 
these investigations. I am happy for all personal details and any 
other identifying information relating to those third parties to 
be redacted. 
•  I am also not interested in receiving any confidential 
information provided to you such as, for example, the security 
measures that were in place at the time of the incident.  I am 
happy for this information to be redacted from the documents to be 
provided. 
I note that access to this information will support the objects of 
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) including: 
•  increasing public participation in Government processes, 
with a view to promoting better‐informed decision‐making; and 
•  increasing scrutiny, discussion, comment and review of the 
Government's activities.  
In addition, I believe that it would be in the public interest 
(for the purposes of Section 11A(5) of the FOI Act) to disclose 
any documents that might otherwise be conditionally exempt, as 
disclosure would: 
•  Enhance the accountability and scrutiny of government 
decision‐making; 
•  Provide context and background to the operations of the OAIC 
and the OAIC’s investigation process; and 
•  Inform debate on a matter of public importance 
My contact details are as follows: 
Contact Phone: (07) 3138 2166 or Mobile: 0408 275 733 Contact 
Email: jj.siganto@student.qut.edu.au 
Address:   
Ms J Siganto 
Faculty of Law 
366  
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434 
Brisbane QLD 4001 
 
Please let me know if I can provide any further information about 
or clarification of my request. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you in due course.   
 
Best regards, 
Jodie Siganto 
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Appendix M 
OAIC Guidance 
Guidelines as at 10 September 20141228 
 
Name of Guideline 
Date 
Issued/Last 
Updated 
1 APP Guidelines March 2014 
2 Guidelines on Data Matching in Australian 
Government Administration 
June 2014 
3 Guidelines for developing codes September 2013
4 Guidelines for recognising external dispute 
resolution schemes 
September 2013
 
Guides as at 10 September 20141229 
 
Name of Guide 
Date 
Issued/Last 
Updated 
1 Mobile privacy: a better practice guide for mobile 
app developers  
September 
2014 
2 TPP quick reference tool (ACT Agency Privacy 
Principles) 
September 
2014 
                                                 
1228 OAIC ‘APP Guidelines’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/app-
guidelines/>, OAIC ‘Advisory Privacy Guidelines’ < 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/advisory-privacy-guidelines/> 
1229 OAIC ‘Privacy Guides’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-
guides/> 
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3 Data breach notification — A guide to handling 
personal information security breaches  
August 2014 
4 Privacy public interest determination guide  June 2014 
5 Guide to developing an APP privacy policy 
supported by: 
What to look for in a privacy policy (1 page Post) 
Guide to developing an APP privacy policy — 
summary 
May 2014 
6 Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments  
Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments 
— summary 
May 2014 
7 Guide to the Privacy (Persons Reported as Missing) 
Rule 2014  
March 2014 
8 APP quick reference tool  March 2014 
9 Australian Privacy Principles and National Privacy 
Principles – Comparison Guide  
April 2013 
10 Guide to information security — April 2013  April 2013 
11 NPPs - Plain English Summary  Undated 
12 IPPs - Plain English Summary  Undated 
13 Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision-
Making - Better Practice Guide (Non-OPC 
document with OPC contributions) (February 2007) 
August 2007 
14 Guidelines for Federal and ACT Government 
Websites  
March 2003 
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15 Privacy and Public Key Infrastructure: for Agencies 
using PKI to communicate or transact with 
individuals  
December 2001 
16 Privacy in the Private Health Sector  November 2001
17 Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles  September 2001 
18 Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 4 - 7  February 1998 
19 Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 8 - 11  November 1996
20 Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 1 - 3  October 1994 
21 Covert surveillance in Commonwealth 
administration guidelines 
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Privacy fact sheets as at 10 September 20141230 
 
 
Name of fact sheet 
Date 
Issued/Last 
Updated 
1 Privacy fact sheet 42: Australian Capital Territory 
Privacy Principles  
September 
2014 
2 Privacy fact sheet 41: Commonwealth spent 
convictions scheme: 
 Long text description for the 
Commonwealth spent convictions scheme: 
A step-by-step guide flow chart 
May 2014 
3 Privacy fact sheet 40: Credit providers, the APPs 
and your credit report  
May 2014 
4 Privacy fact sheet 39: Direct marketing and your 
credit report  
May 2014 
5 Privacy fact sheet 38: Hardship assistance and your 
credit report  
May 2014 
6 Privacy fact sheet 37: Fraud and your credit report  May 2014 
7 Privacy fact sheet 36: When will the information on 
your credit report be deleted  
May 2014 
8 Privacy fact sheet 35: When can a default be 
included in your credit report  
May 2014 
                                                 
1230 OAIC ‘Privacy Fact Sheets’ <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-
fact-sheets/> 
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9 Privacy fact sheet 34: Repayment history 
information and your credit report  
May 2014 
10 Privacy fact sheet 33: Making a credit reporting 
complaint  
May 2014 
11 Privacy fact sheet 32: Seeking correction of your 
credit report  
May 2014 
12 Privacy fact sheet 31: How you can access your 
credit report  
May 2014 
13 Privacy fact sheet 30: How the personal information 
in your credit report can be used  
May 2014 
14 Privacy fact sheet 29: Who can access your credit 
report  
May 2014 
15 Privacy fact sheet 28: What information can be 
included in your credit report  
May 2014 
16 Privacy fact sheet 27: Credit reporting series 
glossary  
May 2014 
17 Privacy fact sheet 26: Credit reporting series 
contents and overview  
May 2014 
18 Privacy fact sheet 25: Credit reporting in Australia – 
summary  
May 2014 
19 Privacy fact sheet 24: How changes to privacy law 
affect you  
May 2014 
20 Privacy fact sheet 23: Emergency access and your 
eHealth record  
Updated 
September 
2014 
21 Privacy fact sheet 22: Medicare and your eHealth 
record  
Updated 
September 
372  
2014 
22 Privacy fact sheet 21: Young people and the eHealth 
record system  
Updated 
September 
2014 
23 Privacy fact sheet 20: Consent and the handling of 
personal information in your eHealth record  
Updated 
September 
2014 
24 Privacy fact Sheet 19: How to manage your eHealth 
record  
Updated 
September 
2014 
25 Privacy fact sheet 18: The OAIC and the eHealth 
record system  
Updated 
September 
2014 
26 
Privacy fact sheet 17: Australian Privacy Principles  
February 2013 
(amended 
January 2014) 
27 Privacy fact sheet 15: Ten tips for protecting the 
personal information in your eHealth record  
Updated 
September 
2014 
28 Privacy fact sheet 12: Conciliation of privacy 
complaints  
June 2012 
29 Privacy fact sheet 11: How will the OAIC handle a 
privacy complaint against my organisation?  
June 2012 
30 Privacy fact sheet 10: What will happen to my 
complaint?  
June 2012 
31 Privacy fact sheet 9: Guide to internal investigations April 2012 
32 Privacy fact sheet 8: Ten steps to protect your 
personal information  
April 2012 
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33 Privacy fact sheet 7: Ten steps to protect other 
people's personal information  
April 2012 
34 Privacy fact sheet 6: The binding Tax File Number 
Guidelines 2011 and the protection of tax file 
number information  
Updated March 
2102 
35 Privacy fact sheet 5: Digital photocopiers: 
inadvertent collection and storage of personal 
information  
December 2011 
36 Privacy fact sheet 4: Online behavioural advertising 
— know your options  
June 2011 
37 Privacy fact sheet 3: 4A framework — A tool for 
assessing and implementing new law enforcement 
and national security powers  
July 2011 
38 Privacy fact sheet 2: National Privacy Principles  July 2011 
39 Privacy fact sheet 1: Information Privacy Principles 
under the Privacy Act 1988  
July 2011 
40 My Privacy My Choice  Undated 
41 My Health My Privacy My Choice - a consumer's 
guide to privacy and health information (November 
2002)  
November 2002
42 Information Sheet (Public and Private Sectors) 1 - 
Emergencies and disasters  
April 2010 
43 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 7 - 2001: 
Unlawful Activity and Law Enforcement  
December 2001 
44 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 5 - 2001: Access 
and the Use of Intermediaries  
December 2001 
45 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 4 - 2001: Access May 2009 
374  
and Correction  
46 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 30 - 2010: ID 
scanning in clubs and pubs  
April 2010 
47 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 3 - 2001: 
Openness  
December 2001 
48 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 29 - 2009: Use or 
disclosure of genetic information in the private 
health sector  
December 2009 
49 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 28 - 2009: NPP 3 
Data Quality  
May 2009 
50 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 26 - 2008: 
Interaction between the Privacy Act and the Spam 
Act  
April 2008 
51 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 25 - 2008: 
Sharing health information to provide a health 
service  
March 2008 
52 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 24 - 2008: 
Disclosure of health information and impaired 
capacity  
March 2008 
53 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 23 - 2008: Use 
and disclosure of health information for 
management, funding and monitoring of a health 
service  
March 2008 
54 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 22 - 2008: Fees 
for access to health information under the Privacy 
Act  
March 2008 
55 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 21 - 2008: 
Denial of access to health information due to a 
serious threat to life or health  
March 2008 
56 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 20 - 2007: August 2007 
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Scanning ''Proof of Identity'' Documents  
57 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 19 - 2007: The 
Prescription Shopping Information Service (PSIS) 
and The Privacy Act  
April 2007 
58 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 18 - 2003: 
Taking reasonable steps to make individuals aware 
that personal information about them is being 
collected  
June 2003 
59 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 17 - 2003: 
Privacy and Personal Information that is Publicly 
Available  
February 2003 
60 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 16 - 2002: 
Application of Key NPPs to Due Diligence and 
Completion when Buying and Selling a Business  
October 2002 
61 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 15 - 2002: 
National Privacy Principle 7 - Identifiers in the 
Health Sector  
April 2002 
62 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 14 - 2001: 
Privacy Obligations for Commonwealth Contracts  
December 2001 
63 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 12 - 2001 
Coverage of and Exemptions from the Private 
Sector Provisions 
2001 
 
 
Privacy Agency Resources as at 10 September 20141231 
                                                 
1231 OAIC ‘Privacy Agency Resources’ < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-agency-resources/> 
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Name of Privacy Agency Resource 
Date 
Issued/Last 
Updated 
1 Privacy agency resource 3: Information Privacy Act 
2014 — Checklist for ACT agencies 
September 2014 
2 Privacy agency resource 2: Privacy Act reforms – 
Checklist for APP entities (agencies) 
May 2013 
3 Privacy agency resource 1: Individual healthcare 
identifiers — Compliance obligations for state and 
territory healthcare providers 
September 2014 
4 Provision of personal information to members of 
Parliament 
August 1990 
Privacy Business Resources as at 10 September 20141232 
 
Name of Privacy Business Resource 
Date 
Issued/Last 
Updated 
1 Privacy business resource 6: Healthcare identifiers 
and the eHealth record system  
September 
2014 
2 Privacy business resource 5: Healthcare Identifiers 
— General information for healthcare providers  
September 
2014 
3 Privacy business resource 4: De-identification of 
data and information  
April  2014 
4 Privacy business resource 3: Credit reporting — 
what has changed  
June 2013 
                                                 
1232 OAIC ‘Privacy Business Resources’ <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-business-resources/> 
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5 Privacy business resource 2: Privacy Act reforms – 
Checklist for APP entities (organisations)  
May 2013 
6 Privacy business resource 1: Individual Healthcare 
Identifiers—Compliance obligations of private 
healthcare providers  
September 
2014 
7 Snapshot of the Privacy Act for Small Business  November 2007
8 Privacy Checklist for Small Business  November 2007
9 Advice for credit providers and credit reporting 
agencies when contracting out record management 
functions 
May 1996 
10 Credit Reporting Advice Summaries (April 2002) April 2002 
11 Health Information and the Privacy Act 1988—A 
Short Guide for the Private Health Sector (January 
2002) 
January 2002 
12 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 9—2001: 
Handling Health Information for Research and 
Management 
December 2001 
13 Information Sheet (Private Sector) 8 — 2001: 
Contractors 
December 2001 
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